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ABSTRACT 
The prime objective of this thesis is to show that contrary to 
the common belief of historians of economic thought, hedonism has 
played a central and a continuous role in the development of economic 
theory. In the process of showing this, the thesis starts with a brief 
examination of the origins of hedonistic ideas in the works of ancient 
Greeks. The next chapter Is concerned with the reappearance (after a 
long break of several centuries) of the basic hedonistic ideas mainly 
In the thought of Gassendi, Helvetius and Hobbes, and their subsequent 
introduction to the field of economics with the work of Bentham, 
Mill, Senior and Cairnes. The main elements of hedonism (although 
somewhat modified) were also observed in the economic thought of 
leading marginalist theorists, the subject matter of the fourth 
chapter, With the marginalist school, hedonistically based terms 
became central to economic theory and generally economic theory was 
characterized by an explicit hedonistic orientation. The fifth chapter 
discusses the attempts to downplay hedonism as found in the work of 
Wicksteed, Pareto and Fisher. The reasons for these attempts were the 
heterodox criticism and the increasing influence of positivist 
scientific philosophies. The discussion supports the view that in 
essence hedonism did not disappear but was pushed into the background. 
The sixth chapter assesses the modern attempts towards a neutral 
economic science without psychological or philosophical connotations. 
77he works of Robbins, Hicks, Samuelson as well as the current 
developments are examined. As a further indication of the hedonistic 
influence on economic theory, chapter seven deals with a discussion of 
alternative economic approaches which stem from non-hedonistic 
paradigms. Adam Smith, Marx and Keynes are mentioned as examples of 
non-hedonistically oriented economists, and lexicographic choice and 
non-maximizing theories of the firm are suggested as examples of 
theories which are independent of the hedonistic framework. 
The general conclusion of the thesis states that in spite of the 
neutralization attempts and contrary to the common belief of many 
theorists, hedonism is still an important underlying conceptual 
framework of economic theory. 
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1.1 GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
Hedonism is the view that the maximization of pleasure is the 
good, and the 'aim of life. This Is a broad definition which covers 
both the normative and the positive nature of hedonism. More 
analytically, it can be maintained that there are two distinctive 
kinds of hedonism. The first, sometimes termed philosophical or 
ethical hedonism, states that people ought to maximize pleasure and 
to minimize pain. The second, known as psychological hedonism, states 
that pleasure seeking and pain avoidance are the motives of man's 
actions; or part of his nature. Various writers -philosophers and 
economists- have used both kinds of hedonism in their works. But while 
economics generally started more with philosophical hedonism, 
gradually it was replaced by psychological hedonism. It should be 
emphasized at this point however, that in this work references to 
hedonism will include both kinds unless it is otherwise specified. 
(Some notes on the distinction between philosophical and psychological 
hedonism are set out in an Appendix to this chapter. ) 
The f irst origins of hedonism appeared . 
in the writ Ings of the 
ancient Greeks. The most Important hedonist philosophers were the 
members of the Cyrenaic School -mainly Aristippus- and later on the 
followers of the Epicurean philosophy. After a retreat from hedonistic 
ideas during the Middle Ages, hedonism was revitalized in the 
materialist theories of the Renaissance and of subsequent periods. 
Although somewhat modified, the modern hedonistic approach has 
influenced many areas of intellectual activity. 
J. Bentham (who was influenced by the ideas of Gassendi, 
Helvetius and Hobbes) systematically introduced the hedonistic 
framework in the younger field of economics during the eighteenth 
century. The key point in Bentham's utilitarianism was that men are 
governed by two sovereign masters, pleasure and pain, and that men 
always seek their pleasure and avoid their pain. Bentham thought that 
his ideas were a description of actual behaviour and thus they were 
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closer to the psychological kind of hedonism. These ideas were very 
Important for the formation of the later classical and neoclassical 
economic thought. The first well-known classical economist after 
Bentham to adopt the utilitarian theory was N. Senior. Like Bentham, 
Senior held that the dominant motive of human behaviour was to 
maximize pleasure and to minimize pain. However, the first systematic 
development and application to economics of hedonistic ideas was made 
by the influential philosopher and classical economist J. S. Mill. (It 
should be mentioned though, that Mill did not regard hedonism as a 
complete theory. ) Mill conceived an "economic man" whose main 
characteristics were pleasure maximization and selfish behaviour. 
Mill, however, by making a distinction between his "economic man" and 
the real man, departed from Bentham and Senior who held that the 
hedonistic psychology is the dominant psychology of real man (this 
distinction can be found in his economic writings). Despite the above 
differences, classical economic theory after Bentham was heavily 
influenced by the hedonistic framework. (The selfish maximization of 
pleasure was seen as the main motive of economic agents. ) 
The hedonistic approach was even more developed by the 
marginalists who emphasized Individual rather than group or class 
behaviour. The establishment of utility theory as the basic building 
block of economic theory and the intensification of the use of a 
hedonistic, selfish economic agent as the main tool in economic 
analysis are clear signs of the prevailing influence of the hedonistic 
approach. More analytically, Jevons based his value theory upon the 
"calculus of pleasure and pain" and stated that the object of 
economics is the maximization of happiness at the least cost of pain. 
In the same spirit, Walras' writings show an economic man in "his most 
rigorously abstract state: selfish, rational and well-informed" 
(Paul, 1979, p. 129). Moreover, the growth of formalization of economic 
theory, which was a manifestation of the mechanistic-positivist 
approach, assisted the establishment of the hedonistic calculus of 
pleasure and pain in orthodox economics. Edgeworth, Fisher, Wicksteed 
and Pareto were in the same climate although the old controversy of 
fictional or real economic man continued. Today this controversy is 
not so strong because most mainstream economists tend to accept that 
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economic man is an abstraction but a very useful and basic one for 
economics (Mach 1 up, 1978, pp. 113,117 and Bensusan-Butt, 1978, p. 145). In 
general, it can be maintained that during the marginalist period, the 
hedonistic influence, assisted by the increasing formalization, 
reached Its peak. The shift of emphasis from a supply-based 
explanation of economic phenomena to a demand-based explanation 
required a standard and predictable economic behaviour. The formalized 
hedonistically oriented behaviour seemed to be the appropriate basis. 
Thus, the selfish maximization of utility (a term synonymous to 
pleasure for many theorists) became the foundation stone of 
marginalist theories. 
This should not be taken to mean that economic theory was always 
based on the hedonistic framework. For instance, the founder of 
political economy, A. Smith had a sophisticated, non-hedonistic view 
of human behaviour. Also, the main representatives of the historical 
and institutional schools criticised the profound influence of 
hedonism on the late classical and marginalist economists. The same 
applies to J. M. Keynes who was very explicit In condemning the 
hedonistic influence on his contemporary economics. 
In the first decades of the twentlenth century, there was an 
attempt to minimize the hedonistic image of orthodox economics. The 
main reasons were the drive towards a neutral, objective economic 
science freed from psychological assumptions and the heterodox attack 
on the hedonistic basis of mainstream theory. Týus, first Robbins set 
the methodological frame and later Hicks and Samuelson constructed 
their theories of choice. These theories were supposed to be free of 
the value laden concepts of economic man, utility and selfish 
behaviour. However, as we shall see, despite these attempts, the 
hedonistic Influence on orthodox theory can still be discerned. 
In general, it is the purpose here to assess the argument that, 
despite the differences in interpetation of various classical and 
neoclassical economists (fictional versus real economic man) and the 
construction of allegedly value-free theories by the moderns (choice 
theories), the hedonistic framework has played, and still plays, an 
important role in the formation of orthodox economic theory 
(especially microeconomic theory). 
3 
A number of distinguished historians of economic thought, like J. 
Schumpeter, M. Blaug, A. Gray, E. Roll, E. Heimann and W. Barber, have 
not paid proper attention to the above. More specifically they only 
make brief mention of the hedonistic approach in mainstream economics 
in spite of its importance in the construction of orthodox theory. For 
Instance, M. Blaug In his "Economic Theory in Retrospect" mentions 
hedonism only in the pages dealing with Jevons and in the section of 
Marshallian utility theory. J. Schumpeter finds that Epicurus and 
Bentham can be called hedonists in a wider sense and he only mentions 
hedonism in relation to the marginalists. The same happens with E. 
Roll who writes about hedonism only In the section dealing with 
marginal utility, and especially with respect to Jevons. A. Gray, E. 
Heimann and W. Barber do not mention hedonism at all. Although, for 
instance, they speak about Jevons' calculus of pain and pleasure, they 
do not refer to him as a hedonistically oriented theorist. In 
general, most historians of economic thought have underestimated the 
role of the hedonistic Ideas in the formation of mainstream economics 
and also have failed to point out the continuity of this approach 
between classical and modern orthodox economics (see Blaug, 1978, 
pp. 372-373, Schumpeter, 1963, pp. 66,887-888,1056, Gray, 1931, pp. 330-356, 
Roll, 1961, pp. 378-385, Heimann, 1945, pp. 184-195, Barber, 1977). On the 
contrary we wish to explore the possibility that since Bentham, 
mainstream economics has been under the continuous influence of the 
hedonistic framework. Even after the attempts of Robbins, Hicks and 
Samuelson to build an economic science without the concept of utility, 
the conceptual basis has not changed. Generally, we do not accept the 
view of the above authors who treat hedonism simply as one of the many 
characteristics of some marginalist economists, but we see it as a 
constant and important influence an conventional economics. 
An important sign of the presence of hedonistic Ideas can readily 
be found In contemporary orthodox textbooks. The contents of these 
textbooks suggest that the hedonistic influence is sometimes explicit 
even today (decades after the neutralization attempt). Thus one can 
read: 
"The principal assumption upon which the theory of consumer 
demand is built Is: a consumer attempts to allocate his 
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limited money income among available goods and services so as 
to maximize his satisfaction. " (Ferguson and Gould, 1975, p. 35) 
"A basic assumption of the utility theory of the household is 
that the members of a household seek to maximize their total 
utility. " (Lipsey, 1979, p. 161) 
"The model of economic man can be described in terms of four 
assumptions... These assumptions form a model of decision 
making sometimes referred to as economic man, where each 
individual is potrayed as a utility maximizer. " (L. Friedman, 
1984, pp. 22,23) 
"The model I the theory of consumer choice] has four elements 
which describe both the consumer and the market environment: 
1. The given income that the consumer can spend 
2. The prices at which goods can be bought 
3. The consumer's tastes, which rank different combinations 
or bundles of goods according to the satisfaction they yield 
to the consumer 
3. The behavioural assumption that consumers do the best they 
can for themselves. Of the possible consumption bundles that 
can be purchased out of a given income, the consumer picks 
the bundle that maximizes his or her satisfaction. " 
(Begg et all, 1984, p. 90) 
Apart from the above, the hedonistic influence can also be discerned 
In a number of conventional definitions of economics. The definition 
of economics In terms of satisfaction comes from the marginalist era 
but it Is still used occasionally. 
"Economics Is the study of the way man meets the problem of 
limited resources, choosing among alternative uses as he 
attempts to satisfy his own satisfaction. " (Solmon, 1976, p. 14) 
Moreover, we believe that the role of economic methodology is 
Important In understanding the relationship of economics and hedonism. 
Hedonistic ideas turned out to be conveniently adaptable to the 
Mechanistic-positivist approach of mainstream economics. This approach 
called for a stable, quantifiable and predictable economic behaviour. 
Thus, a selfish, pleasure maximizer economic agent was the ideal. And 
. 
this is the main reason why the keenest advocates of the mechanistic- 
Positivist methodological approach were also the keenest supporters of 
hedonistic ideas (although we think that there can be a mechanistic, 
but non-hedonistic representation of human nature). 
During the development of hedonistic ideas in orthodox economics 
there was also a parallel heterodox movement which opposed this trend. 
5 
Examples of this movement were the Historical, Institutional and the 
Post-Keynesian schools of thought. These alternative approaches 
condemned the hedonistic bias of mainstream theory and suggested that 
a less simplistic account of human nature should be introduced in 
place of economic man. Moreover, they rejected the mechanistic- 
positivist methodology of the orthodox approach and instead, followed. 
a more open, pluralist economic methodology. 
In order to discuss the above Ideas, we shall begin with a brief 
examination of the origin of the development of the concepts of 
pleasure and pain In the writings of the ancient Greeks. We believe in 
that this will be helpful in understanding the nature and significance 
id 
of the hedonistit framework. Although many ancient thinkers have 
ýe 
written about pleasure and happiness, we will concentrate on the m 
Cyrenaic school and the Epicureans because those were the ones who ýd 
emphasized them most, and thus influenced subsequent hedonistically 
oriented theorists. M 
In the beginning of the third chapter, we shall examine how the if 
ancients (through Gassendi, Helvetius and Hobbes) influenced J. 5. 
Bentham the founder of utilitarianism. Then we will discuss the way it 
that the hedonistic ideas were systematized and introduced in 
classical economics through Senior, Mill and Cairnes. We will also 
attempt to assess the first formulation of the hedonist ic-based d 
economic man and the various controversies concerning its n 
interpretation. 
In the first part of the fourth chapter, we shall examine the way s 
that the hedonistic approach was consolidated In the views of the 'r 
members of the first marginalist generation: Gossen, Sevons, Walras M 
and Menger. In the second part, Edgeworth's and Marshall's role in the d 
development of the hedonistic framework will be assessed. Moreover In s 
this chapter, we will find out how the hedonistic orientation of e 
economics was assisted by the prevailing formalization of economic 
theory. Generally, as we shall see, the hedonistic influence on d, 
orthodox economics reached its peak during the marginalist period. e 
The fifth chapter will discuss the first attempts to downplay f 
hedonism in economics. As we will observe, Wicksteed, Pareto and c 
Fisher were the first theorists who tried to construct a "value free" .r 
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economic science. Our attention In this section, will be on the 
success of the above in minimizing the psychological assumptions of 
economic theory. 
In the sixth chapter we will deal with the modern attempts 
towards a neutral economic science, without psychological or 
philosophical bias. The basic point here will be to examine the claim 
of modern orthodox economists that economic theory Is free from any 
kind of psychological basis. We will concentrate mainly on the work of 
Robbins, Hicks and Samuelson, and will also summarize the major modern 
developments. 
Our examination of the influence of hedonism on mainstream 
economic theory will close with a discussion of non-hedonistic 
oriented economists. This section will be necessary in order to show 
the existence of alternative economic approaches without hedonistic 
basis. The 'purpose here, however, will not be a detailed examination 
of the non-hedonistic approaches, but the exposition of indicative 
examples which will serve the above stated intention. 
A general conclusion which will contain the results of our 
Investigation, will constitute the final chapter of the present 
thesis. The main aim there will be to summarize the most important 
arguments and to state their possible implications for economic 
theory. 
In summary then, the thesis will be the following: despite the 
minor attention that important historians of economic thought give to 
the role of hedonistic ideas, these ideas have had a significant 
influence in the development of orthodox economic theory. Hedonism, 
which originated in ancient Greek thought, entered economics with 
Bentham and ever since has had a continuous, underlying presence. 
Hedonism in economics was further strengthened by the dominant 
mechanist ic-pos it ivist methodological approach especially during the 
marginalist period. Modern attempts to build a positive economic 
science might have succeeded in eliminating extreme hedonistic 
connotations. However, In spite of this, we believe that the 
hedonistic influence is still present as an underlying characteristic 
of mainstream economic theory. 
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER I 
Philosophical Hedonism: Traditionally philosophical hedonism states 
that the maximization of pleasure is the true goal of every being and 
what everyone ought to aim at. Pleasure is Identified with Good. A 
Hedonist offers the following equation: 
Pleasure Good 
And also: Happiness Pleasure 
A basic difference between a hedonist and a non-hedonist lies In the 
fact that the non-hedonist might accept that pleasure is a good but he 
will definitely reject that pleasure is the Rood. 
Psychological Hedonism,: Pleasure is the good In itself because it is 
what we all, ultimately at least desire or aim at. 
Reconciliation Between Moral and Psychglogical Hedonism: Generally the 
followfng sequence of arguments has been suggested: 
1) Pleasure and Pleasure alone is desired as an end 
2) What is desired as an end and only what Is desired as an end 
is good as an end 
3) Pleasure and Pleasure alone is good as an end. 
Non-hedonistic thinkers have put Truth, Knowledge, Beauty or Virtue In 
the place of or in addition to pleasure as an end. Moreover, non- 
hedonistic psychological theories emphasize self-actualization and not 
pleasure maximization (Maslow's psychological theory can be seen as a 
representative example of this). 
A detailed discussion of the above ideas can be found In 
Mill, 1979, Moore, 1966, pp. 60-109, Frank ena, 19 63, pp. 67-72, and in Plato 
(Philebus). 
Egoism: Analogous to the distinction between moral and psychological 
hedonism, is the distinction between ethical and psychological egoism. 
An ethical egoist should act and Judge by the standard of his 
advantage in terms of good and evil. On the other hand psychological 
egoism states that everyone is always seeking his own greatest good. 
Ethical egoism has generally presupposed what is called psychological 
egoism. Thus, psychological egoist hedonism, which as we shall see is 
8 
the idea that prevails in orthodox economics, states that it is in 
the nature of man to seek his own greatest pleasure. 
Again an extensive discussion of both kinds of egoism can be 
found in Moore, 1966, pp. 18,96-105, Frankena, 1963, pp. 16-21, and in 
Butler, 1950, p. 45. 
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CHAPTER 2 
ORIGINS OF HEDONISTIC IDEAS 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Before starting to examine the role of the hedonistic approach in 
the development of economic thought, it would be useful if we devoted 
a brief section to discussing the origins of hedonistic ideas. We 
believe that in order to grasp the role and significance of hedonism 
in orthodox economic theory we must first understand its birth and 
growth as an intellectual movement. 
As with many other ideas, one can trace the origins of hedonism 
back to ancient Greek thought. The first to attempt an analysis of 
the concepts of pleasure and pain were the ancient Greek philosophers. 
Nearly every major ancient philosopher had his own theory about 
happiness and the role of pleasure and pain in it. Specifically, 
Democritus, Plato, Aristotle and others wrote about pleasure and pain. 
Amongst the pre-Socratic philosophers, Democritus especially had 
placed particular emphasis on the idea of an Interplay between 
pleasure and pain. However, there were two schools of philosophical 
thought which considered pleasure and pain as the principal concepts 
in their system, and only these two had as a starting point of their 
theories the following principle: pleasure is the highest good and aim 
of human life. These two philosophical schools were the Cyrenaics and 
the Epicureans. The respective leaders of the schools were Aristippus 
and Epicurus. As we pointed out, many ancient philosophers have 
written about pleasure and pain but the distinctive characteristic of 
these two was that the concept of pleasure maximization was considered 
to be the central idea of their teachings (this view constitutes the 
essence of the hedonistic framework). The idea of maximization of 
pleasure is a universal feature of all subsequent hedonistic 
theorists. Moreover, ArIstippus and especially Epicurus were major 
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source of influence on Bentham, who was to Introduce the hedonistic 
approach in economic thought. 
In this chapter we will discuss the growth of the hedonistic 
thought In the ideas of these two philosophers and their followers. 
Before that, however, we will briefly mention the state of analysis 
of the concepts of pleasure and pain before the Gyrenaics and the 
Epicureans set the basis of hedonism. 
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2.2 ANALYSIS OF PLEASURE AND PAIN: DEMOCRITUS AND PLATO 
Although Democritus cannot be characterized as a hedonist, one 
can trace some elements of his thought which influenced the formation 
of subsequent hedonistic philosophy. For Instance, Democritus placed 
Importance on pleasure and pain by stating' : 
"The criterion of our interests is pleasure and pain. " 
(Fragment No: 188 in Hellos, 1981, p. 30) 
As we shall see, the above idea Is very similar to one of Bentham's 
fundamental philosophical views. However, Democritus did not see 
pleasure as the ultimate purpose of life as did subsequent 
philosophical schools. According to him, the purpose of life was the 
"ev6aipov(a" which means the equilibrium of the "VuXj" (soul) and this 
Is attainable only through the moderation, wisdom, and education of 
the individual (see Karayiannis, 1988, p. 8 and Hellos, 1981, p. 32). 
Moreover, in other parts of his writings, Democritus qualifies the 
importance of pleasure by emphasising that: "Man achieve harmony of 
the soul when they mitigate their pleasures and when they hold a 
balance In their life. " (Fragment No: 191 In Helios, 1981, p. 30). The 
above show that Democritus; was not a hedonist in the sense that his 
thought did not revolve around the idea of pleasure maximization. 
Democritus attempted to find a method to measure pleasure and 
pain. This attempt is a basic characteristic of the development of the 
hedonistic approach. In principle he believed that pleasure can be 
measured because it had to do with the mechanical movements of the 
soul. However, he did not leave us a concrete method of measuring 
pleasure and pain. 
Plato, in his dialogues discusses extensively the problem of 
pleasure and pain and their significance for human life. More 
specifically, there are at least two dialogues where he attempted a 
systematic analysis of the Issue: "Protagoras" and "Gorgias". 2 
Furthermore, Plato devotes a whole dialogue -'Philebusl- to a detailed 
examination of the problem. In the beginning of this work two opposite 
views, which are going to be examined in the dialogue, are suggested. 
The first states that for every living being the highest good is 
pleasure. The second one asserts that. prudence and reasoning 
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constitute the highest good (Plato, Philebus: Ila). As one can observe 
the first view characterises the hedonistic approach, while the second 
can be taken as the starting point for a non-hedonistic creed. Plato's 
approach to pleasure is mainly moral and this puts him closer to 
philosophical hedonism (altough one can find some psychological 
observations in his work which support his moral ideas). 
During the process of the discussion, Plato rejects both views 
and in their place suggests that only a mixed life of prudence and 
pleasure is the highest good. In this mixed life, Plato gives priority 
to prudence and reasoning; pleasure comes afterwards. His main 
argument supporting this, Is that prudence Is necessary for pleasure 
otherwise human life would be no different from the life of an oyster 
(Plato, Philebus: 21d). 
Thus, one can see that before the Cyrenaics and Epicureans, a 
number of thinkers, but especially Democritus and Plato had occupied 
themselves with the study of pleasure and pain3. However, as we shall 
see, the history of hedonism as an Independent doctrine starts with 
the above two schools. 
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2.3 CYRENAICS 
The founder and the main representative of the Cyrenaic school 
was Aristippus (435-356 B. C. ). He was the one of the many students of 
Socrates although much of his teaching was in opposition to that of 
his teacher. It is highly likely that he has written a number of books 
but unfortunately they have never been found. Thus the sources of his 
teachings are the writings of his contemporaries or of subsequent 
Greek and Roman authors. The main source of information on 
Aristippus' views is considered to be the work of Diogenes Laertius. 
In his book entitled "Biot 0-tXoa6T(ov" ("The Lifes of Philosophers") 
Diogenes Laertius makes an analytical reference to Aristippus and also 
to his school, the Cyrenaics. After mentioning some facts and episodes 
from Aristippus's life, he proceeds to state the basic points of his 
philosophical system. The way that Diogenes Laertius begins his 
description of Aristippus's views reveals an Important characteristic 
which will be found In all subsequent followers of the hedonistic 
approach: the emphasis on two opposite concepts, pleasure and pain. 
"The ones who followed the teaching of ArIstippus, and they 
were named Cyrenaics, supported the following views: they 
said that there are two feelings, pain and pleasure In6vor, 
xa( ilSov43 and that the feeling of pleasure Is born by the 
soft movement, while that of pain from the hard and impetuous 
movement; that there is no difference among the various 
pleasures, and also that no pleasure is more pleasant than 
another pleasure; and that pleasure is desirable for all 
beings while pain is hated. "(Diogenes Laertfus, Book 2,987) 
Amother point which can be observed from the above passage is that 
Aristippus is closer to what was to be called later quantitative 
hedonism, viz: no qualitative difference among pleasures. (As we shall 
see Bentham was also a quantitative hedonist. ) A few lines further on, 
the basic principle of the hedonistic framework can be seen: 
"But they [Cyrenaics] mean the bodily pleasure, which they 
consider as the ultimate purpose... " (Diogenes Laertius, Book 
2, §87) 
The above is the distinguishing characteristic of the Cyrenaics. We 
saw that Democritus and Plato theorized about pleasure but the 
emphasis of the Cyrenaics upon pleasure as the aim of life made them 
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the first school of thought to establish the basis of the hedonistic 
approach. The fact that they placed pleasure in the centre of their 
philosophy by making it the highest good and aim of life, and also the 
fact that they were the first to concentrate exclusively on its 
analysis, justifies the view that they were the first systematizers of 
the philosophy of hedonism. The well-known scholar of ancient Greek 
philosophy E. Zeller writes: "Thus the crowning principle of his 
[Aristippus] ethics is the conviction that all our actions must be 
directed to the object of gaining for us as much pleasure as possible" 
(Zeller, 1901, p. 123). The above ideas of Aristippus are also confirmed 
by another ancient Greek author Athinalos. As he writes: 
"After he [Aristippus] accepted pleasure he then said that it 
Is the ultimate aim of life and also happiness depends upon 
it. " (Helios, 1981, p. 42) 
It is clear that Aristippus' Ideas are closer to ethical or moral 
hedonism. As will become evident later, the majority of the 
hedonistically-oriented economists are inclined more towards 
psychological hedonism. However, Aristippus attempts to establish his 
ethical belief in the maximization of pleasure by drawing from the 
psychology. Thus he tries to reconcile moral and psychological 
hedonism (see appendix to chapter 1). He reinforces his ethical ideas 
from psychological observations. As he states: 
"The evidence, however, that the ultimate purpose is 
pleasure, is the fact that, by instinct, when we are children 
we are attracted by it; and when we attain it we do not seek 
anything else, while there Is nothing we avoid so much as the 
opposite to It, paln. " (Diogenes Laertius, Book 2, §88) 
Zeller observes this important point when he emphasizes that 
Aristippus believed that the fact that pleasure coincides with the 
good and the bad with the unpleasant, is declared to everyone by the 
'voice of nature' (Zeller, 1901, p. 123). 
The Cyrenaics did not believe In any hierarchical order of 
actions according to their moral values. All kinds of actions are 
desirable as a long as they bring pleasure. The placement of pleasure 
on the position of the highest good means that all actions have the 
same moral value. This point Is related to the quantitative hedonism 
of the school. A serious moral and practical problem arises here, 
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which is also observed in Bentham's utilitarian theory. Actions that 
bring pleasure to the individual may be harmful for another Individual 
or for the society as a whole. Diogenes Laertius writes: 
"They [Cyrenaics] considered pleasure as something good even 
if it is coming from indecent behaviour... Although the action 
(from which pleasure is derived) could be absurd, the 
pleasure however which is extracted by it, is as such, 
desirable and good. " Glogenes Laertius, Book 2,588) 
Another Important issue is the nature of pleasure. Zeller 
explains: "By pleasure Aristippus does not, like Epicurus after him, 
think only in terms of repose of spirit, for this would be the absence 
of any feeling, but of positive enjoyment" (Zeller, 1901, p. 123). As we 
shall see later In this chapter, Epicurus had a different conception 
of pleasure. Aristippus associates it with movement not with the 
absence of pain. Diogenes Laertius makes it clear: 
"The absence of pain, which Epicurus supports, is not 
according to them [Cyrenaics] pleasure; nor Is the absence of 
pleasure pain. " (Diogenes Laertius, Book 2,989) 
Aristippus distinguishes two kinds of pleasure: the bodily 
pleasures and the pleasures of the soul. He holds that the pleasures 
of the body are preferable because they are more intense than those of 
the soul. As Diogenes Laertius explicitly states: 
"Much superior are the pleasures of the body than the 
pleasures of the soul, and the pleasures of the body are more 
intense. Because of this the outlaws should be punished by 
bodily pains. " (Diogenes Laertius, Book 2,589) 
The Issue of measuring pleasure and pain Is related to the above 
point. As a genuine hedonist, Aristippus attempted to find a method to 
measure pleasure. More specifically, it seems that he accepts the 
views of Socrates which are expressed In Plato's dialogue 'Protagoras' 
(Hellos, 1981, p. 42>. In this dialogue, Socrates believes that there Is 
a $measuring art' with which one can calculate the pleasures and pains 
(Plato, Protagoras, 1979, pp. 66-69). As we shall see the attempt to 
measure pleasure is common to many subsequent hedonistic oriented 
theorists (eg Bentham's. calculus of pleasure and pain). 
It is quite likely that Aristippus' hedonism was basically 
egoistic hedonism (egoist In the sense that people always seek their 
own greatest good; in this case pleasure). Although we do not have an 
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explicit statement which proves the above, we can conclude from the 
general spirit of his Ideas that this is the case. Paragraph 89 from 
Dlogenes Laertius quoted above and Zeller's comment In page 15 are 
clear Indications. 
The immediate followers of Aristippus were his daughter Arete and 
Antipatros. Other important Cyrenaics were Theodorus, Hegesias and 
Anniceris. Theodorus brought a considerable change to the 
philosophical system of the school by giving less emphasis to the 
maximization of pleasure as the purpose of life. Instead, he 
emphasized the feeling of Joy (gladness) which comes from pleasure 
(Helios, 1981, p. 43). Thus it seems that he gave more attention to the 
spiritual than the bodily level. Moreover, although he accepted the 
basic principles of the school, Anniceris spoke about the value of 
friendship and gratitude which cannot be subsumed under hedonism. 
Diogenes Laertius writes: 
"However they (Anniceris and his followers] accepted In life 
friendship, gratitude and the respect towards the parents and 
also that we ought to do something for our country. " 
(Diogenes Laertfus, Book 2, §96) 
Here it is clear that there Is a shift from the atomistic (egoist) 
hedonism of Aristippus to a less selfish view. Care about others comes 
In to the picture and gives more of a social character to the school. 
The above examination of the principal views of the Cyrenaic 
school enables us to distinguish them as the founders of the 
hedonistic approach. The Cyrenaics were the first to build a whole 
philosophical system on the idea of pleasure maximization. Nearly all 
subsequent hedonistic theorists were based on their doctrines. In 
particular, as we shall see, the theories of hedonistic oriented 
economists exhibit many common points with the Cyrenaics. Namely, the 
pleasure-pain distinction, the emphasis on the Idea of pleasure 
maximization, and the attempt to find some measure of pleasure and 
pain, are all ideas which can be found in the writings of Bentham, 
Mill, Jevons, Edgeworth and others. The importance of the Cyrenaic 
school in the formation and development of hedonism is evident. The 
other source of Influence on subsequent hedonists, the Epicureans, is 
our next topic of discussion. 
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2.4 THE EPICUREANS 
The founder of this school was Epicurus (341-271 B. C. ). Although 
his parents came from Athens, he was born in Samos -a small Greek 
island in the Aegean sea. There he took courses In philosophy from 
Pamphilos who was an advocate of Plato, and from Naphsifanis a 
follower of the philosophy of Democritus (Theodorides, 1981, p. 136). The 
Democritean and Platonic origins of his teachers give a first 
indication of his philosophical orientation (see earlier section on 
Democritus and Plato). These two were the only known teachers of 
Epicurus , which is why later he used to say that he was a self-taught 
man (Helios, 1981, p. 90). After founding a philosophical school in 
Lampsakos -a city In Asia Minor- he came to Athens where he opened a 
school, the famous "Kýnoq" ("Garden"). In Athens, he had many 
advocates and friends and soon his school became one of the four most 
important. (The other three were the Academy, the Peripatics and the 
Stoics. ) Epicurus' rejection of all previous and contemporary 
philosophical systems and the Introduction of a new philosophical 
scheme, made him famous and assisted Epicurean thought to spread 
rapidly in the whole Graeco-Roman world (Matsoukas, 1981, p. 232). As we 
shall see, the influence of the Epicurean thought was to be felt in 
the Renaissance and in the modern period. 
Epicurus wrote a number of philosophical works and also some 
letters. Unfortunately, only a small part of his work was not lost. 
His main works that came down to us are three letters (a letter to 
Herodotus, a letter to Pythocles, and a letter to Menoeceus) and an 
essay called "Hptai Mkat" ("Principal Doctrines") which is a summary 
of his teachings. As in the case of Aristippus, Diogenes Laertius is 
again the main source of knowledge about Epicurean ideas. 
Epicurus' starting point is the same as that of Aristippus: 
emphasis on pleasure. 
"Wherefore we call pleasure the beginning and the end of a 
happy life; pleasure is our first kindred good. It is the 
start of every choice and every aversion, and to it we come 
back, in order to make the feeling the rule by which to Judge 
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every good thing. " (Diogenes Laertius, Book 5,6128) 
The quotation indicates that Epicurus' thought was closer to moral 
hedonism. Professor G. Stordach agrees with this view when he writes: 
"Epicurus' hedonism has two basic assumptions: a) that moral good is 
the same as pleasure, either physical or mental, since the 
experienceable range of pleasure Is very wide to more than one level; 
and b) that moral evil is the same as pain, whether physical or 
mental" (Stordech, 1963, p. 72). However, like Aristippus he attempts to 
reinforce his moral belief by using psychology. He uses the examples 
of animals and newborn babies. Sextus Empiricus writes: 
"The Epicureans believe that by nature pleasure is good; 
because, they say, animals when they are born unperverted, 
seek pleasure and avoid pain... The newborn baby, which has 
not yet been Influenced by mistaken Ideas, cries when an 
extremely cold wind strikes it. Thus If by nature the baby Is 
attracted by pleasure and avoids pain, it is natural to avoid 
pain and seek pleasure. " (Sextus Empiricus, in 
Theodorides, 1981, p. 234) 
Here again we see an example of reconciliation of moral and 
psychological hedonism. The key point In the Epicurean reconciliation 
is that the only case in which people do not seek pleasure and avoid 
pain is when they are alienated from nature, when they hold mistaken 
Ideas. Thus the function of moral hedonism is to remove these mistaken 
views and to convince them to follow the rules of nature. Moreover, as 
In the case of Aristippus, the whole spirit of Epicurus' writings 
favours egoistic hedonism. 
After placing pleasure in the centre of his philosophical system, 
Epicurus proceeds to distinguish two categories of pleasure. He calls 
the first category "%a-EaaTnýLaTixý i)&ový" ("stable pleasure") and the 
second "ev xtvýuei zjSov4 11 ("moving pleasure"). This issue is central 
to Epicurean hedonism and as we shall see, it is the main difference 
from the hedonism of the Cyrenaics. The first kind of pleasure the 
"stable pleasure", is a permanent situation. In the words of Epicurus: 
"By pleasure we mean the absence of pain in the body and of 
trouble in the soul. " (Letter to Menoeceus, in 
Saunders, 1966, p. 51) 
It is clear that this definition of pleasure is a rather negative one. 
Diogenes Laertius mentions that this negative definition is criticized 
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by the Cyrenaics who reject it because they believe that pleasure has 
to do with movement. According to the Cyrenaics, Epicurus' "stable 
pleasure" is like the situation of a sleeping man (Diogenes Laertius, 
Book 2,989). One can say that Epicurus refers to a untroubled state 
of mind. He uses a word which describes exactly this state: "arapaý(W' 
meaning calmness, tranquility of mind. The same term is used by the 
Stoics and especially by Epictetus in order to describe their moral 
attitude towards life, some years later (see Xenakis, 1983, pp. 113-153). 
The other kind, the "moving pleasure" encompassed the common 
pleasures of everyday life that is food, drink, and entertainment 
(Theodor ides, 198 1, p. 23 1). The most important feature of the second 
kind of pleasure is its transient character. Although Epicurus 
believed that all kinds of pleasure are natural and thus good, he 
prefered the "stable pleasure". This preference can be explained -in 
our view- by his belief that the common pleasures do not last and 
usually bring unpleasantness in the long-run. 
"Because of the very fact that pleasure is our primary and 
congenital good we do not select every pleasure; there are 
times when we forgo certain pleasures, particularly when 
they are followed by too much unpleasantness. " (Letter to 
Menoeceus, in Stordach, 1963, p. 80) 
Epicurus' preference for the first category of pleasure becomes more 
explicit when he specifies which pleasures he approves of: 
"When I say that pleasure is the goal of living I do not mean 
the pleasures of liberties or the pleasures inherent in 
positive enjoyment, as is supposed by certain persons who are 
ignorant of our doctrine or who are not in aggreement with it 
or who interpret it perversely. I mean on the contrary, the 
pleasure that consists in freedom from bodily pain and mental 
agitation. "(Letter to Menoeceus, in Stordach, 1963, p. 77) 
From the previous two passages it is clear that the Epicurean hedonism 
is different from that of the Cyrenaics. As was observed the Cyrenaics 
did not distinguish among different pleasures. Epicurus did not accept 
this position but on the contrary, he states explicitly that "there 
are differences between one pleasure and another" (Principal 
Doctrines, in Saunders, 1966, p. 54). This makes him an advocate of 
qualitative hedonism. 
Like Aristippus, Epicurus speaks about a method for measuring 
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pleasure. His approach to this problem is related to his ideas about 
the two categories of pleasure. Since not all pleasure Is equally 
desirable, there must be a measuring device in order to be able to 
choose: 
"It is however, by measuring one against another [pleasure], 
and by looking at the conveniences and the Inconveniences, 
that all these matters must be Judged. " (Letter to Menoeceus, 
in Saunders, 1966, p. 51) 
Epicurus as far as we know, did not analyze further this issue which 
becomes extremely complicated when one accepts differences among 
pleasures. However, it shows again the attempt to find a measuring 
device, an attempt which is observed in the vast majority of 
hedonistic theorists. 
Epicurus devotes much space among his writings to emphasizing the 
superiority of the pleasures of the soul from the pleasures of the 
body. At this point he Is In marked contrast with Aristippus who 
considered corporeal pleasures as superior to the pleasures of the 
mind. The same holds true with the pains of the body and the pains of 
the soul. This difference between the two originators of the 
hedonistic philosophy Is also marked out by Diogenes Laertius: 
"Still, there Is a difference from the Cyrenaics; they say 
that the bodily pains are much worse than the pains of the 
soul, and that is why criminals should be punished by bodily 
pains; but he [Epicurus] says that the mental pains are 
worse; because for the flesh only the present exists, while 
for the soul exists the past, and the present and the future; 
thus the greatest pleasures are those of the soul. " (Diogenes 
Laertius, Bonk 5,9137) 
By Identifying it with peace of mind, Epicurus' views pleasure In a 
broader sense than Aristippus. Thus the Epicurean hedonism Is more of 
an 'enlightened hedonism', contrary to the common belief which holds 
Epicurus as an advocate of the vulgar way of life. 
Apart from Epicurus, other important members of the school were 
Metrodoros and Polyainos who were contemporaries of Epicurus. After 
Epicurus' death, the leader of the school became Ermarhos who along 
with Kolotis were the main representatives of the Epicurean thought 
(Theodor ides, 198 1, p. 146). During the third century B. C. Epicureanism 
as a movement had considerable influence in the Greek and Roman world. 
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After a temporary decline in the second century, it reappears again 
and continues its influence until the end of the Roman Empire. The 
extent of its Influence can be seen by the fact that great Roman poets 
and authors were advocates 'of Epicurean thought. For instance one can 
mention the names of Lucretius and Horace (Helios, 1981, p. 91). 
Moreover, the well-known Roman philosopher Cicero mentions many of 
Epicurus' ideas (see Adam, 1902, pp. 10-27). 
After the dark period of the Middle Ages, Epicurean thought is 
revitalized in materialistic theories, especially in the writings of 
Gassendi and- Helvetius. Moreover, Bentham, Mill and later Sevons and 
Edgeworth would borrow a lot of Epicurean ideas (especially ones about 
pleasure and pain) s ometimes Indirectly through the writings of 
Gassendi and Helvetius, and sometimes directly by reference to the 
Epicureans. As we shall see, however, Aristippus' hedonism was closer 
to the hedonistic ideas of the above writers than Epicurus' hedonism 
(especially with respect to the concept of pleasure). The main reason 
for this was that the Epicurean thought was more popular in the Roman 
world and thus became more Influential in subsequent centuries.. 
In general, the Epicureans along with the Cyrenaics are the main 
two branches of ancient Greek hedonistic philosophy. In spite of their 
differences, the fundamental principle of hedonism (the maximization 
of pleasure and minimization of pain) had been established. 
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2.5 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter we have discussed the origins of hedonism in 
ancient Greek thought. More specifically, we stated that although a 
number of philosophers theorized about pleasure and pain (I. e 
DemocrItus, Plato), only the Cyrenaics and the Epicureans placed 
pleasure In the centre of their system. Both schools advocated a 
number of key Ideas which can be taken to constitute the essence of 
the hedonistic approach ever since. These Ideas are the following: 
1) They both believed in the existence of two opposite 
motives, pleasure and pain, which play a fundamental role in 
human life. 
2) They both held that the maximization of pleasure and the 
minimization of pain is the highest good and aim of human life. 
3) It seems that they both were inclined towards egoistic 
hedonism 
4) They both realized the need to find a measuring device In 
order to calculate pleasure and pain and thus to assess a 
particular action. 
The second point refers to the problem of the reconciliation between 
moral and psychological hedonism. It seems that both philosophers 
started from moral statements and then tried to reinforce their 
validity by drawing from psychological observations. Epicurus, who was 
more explicit in this matter, combines the two by referring to man's 
alienation from his nature. 
Apart from the above common points, there are also some 
differences between the two. The first difference has to do with the 
nature of pleasure. The Cyrenaics accepted as most desirable the 
"moving pleasures" or the pleasures which bring positive enjoyment. 
These kind of pleasures are generally the pleasures of the body.. By 
contrast, the Epicureans conceive pleasure as the absence of pain and 
consider that mental pleasures are more desirable because of their 
permanent nature. Another difference was that the Epicureans were 
qualitative hedonists while the Cyrenaics can be characterized as 
quantitative hedonists. As we shall see, subsequent hedonist theorists 
exhibit the same differences. For Instance, Bentham's hedonism can be 
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seen as quantitative, while Mill's as qualitative. 
With Aristippus and Epicurus we have the. first-systematic 
hedonistic philosophies, and as frequently happens in the history of 
ideas, subsequent thinkers were to borrow a great deal from the 
originators. Thus after examining the birth and growth of hedonism, we 
will proceed to discuss its development In modern times and its 
s' uýbsequent- Introduction in economics. The first part of the next 
chapter will deal with Gassendi, Helvetius and Hobbes who were the 
ones to revitalize the hedonistic Ideas after a long break in the 
Middle Ages. The second part will examine the introduction of 
hedonistic views in late classical economics. 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 2 
1) The original quotations from Democritus and most quotations from 
Diogenes of Laertlus mentioned in the text were in ancient Greek. The 
translation to English has been done by the author. 
2) Plato's solution to the problem of the happy life in his other 
dialogues where the problem of pleasure and pain is discussed, is 
similar to the ideas expressed in "Philebus" (1980). In his 
"Protagoras" and "Gorgias" the happy life is a mixture of sober 
reasoning and pleasure. The key phrase in Plato is "Measure in 
everything". In "The Rebuplic" intellectual life Is given priority. 
See "Protagoras", 1979, "Gorgias", 1980, and "The Rebuplic", 1976. 
3) Another ancient Greek philosopher who considered the problem of 
pleasure and pain was Aristotle. Aristotle like Plato, rejects the 
notion that maximization of pleasure leads to happiness. Instead he 
speaks of a mixed life with emphasis on activity. See Aristotle's 
"Nicomachean Ethics", 1925, and Helios, 1981, pp. 70-72. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE REAPPEARANCE OF HEDONISM AND ITS INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMICS 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter, we discussed the birth of hedonistic 
ideas In the philosophical theories of the Cyrenaics and Epicureans. 
We observed that these two schools of thought were the only ones which 
considered the concepts of pleasure and pain as central to their 
theories. In fact their whole approach was based on the idea of 
pleasure maximization. The influence of Cyrenaic and Epicurean thought 
in ancient Greece and later in the Hellenistic period was 
considerable. However, with the appearance of Christianity, these 
Ideas started to weaken. And finally they disappeared almost 
completely during the Middle Ages. 
After a thousand or more years of absolute reign of Christian 
dogma (expressed by St. Augustine and later by Thomas Aquinas) and 
modified Aristotelian thought, the other ancient Greek philosophers 
were brought out of oblivion during the Enlightenment period. The 
materialist theories and the anti-theological spirit, which was 
growing during this time, favoured the rediscovery of ancient Greek 
thinkers like Aristippus and especially Epicurus. In particular, the 
representatives of the French Enlightenment were the most enthusiastic 
promoters of the ancient Greek thinkers. P. Gassendi first and C. A. 
Helvetius later were the ones who were Influenced most by the 
hedonistic Ideas of Aristippus and Epicurus. Also T. Hobbes was the 
philosopher who popularized the hedonistic ideas in the Anglo-Saxon 
world. 
The somewhat modified (as we shall see) hedonism of the above 
thinkers was the main source of influence on J. Bentham. Bentham was 
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the one who Introduced hedonism, through his utilitarian theory, to 
the field of economics.. Other important economists of the classical 
school adopted the hedonistic views of Bentham. Classical economists 
like J. S. Mill, N. Senior and J. Cairnes elaborated further the 
hedonistic principles that Bentham had Introduced. 
However, it must be pointed out that although the basic 
principles of the hedonistic framework can be found In the writings of 
all the above theorists, there were also some differences from these 
principles. First of all, we observed that the Cyrenaics and the 
Epicureans thought of hedonism mainly as a moral system (although 
psychological hedonism can also be found In their work). Helvetius and 
most of the classical economists saw it mainly as a psychological 
theory. Second, Aristippus and Epicurus only implicitly refer to 
egoism but the modern and classical economists can be described as 
'egoistic hedonists' because of their emphasis on the concept of self- 
interest. This concept along with the pleasure-pain principle and that 
of rational behaviour would form the basis of economic man. 
Thus, in general we can say that Gassendi, Helvetius and to a 
certain extent Hobbes, revitalized -although in a somewhat modified 
form- the hedonistic views of the Cyrenaics and Epicureans. 
Consequently, the above influenced considerably Bentham who introduced 
the hedonistic approach In economics. By adding the element of 
rationality, in the sense of consistency, subsequent classical 
economists like Senior, Mill and Cairnes constructed the firsi model 
of economic man. A pleasure maximizer, selfish and rational economic 
agent would be an important manifestation of the Influence of hedonism 
on classical economics. 
In order to show the above, we will begin this chapter with a 
discussion of the views of Gmssendi, Helvetius and Hobbes and we will 
attempt to identify their contribution to the reappearance of hedonism 
in modern times. In the second part, we will examine the ideas of 
Bentham and the Introduction of hedonism in economic thought. 
Subsequently, we will discuss the hedonistic influence on the 
economic thought of Senior, Mill and Cairnes. 
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3.2 THE REAPPEARANCE OF HEDONISM 
3.2.1 Gassendl 
Although there is a time difference of some decades between 
Gassendi and Helvetius, one can safely say that they belonged to the 
same era. Gassendi (1592-1655) died twenty years before the history 
textbooks' starting date of the Enlightenment (1675) but his ideas are 
in the same ideological climate of that age. It can also be 
maintainted that his thought influenced many representative thinkers 
of the Enlightenment and particularly of the French Enlightenment. 
The main characteristics of Gassendi's age -which would become 
stronger in the eighteenth century- were a growing rejection of 
Aristotle's authority and a trend towards experimentation In the field 
of science. Gassendi was one of the strongest opponents of Aristotle's 
dominance. In contrast, he was one of the most enthusiastic advocates 
of Epicurean thought. In fact it was he who popularized and spread the 
teachings of Epicurus (Mitropoulos, 1980, p. 134 and Kearns, 1979). More 
specifically, Gassendi attempted to make a synthesis of Epicurean 
atomism with the mechanical science of his age. Along with this, he 
adopted the Epicurean ethical philosophy and tried to harmonize it 
with the prevailing Christian ideology. 
From our point of view the second aspect of Gassendi's thought - 
his ethical philosophy- is the most interesting. Gassendi's ethical 
philosophy is heavily based on the ideas of the two ancient Greek 
schools of hedonistic philosophy the Cyrenaics and Epicureans. 
However, the emphasis of the Cyrenaics on bodily pleasure made it 
impossible for Gassendi to adapt it to Christian Ideology. This is the 
main reason that Gassendi refers to the Cyrenaics only two or three 
times in his famous work "The Syntagma" while he makes many references 
to Epicurus. 
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The cornerstone of his ethical philosophy is based on Epicurean 
hedonism. In the preface of his work "Exercises In the Form of 
Paradoxes in Refutation of the Aristotellans", Gassendi specifies the 
contents of Book VII which deals with moral issues: 
"Finally, Book VII deals with moral philosophy. It hardly 
requires a lengthy recapitulation. In one word, it teaches 
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Epicurus' doctrine of pleasurer by showing in what way the 
greatest good consists of pleasure and how the reward of 
human deeds and virtues is based on this principle. " 
(Gassendi, 1972, p. 25) 
The above quotation shows that Gassendl was in line with Epicurus as 
far as the idea of pleasure as being the highest good is concerned. As 
we have shown, Epicurus thought of the maximization of pleasure 
principle mainly In normative terms, although he tried to reinforce it 
with psychology. Gassendi did not make a clear distinction between the 
two. For instance In his other work, "The Syntagmall he states: 
"... and a third inclination of this nature is Epicurus' 
Inclination, or pleasure and pain to the extent that we do 
everything in order to obtain the former and avoid the 
latter. " (Gassendi, 1972, p. 291) 
Clearly the meaning here is that he views the pleasure-pain principle 
as a psychological motivation for action. He then proceeds to examine 
a criterion for action, for what is good and what is bad. Again here 
there is a shift to philosophical hedonism. As he states: 
"Hence for example, music has the senses (namely hearing) as 
Its criterion to a certain degree, not in Just any way at 
all, but Inasmuch as it is affected by harmony and discord; 
in the same way ethics has the senses as its criterion, not 
In just any way at all, but inasmuch as they can be affected 
by pleasure and pain. And pleasure and pain are as much the 
province of logic as are harmony and discord. " 
(Gassendi, 1972, p. 360) 
It seems that there is a mixture of philosophical and psychological 
hedonism. Gassendi does not provide a clear method of reconciliation 
between the two. An obvious way out could be Epicurus' method. 
Following the hedonistic tradition, Gassendi's next step is to 
f Ind a method of calculating pleasure and pain. Like Epicurus, he 
finds reason as the means for calculating pleasure. Professor Sarasohn 
writes: "It [right reason] will defend us from stress due to 
engendered or social prejudices and serve as a means to calculate what 
will bring us the greatest amount of happiness and the least amount of 
pain" (Sarasohn, 1982, p. 241). Again one finds here the familiar need 
for nearly all hedonistically oriented thinkers to calculate pleasure 
and pain. We shall meet this expression -calculus of pleasure and 
pain- In many classicals but especially marginalist economists. 
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After the idea of how to calculate pleasure, Gassendi states his 
views about the nature of pleasure. As one would expect, he Is close 
to the Epicurean approach. Here he feels that it is necessary to 
emphasize the spiritual dimension of Epicurus' notion of pleasure in 
order to show Its compatibility with the Church's views. As he states: 
"Epicurus feels that no other pleasure Is the end than that 
which consists of stability, somewhat like repose, namely 
tranquility and freedom from pain. " (Gassendi In 
Sarasohn, 1982, p. 241) 
At the time when Gassendi wrote his works the dominance of Christian 
theology in the community of French intellectuals was still very 
strong. Thus, it is natural for his interpretation of Epicurus to be 
austere In the spirit of the age. France's Intellectual environment 
was still very much influenced by Christian dogma and a more 
materialist approach to pleasure would be absurd. As J. Spinks points 
out: 
"-- he I Gassendil had undertaken a study of Epicurus and 
gradually the whole of the time which his ecclesiastical 
duties left at his disposal became absorbed in an effort to 
present the natural and moral philosophy of Epicurus in a 
form acceptable to the reason and conscience of his 
contemporaries. " (Spink, 1960, p. 15) 
And as we have stated, Christian theology was the core of this 
conscience. Thus, Gassendi had to introduce God in his moral theory. 
And he did it by expressing God's providence In terms of the pleasure- 
pain principle. More specifically, he thought that God led human 
beings to prefer maximum pleasure over pain and thus to be able to 
survive by acting according to this principle.. As Sarasohn writes: 
"The natural desire for pleasure and aversion to pain, 
supplemented by the natural ability of the reasonable 
creature to calculate what will bring him pleasure over pain 
in the long run, becomes the 'invisible hand' of God, guiding 
man along his foreordained path while, as we shall see later, 
not denying him the use of free will. " (Saresohn, 1982, p. 243) 
In general, it can be said that Gassendi based his moral system 
on the Epicurean pleasure-pain principle. In his thought one can also 
find elements of psychological hedonism, apart from the apparent 
philosophical one. Moreover, he tried to combine Epicureanism with 
Christian theology by emphasizing the spiritual side of pleasure and 
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by Introducing God's providence in the pleasure-pain principle. 
However, the significance of his thought was the reintroduction of the 
concept of pleasure maximization. As we shall see, subsequent hedonist 
theorists were to discard the theological aspect of his thought and 
keep those aspects suitable for a secular hedonism based on the 
calculus of pleasure and pain. Thus the most important role of 
Gassendi in the development of hedonism, was the rediscovery and the 
dissemination of the idea of pleasure maximization. 
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3.2.2 T. Hobbes 
In the same way that Gassendi was responsible for the rediscovery 
of hedonistic views In France, T. Hobbes (1588-1679) promoted the 
hedonistic approach (especially egoistic hedonism) in England. Hobbes 
was a contemporary of Gassendi and thus Christian theology had a 
substantial influence on him also. Like Gassendi, Hobbes had studied 
ancient Greek philosophy and had been influenced by it. However, he 
was not as keen a follower of Epicurus' as Gassendt. The concepts of 
pleasure and pain, as well as that of selfish behaviour, are basic in 
Hobbes' moral philosophy. The combination of these two constitutes the 
essence of egoistic hedonism which is closer to the hedonism advocated 
by subsequent orthodox economists. In addition, Hobbes Is considered 
to be one of the main advocates of materialism. But let us start first 
from pleasure and pain. 
Like the previous theorists, Hobbes Identifies good with pleasure 
and bad with pain. As he declares: 
"Every man, for his own part, calleth that which pleaseth, 
and is delightful to himself, good; and that evil which 
displeaseth him. " (Hobbes, 1839, volIV, p. 32) 
The pleasure-pain approach which we find in Hobbes, is a common 
characteristic of the hedonistically oriented thinkers. Like Epicurus 
and Aristippus, Hobbes speaks of the pleasures of the body and the 
pleasures of the soul: 
"There are two sorts of pleasure, whereof the one seemeth to 
affect the corporeal organ of the sense, and that I call 
sensual-The other sort of delight is not particular to any 
part of the body and Is called delight of the mind, and is 
that which we call joy. Likewise of pains, some affect the 
body, and are therefore called the pains of the body; and 
some not, and those are called grief. " 
(Hobbes, 1839, vol. IV, p. 34) 
Apart from pleasure and pain the other important element in 
Hobbes' ethics is the idea of self-interest. Hobbes places greater 
emphasis on the analysis of this idea than he does on the concepts of 
pleasure and pain. One could also argue that selfish behaviour is the 
cornerstone of Hobbes' moral views. In a very stong statement, Hobbes 
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speaks of self-interest as one of the basic motives of human 
behaviour. 
11 ... I set down for a principle, by experience known to all 
men and denied by none, to wit, that the dispositions of men 
are naturally cruel, that except they be restrained through 
fear of some coercive power, every man will distrust and 
dread each other. " (Hobbes, 1839, vol. Il, p. xv) 
Hobbes considers self-interest as having great personal and social 
importance (for a further discussion of Hobbes views on selfish 
behaviour and its consequences for social organization see 
Faulhaber, 1977, pp. 311-329). At the same time he sees it as a 
destructive motive which can lead to confusion and disorder (see 
Myers, 1983, pp. 28-34 and Faulhaber, 1977, pp. 314-316). At this point one 
can mention that in the history of orthodox economics the prevailing 
attitude towards selfish behaviour was the exactly opposite one, 
although recently some economists have partially returned to Hobbes' 
(eg. prisoners' dilemma). The connection between self-interest and 
pleasure and pain is obvious: individuals always seek their own 
greatest pleasure. The whole of Hobbes' approach Is psychological. 
Selfish behaviour and pleasure seeking are seen as psychological 
characteristics. Thus, Hobbes' hedonism can be termed psychological 
egoistic hedonism. Like Bentham later, Hobbes sees egoistic hedonism 
as hiding behind any 'noble' or altruistic action. As R. Peters points 
out: "The appearances, our pretentions to generosity or to 
disinterestedness, are but cloaks to hide the struggle between these 
egoistic motives; the reality beneath is the thrust and recoil of a 
pleasure-pain calculating machine" (Peters, 1956, p. 143). 
The significance of Hobbes' thought for the development of the 
hedonistic ideas, is that he emphasized the element of self-interest 
in the analysis of pleasure and pain, As we stated, the previous 
thinkers do not mention explicitly this element. Helvetius and 
subsequent followers of hedonism were to elaborate further on this, 
and finally as we shall find out, egoistic hedonism became the 
prevailing strain of hedonism, especially among the marginalist 
economists. 
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3.2.3 C. A. Helvetius 
Helvetius was born in the eighteenth century (1715-1771) and In 
that period some changes had been made in the Church's strictness over 
new Ideas. More specifically there was a movement of intellectuals, 
who advocated radical ideas (i. e materialism), and which grew stronger 
and stronger as the period proceeded. This period (1675 up to the end 
of the eighteenth century) Is better known as the French 
Enlightenment. The most representative figures of the era, (Diderot, 
Holbach, Helvetius, ) were also the most important materialists and 
hedonists of that time, and this shows the general character of the 
period. The important characteristics of the period were a strong 
belief in mechanical materialism, the theory of evolution and 
sensationalism. As Wade points out: 
"In fact, all ethical thought of the Enlightenment Is 
oriented towards three concepts, all of them concrete: 
happiness, enlightened self-interest, and beneficence. " 
(Wade, 1977, p. 243) 
From our point of view the moral attitude of the era is our main 
interest. However the existing context of mechanistic materialism 
shows also the relationship of moral ideas with the prevailing 
scientific approach of the period. More analytically, the growth of 
experimental science and the attempt to explain everything in terms of 
laws of matter, assisted the view that man is simply a pleasure-pain 
calculating machine. The views of a representative philosopher of the 
period, D' Holbach, are indicative: 
"According to Holbach Man, too, is a mixture of matter whose 
arrangement Is called organization and whose essence is to 
sense, to think, and to act. The mind of each depends on his 
physical sensibility, which depends in turn on his 
temperament. The sole law of his activity is to love pleasure 
and to fear pain. " (Brehier, 1967, p. 129) 
This materialist hedonism was shared by a considerable number of 
Intellectuals. The hedonistic philosophy of Gassendi, which as we 
observed, contained an element of Christian theologX, was transformed 
to a hedonism which was characterized by sensual pleasure. Thus, the 
idea of a morality of pleasure and the identification of the more 
general concept 'happiness' with that of pleasure took place 
(Wade, 1977, p. 244). This shift from the spiritual pleasures of Epicurus 
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and even of Gessendi, would be very influential for subsequent 
economists who spoke about pleasure and pain. 
The work which gave an Identity to the spirit of the age and 
created a more specific Ideological framework was the famous 
"Encyclopaedia". Its twenty-eight volumes -published in France from 
1751 to 1772- expressed the philosophical attitude of the 
Enlightenment. Elements of the same philosophical attitude could be 
found in other European countries like England, Scotland and Italy. 
Philosophers from these countries had travelled to and made contacts 
with France, and many French thinkers and especially Diderot and 
Holbach had travelled to these countries too (Brumfit, 1972, p. 23). For 
example E. Gibbon, A. Smith and D. Hume had visited France. 
However, it was Helvetius who systematically developed a theory 
of pleasure and pain and who influenced most su bsequent hedonists and 
especially Bentham. Helvetius' main works are two books; the first 
entitled "A Treatise on Man, his Intellectual Faculties and his 
Education" and the second "Essays on the Mind". In the beginning of 
chapter IX of his second work he writes: 
"The design of this chapter is to show that all our passions 
have their source in the love of pleasure, or in the fear of 
pain. " (Helvetius, 1810, p. xxx) 
THe quotation indicates that Helvetius was closer to psychological 
hedonism, which views pleasure and pain as motives for human actions. 
In his other book, "A Treatise on Man" he has the same attitude: 
"Pleasure and pain are, and always will be, the only 
principles of action in man-The question being discussed, I 
conclude that corporeal pains and pleasures are the unknown 
principles of all human actions. " (Helvetius, 1777, vol. I 
pp. 120,143) 
Apart from psychological hedonism, the above shows also Helvetius' 
emphasis on the bodily pleasures, and this fact is indicative of the 
difference from Epicurus and Gassendi, and of the similarity with 
Aristippus. In another part of his book -namely in volume II- 
Helvetius distinguishes two kinds of pleasure: the corporeal pleasures 
and the pleasures of expectation (although the second kind of 
pleasures are derived from corporeal pleasures, they are themselves 
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mental). However, the basis remains the corporeal pleasures. As he 
wr i tes: 
"I distinguish two sorts of pleasures. The one are the 
pleasures of the senses. They are founded on corporeal wants, 
are enjoyed by all. conditions of men, and at the time of 
enjoyment are equally happy. But these pleasures are of short 
duration. The others are the pleasures of expectation. Among 
these I reckon all the means of producing corporeal 
pleasures; these means are by expectations always converted 
into real pleasures. " (Helvetius, 1977, volI, p. 198) 
It is evident that the real pleasures according to Helvetius are the 
pleasures of the senses. 
As in the case of Hobbes the pleasure-pain theory Is combined 
with selfish behaviour. Helvetius put a lot of emphasis on self- 
interest, an idea which was in the spirit of his era. He sees self- 
interest as playing a decisive role for individuals and nations. As he 
declares: 
11 ... at all times, and in all countries, both with regard to 
morality and genius, personal Interest alone dictates the 
Judgment of individuals; while general interest dictates that 
of nations. " (Helvetius, 1810, p. 38) 
As we shall see later this egoistic hedonism of Helvetius would be 
discernable in many classical and marginalist economists. According to 
Helvetius the role of self-interest in human life is like that of a 
mechanical law of the Universe. This is in accordance with the 
Intellectual environment of his age where mechanistic phy sics started 
to be influential. This spirit can be seen in Helvetius materialist 
and mechanist account of man: 
"Man is a machine, that being put in motion be corporeal 
sensibility, ought to perform all that it executes. " 
(Helvetius, 1777, vol I, p. 146) 
To all of-the above (pleasure-pain, self-interest) the concept of 
rationality is added, and Helvetius puts them all into the same 
picture: a picture which is not very different from the subsequent 
formulatiop of @economic man'. Helvetius writes in the form of 
questions and answerst 
'IQ. What is a man? 
A. An animal, said to be rational, but certainly sensible, 
weak and formed to propagate his species. 
Q. What should man do as an animal of sensibility? 
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A. Fly from pain, -and pursue pleasure. It is to this 
constant flight and pursuit that is given the name of 
self-love. " (Helvetius, 1777, vollI, p. 413) 
One can also notice here that In the above quotation Helvetius is not 
consistent with his view of psychological hedonism. Without doubt, the 
above is more of a normative statement. However, the element of 
rationality might be used as a way of reconciling the two. A rational 
man would always seek the maximum pleasure for himself. An irrational 
individual (alienated from his true nature) would need a normative 
statement like the previous one in order to act according to his true 
nature, rationally. This element of rationality would become Important 
in the work of subsequent orthodox economists. In spite of the 
quotation cited however, we believe that Helvetius was more in favour 
of psychological hedonism. And this is another difference from 
Epicurus and Aristippus and from Gassendi's middle position. 
In addition, Helvetius was an advocate of the mechanistic science 
of his age and a strong opponent of the Christian dogma. He was also 
an advocate of education and believed that the pleasure-pain principle 
could serve as a basis for better legislation, an idea which would be 
found later in Bentham's system. 
In general it can be maintained that Helvetius' (and Hobbes' 
hedonism was closer to the hedonism of Bentham and other economists in 
the sense that he excluded all metaphysics and spiritual elements from 
the hedonism of Gassendi. His emphasis on the role of self-interest 
in human actions combined with the pleasure-paln principle and 
rationality, was a close approximation to the subsequent 'economic 
man'. 
In this section we have discussed the rebirth of Epicurean 
hedonism in the writings of Gassendi, who added a metaphysical 
element. Then we examined Hobbes' hedonism with his emphasis on 
selfish behaviour. The continuation of the rediscovery of hedonistic 
ideas was carried out by Helvetlus, who following the line of Hobbes, 
expanded the theory of egoistic hedonism. All these developments took 
place in an intellectual framework which was characterized by the 
growth of mechanistic materialism and thus favoured the conception of 
man as a pleasure-pain calculating machine (see also 
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Wisman, 1979, p. 31). The next thinker to continue and elaborate hedonism 
and above all to introduce the hedonistic ideas In economics was 
Bentham. 
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3.3 HEDONISM AND ECONOMICS 
3.3.1 J. Bentham 
J. Bentham (1748-1832) was the founder of utilitarianism, a 
theory which -as we shall see- has influenced a considerable number of 
economists. Bentham cannot be identified as an economist only. His 
main interest was philosophy, but one can also find some economic 
writings In his various works. In spite of the philosophical nature of 
his theories, his utilitarianism had, and according to our view still 
has, a great impact in the field of economics. Although many 
economists would refer to Bentham as a phi losopher-economist who 
Influenced only some members of the late classical school (see for 
instance Backhouse, 1985, p. 135), we hold that his thought Is a constant 
underlying characteristic of the development of economic theory up to 
this day. With Bentham's utilitarian theory the hedonistic approach 
entered orthodox economics in a systematic way. But let us discuss the 
main points of Bentham's theories In a more detailed manner. 
One of the most Important works of Bentham Is "An Introduction to 
the Principles of Morals and Legislation" where he presents the basic 
points of his thought. From the f irst page of this work, one can 
distinguish the relationship of Bentham's ideas with hedonistic 
philosophy (for a discussion of the influence of previous hedonistic 
ideas on Bentham see Lowry, 1981, pp. 819-820). As every advocate of the 
hedonistic approach, from Aristippus up to the moderns, Bentham begins 
with the concepts of pleasure and pain. 
"Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two 
sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to 
point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what 
we shall do. On the one hand the standard of right and wrong, 
on the other the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to 
their throne. " (Bentham, 1823, p. 1) 
Two observations can be made from the above quotation. The first and 
the most Important one is that Bentham's starting point is pleasure 
and pain. We noted this in all previous hedonists that we have 
discussed: Aristippus, Epicurus, Gassendi, Hobbes and Helvetius. The 
second observation is that Bentham does not distinguish between 
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ethical and psychological hedonism. As in the case of Aristippus and 
Epicurus, the quotation shows that Bentham thought that the one kind 
of hedonism reinforces the other. In the following passage, (which is 
on the same page as the previous one, ) he emphasizes psychological 
hedonism: 
"They [pleasure and pain] govern us in all we do, In all we 
say, In all we think: every effort we can make to throw off 
our subjection, will serve but to demonstrate and confirm 
it. " (Bentham, 1823, p. 1) 
However, it has to be pointed out that the above refers to the 
individual. As we shall see later, Bentham emphasizes the other kind 
of hedonism, the ethical one, in his social and political theories. 
The next step of Bentham is to state the "Principle of Utility" 
which was to be the foundation of his utilitarianism. In turn, he 
bases this principle on the concepts of pleasure and pain. As he 
declares: 
"The Principle of Utility recognizes this subjection and 
assumes it for the foundation of that system, the object of 
which Is to rear the fabric of felicity by the h, ands of 
reason and law. Systems which attempt to question it, deal in 
sounds instead of sense, in caprice Instead of reason, in 
darkness instead of light. " (Bentham, 1823, pp. 1-2) 
According to Bentham only a philosophical system which has pleasure 
and pain as Its basis is acceptable. Bentham based his whole moral 
theory, his philosophy of law, and also his theory of government on 
the "Principle of Utility". Thus Bentham constructed a complete 
hedonistic framework. But let us discuss further the "Principle of 
Utility", the cornerstone of Bentham's thought. He himself explains: 
By the Principle of Utility is meant that which approves or 
disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the 
tendency which it appears to have to augument or diminish the 
happiness of the party whose interest is in question: or what 
is the same thing in other words to promote or to oppose 
happiness. " (Bentham, 1823, p. 2) 
Before we go on we must point out that for Bentham the notion of 
happiness is very similar to that of pleasure (see Bentham, 1823, p. 1) . 
In the Benthamite system, happiness is not thought of as a general 
term which might include pleasure as is the case in other non- 
hedonistic philosophical systems. Bentham places great importance on 
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the discovery of the Utility Principle, which he thought would open 
new horizons for the whole mankind. He recognizes, however, that other 
thinkers In previous times had stated It. In his work "The Limits of 
Jurisprudence Defined" he writes: 
The principle [utility] such as it is, is not of my own 
Invention. The merit of discovering it Is none of mine. The 
legitimate consequences of it, should any of them prove 
abnoxious are not chargable upon me. I had it from Epicurus, 
from Carneades, from Horace, from Helvetius, from Beccaria. 11 
(Bentham, in Mack, 1969, p. 154) 
The Influence on Bentham of the first hedonist philosopher Epicurus, 
and also of the main representative and systematizer of the hedonistic 
philosophy in the Enlightenment period, Helvetius, is evident. The 
continuation of the development of the hedonistic approach can be 
identified. 
Moreover from the above quotation one can dis. cern a statement of 
reservation. In fact, Bentham was Worried about the impossibility of 
proving the Utility Principle. Thus he had to accept it without proof 
and he sought to make it true by definition that the meaning of moral 
terms was a priori a function of pleasure itself. Also he made a 
negative approach by asking what other motive exists If we exclude the 
pursuit of happiness (Bentham, in Mack, 1969, p. 154). 
The given definition of the Utility Principle mainly refers to 
the individual. However, there is another formulation of the Utility 
Principle which has to do with the community or society. This is known 
as the Greatest Happiness Principle, and states that an action Is 
justified when it tends to Increase the total sum of happiness of the 
community. In Bentham's words: "It Is the greatest happiness of the 
greatest number that is the measure of right and wrong" (Bentham in 
Mack, 1969, p. 45). In the first formulation of the Utility Principle, 
which deals with the individual, Bentham is more in favour of 
psychological hedonism (man seeks pleasure and avoids pain). His 
theory is rather a psychological theory which views the seeking of 
pleasure and the avoidance of pain as the only notives of human 
action. However, the second formulation -which for Bentham is a 
consequence of the first- is clearly an ethical formulation. Bentham's 
theory of legislation and theory of government are based on this moral 
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principle. According to Bentham all government actions should aim at 
the Increase of the total happiness of the community; and also the 
spirit of the Law should be such as to approve actions which add to 
the total happiness of the community and to punish actions which tend 
to diminish it. In his work "Pannomial Fragments" which deals with 
legislation and penal code, the Greatest Happiness Principle is the 
prime concern: 
"In the formation of such a work, the sole proper all- 
comprehensive end should be the greatest happiness of the 
whole community, governors and governed together; -the 
greatest happiness principle should be the fundamental 
principle. " (Bentham In Mack, 1969, p. 243) 
In general, It can be said that Bentham's utilitarianism Is a 
psychological theory on the individual level and a normative or 
ethical theory on the social level. Thus, he is an advocate of 
psychological hedonism on the individual level and a follower of 
philosophical hedonism on the social level (see also Hunt, 1979, p. 562). 
As we shall see later this distinction would become a controversial 
point in the writings of subsequent economists. 
An important issue of the two formulations of the Utility 
Principle is the problem of their compatibility. One might say that 
there are some actions of individuals which increase their pleasure 
but at the same time these actions do not add to the total pleasure of 
society. For Instance let us think of two neighbours A and B. 
Neighbour A believes that he can increase his pleasure or utility by 
buying a luxury good. According to the Individualistic formulation of 
the principle of utility his action is absolutely correct and natural. 
In addition to that, as Bentham said the individual 'is the best Judge 
of his own utility (Bentham, 1882, partI). However, the same action is 
not considered acceptable if we take Into account the second principle 
of Greatest Happiness of the greatest number, because A could have 
given his extra money to the needy neighbour B and thus increase the 
utility of the community (assuming that A experiences decreasing 
marginal utility). This problem can be solved however, if one follows 
the subsequent distinction between act-utilitarianism and rule- 
utulitarianism. According to act-utilitarinism the rightness of an 
action depends on the goodness of the consequences of the action 
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itself. Rule-utilitarianism is concerned with the consequences of the 
action as if the action was to become a universal rule. Followers of 
these two versions have definite answers to the problem (see Smart and 
Williams, 1973, pp. 9-12). 
Bentham however, did not make the above distinction and some 
authors spoke of a "conflict between individual egoistic hedonism and 
universal ethical hedonism" (Petrella, 1977, pp. 221-224). One can 
possibly defend Bentham by saying that individual hedonism and 
universal hedonism can be reconciled If there are social structures 
which will make it to the Interests of those who govern to do (in 
their own interest) what In fact is in the general interest. This idea 
has an echo in economics in terms of coordination of Individual 
economic actions at macro levels. 
Before going on to discuss the problem of the measurement of 
utlity in detail , we will take a closer look at the meaning of the 
term utility as it is conceived in Bentham. The term utility entered 
the field of economics with Bentham, and ever since it has occupied a 
central part of economic terminology. Bentham defines it as follows: 
"By utility is meant that property in any object, whereby it 
tends to produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good or 
happiness (all this in the present case comes to the same 
thing) or (what comes again to the same thing) to prevent the 
happening of the mischief, pain, or unhappiness to the party 
whose Interest is considered: if that party be the community 
in general, then the happiness of the community: if a 
particular individual, then the happiness of that 
. 
individual. " (Bentham, 1823, p. 2) 
There is a clear identification of utility with pleasure and with 
happiness (as was also seen in previous section). Moreover, the 
similarity of the use of the words pleasure and pain with good and 
evil is a feature of the hedonistic approach and it can be found for 
instance in Epicurus. It must also be noted here that Bentham does not 
use the concepts of pleasure and pain as frequently as the previous 
hedonistic philosophers. Instead, he uses extensively the word utility 
which would replace to a great extent, the word pleasure. Subsequent 
economists enthusiastically adopted the utility concept because it 
represented an apparently more objective concept than the 
philosophically loaded concept of pleasure.. 
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All previously examined hedonist philosophers made an attempt to 
find a system of measuring pleasure, and the main reason for that is 
that the calculation of pleasure and pain is necessary for the 
foundation of any hedonistic system. Thus, Bentham, after having 
stated the Principle of Utility, found it necessary to establ-ish a 
measurement of pleasure or utility. As we shall see in later chapters, 
the same need for a "calculus of pleasure and pain" was to arise in 
the works of hedonistic economists and particularly in the writings of 
the marginalists. But let us now see Bentham's views about the 
measurement of utility. 
Bentham's first attempt at measuring pleasure and pain can be 
found in his major work "Introduction to the Principles of Morals and 
Legislation". The main purpo se of his attempt to measure pleasure was 
the construction of a moral rational system of legislation and a penal 
code. First, he gives his view about the individual: 
"To a person considered by himself, the value of a pleasure 
or pain considered by Itself, will be greater or less, 
according to the following circumstances: 1. Its Intensity, 
2. Its duration, 3. Its certainty or uncertainty, 4. Its 
propinquity or remoteness... 5. Its fecundity... 6. Its 
purity. " (Bentham, 1823, pp. 29,30) 
The next step is to state the circumstances to be taken into the 
account in estimating the value of a pleasure or pain with reference 
to a number of persons. Again the above six circumstances hold, but he 
adds a seventh one which Is "Its extent" meaning the number of 
persons to whom it extends (Bentham, 1823, p. 30). 
The final step is to describe the process for estimating the 
tendency of any act according to the balance of pleasure and pain: 
"Begin with any person of those whose interests seem most 
Immediately to be affected by it: and take an account, 1. Of 
the value of each distinguishable pleasure which appears to 
be produced by It in the first instance. 2. Of the value of 
each pain which appears to be produced by It in the f Irst 
instance. 3. Of the value of each pleasure which appears to 
be produced by it after the first. This constitutes the 
fecundity of the first pleasure and the impurity of the first 
pain. 4. Of the value of each pain which appears to be 
produced by it after the first. This constitutes the 
fecundity of the first pain, and the impurity of the first 
pleasure. " (Bentham, 1823, pp. 30,31) 
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Given the above , everything Is a matter of arithmetic. In Bentham's 
words: 
"Sum up all the values of all pleasures on the one side, and 
those of all the pains on the other. The balance, if It be on 
the side of pleasure, will give the good tendency of the act 
upon the whole; if on the side of pain, the bad tendency of 
it upon the whole. " (Benthem, 1823, p. 30) 
The same thing holds true for a number of persons or for the whole 
community. The only difference Is that the number of persons must be 
taken into account in the general summation. The above quotations are 
the essence of the Benthamite calculus of pleasure and pain. Although, 
as we have stated, previous hedonists had attempted to measure 
pleasure, none of them had taken the extreme position of reducing it 
to mere arithmetic. Bentham's calculus was facilitated by his strict 
quantitative hedonism (see also Bronfenbrenner, 1977). G. Stigler 
points out the Importance of the Benthamite calculus. "Bentham had 
indeed planted the tree of utility. No reader could overlook the 
concept of utility as a numerical magnitude" (Stigler, 1950, p. 311). Or 
as E. Halevy states In general terms: 
"The aim of Bentham, as of all Utilitarian philosophers, was 
to establish morals as an exact science. He therefore sought 
to isolate in the human soul that feeling which seems to be 
the most easily measurable. " (Halevy, 1928, p. 15) 
The predominant scientific framework of that era, which demanded the 
quantification of everything has surely influenced Bentham's attempt 
in the construction of his "moral arithmetic". However, Bentham did 
not stop at this point. He proceeded to an issue which would become 
the center of discussions among economists and especially among 
marginalist economists: the issue of interpersonal comparisons of 
utility. This matter Is related to the measurability of pleasure or 
utility and to the concept of collective maximization of happiness. 
Interpersonal comparisons were necessary for the Benthamite system and 
also for subsequent utilitarian economists. Thus, as one would expect, 
Bentham did not hesitate to accept comparability. 
The important and interesting part of the issue of comparability is 
that which refers to the utility of income. In his "Theory of 
Legislation", Bentham makes interpersonal comparisons of the utility 
of income. He writes: 
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111) Each portion of wealth, has a corresponding portion of 
happiness. 
2) Of two individuals with unequal fortunes, he who has the 
most wealth has the most happiness. 
3) The excess in happiness of the richer will not be so 
great as the excess of his wealth. " 
(Bentham, 1882, pp. 103,104) 
Proposition 2 compares feelings for each individuals and proposition 3 
implies both diminishing marginal utility for each individual and 
similar capacities for satisfaction. These two Ideas can be found in 
subsequent utilitarian oriented economists (see Drakopoulos, 1988, p. 4). 
Moreover, the first proposition establishes a link between wealth and 
happiness and the whole spirit of the quotation seems to indicate that 
other things being equal the greater the wealth the greater the 
happiness; an idea which is not so alien In subsequent economic 
thought. In addition G. Stigler has observed the following with 
respect to the third proposition: 
"Then shifting ground, Bentham argues that, although utility 
does not increase as fast as income, for small changes the 
two move proportionately, so we may measure pleasures through 
the prices they command. " (Stigler, 1950, p. 310) 
The above notion of measuring pleasures through prices is not an 
unknown one for orthodox economists, the only important difference is 
that instead of "pleasures" they prefer the "softer" word, 
"utilities". (The above is also related to the subsequent concept of 
income compensated demand curves. ) One can discern from this aspect of 
Bentham's work, that he constructed the framework for the subsequent 
development of a utility based theory of value and of the theory of 
consumer behaviour. 
Before we proceed to the next Issue, which is the Influence of 
Bentham's thought on subsequent economists, we should recapitulate the 
main points of Bentham's view about human nature. First of all as we 
saw, he believed that all actions of human beings have as an object 
the seeking of pleasure and the avoidance of pain. He writes: "My 
notion of man is, that, successfully or unsuccessfully, he aims at 
happiness, and so will continue to aim as long as he continues to be a 
man, in everything he does" (Bentham, in Stark, 1954, p. 421). In 
addition to this hedonistic view of human nature, Bentham holds that 
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man is also rational. He thought that, because man was a rational 
agent Bentham viewed him as the best judge of his own utility. The 
third element of Bentham's view of human nature Is selfish behaviour. 
According to him man is basically an egoist. Because this egoism 
involves a conflict between utility at the Individual level and at the 
social level it is necessary to formulate laws which would enforce the 
principle of' the greatest happiness of the greatest number. Here, as 
J. Viner emphasizes, there is a serious discrepancy between the actual 
behaviour of the individuals and the behaviour which would conduce to 
the above principle (Viner, 1949, p. 365). 
Thus, Bentham's image of man is that he is a rational, hedonist 
and selfish being. This Image Is not very far from the basic 
characteristics of the subsequent "Economic Man". As we shall discuss 
later, the "Economic Man" of J. S. Mill and especially the "Economic 
Man" of the marginalists would have the same characteristics as 
Bentham's view of human nature. And, as is known, "Economic Man" would 
be a fundamental notion for the development of orthodox economic 
theory. 
The influence of Bentham's thought on subsequent economists was 
great. As one would expect, the first economists to be Influenced by 
his ideas were the representatives of the late perl6d of the classical 
school. N. Senior, J. S. Mill and J. E. CaIrnes were the most famous 
classicals to be influenced. In addition, Bentham's influence extended 
to the neoclassical school of economic thought. Bentham's reference to 
the maximization of pleasure and to the concept of utility along with 
his general view of man as a rational and selfish being, make him the 
ideological ancestor of the marginalist. school. As T. W. Hutchison 
declares: 
It has often been pointed out, obviously with much truth, 
that Bentham's development of, and emphasis on, the two 
concepts of maximization and utility make him above all the 
ancestor of the neo-classical economic theorizing, and 
especially of Jevons and Edgeworth. " (Hutchison, 1956, p. 290) 
More specifically, as we shall find out later in the section dealing 
with Jevons, his main work "Theory of Political Economy" deals largely 
with the concepts of pleasure and pain and also with the principle of 
utility. Jevons' theory has its roots in Bentham' approach (see also 
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Collison Black, 1972a, p. 125). Apart from Jevons, another marginallst 
economist, L. Walras based a lot of his economic ideas on Bentham's 
thought. The Issue of Bentham's influence on mainstream economics will 
be discussed more thoroughly in the appropriate sections. 
Bentham lived in an era whose main features were, scientific 
experimentation, mechanistic physics and reason. It was an era which 
was characterized by a belief in the power of science and more 
specifically of mechanistic, deterministic science. The great success 
of Newtonian physics and later of classical mechanics, had created a 
conceptual framework which demanded that all branches of knowledge 
should follow the path of mechanistic physics. Thus, one could observe 
a strong trend towards quantification and mathematization even in 
traditional theoretical branches of knowledge like philosophy. Many 
people thought that as there exist absolute universal laws In physics 
so It must be the case with other fields like morals. This conceptual 
framework had an Important impact on Bentham, and one has to take this 
into account for a better understanding of the nature of Bentham's 
thought. Having this in mind, it will not seem surprising that in his 
time "Bentham was hailed from St. Petersburg to Lisbon as the 'Newton 
of the moral world' who had laid down for all time the basic Universal 
laws of Utility" (Mack, 1969, p. viii). Or as E. Halevy puts It- 
"In laying down the rules of his moral arithmetic, he 
[Bentham] Is trying to construct a kind of mathematical 
morality analogous to mathematical physics. " 
(Halevy, 1928, p. 29) 
Generally, Bentham's thought represents a continuation of the 
hedonistic approach which originated in ancient Greece with the work 
of Aristippus and Epicurus, and continued in modern times with 
Gassendi, Hobbes and Helvetius. Bentham's Ideas are very much 
influenced by the above theorists. For instance, he refers a number of 
times to Epicurus and he accepts his debt to Helvetius for his 
greatest happiness principle: 
"A sort of action is a right one, when the tendency of it is 
to augument the mass happiness in the community. This is what 
we are indebted for to Helvetius. " (Bentham in 
Mack, 1969, p. 39) 
(One can also note here that the above quotation suggests that Bentham 
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had some kind of awareness of the significance of rule- 
utilitarianism. ) However, Bentham's hedonism is much more elaborated 
and systematized than that of the previous hedonists. He constructs 
his hedonistic philosophy in a careful way using principles and 
propositions. He is the first to Introduce a concept which would be 
central in subsequent mainstream economic theory, the concept of 
utility. Thus, wit h Bentham hedonism entered economics and since then 
it has constituted a considerable part of orthodox economics 
conceptual framework. More specifically, Bentham defined the concept 
of utility in terms of pleasure or happiness, after accepting -as 
every hedonist did- that the main motives of human actions are the 
seeking of pleasure and the avoidance of pain. Moreover, his second 
formulation of the utility principle demonstrated the ethical (along 
with the psychological of the first formulation) aspect of his 
utilitarianism. After this, he proceeded to an attempt of the 
quantification of utility, As was noted, his attempt was In the spirit 
of his era which called for greater quantification In all fields of 
knowledge. Moreover, he accepted the possibility of Interpersonal 
comparisons of utility because it was necessary for the coherence of 
his system. Finally, he held that man was a rational being and a 
selfish one. 
All these aspects of Bentham's thought Influenced to a great 
extend the subsequent course of economic thinking. Without doubt, the 
concepts of economic man, utility and marginal utility which are 
central in late classical and marginalist economic thought, are based 
on his views. The first major classical economist who was influenced 
by Bentham, was N. Senior and our next section is concerned with his 
ideas. 
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3.3.2 N. W. Sen I or 
As we stated in the previous section, Senior was the first major 
classical economist who was Influenced by the Ideas of J. Bentham. In 
addition to this Senior introduced some new methodological ideas which 
assisted the advance of hedonistic views in economics. More 
specifically, Senior maintained that four basic propositions were 
enough for the formation of the fundamentals of economics. Moreover, 
he set the bases for the positive-normative distinction by pointing 
out that economists must not give advise, but state general 
principles. But let us see the above points In a more detailed way. 
Senior starts by stating. that political economy rests on few 
general propositions. The first and most important proposition, 
according to Senior is the following: 
"That every person is desirous to obtain, with as little 
sacrifice as possible, as much as possible of the articles of 
wealth. * (Senior in Bowley, 1967, p. 46) 
The important point here is Senior's definition of wealth which is as 
follows: 
"Under that term (wealth] we comprehend all those things, and 
those things only, which are tranferable, are limited in 
supply, and are directly or Indirectly productive of pleasure 
or preventive of pain. " (Senior, 1850, p. 6) 
From the first proposition and from the definition of wealth, one can 
discern the idea of pleasure maximization which is the basic principle 
of the hedonistic framework. Although the concepts of pleasure and 
pain are not mentioned in the proposition, there Is a clear connection 
when one takes into account the definition of wealth. The implicit 
idea of pleasure maximization can also be observed in Senior's 
definition of political economy which was given in his introductory 
lecture at Oxford in 1826. He defines political economy as "the 
science which teaches in what wealth consists -by what agents it is 
produced- and according to what laws it is distributed- and what are 
the institutions and customs by which production may be facilitated 
and distribution regulated, so as to give the largest possible amount 
of wealth to each individual" (Senior in Bowley, 1967, p. 43). 
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Apart from the Implicit idea of pleasure maximization, the above 
def initi on also reveals some important aspects of Senior's 
methodological thought. The fact that he defined political economy as 
a science Indicates his methodological orientation. Moreover, the use 
in the definition of words like "laws" shows Senior's intention to 
treat political economy as an exact, physical science. However, the 
best example of Senior's methodology were his basic four propositions 
on which, he thought, political economy rests. The first of these four 
propositions was , as we stated, the principle of the maximization of 
wealth. The other three were: 
"2. That the population of the world, or, In other words the 
number of persons inhabiting it, is limited only by moral or 
physical evil 
3. That the power of labour, and of other instruments of 
production will produce wealth, may be indefinitely increased 
by using their products as the means of further production. 
4. That agricultural skill remaining the same, additional 
labour employed on the land within a given district produces 
In general a less proportionate return. " (Senior, 1850, p. 26) 
The first thing that can be observed is that proposition two is not 
compatible with Senior's emphasis on a positive approach to economics. 
Senior held that the validity of these propositions can be proved by 
the fact that they are familiar to almost every man's thoughts (a 
priori acceptance). Again this is not in agreement with his belief 
that economics should be a science like physics. Senior does not prove 
the propositions scientifically but appeals to common sense. 
Senior believed that if someone started from these propositions, 
one could deduce conclusions which have universal validity for the 
science of political economy. He also wanted a clear separation 
between the positive science and the normative art of political 
economy. He desired a scientific political economy freed from all 
normative elements. In this context, one can understand the reasons 
for his disapproval of the economist as an adviser. 
The methodological ideas of Senior are important because, as we 
stated, they assisted the introduction of hedonistic views in 
economics. Thus his main methodological ideas were the following: a) 
economics is based on four basic propositions b) from these 
propositions one can draw conclusions about political economy which 
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are universally true c) the above mean that political economy is a 
positive science and not to be involved with normative matters. Gide 
and Rist summarise: 
"He [Senior] removed from political economy every trace of 
[ethical] system, every suggestion of social reform, every 
connection with moral or conscious order, reducing it to a 
small number of essential, unchangeable principles. " Wide 
and Rist, 1915, p. 350) 
Senior's methodological approach was in accordance with the 
prevailing conceptual framework of his era. The great success of the 
physical sciences had Influenced researchers working in other fields 
who also wanted their fields to achieve the high status of physics. 
This meant a growing trend towards formalization in every field and 
especially in economics. The hedonistic principles, selfish 
maximization of pleasure and minimization of pain, offered a basis for 
a "positive" science of economics where man's behaviour would be 
easily calculable and predictable. Thus, it can be argued that 
Senior's methodological views are closely connected with his 
hedonistic Ideas. 
Apart from his first proposition which clearly indicates a 
hedonistic orientation, other aspects of Senior's economic thought 
demonstrate its relationship with the hedonistic approach. More 
specifically, Senior's theory of value is an Important indication of 
the above. Before Senior, Adam Smith and D. Ricardo had constructed a 
cost-of-production theory of value (see Deane, 1978, p. 69). Both 
theorists attempted to connect value with something objective (i. e 
labour). Senior explicitly disagreed with this attempt and pointed out 
that value depends on utility, limitation in supply and 
transferableness (Bowley, 1967, p. 95). Thus he connected value with 
utility (subjective) instead of with costs. as was the case with 
previous classicals. This connection would become very important 
because it was to influence -as we shall see- the value theory of 
marginalist economists who based value solely on marginal utility. 
Uevons recognized Senior as one of the prophets of marginal utility 
theory. ) But before we proceed let us see first Senior's definition of 
utility: 
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"Utility, however, denotes no intrinsic quality In the things 
which we call useful; it merely expresses their relations to 
the pains and pleasures of mankind. " (Senior, 1850, p. 7) 
The important idea here is the definition of utility in terms of 
pleasure and pain. Thus, Senior's value theory involves the concepts 
of pleasure and pain and this means that there Is a clear break from 
the classical theory of value. 
Another indication of Senior's hedonistic influence Is his 
formulation of the law of diminishing marginal utility where pleasure 
and pain are again central in the analysis: 
"Not only are there limits to the pleasure which the 
commodities of any given class can afford, but the pleasure 
diminishes in a rapidly increasing ratio long before those 
limits are reached. Two articles of the same kind will seldom 
afford twice the pleasure of one, and still less will ten 
give five times the pleasure of two. " (Senior, 1850, p. 11) 
Apart from expressing the law of diminishing marginal utility, the 
above passage Implies a conviction in the measurability of utility. As 
we have seen, the attempt to measure pleasure is a universal 
characteristic of all advocates of the hedonistic approach. In the 
following quotation, Senior Implies that there must be a measurement 
of pleasure: 
"The comparative utilty of commodities depends partly on the 
intensity of the pleasure they afford, and partly on their 
durability... " (Senior In Bowley, 1967, p. 103) 
Another manifestation of Senior' hedonistic tendencies was his 
views about J. S. Mill's economic man. As we shall see In the next 
section, J. S. Mill had created a model of economic man based primarly 
on hedonistic principles. However, Mill thought that his economic man 
was a fictional man useful only for the purposes of economics. Senior 
did not accept the fictional man view of Mill. Rather he thought that 
the model of economic man was 'also a description of man's actual 
behaviour. Senior himself did not formulate a model of economic man 
but in a way he had implied such a model in the first of his four 
fundamental propositions. His view that Mill's economic man was not an 
Imaginery being but the actual man, is a clear indication of adherence 
to an extreme kind of psychological hedonism. More specifically he 
comments on Mill's hypothesis of economic man: 
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"It appears to me, that If we substitute for Mr Mill's 
hypothesis, that wealth and costly enjoyment are the only 
objects of human desire, the statement that they are 
universal and constant objects of desire, that they are 
desired by all men and at all times, we shall have laid an 
equally firm foundation for our subsequent reasonings, and 
have put a truth in the place of an arbitrary assumption. " 
(Senior, in Bowley, 1967, p. 61) 
Senior believes that the hedonistic based economic man portrays human 
behaviour at all times. The above statement also affirms Senior's 
methodological views. 
In general it can be said that Senior was the f irst major 
classical economist who was an advocate and promoter of Bentham's 
hedonistic ideas. The first hedonistic-based proposition, the 
connection of utility with pleasure, the utilty-based theory of value, 
the implicit acceptance of the measurability of pleasure, and the 
belief that man's actual behaviour is based only on the maximization 
of pleasure, all prove the hedonistic orientation of his thought. In 
additon, his deductive, positive and physical science oriented 
economic methodology, facilitated the Influence of the hedonistic 
approach on economics. S. S. Mill represents the next phase of the 
history of hedonistic influence on classical economics. 
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3.3.3 J. S. Mill 
1. S. Mill's work represents the continuation of the introduction 
of hedonistic ideas in economics. Mill was the most important 
economist of the late period of the classical school, and his thought 
exercised a considerable influence on the ideas of subsequent 
economists and especially of the marginalists. 
Mill's exceptional educational background provides a first 
Indication of the orientation of his thought. More specifically, Mill 
was educated in an intellectual environment which was dominated by the 
philosophy of utilitarianism. His father, James Mill, was a 
utiltiarian economist and also a close friend of Bentham. For the 
whole of his life, James Mill was a utilitarian propagandist and 
theorist (Winch, 1966, p. 1). James Mill was one of the first utilitarian 
thinkers who attempted to apply utilitarian principles to politics. 
The influence of his father on the young Mill was considerable. It is 
known that J. S. Mill first heard about utilitiartanism from his 
father. Moreover, Bentham, being a friend of Mill's family, discussed 
utilitarian philosophy with the young Mill. Undoubtedly, this strong 
utilitarian environment had an impact upon the formation of his views. 
However, unlike his father, Mill was not a mere follower of Bentham's 
utilitarianism. By criticizing some of the master's ideas and by 
suggesting new ones, Mill established his own version of 
utilitarianism. Mill's modification of utilitarianism made easier the 
adoption of hedonistic ideas by economists. For instance, by limiting 
Bentham's hedonism only to the business part of life (examined by 
economics) and by emphasizing that political economy is an abstract 
science based on some psychological (hedonistic) assumptions, Mill 
laid the foundation for the notion of economic man which became so 
influential among subsequent economists. But let us see these points 
In greater detail: 
A number of philosophers have characterized Mill as being a 
"quasi-ideal utilitarian" (Smart and Williams, 1973, p. 13). The reason 
for this was that Mill's utilitarianism was softer than Bentham's in 
the sense that he did not explain every human action In terms of 
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pleasure and pain. Mill condemns Bentham because he did not take into 
account aspects of human life like spiritual perfection and self- 
respect for their own sake. As he emphatically writes: 
"Man is never recognised by him [Bentham] as being capable of 
pursuing spiritual perfection as an end; of desiring, for its 
own sake, the conformity of his own character to his standard 
of excellence, without hope of good or fear of evil from 
other source than his own inward consciousness... and neither 
the word self-respect, nor the Idea to which that word Is 
appropriated, occurs even once, so far as our recollection 
serves us, in his whole writings. " (Mill, 1979, p. 100) 
It is clear that while Bentham believed that all forms of human 
behaviour could be explained by his pleasure-pain principle, Mill 
could not accept this oversimplified view of human nature. Instead, 
Mill believed that Bentham's theory describes human behaviour only in 
the business part of life. In his "Essay on Bentham", Mill devotes a 
number of pages to trying to show the weaknesses of Bentham's view 
that all human behaviour is hedonistic. He is anxious to emphasize 
that Bentham's ideas are not universally true, but they stand for one 
aspect of human life, that of business. He refers mainly to the 
hedonistic view that men maximize pleasure and minimize pain. As he 
writes: 
"It [Bentham's philosophy] can teach the means of organizing 
and regulating the merely business part of the social 
arrangements... He committed the mistake of supposing that the 
business part of human affairs was the whole of them. " 
(Mill, 1979, pp. 105,106) 
If one thinks that the business part of life is the province of 
political economy, then the representation of economic agents 
according to Bentham's hedonistic ideas is acceptable. The above is 
very close to the idea of a fictional economic man with hedonistic 
behaviour. The picture will be even clearer when we discuss Mill's 
methodological Ideas. 
The first observation that one can make about Mill's 
utilitarianism then, is that it is not universal but limited only to a 
specific aspect of human life. The second difference from Bentham has 
to do with the concept of pleasure. As we saw, Bentham can be 
characterized as a quantitative hedonist because he did not 
distinguish among different pleasures or pains. Mill however, states 
56 
explicitly that there are differences. As he asserts In his famous 
"Utilitarianism": 
"It Is quite compatible with the principle of utility to 
recognise the fact, that some kinds of pleasure are more 
desirable and more valuable than others. It would be absurd 
that while, in estimating all other things, quality is 
considered as well as quantity, the estimation of pleasures 
should be supposed to depend on quantity alone. " 
(Mill, 1979, p. 258) 
In general, Mill's limitation of utilitarianism to one aspect of 
human life and his qualitative approach to hedonism, are the two 
unique characteristics of his 'softer' version of utilitarianism. 
However, the above should not taken to mean that there is a great 
distance between Bentham and Mill. After criticizing Bentham, Mill 
proceeds to express his admiration and esteem for the father of 
utilitarianism: "We are now to show the greatness of the man; the 
grasp which his intellect took of the subjects with which it was 
fitted to deal; the giant's task which was before him, and the hero's 
courage and strenght with which he achieved it" (Mill, 1979, p. 106). 
Thus. although Mill was critical of some aspects of Bentham's 
philosophical system, he still viewed him as a great theorist and his 
ideas as correct in many respects. In essence, Mill's thought' 
represents the continuation of Bentham's system. As 1. Schumpeter 
points out In his "History of Economic Analysis" : 
Ili. S. Mill cannot be called a utilitarian without 
qualification. In some respects he outgrew the creed; in 
others he ref ined I t. But he never renounced it 
explicitly... " (Schumpeter, 1963, p. 408) 
In spite of his more open attitude and his more sophisticated approach 
to human nature, Mill's thought still exhibits the basic traits of 
hedonistic philosophy. 
First of all, one can discern In his writings the common concepts 
which can be found In every hedonist Ical ly-or iented thinker: pleasure 
and pain. Mill refers to them as the concepts which form the basis of 
the term utility. We noted that Bentham did the same thing. More 
specifically, in chapter 13 of his Important work "Utilitarianism", 
Mill attempts to give a definition of utility: 
57 
"Those who know anything about the matter are aware that 
every writer, from Epicurus to Bentham, who maintained the 
theory of utility, meant by it, not something to be 
contradistinguished from pleasure, but pleasure itself, 
together with exemption from pain. " (Mill, 1979, p. 256) 
Apart from linking utility with pleasure and pain, the above statement 
also demonstrates Epicurus' influence on Mill. The fact that he saw 
Epicurus as the first utilitarian writer, shows Mill's view of the 
continuation and development of the hedonistic ideas from ancient 
Greece up to this time. 
Another indication of Mill's hedonistic orientation can be found 
In his statement about utilitarianism: 
"The creed which accepts the foundation of morals, Utility, 
or the Greatest Happiness principle, holds that actions are 
right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong 
as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By 
happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain. " 
(MIII, 1979, p. 257) 
Two interesting points can be observed from this quotation. Firstly, 
Mill places greater emphasis on the second formulation of the utility 
principle, which Is the greatest happiness principle. As we have seen 
in the section dealing with Bentham, the founder of utilitarianism had 
given two formulations of the utility principle: the first that deals 
with the utility of the individual and the second which concerns the 
utility of the community or the greatest happiness principle. Mill 
shows preference for the second formulation. Secondly, Mill identifies 
happiness with pleasure. As we have noted, this is a distinct 
characteristic of the hedonistic approach. Usually non-hedonistic 
theorists would hold that pleasure is only a part of happiness but not 
happiness itself; happiness is conceived as a more general term than 
pleasure. Mill, like Bentham, equates happiness with pleasure, 
Before we proceed, it is appropriate to devote more space to the 
discussion of Mill's emphasis on the second formulation of the utility 
principle, because it represents a unique element in Mill's version of 
utilitarianism. The following quotation is indicative of Mill's 
views:. 
"I have dwelt on this point, as being a necessary part of a 
perfectly Just conception of utility or happiness, considered 
as the directive rule of human conduct. But it is by no means 
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an indispensable condition to the acceptance of the 
utilitarian standard; for that standard is not the agent's 
own greatest happiness, but the greatest amount of happiness 
altogether. " (Mill, 1979, p. 262) 
In the section on Bentham we noted the problem of compatibility 
between the two formulations of utility principle. Mill clearly 
chooses the second one when there is a conflict between the two. Thus 
one can argue that Mill follows more a "social utilitarianism". As was 
seen, the second formulation allows for rules or laws which curb 
pleasure maximization of the individual where this would conflict with 
the greatest happiness principle. (One can also note here the 
utilitarian origins of welfare economics. ) However, this preference 
for the second formulation is abandoned when it comes to the business 
part of life. But we will discuss this issue later in the section. 
The above second formulation of utility principle is related with 
our next issue which Is the problem of utility measurement. It is 
evident that if one accepts the greatest happiness principle, then one 
has to assume some sort of utility measurement in order to make It 
operational. Although Mill does not mention much about the method of 
measurement, it is clear that he believes in the measurability of 
pleasure or utility. (Again he realizes the differences among 
pleasures and this is the reason why In the following quotation, he 
refers to 'allowances made for kind. ) This is another important 
characteristic of the hedonistic framework. Mill writes: 
"That principle (greatest happiness] is a mere form of words 
without rational signification, unless one person's 
happiness, supposed equal in degree (with proper allowance 
made for kind), is counted for exactly as much as another's. " 
(Mill, 1979, p. 319) 
The passage implies measurability of pleasure. Interpersonal 
comparisons of utility are also assumed along with the idea of equal 
capacities for satisfaction. We noticed the same assumptions in 
Bentham, but the difference with Mill is that they are mentioned more 
explicitly; and this Is one of the reasons why Mill has been called a 
liberal utilitarian.. (This has to do more with the acceptance of equal 
capacities for satisfaction. ) 
As a recapitulation of the Ideas that we have discussed up to 
now, we can say that Mill's thought exhibits the basic traits of a 
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hedonistically oriented theorist. These are: the concept of pleasure 
maximization and pain minimization, the identification of happiness 
with pleasure and the idea of the measurability of pleasure or 
utility. However, his qualitative approach to hedonism, his belief 
that utilitarianism. as advocated by Bentham Is true only for the 
business part of life, and his empkasis on the social dimension of 
utilitarianism, mean that his approach was softer than Bentham's. 
In spite of his generally softer version of utilitarianism, Mill, 
by stating that Bentham's views are valid for the business part of 
life, set the basis for the concept of economic man. In essence Mill 
suggested that although not all human behaviour is hedonistic, the 
behaviour of individuals in the market place is. Moreover, by making 
this distinction, Mill also set the basis of dualism in economics. 
Mill did not mention in his writings the term 'economic man'; this 
term appeared in the marginalist period. However, one can say that he 
was the one who supplied its basic methodological and psychological 
characteristics. He based the psychology of economic man on hedonistic 
principles and especially on Bentham's utilitarianism. Moreover, he 
provided the basis of its methodology by stating some methodological 
principles which were based on the Idea that political economy was an 
abstract science. But let us see first his ideas which helped the 
genesis of economic man. 
The notion of economic man Is a very important one for the field 
of economics, because it became a basic tool for economic analysis 
especially in the marginalist period. Thus It is worth citing one long. 
quotation which show the specific views of Mill on this subject. 
Mill's Ideas about this problem can be found in his book entitled 
"Essays on Some Unsettled Questions of Political Economy". He 
asserts: 
"It Epolitical. economy) does not treat of the whole of man's 
nature as modified by the social state, nor of the whole 
conduct of man in society. It is concerned with him solely as 
a being who desires to possess wealth, and who is capable of 
Judging of the comparative efficacy of means for obtaining 
that end. It predicts only such of the phenomena of the 
social state as take place in consequence of the pursuit of 
wealth. It makes entire abstraction of every other human 
passion or motive, except those which may be regarded as 
perpetually antagonizing principles to the desire of wealth, 
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namely, aversion to labour, and desire of present enjoyment 
of costly indulgences. " (Mill, 1874, p. 137) 
The above passage is a crucial for the history of economic thought, 
because it sets the basis on which the next school. the neo-classical, 
would develop methodologically. It considers only one motive, the 
hedonistic one, which concerns the field of political economy. By 
using the method of abstraction, Mill isolates the pursuit of wealth 
or enjoyment. from all other human motives. The important point is that 
he considers that political economy -which examines the business part 
of life- can be constructed on the principles of Benthamite hedonism. 
In another passage, the isolation of motives is quite clear: 
"The science [political economy] then proceeds to Investigate 
the laws which govern these several operations, under the 
supposition that man is a being who is determined, by the 
necessity of his nature, to prefer a greater portion of 
wealth to a smaller in all cases... " (Mill, 1874, p. 138) 
Mill's views on economic man are linked to his general methodological 
thought which we will examine later in this section. However, at this 
point It is important to notice that Mill viewed economic man as an 
abstraction, as a hypothetical creature or generally as a "fictional" 
and not a real man. Moreover, this is a point of difference from 
Senior who thought that the hedonistic motives of Mill's economic man, 
are also the only motives of real man. As we shall see this 
controversy between fictional versus real economic man was to be an 
issue also for subsequent economists. 
After having established the psychological characteristics of his 
fictional economic man, Mill proceeded to give the definition of 
political economy. 
"Political Economy, then, may be defined as follows; and the 
definition seems to be complete: The science which traces the 
laws of such of the phenomena of society as arise from the 
combined operations of mankind for the production of wealth, 
in so far as those phenomena are not modified by the pursuit 
of any other object. " (Mill, 1874, p. 140) 
From this definition certain characteristics of Mill's conception of 
political economy can be observed. The first is that he calls 
political economy a science and not an art. This shows his intentions 
to treat political economy as an abstract science in the manner of 
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positive sciences. And second, he views political economy as a science 
which studies only the phenomena which are connected with the 
production of wealth. But as we shall see later, the concept of wealth 
is a very narrow concept in Mill's economic thought. 
After the definition, Mill proceeds to describe the basic 
methodological features of political economy. 
"In the definition which we have attempted to frame of the 
science of political economy, we have characterized It as 
essentially an abstract science, and its method a priori. " 
(Mfll, 1874, p. 143) 
Then he combines his methodological views with the assumption of 
economic man and writes: 
"Geometry presupposes an arbitrary definition of a line 'that 
which has length but not breadth'. Just in the same manner 
does political economy presuppose an arbitrary definition of 
man, as a being who Invariably does that by which he may 
obtain the greatest amount of necessaries, conveniences, and 
luxuries, with the smallest quantity of labour and physical 
self-denial, with which they can be obtained in the existing 
state of knowledge. " (Mill, 1874, p. 144) 
It is clear that Mill viewed economics as a science which should 
be developed in the same way as the more positive sciences. His method 
was, as the quotation shows, to start from a priori assumptions like 
that of economic man with hedonistic behaviour, and by deduction to 
reach universally valid conclusions. The reference to Euclidean 
geometry which is based on abstract and a priori (self-evident) 
axioms, Is Indicative. (One can maintain that this method, starting 
from assumptions like that of economic man, is a very influential one 
even among modern economists. ) Just as was the case with Senior, Mill 
was influenced by the prevailing conceptual framework of the 
nineteenth century which promoted the idea that all sciences should 
follow the method of the more 'advanced' positive sciences. This meant 
greater quantification, and exclusion of all non-measurable elements 
from the social sciences. Also it meant that the behaviour of Mill's 
economic man with its standard, well-defined hedonistic 
characteristics fitted the requirements of greater formalization and 
abstraction in the social sciences and especially in economics, the 
most advanced of them. As Whitaker observes about Mill's book "A 
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System of Logic" : "The keynote of book 6 is set by Mill's belief that 
the complexities of human and social phenomena will only be understood 
by applying to them the successful methods developed in studying 
natural phenomena" (Whitaker, 1975, p. 1037). 
However, it should also be noticed that Mill was conscious that 
political economy and its method were based on a priori assumptions. 
He insisted that every economist must keep in mind the nature of the 
assumptions. A few pages after defining economic man and political 
economy, he was anxious to point out: 
"Political Economy, therefore, reasons from assumed premises 
-from premises which might be totally without foundation in 
fact, and which are not pretended to be universally in 
accordance with it. The conclusions of political economy, 
consequently, like those of geometry, are only true, as the 
common phrase is, In the anstract. 11 (Mill, 1874, p. 144) 
In another part of his work, Mill refers specifically to the 
assumption of economic man. He states that this is a hypothetical 
assumption which makes the political economist's conclusions, only 
true in the abstract (Schwartz, 1972, p. 60). This limitation that Mill 
himself imposed on his utilitarian oriented economic Ideas, was to be 
forgotten by subsequent economists who followed the same approach, 
namely to see human nature from a hedonistic perpective and to apply 
the method of abstraction and a priori deduction. 
The main aspects of Mill's economic theory can be found in his 
well-known book "Principles of Political Economy". In this work he 
does not mention much about method and human nature, but states his 
economic ideas. Again, however, one can find a passage when he is 
conscious of the limitations of abstract methodology: 
"For practical purposes, Political Economy is inseparably 
interwined with many other branches of Social Philosophy. 
Except on matters of mere detail, there are perhaps no 
practical questions, even among those which approach nearest 
to the character of purely economical questions, which admit 
of being decided on economic premises alone. " 
(Mill, 1909, p. xxvii) 
In the same book, Mill discusses the basic economic concepts of 
utility, wealth, and value. First, he distinguishes three kinds of 
utilities: 1) utilities fixed to objects, 2) utilities fixed in human 
beings, where he gives as an example educat ion and 3) utilities not 
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fixed In any object, but consisting in a mere service rendered, where 
he gives the example of the 1 abour of musical performer 
(Mill, 1909, p. 46). He then Oroceeds to define wealth in the following 
way: 
"I shall therefore, In this treatise, when speaking of 
wealth, understand by it only what is called material wealth, 
and by productive labour only those kinds of extertion which 
produce utilities embodied In material objects. " 
(Mill, 1909, p. 48) 
The above definition of wealth is very important because the concept 
of wealth is used in the definition of economic man and of political 
economy (as was noticed in the previous pages). This evidently narrows 
the scope of political economy and reinforces the conception of man as 
a being who maximizes his pleasures by acquiring material wealth. The 
identification of happiness with pleasure and pleasure with material 
wealth is thus characteristic of Mill's economic thought. This point 
was not accepted by Senior who also included services in his notion of 
wealth. 
With respect to value, Mill departs from Senior and goes back to 
Ricardo, advocating a cost-of-production theory of value. Thus utility 
is not an essential part of Mill's theory of value as it is in 
Senior's and in subsequent neoclassical economists. 
As a recapitulation, one can maintain that J. S. Mill was a 
sceptical utilitarian. While he critisized Bentham's hedonistic views 
and Bentham's quantitative hedonism, he accepted them completely in 
the business part of life. While he proposed the model of hedonistic 
economic man, at the same time he limited its use by stating that this 
is only a fictional being. (One can point out here that the term 
fictional mainly implies that hedonistic behaviour Is limited to the 
business part of life, not that Mill thought of it as an unrealistic 
creation; see also Lawson, 1987). And lastly, while he advocated an 
abstract, positive-science-like, methodology for economics, he pointed 
out its limitations. Thus it can be said that Mill's thought has two 
sides. The first one shows a theorist who advocated a utilitarian, 
hedonistic approach; who created a pleasure maximizing economic agent 
and who proposed an abstract, positivist economic methodology. The 
other side represents a thinker who had many doubts about the 
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universal validity of the hedonistic views, who insisted his economic 
agent was only an abstraction and not a real man, who recognized the 
differences between different pleasures, and who pointed out the 
limited nature of his positive economic methodology. In addition, he 
defined wealth only in terms of material objects and at the same time 
he based his theory of value on costs and not on utility as Senior as 
well as many subsequent (neo-classical) hedonistically oriented 
economists, did. 
The first side of Mill's thought is in the hedonistic tradition 
of Aristippus-Epicurus-Gassendi-Helvetius-Bentham and Senior. The 
other side is closer to the thought of Hume and especially of A. 
Smith. However, the first side of his thought played an Important role 
In the development of hedonistic ideas in economics. Mill's 
contribution was that by specifying some hedonistic principles and by 
combining them with an abstract methodology, he was able to construct 
the concept of economic man. Also It was Mill who Justified the 
dualistic approach (fictional and real man) in economics thus allowing 
the introduction of hedonistic assumptions without worrying much about 
their relevance to human behaviour. The next school of economic 
thought, the marginalists, adopted only the first hedonistic and 
positivist side of his thought without paying attention to his 
cautions. In short, his 'business part of life' utilitarianism and a 
priori methodology facilitated the introduction of hedonistic Ideas in 
economics especially during the marginalist era. 
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3.3.4.1. Cairnes 
J. Cairnes (1824-1875) represents the closing period of the 
classical school of economics. The date of his death coincides with 
the beginning of the marginalist period of economics, which we will 
examine in the following chapter. J. Cairnes was a disciple and a 
close friend of J. S. Mill, and generally his views on the most 
Important economic issues are similar to those of Mill. The main 
contribution of Cairnes to the development of hedonistic ideas in 
economics was his economic methodology. Cairnes systematized and 
promoted the establishment of the positivist methodology of Mill and 
thus facilitated the acceptance of hedonistic views. Moreover, 
Cairnes' thought provides a first indication of the marginalist 
intellectual environment. But let us discuss briefly Cairnes' 
position. 
Cairnes most Important ideas can be found in his two chief works: 
"The Character and Logical Method of Political Economy" and "Some 
leading Principles of Political Economy". In his first work one can 
see the tendencies of orthodox economic methodology in the middle of 
the nineteenth century. In this book he places wealth as the subject- 
matter of political economy: 
"I should therefore at starting take it for granted that 
'wealth' , the subject-matter of Political Economy, is 
susceptible of scientific treatment; that there are laws of 
its production and distribution. " (Cairnes, 1875, p. 7) 
The use of terms like 'scientific' and 'laws' in the above passage 
gives a first impression of Cairnes' methodological views. In the 
spirit of the age, Cairnes attempted to place political economy on the 
same level as the exact, physical sciences. The following quotation 
indicates Cairnes' intentions: 
"What Dynamics does for the phenomena of motion; what 
Chemistry does for the phenomena of chemical combination; 
what Physiology does for the phenomena of the functions of 
organic life; that Political Economy does for the phenomena 
of wealth: it expounds the laws according to which those 
phenomena co-exist with or succeed each other; that is to 
say, it expounds the laws of the phenomena of wealth. " 
(Cairnes, 1875, p. 18) 
It is clear that Cairnes reinforces the conception of political 
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economy as an exact science. As we saw this conception had started to 
take shape in the late period of classical school. In Cairnes' thought 
the old dilemma of the nature of political economy (art versus 
science) does notexist anymore. For him, political economy is exactly 
the same kind of science as chemistry, dynamics, and physiology. This 
parallelism of political economy with the positive sciences leads to 
the idea that political economy is a neutral science and the political 
economist an objective scientist. As he declares: 
"In the first place, then, you will remark that, as thus 
conceived, Political Economy stands apart from all particular 
systems of social or industrial existence... But this 
notwithstanding, the science is neutral, as between social 
schemes, in this important sense. It pronounces no Judgement 
on the worthines or desirableness of the ends aimed at in 
such sytems. " (Cairnes, 1875, p. 20) 
and after some paragraphs, he adds more emphatically: 
of On the relative importance of such conflicting 
considerations, Political Economy offers no opinion, 
pronounces no judgement, thus, as I said, standing neutral 
between competing social schemes. " (Cairnes, 1875, p. 21) 
The above views reflect the prevailing conceptual framework of 
the nineteenth century which was characterized by the dominance of the 
philosophy of positivism and by the belief that the ideal model of a 
science is the physical science. However, in order to establish the 
field of economics among the exact, positive sciences, Cairnes needed 
to establish some solid, unquestionable bases. He founded those bases 
on three premises which were universally true, according to Cairnes, 
because they were based on facts. Following the previous theorists and 
especially Bentham, Senior and Mill, Cairnes accepts the hedonistic 
view of human nature as the first of these three fundamental premises. 
Moreover, as was the case with Senior and Mill, Cairnes tends to 
psychological hedonism. 
"The principal of these I stated to be, first, the desire for 
physical well-being implanted in man, and for wealth as the 
means of obtaining it, and, as a consequence of this in 
conjuction with other mental attributes, the desire to obtain 
wealth at the least possible sacrifice; secondly, the 
principles of population as derived from the physiological 
character of man and his mental propensities; and thirdly, 
the physical qualities of the natural agents, more especially 
land, on which human industry is exercised. " 
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(Cairnes, 1875, p. 59) 
According to Cairnes these three "mental principles and physical 
conditions are taken by the political economist as ultimate facts, as 
the premises of his reasonings" (Cairnes, 1875, p. 59). Thus, these three 
premises can not be refuted because they are ultimate facts. At this 
point, CaIrnes departs from Mill's position that the assumptions in 
economics are hypothetical ones. However, he does not hold the same 
view when it comes to the conclusions of political economy. As he 
states, the economists' conclusions will "correspond with facts only 
in the absence of disturbing causes, which is, in other words to say 
that they represent not positive but hypothetical truth" 
(Cairnes, 1875, p. 49). From these Ideas, one can understand Cairnes' 
view that political economy is both a positive and a hypothetical 
science. As far as its premises are concerned, political economy is a 
positive science, but as far as its conclusions are concerned it is a 
hypothetical science (because of disturbances which occur in the 
process from the assumptions to the conclusions). One can note that 
other sciences are both positive and hypothetical in Cairnes' sense; 
the postulated conditions are not frequently fullfilled. In addition, 
it is clear that the above premisses are not something new in 
political economy because we saw approximately the same assumptions in 
the section dealing with Senior. 
Thus, in general it can be maintained that Cairnes agrees with 
Senior that the assumptions of economics are not hypothetical but 
based on fact. rhis means that the assumption of economic man is a 
real one and it follows that economic man is not an imaginary being 
but a real man. This point is the opposite of Mill's view of fictional 
economic man. However, Cairnes agrees with Mill on the Issue of 
economic conclusions which both regard as hypothetical. 
Apart from the disagreement on the issue of assumptions, Cairnes 
follows Mill's views in other important economic points. For instance, 
Mill's influence is distinguishable in both of his major economic 
works. In particular, Cairnes adopts Mill's theory of value. He holds, 
like Mill, that value depends on costs and not on utility. Moreover, 
he critisizes and rejects the new marginal utility theory of value 
which was proposed by Jevons and marked the beginning of a new era in 
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economics (Cairnes, 1874, pp. 14-16). 
Overall, it can be said that Gairnes brought to the surface a 
semi-hidden trend of the late period of orthodox classical economics: 
identification of political economy with the exact, physical sciences. 
And in order to do this, he stated three ultimate premisses which he 
characterized as based on facts. The first and most basic assumption 
described the behaviour of what would be termed economic man 
(Gray, 1931, p. 288). In addition to the first assumption , Cairnes 
emphasized the factor of self-interest which is present in the 
operations of trade (Cairnes, 1875, p. 103). By promoting a formalist 
economic methodology, Cairnes facilitated the development of 
hedonistic ideas in economics. 
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3.4 CONCLUSION 
We have separated this chapter into two parts In the first part 
we discussed the rebirth of hedonistic ideas in the period of the 
Enlightenment. It was observed that after their virtual disappearance 
in the Middle Ages, the hedonistic views (which originated in the 
writings of Cyrenaics and Epicureans) came again onto the intellectual 
picture. Three thinkers were mainly responsible for this 
reintroduction: P. Gassendi, T. Hobbes and C. A. Helvetius. In their 
work one can find again the basic elements of the hedonistic approach: 
major emphasis on the concepts of pleasure and pain, and philosophical 
and psychological hedonism combined with selfish behaviour. Their 
Ideas (especially those of Helvetius) were assisted by the prevailing 
intellectual environment which favoured mechanistic materialism and 
thus facilitated the acceptance of the hedonistic Image of human 
nature (as a pleasure maximizing machine). 
The thinker who systematically introduced the hedonistic ideas to 
the young field of political economy, was the founder of 
utilitarianism, J. Bentham. Thus, in the second part of this chapter, 
we started our discussion of the introduction of hedonism in economics 
with an examination of the main ideas of Bentham. Bentham's hedonism 
was much more elaborated and systematized than the hedonism of 
previous theorists. It was he who introduced the concept of utility 
which gradually replaced the more "loaded" term of pleasure, and was 
to become central for subsequent economists. Like all previous 
hedonists, Bentham proceeded to attempt the measurement of utility. 
Moreover, his image of man as a rational, selfish and pleasure 
maximizing being would set the bases for the development of the 
concept of economic man. N. Senior and J. S. Mill followed Bentham's 
general approach. Senior's thought exhibited most of the 
characteristics of hedonistic philosophy; in addition, he introduced a 
positive, exact-science-like economic methodology which facilitated 
the introduction and development of the hedonistic approach in 
economics. Mill was another part of the chain of those who developed 
hedonistic ideas. However, he was the most sceptical of' all 
hedonistically oriented classical economists. Although, he was the one 
who conceived the idea of an abstract economic agent (later known as 
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economic man), he was cautious to point out his doubts about the 
universal validity of the hedonistic views and to state that his 
hedonistic, selfish economic agent was a fictional one useful only for 
the purposes of economics. Moreover, limiting hedonism to the business 
part of life (the province of economics) made easier for subsequent 
economists the acceptance of hedonistic ideas. The last major 
classical economist, J. Cairnes, was in the same line of thought. In 
addition he emphasized a more positive economic methodology, and like 
Senior, he believed in the reality of the ideal economic agent of 
Mill. 
Thus, it can be maintained that after the revitalization of 
hedonistic views in the modern period, Bentham introduced them into 
economics. Senior, Mill and Cairnes assisted the process by 
elaborating the concept of utility, by setting the basis for the 
subsequent model of selfish, rational and above all pleasure- 
maximizing economic man, and finally by constructing a positive, 
physical-science-influenced, economic methodology which assisted the 
development of hedonism in economics. However, as far as the concept 
of economic man is concerned, it must be noted that since classical 
economists were concerned mainly with questions of growth and 
distribution and not so much with questions of allocation, the idea 
of economic man did not play a central role in their theories. As we 
shall see, the idea of economic man (albeit its classical roots) 
would become a major analytical tool in the marginalist period when 




HEDONISM AND MARGINALISM 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter we discussed the rebirth of hedonism in 
the writings of Gassendi and Helvetius and also its introduction and 
development in the field of economics. More specifically, we observed 
how Bentham's hedonistic views influenced subsequent classical 
economists, Senior, J. S. Mill and Cairnes, who also represent the 
mainstream of the later period of the classical school. Cairnes was 
the final major figure of the classical school. Chronologically, the 
end of the classical school is consi dered to be in 1850's or 18601s. 
By that time, the writings of Bentham, Senior, Mill and Cairnes had 
already contributed to the promotion of the hedonistic approach In 
economics. Elements to be found in the works of these theorists 
include, the emphasis on the concepts of pleasure and pain, (as well 
as the attempt to find a method of measurement of those); self- 
interest; the first formulations of the concept of (hedonistic) 
economic man; and the intensification of the use of the term utility 
which was conceived as equivalent to pleasure. In addition to the 
above concepts, a positive, physical science oriented methodology of 
economics, that facilitated the application of these hedonistic ideas, 
can be observed. 
The 1870's was the period in which the originators of the 
marginalist revolution published their economic theories. From our 
point of view, the marginalist school represents a strengthening of 
the influence of the hedonistic approach In economics. indeed, one can 
say that the peak -of hedonistic influence was reached with the 
emergence of the marginalist school which also represented a 
theoretical shift of major importance. The shift of emphasis to 
questions of allocation, which was a basic feature of marginalism, 
meant that a model of standard economic behaviour was needed 
(classicals were concerned more with questions of growth and 
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distribution). In addition, the emergence of marginalism was assisted 
by a shift from a supply-based explanation of value and prices to a 
demand-based explanation. The emphasis on the concept of demand and 
the attempt to analyse it, required a psychological model and this 
assisted the application of hedonistic ideas. (One can argue that the 
analysis of costs which are the basis of supply, does not require a 
psychological, agent-based, theory. ) Moreover, the trend towards a 
mathematical methodology demanded a well defined economic agent with 
standard and predictable behaviour. The hedonistic framework was a 
very good model for these purposes and thus during the marginalist 
period, hedonistic ideas become more and more Influential in 
economics. 
All of the above represented a more consistent and systematic 
application of hedonistic principles to economics. The foundation of 
the marginalist doctrine on the concept of marginal utility which Is 
defined -as we shall see- in terms of pleasure, is a first indication 
of the hedonistic influence. Another indication is the use of 
hedonistically oriented economic man as a main tool of economic 
analysis. In addition, there was a close association of the 
increasingly mathematical methodology of the marginalists with the 
standard hedonistic behaviour of economic agents. Overall, the 
marginalist period is an extremely important phase of the development 
of hedonistic ideas in economics. 
In this chapter then, we shall examine the main views of the most 
important marginalist economists. We shall start with a discussion of 
one of the most important forerunners of the marginalist doctrine H. 
Gossen whose work contains the central points of marginalism and 
hedonism. The makers of the marginalist revolution, Jevons, Menger, 
and Walras will be examined next. Finally, a discussion of the work 
of the main representatives of the second marginalist generation will 
follow. 
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4.2 FIRST MARGINALIST GENERATION 
4.2.1 H. Gossen: Forerunner 
Although there are signs that some marginalist ideas can also be 
found In the work of economists like 1. Dupult (1844) and R. Jennings 
(1855), it can be maintained that the first concrete exposition of the 
marginalist ideas can be identified in the work of a German economist 
named Hermann Heinrich Gossen, almost forgotten by all except 
historians of economics (see Dupuit, 1933; and Tennings, 1969). His main 
economic work appeared in 1854, almost twenty years before the 
formulation of the marginal utility theory by Jevons, Walras and 
Menger. After two decades of oblivion, Gossen's work was rediscovered 
by Jevons and Walras who in the name of Gossen found a forerunner of 
their theories. It was only after reference to Gossen's name by Jevons 
and Walras that his work attracted the attention of the historians of 
economic thought. The enthusiasm with which Jevons and Walras promoted 
Gossen's work Indicates the great similarity of Gossen's views with 
those of the marginalists. 
Gossen states his economic ideas in a book entitled: "Development 
of the Laws of Human Relationships and of the Rules to be derived 
therefrom for Human Action". In this work one can find the main 
marginalist principles which in turn are Influenced by the hedonistic 
framework. Moreover, the methodology and the manner of exposition of 
Ideas are of a mathematical character, another similarity with 
subsequent marginalist work. As E. Roll states: "Thus Gossen's book 
contains the main elements of the Jevonian and Austrian theory. Even 
the geometric and algebraic apparatus is there" (Roll, 1961, p. 376). But 
let us look at Gossen's ideas more analytically. 
The starting point of his economic theories shows the direct 
influence of hedonism. As A. Gray states in his section about Gossen: 
"The fundamental principle, then, is that man should so 
direct his actions that the sum of his enjoyments in life 
should be a maximum; and this, moreover is In accordance with 
the will of the Creator. " (Gray, 1931, p. 337) 
The above quotation clearly demonstrates the hedonistic orientation 
of Gossen's thought (one can note the similarity with Gassendi's 
hedonism due to the the added metaphysical element). Although the 
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passage is closer to philosophical hedonism, Gossen is not an advocate 
of ethical hedonism alone. In another statement he writes that "the 
aim of all human conduct is to maximize enloyment" (Gossen in 
Roll, 1961, p. 374). This is clearly closer to psychological hedonism. He 
reconciles the difference by stating that many pleasures may generate 
a feeling of pain as an after-effect, thus although man aims at 
pleasure he should only act in a way that the sum of his pleasures is 
maximized. It seems that an element of rationality is added in 
Gossen's hedonism. 
After stating the basic hedonistic principle, Gossen attempts to 
find a method of measurement of pleasure. As we have already seen, 
this need to discover a measuring device of pleasure and pain was a 
common characteristic of almost all previous hedonistic thinkers. 
Gossen's mode of thought in this important area is as follows: 
"We can conceive of the magnitudes of various pleasures only 
by comparing them with one another, as, indeed, we must also 
do in measuring other objects. We can measure the magnitudes 
of various areas only by taking a particular area as the unit 
of measurement, or the weights of different bodies only by 
taking a particular weight as the unit. Similarly, we must 
fix on one pleasure as our unit, and hence an Indefiniteness 
remains in the measurement of a pleasure. It is a matter of 
indifference which pleasure we choose as the unit. Perhaps 
the consequences will be most convenient if we choose the 
pleasure for the commodity which we use as money. "(Gossen in 
Stigler, 1950, p. 115) 
The idea of using money as an indirect measure of pleasure is similar 
to subsequent ideas about the relationship between money and marginal 
utility (as expressed by Marshall for instance). 
After the above attempt of measuring pleasure, Gossen proceeds to 
define the concept of utility. This concept is central to Gossen's 
work. As was seen, after Bentham utility became a familiar and often- 
used term in the writings of classical economists. However, in Gossen 
and in subsequent representatives of the marginal school, utility and 
especially marginal utility was to become the single most Important 
concept. Gossen's definition of utility can be found indirectly in a 
piece written by one of the originators of the marginalist revolution, 
L. Walras: 
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"The term 'werthl is next introduced, which may, Professor 
Adamson thinks, be rendered with strict accuracy, as utility; 
and Gossen points out that the quantity of utility, material 
or immaterial, is measured by the quantity of pleasure which 
it affords. " (Walras, 1973, p. 216) 
Walras carries on to state Gossen's ideas about "useful objects". The 
classification of useful objects is conducted in terms of pleasure and 
this can be the first indication of his theory of value. 
He [Gossen] classifies useful objects as, 1) those which 
possess pleasure-giving powers in themselves; 2) those which 
only possess such powers when in combination with other 
objects; 3) those which only serve as means towards the 
production of pleasure-giving objects. " (Walras, 1973, p. 216) 
This identification of pleasure with utility is another indication of 
the hedonistic orientation of Gossen's economic views. Thus, after 
having specified the term of utility, Gossen proceeds to state the 
basic principles which characterized this utility, and which also are 
of major importance for marginalist economics. Professor Stigler, in 
an article entitled: "The Development of Utility Theory" thinks that 
Gossen was the first writer to formulate explicitly what would be 
known as the fundamental principle of marginal utility, and he quotes 
Gossen as follows: 
"A person maximizes his utility when he distributes his 
available money among the various goods so that he obtains 
the same amount of satisfaction from the last unit of money 
spent upon each commodity. " (Gossen in Stigler, 1950, p. 315) 
It is clear that the above passage was a step towards the development 
of the relationship between utility and demand curves (see also 
Stigler, 1950, p. 315). 
After having stated his views about pleasure and utility, Gossen 
proceeds to formulate three fundamental principles. These principles 
exhibit a great similarity with the subsequent main core of the 
marginalist doctrines. He writes: 
"I. In the case of each enJoyment there is a manner of 
enjoyment chiefly dependent on the frequency of repetition, 
which will make the sum of enjoyments a maximum. If this 
maximum is attained, a more frequent or less frequent 
repetition will diminish the total enJoyment. 
2. When there Is. a choice between several enjoyments, but 
insufficient time to enjoy all completely, maximum enjoyment 
requires that all should be partly enjoyed, even before the 
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greatest of these enjoyments has been exhausted. At the 
moment of breaking off, the enjoyment which is being derived 
from each of the possible lines should be the same. 
3. Thirdly, and rather oddly, the possibility of increasing 
the sum total of enjoyment is present whenever a new 
enjoyment (however small in itself) Is discovered, or an 
existing enJoyment extended. Blessed indeed is he who invents 
a new pleasure. " (Gossen In Gray, 1931, p. 338) 
The whole spirit of the above quotation is clearly based on the 
hedonistic framework. 
Gossen's hedonistic orientation can also be seen in his 
discussion of various economic issues like the theories of labour and 
exchange and the theory of value. In short, Gossen's theory of labour 
is based on the idea that work is a disutility and thus it must be 
substracted from the utility of the product. In other words, the final 
utility of a product Is its utility minus the disutility of labour for 
that product. One can note here that the disutility of labour, which 
is not a constant function of quantity of labour, undermines any 
labour theory of value because it introduces the subjective concepts 
of pleasure and pain. Moreover, Gossen's analysis of the disutility or 
pain of labour is similar to that of Walras'. As Walras himself states 
on this point: "Ile [Gossen] describes the variation of the pain of 
labour much as I have done, exhibiting it graphically, and Inferring 
that we must carry on labour to' the point at which the utility of the 
product equals the pain of production" (Walras, 1973, p. 216). The above 
summary of Gossen's labour theory is the' first sign of a subjective 
theory of value and also it indicates the great difference of his 
views from the Ideas of early classical economists who would sharply 
reject the conception of labour as a I'disutility". (Adam Smith and 
Marx for instance, placed much emphasis on labour as such; the basis 
of wealth. ) 
Gossen constructs his theory of exchange in the same manner, 
starting with a demonstration of the way exchange leads to a rise of 
utility. And In a would-be typical marginalist manner, he states that 
exchange will proceed up to a point at which the utilities of the 
portions next to be given and received are equal (see 
Walras, 1973, p. 216). 
His theory of value is linked with the three fundamental 
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principles and is based on the concept of diminishing satisfaction. 
The other basic idea of Gossen's value theory is that "the value of a 
thing is to be reckoned entirely in terms of the enjoyment which it 
can produce" (Roll, 1961, p. 375). His theory of value is also related to 
his classification of objects according to their pleasure-giving 
power. Thus, he departs drastically from the classical view of the 
labour theory (except as put forward by Senior) and he offers the 
first outlines of a new theory of value based on the concept of 
utility or pleasure. 
As was noted in the beginning of this section, Gossen follows a 
method which was to become very familiar In marginalist theory. His 
enthusiasism for, and use of mathematics indicates his conception of 
economics as an abstract science with formalist methodology. Moreover, 
he compared the importance of his economic theories with that of 
Copernicus, whose discoveries brought a great transformation in 
physical science. The physical science I deal is thus present in 
Gossen's thought too. As Spiegel states: 
"So f irmly was Gosse 
,n 
convinced of the far-reaching 
consequences of his message that he started his book by 
comparing it with the discoveries of Copernicus and ended it 
with the promise that the acceptance of his doctrines would 
turn the world into a paradise. " (Spiegel, 1971, p. 512) 
In general, Gossen can be characterised as a forerunner of the 
marginalist doctrine. His economic thought exhibits the major points 
that constitute the marginalist economic theory. His economic ideas 
are also a first indication of the influence that the hedonistic 
approach would have on marginalist economics. The hedonistic 
principles; the continuous use of concept of pleasure and pain; the 
attempt of their measurement; the principle of diminishing 
satisfaction; and the utility-based theories of labour, exchange and 
value, are ceniral elements in Gossen's economics. As we shall find in 
the following pages, the very same elements would constitute the 
foundations of the new major school of economics, the marginalist 
school. Thus, in marginalism the hedonistic trend of mainstream 
economics would continue, more strongly. 
78 
4.2.2 W. S. levons 
The British economist W. S. Jevons (1835-1882) was one of the 
makers of the marginalist revolution. The decade of the 1870's was the 
period when three economists, Jevons, Walras and Menger, published 
their maJor, and extremely Influential, works. 
In 1871 Sevons published his work "Theory of Political Economy" 
in which he developed his economic Ideas. These can be characterized 
as being novel in comparison to the work of the classical economists. 
The basis of this work is the notion of marginal utility upon which 
the theories of labour, exhange and value are constructed. The fact 
that utility is linked with pleasure and also that Jevons devotes a 
whole chapter to the "theory of pleasure and pain" as well as other 
points which will be discussed below, show the great influence of 
hedonism. Moreover, the mathematical methodology that is used 
completes the image of mathematical ly-oriented hedonist ical ly-based 
economic theory. Thus, in the following pages we shall discuss the 
main aspects of Jevons' economic thinking starting with his definition 
of political economy. 
In the preface of his "Theory of Political Economy", Jevons gives 
a summary of his views and methods concerning economics. He states 
explicitly that in his work he has attempted "to treat Economy as a 
Calculus of Pleasure and Pain" (Jevons, 1871, p. vii). This statement 
shows clearly his mathematical and hedonistic treatment of economics. 
In the same paragraph he reveals the nature of his approach by 
writing: 
"The Theory of Economy thus treated presents a close analogy 
to the science of Statical Mechanics, and the Laws of 
Exchange are found to resemble the Laws of Equilibrium of a 
lever as determined by the principle of virtual velocities. 
The nature of Wealth and Value is explained by the 
consideration of indefinitely small amounts of pleasure and 
pain, Just as the Theory of Statics is made to rest upon the 
equality of idefinitely small amounts of energy. " 
(Jevons, 1871, p. viii) 
The comparison that Jevons makes between economics and physical 
sciences like mechanics, supports the view that nineteenth century 
economists had physical science as their ideal model of science, and 
attempted to construct economics on their method. This trend was 
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observed in previous economists and as would become obvious, it would 
be intensified in the work of the marginalists. Moreover, another 
quotation from Sevons' book demonstrates again the emphasis that he 
put on the notions of pleasure and pain, and their importance for 
economics. 
"Pleasure and pain are undoubtedly the ultimate objects of 
the calculus of Economy... In other words, to maximize comfort 
and pleasure, is the problem of Economy. "(Jevons, 1871, p. 44) 
Here, the basic hedonistic principle of the maximization of pleasure 
is placed as the prime objective of economic science. The hedonistic 
principle in levons goes together with his attempt to reduce complex 
economic phenomena to simple facets. Thus, a hedonistic view of human 
nature reduces the complexity of. human behaviour to well-defined, 
relatively simple hedonistic principles. This reductionist trend can 
also be found in a considerable number of subsequent economists. 
Jevons emphasizes: 
"The science of Political Economy rests upon a few notions of 
an apparently simple character. Utility, value, labour, 
capital, are the elements of the subject. " (Sevons, 1871, p. 1) 
After having defined economics in terms of a calculus of pleasure 
and pain and attempted to reduce it to simple elements, Tevans does 
not conceal -the great influence of the utilitarian theory of Bentham. 
In fact, he refers frequently to Bentham's work, especially in the 
chapter deal Ing with the theory of pleasure and pain. In addition, 
Jevons explicitly admits the influence of utilitarianism when in the 
introduction of his book he states: "I have no hesitation in accepting 
the Utilitarian theory of morals" (Jevons, 1871, p. 27). However, it must 
be noted that Jevons, when he writes about utilitarianism, mainly 
refers to the principle of Individual utility and not to the Greatest 
Happiness Principle (though he refers to 'it as a theory of morals). As 
was noted before, the marginalist economists did not pay much 
attention to social questions but were mainly interested in individual 
economic behaviour. As Collison Black points out: 
"Yet the 'Theory of Political Economy' with which we are here 
primarily concerned, deals very little with social questions. 
How then does Bentham come into It? Clearly it is not 'the 
greatest happiness principle', but the 'principle of utility' 
which matters in the Theory. Indeed that work not only starts 
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out from, but revolves around, the theory of pleasure and 
pain. " (Collison Black, 1972a, p. 125) 
As a hedonistically oriented thinker, levons continuously refers 
to the concepts of pleasure and pain, and following the hedonistic 
tradition, he attempted to find a method of their measurement. 
However, Jevons, (and as we shall see later Menger and Walras), were 
not very clear on this important issue. First of all, in Jevons, 
introduction, he accepts a possible reader's observation that "there 
is no unit of labour, or suffering, or enjoyment" and this according 
to him could mean that "a mathematical theory of Folitical Economy 
would be necessarily deprived for ever of any numerical data" 
(Jevons, 1871, p. 9). In this observation he answers that "if we trace 
history and other sciences, we gather no lessons of discouragement. In 
the case of almost everything that Is now exactly measured, we can go 
back to the time when vaguest notions prevailed" (Jevons, t871, p. 9). 
Thus although he agrees that in the present time there is no unit of 
pleasure or pain, he believes that it would be found in the future. 
The important implication of this, is that he accepts the existence of 
a unit for the measurement of pain and pleasure whose discovery is 
only a matter of time. (One can think of examples of subsequent 
economists who expressed the same line of argument; 1. Fisher on the 
method comparing interpersonal utilities for instance, see 
Fisher, 1965, pp. 86-87. ) 
However, after some pages Jevons declares: 
"I have granted that we can hardly form the conception of a 
unit of pleasure and pain, so that the numerical expression 
of quantities of feeling seems to be out- of question. " 
(S evons, 187 1, p. 19) 
Thus, a discrepancy between his statements can be discerned. In the 
same page Sevons adds that "Pleasures, in short, are for the time 
being, as the mind estimates thed' (Jevons, 1871, p. 19). Clearly, this 
is an important manifestation of the shift towards subjectivism which 
took place during the marginalist period. However, he seems to forget 
these reservations when he comes to the actual development of his 
theory of pleasure and pain. In the relevant chapter, he starts by 
quoting Bentham's writings about estimating the value of pleasure and 
pain. He quotes Bentham extensively and follows Bentham's method. More 
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specifically, he refers to Bentham's book "An Introduction to the 
Principles of Morals and Legislation" where Bentham estimates the 
value of pleasure and pain according to four circumstances: a)lts 
intensity, b)Its duration, Olts certainty or uncertainty and d)Its; 
propinquity or remoteness (see section 3.3.1. on Bentham). After this, 
Jevons emphasizes the element of Intensity and goes on to construct a 
diagram which represents the quantity of feeling (pleasure or pain) at 
time Intervals. He attempts to measure the intensity of feeling. After 
maintaining that the estimation will be more accurate if the time 
intervals are very short, he draws the following diagram: 
y 
Figure 4.1 
(Sevons, 1871, p. 37) 
where the x-axis measures time and the y-axis measures Intensity of 
pleasure. In the pq curve, the quantity of feeling generated (i. e. by 
the consumption of a commodity). in the time mn Is measured by the area 
below It (mpqn). As the negative slope of the curve indicates, Sevons 
assumes that the intensity of the feeling Is supposed to be gradually 
declining. This Is the first step towards his theory of utility. In 
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addition, another indication of his attempt to measure pleasure and 
pain is his notion that pleasure Is a positive quantity and pain is a 
negative one, as he writes: 
"The algebraic sum of a series of pleasures and pains will be 
obtained by adding the pleasures together and the pains 
together, and then striking the balance by substracting the 
smaller amount from the greater. Our object will always be to 
maximize the resulting sum in the direction of pleasure, 
which we may fairly call the positive direction. This we 
should really do by accepting everything and undertaking 
every action of which the resulting pleasure exceeds the pain 
which is undergon e; we must avoid every object or action 
which leaves a balance in the other direction. " 
(Jevons, 187 1, p. 38) 
Apart from indicating clearly that at this point Jevons thought of 
pleasure and pain as purely quantitative concepts, the above passage 
provides the essence of a hedonistic moral guidance. Again, this point 
can be found in Bentham in almost identical form. This hedonistic 
morality may also be the central assumption for the actual behaviour 
of individual economic agents, which can be identified in many 
marginalist economists' writings. Moreover, one can point out that 
although Jevons tends to favour the "principle of utility" which is 
closer to psychological hedonism, the passage Is to a certain extent, 
a formulation of moral hedonism. 
After stating his views about pleasure and pain, Sevons moves an 
to the next chapter which is concerned with the "Theory of Utility". 
He gives a definition of utility which is in accordance with his Ideas 
about pleasure and pain: "Whatever can produce pleasure or prevent 
pain may possess utility" (Jevons, 187 1, p. 45). Also, he quotes 
Bentham's definition of utility which is again given In terms of 
pleasure, or benefit, or happiness. In addition, Jevons treats utility 
as he treats pleasure. In a section entitled "Duration of Utility" he 
writes: 
"As utility corresponds to, and is measured by, pleasure 
produced, and as pleasure is a quanti ty of two dimensions, 
intensity and duration, so utility must be conceived as 
capable of duration. " (levons, 1871, p. 71) 
Thus, the concept on which his entire economic theory is based, is 
defined in terms of pleasure. As would become clear later, a great 
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number of subsequent economists identified utility with pleasure. In 
addition to this, other important economic concepts are defined 
accordingly. For instance Sevons defines a commodity as "any object, 
or, it may be, any action or service, which can afford pleasure or 
word off pain" (Sevons, 1871, p. 45). 
His next step Is to examine further the Is. sue of utility using 
diagrams which were to become the basis of the subsequent development 




Here there is a shift from the previous 'average' curve to a marginal 
curve. In the x-axis he puts quantity of food ard on the y-axis degree 
of utility. When Oa has been consumed the degree of utility Is ab. He 
names ab as the degree of utility which Is the marginal utility. 
The Introduction of the concept of marginal utility was a major 
point of difference between the classical and the marginalist school. 
The core of the new school was the notion of the "Degree of Utility" 
or as it became known later Marginal Utility. Tevons realizes the 
novelty of the notion and he repeats that his great object is to 
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express the degree of utility. His next step is to define the utility 
function of a given quantity x, and then to express the degree of 
utility as the fraction Au/Ax. And after a few pages, he states the 
principle of diminishing marginal utility: 
"The variation of the function expressing the final degree of 
utility is the all-important point In all economical 
problems. We may state, as a general law, that it varies with 
the quantity of commodity, and ultimately decreases as that 
quantity increases. " (Jevons, 1871, p. 62) 
As Jevons himself emphasizes, this law is of fundamental importance 
for economics. Indeed, since the marginalists the law of diminishing 
marginal utility (as well as his formulations of total utility, 
marginal utility and utility function, ) constitute a central part of 
modern economic theory and especially of microeconomic theory. It must 
be pointed out however, that Jevons' approach to utility Is a cardinal 
one. As we shall observe in subsequent chapters, the Hicksian-based 
ordinal utility theory replaced the cardinal approach of marginallsts 
(although the theoretical constructions and conclusions of the 
ordinal approach are basically the same as those of the cardinal one). 
Moreover, before concluding the discussion of Jevons' utility theory, 
it must be noted that he was not the first theorist to formulate the 
notion of diminishing marginal utility. As was seen in the section 
dealing with Senior, he also conceived the basic idea of this 
principle. This fact is accepted by Tevons who acknowledges Senior's 
contribution. 
As was stated in the section which discusses Bentham's ideas, the 
idea of interpersonal comparisons of utility was one of the 
characteristics of the utilitarian approach. Jevons discusses this 
issue in his "Theory" where he writes: 
"The reader will find again, that there is never, in a single 
instance, an attempt made to compare the amount of feeling in 
one mind with that in another. I see no means by which such 
comparison can ever be accomplished. " (levons, 1871, p. 21) 
From the above it is clear that Jevons categorically rejects the idea 
of interpersonal comparisons (although his cardinal approach makes 
easier its acceptance than it is with the ordinal approach). This 
point also indicates his preference for the principle of utility 
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rather than the Greatest Happiness principle. (The rejection of 
Interpersonal comparisons of utility undermines the Greatest Hppiness 
principle. ) In spite of this however, one can find examples in Jevons' 
work where he makes interpersonal comparisons. For instance in the 
process of his theory of exchange he demonstrates that both parties 
gain satisfaction. However, his demonstration is based on the marginal 
utility curves of nations (see also Stigler, 1950, pp. 318-320). Thus 
there seems to be a contradiction with his previous explicit rejection 
of comparability. This contradiction shows, as with the question of a 
unit of pleasure, the ambiguity of his views in an important issue in 
his economic theory. 
Jevons does not refer to the concept of economic man as such, but 
it is implied throught his work. First of all he -enthusiastically 
endorses Bentham's hedonistic view of human nature. ("Nature has 
placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters -pain and 
pleasure... 11 Bentham, 1823, p. 1. ) Second, the existence of economic man 
is clearly implied in the following passage: 
"My present pleasure is accomplished in pointing out this 
hierarchy of feeling, and assigning a proper place to the 
pleasures and pains with which Economy deals. It is the 
lowest rank of feelings which we here treat. The calculus of 
utility aims at supplying the ordinary wants of man at the 
least cost of labour. Each labourer, in the absence of other 
motives, is supposed to devote his energy to the accumulation 
of wealth. " (Sevons, 1871, p. 32) 
Jevons recognizes the existence of higher motives for which a "higher 
calculus of right and wrong Is needed". But he adds that "there is no 
rule of morals to forbid our making two blades of grass grow instead 
of one, if, by the wise expenditure of labour, we can do so" 
(Sevons, 1871, p. 32). This is a clear manifestation of a dualistic 
approach initiated by Mill. Sevons accepts explicitly that economic 
man is only a partial picture of human behaviour since he omits higher 
motives (one can only wonder if by stating this, Jevons assumed that 
higher motives do not produce utility). Moreover, in another part of 
the book, he writes that "in the science of Economy we treat men not 
as they ought to be, but as they are" (levons, 1871, p. 45). Thus it 
seems that Jevons advocates the conception of human nature as 
characterized by maximization of pleasure and self-interest as a 
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description of actual behaviour. However, he also accepts that these 
are lower motives and economics deals with these lower motives (again 
one can observe the explicit dualist orientation). The way that he 
develops his economic theory shows that he believes that higher 
motives do not have any effect on the universal validity and 'physical 
science exactness' of the discipline of economics. Overall, Jevons' 
theory of utility is based on the hedonistic principle that man 
maximizes his pleasures and minimizes his pains, and this is a 
description of actual behaviour. The above-mentioned standard and 
predictable hedonistically-oriented behaviour facilitates the 
application of mathematical methodology. As Bensusan-Butt comments: 
"Thus in Sevons we f ind Economic Man described as a 
psychological construction and already equipped with all 
abstractions so convenient for mathematicians. " (Bensusan- 
Butt, 1978, p. 128) 
Jevons' theory of value is another important part of his work and this 
also had and still has great influence on subsequent economists' 
ideas about value. It also indicates another application of his 
hedonistic approach to a crucial economic issue: the theory of value. 
He makes clear his intentions in the introduction of his "Theory": 
"Repeated reflection and inquiry have led me to the somewhat 
novel opinion, that value depends entirely upon utility. 
Prevailing opinions make labour rather than utility the 
origin of value. " (levons, 1871, p. 2) 
Jevons' criticism refers to the classical tradition which viewed value 
as dependent on costs of production. (The costs of production theory 
of value has two main approaches: 1) labour or capital spent for the 
production and 2) sacrifices made for production -labour, abstinence, 
risk). The classical economists who advocated the costs of production 
based theory of value thought of value as something real, as an 
objective term (related to this was their desire to have an Invariant 
measure of the wealth of nations). The difference in Jevons is that by 
defining value in terms of utility only, it becomes a purely 
subjective concept. Jevons rejects the labour theory of value (he 
refers to Ricardo and to all economists who put forward labour as the 
cause of value). He criticizes it by using the following arguments 
which nowadays have become commonplace. First, he mentions examples of 
87 
high price goods which are fixed in supply like ancient books, coins, 
antiquities. Second, by stating that -large labour costs do not 
necessarily mean large v. alue: Labour once spent has no influence on 
the future value of any article" (Sevons, 1871, pp. 158,159). And thirdly 
he holds that labour itself can not be considered as a uniform entity. 
Then, he states his own view about value. 
"Value depends solely on the final degree of utility. How can 
we vary this degree of utility? By having more or less of the 
commodity to consume. And how shall we get more or less of 
it? By spending more or less labour in obtaining a supply. 
According to this view then, there are two steps between 
labour and value. Labour affects supply, and supply affects 
the degree of utility, which governs value, or the ratio of 
exchange. " (levons, 1871, p. 160) 
Apart from the indication of levons' view that value depends on the 
final degree of utility, or marginal utility (Jevons himself never 
used the term marginal), the above also shows the well-known 
connection between labour and value: 
Labour determines supply, 
Supply determines marginal utility 
Marginal utility determines value 
(At this point it has to be noted that given the above, value depends 
on what determines labour. One can go further by stating that for a 
given quantity of labour, the marginal principle would yield values in 
proportion to marginal labour inputs. Thus a labour supply function is 
necessary. And if Jevons's view that the only factor of value is 
utility is to be valid, then labour supply must be determined by 
utility. ) 
Thus, Sevons' economic thought Introduces a definite shift from 
the cost of production theory of value to the marginal utility theory 
of value, a crucial development In the history of economic thought. 
This shift which characterizes the school of marginalism and also of 
modern mainstream economics is rightly called the "subjective theory 
of value" (Dobb, 1979, p. 168). 
Having established the basic economic concepts of utility, final 
degree of utility and commodity, and also an implicitly hedonistic 
treatment of economic agents, levons constructs the theories of 
exchange, labour, rent and capital. He constructs these theories by 
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following a mathematical methodology. In the next pages, we will 
discuss the most important of the basic points of his exchange and 
labour theories. These would serve as examples of explicitly 
hedonistically-oriented economic theories. As we shall see, the 
marginalist theories of rent and capital are built on the same lines. 
Before analysing his theory of exchange Jevons, makes the 
assumptions of perfect competion, whose essential points can be found 
in most modern textbooks. (The classicals used the notion of free 
competition). Namely, he states that there is homogeneity of products, 
that buyers or sellers cannot influence the price and that there is 
perfect information. Then he takes two commodities x, and y and states 
that in in the perfectly competitive market their ratio of exchange is 
dy/dx = y/x where the first term represents marginal utilities and the 
second term represents prices. After that he writes what he sees as 
the "keystone of the whole theory of exchange, and of the principal 
problems in Political Economy": 
"The ratio of exchange of any two commodities will be 
Inversely as the final degrees of utility of the quantities 
of commodity available for consumption after the exchange is 
affected. " (Sevons, 1871, p. 95) 
He proceeds by supposing that if a person A held the quantity a of 
corn and person B the quantity b of beef (in this case, x is the 
quantity of corn available and y is the quantity of beef available) 
then after the exchange the situation will be: A has a-x of corn and y 
of beef and B has x of corn and b-y of beef. Then if (D, (a-x) and 
W, (y), 0, (x) and 7, (b-y) are the final degrees of utilities (margina! 
utilities) of corn and beef and persons A and B respectively then for 
maximum satisfaction of the two person the following should be true: 
4), (a-x) y= Ox 
IF, yx Wm (b-y) 
(3 evons, 187 1, p. 10 1) 
This means that maximum 
"satisfaction is attained when the ratio of 
exchange is inversely proportional to the ratio of marginal utilities. 
The above serves as an illustration of the way that one of the 
originators of the marSinalist revolution develops economic theories. 
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The hedonistic principles and the mathematical methodology are 
fundamental characteristics of the theory. This kind of theoretical 
framework would become very common, as we shall see in later chapters, 
among the majority of modern orthodox economists. 
Sevons' theory of labour is also built on hedonistic bases, and 
more specifically on the premise that labour Is disutility or pain -a 






The curve abcd represents the marginal painfulness of labour in 
proportion to produce. In this dia . gram, Oy represents marginal 
pleasure and below 0 marginal pain, Ox represents amount of product. 
As Sevons writes "at the moment of commencing labour, it is always 
more irksome than when the mind and body are well bent to work thus 
the pain is measured by Oa... between b and ca small excess of 
pleasure Is represented as due to exertion Itself-but after c: the 
energy begins to be rapidly exhausted, and the resulting pain is shown 
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as cd" (Sevons, 1871, p. i68). The curve pq is the marginal utility of 
the produce. It shows that the larger the product produced (Ox) and 
thus wages earned, the less Is the pleasure derived from a further 
increment. At point m where qm = dm , the marginal pleasure gained is 
exactly equal to the marginal labour endured and this is the 
equilibrium point (Jevons, 1871, p. 169). In this theory one can discern 
Jevons' ideas about maximization of pleasure and measurement of 
pleasure and pain, applied in a specific economic problem. Also the 
basis of modern orthodox theories of labour are not very far from the 
above approach. The difference is that the "strong" terms of pleasure 
and pain have been replaced with more technical, allegedly neutral 
ones. 
As was observed, Jevons follows a mathematical methodology in his 
theories of utility, exchange and labour. He does the same thing in 
the theory of rent and the theory of capital. Jevons applies 
mathematics consciously. He is a firm advocate and promoter of the 
mathematical method in economics. His methodological belief can be put 
Into perspective if we take into consideration his conception of 
economics as a rational system of ideas which can achieve the 
exactness and high scientific status of physical sciences. Moreover, 
Jevons had a mathematical education which facilitated his enthusiastic 
application of mathematics to economics. As Collison Black points out: 
"On the foundation of this basic training in experimental 
science Sevons deliberately built a further training In logic 
and mathematics so that he ultimately acquired a knowledge of 
scientific method which was broad and deep. " (Collison 
Black, 1972b, p. 370) 
In addition, Jevons' ambition that political economy achieve the 
status of exact sciences can be seen from the following passage: 
"But I do not hesitate to say, too, that Political Economy 
might be gradually erected into an exact science, if only 
commercial statistics were far more complete and accurate 
than they are at present, so that the formulae could be 
endowed with exact meaning by the aid of numerical data. " 
(Sevons, 187 1, p. 25) 
Thus he sees the Incompleteness of commercial statistics as the only 
obstacle for economics to become an exact science. According to him 
the perfect model of an exact science was the science of Astronomy, 
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"because the position of a planet or a star admits a close measurement 
(Jevons, 1871, p. 6). In addition to this one can find examples of his 
economic methodology In his "Principles of Economics" where for 
instance economic laws are conceived as universally valid like those 
of physical sciences (see Jevons. 1905a, p. 198). Also his well-known 
belief that if economics is to be a science at all, it must be a 
mathematical science, indicates his great support for a mathematical 
oriented science of economics. A systematic exposition of his 
methodological views can be found in his more general work 
"Principles of Science" (Jevons, 1905b). A very good summary of Jevons' 
methodological viewpoint is given by D. Winch: 
"According to Seyons, economic science was a rational, 
logical, deductive, and ultimately mathematical pursuit. Its 
scope was narrowly confined to the 'mechanics of self- 
interest and utility'; but since it dealt with universal laws 
of human wants it also possessed great generality. " 
(Winch, 1972, p. 328) 
Moreover, Jevons in order to indicate that all political or 
normative elements should be excluded (mainly because of their non- 
measurability), omitted the term "Political" from the second edition 
of his "Theory". This also demonstrates that mainstream economics had 
definitely turned towards a positive, mathematically oriented economic 
methodology. 
Before we conclude this section, we have to note that Jevons' 
thought exhibits a characteristic which is unique in the marginalist 
tradition: his concern with social reform. In fact he wrote a whole 
book where he discusses socio-economic Issues and possible methods of 
reform (see Jevons, 1883). However, this aspect of his thought was not 
an important factor in the construction of his economic theories. 
As a conclusion It can be maintained that Jevons' work is a 
typical example of a mathematically formulated hedonistic-based 
economic theory. One can discern this if one looks at the main aspects 
of his thought. Jevons defines political economy in terms of pleasure 
and pain. He then develops a theory of pleasure and pain which 
exhibits most of the features of the hedonistic framework. The 
emphasis on the concepts of pleasure and pain and his attempt to 
measure them are always present throughout his work. On the issue of 
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measurement he follows the approach of Bentham but there Is a 
discrepancy in his thought about the existence of a unit of pleasure 
and pain. He goes further than does Bentham's measurement approach by 
constructing diagrams on which he measures the Intensity of pleasure. 
His next step was to define the concept of utility in terms of 
pleasure and also to make the important distinction between total 
utility and the final degree of utility (marginal). However, he Is 
again vague on the crucial issue of interpersonal comparisons of 
utility. He seems to reject the possibility of interpersonal 
comparisons buý there are examples where he implicitly accepts them. 
From his writings one can also discern the formation of the concept of 
economic man (although not explicitly) with a hedonistic psychology. 
Jevons* admits that economics deals with the lower human motives which 
is an indication that he had reservations about the moral version of 
hedonism. On the central issue of the theory of value, he rejects all 
previous attempts to define it In terms of costs, and he defines It In 
terms of marginal utility or indirectly in terms of pleasure. With 
Jevons, there is the start of the dominance of the subjective approach 
to value. His theories of exchange and labour are the practical 
applications of his hedonistic views and of his mathematical, positive 
economic methodology. Moreover, Jevdns is a devoted supporter of the 
application of the method of physical sciences to the sciences 
occupied with the study of mental and social phenomena, and thus to 
economics (see Sevons, 1905b). 
In general, levons' work represents an ideal example of the 
application of hedonistic Ideas (which are integraded with formalist 
methodology) to economics. His work is considered as one of the 
foundation stones of modern orthodox economics and this might, mean 
that his notions of economics as a 'calculus of pleasure and pain' or 
as 'the mechanics of self-interest and utility' were not to be thought 
of as an extreme position, but they were to be shared by an increasing 
number of subsequent economists. With Tevons, hedonism combined with a 
positive methodology was firmly established in mainstream economics. 
Bentham's calculus of pleasure and pain was at its height. 
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4.2.3 L. Walras 
The French economist L. Walras (1834-1910) was one of the three 
originators of the marginalist revolution. Walras' work did not 
receive immediate recognition by contemporary economists, but today he 
is considered to be the most influential of the three (the other two 
being levons and Menger). Most orthodox economists when they refer to 
general equilibrium, derivation of demand curves or to the marginal 
utility-based theory of value, acknowledge the crucial contribution of 
Walras to the development of these concepts. Moreover, mainstream 
economists give credit to Walras as one of the first economists to 
apply mathematical analysis to economics In a consistent manner. 
(Cournot had made the first step to a systematic application of 
mathematics to economics. ) 
From our point of view, Walras represents an important link in 
the chain of development of the hedonistic framework In orthodox 
economics. As we shall discover in this section, Walras' economic 
thought exhibits most of the characteristics of the hedonistic 
framework which can be found in previous hedonistically oriented 
economic theorists. The theoretical basis of his famous general 
equilibrium analysis, the concept of the demand curve and his theory 
of value are all influenced by the hedonistic approach. Moreover, 
Walras' continuous use of mathematical tools represent a vital step In 
the development of mathematical methodology in economics which, as we 
have pointed out, appears to go -together with the hedonistic 
framework. 
Walras published his most important work "Elements of Pure 
Economics" ("Elements d' Economie Politique Pure") in 
_1874, 
three 
years after the publication of Jevons' and Menger's works. Despite the 
obvious similarity of the general approach and the identical Use and 
application of new economic concepts (mainly marginal utility), of 
Walras' work with that of Sevons and to a lesser extent with'that of 
Menger, Walras was not influenced by them. It can be maintained that 
their conceptions of the marginal utility theory occurred 
independently. However, Walras was influenced by his father Auguste 
Walras who also was an economist. As Walras himeself comments in his 
principal work: "I readily acknowledge Gossen's priority with respect 
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to the utility curve and Jevons' priority with respect to the equation 
of maximum utility in exchange, but these economists were not the 
source of my Ideas. I am Indebted to my father, Auguste Walres, for 
the fundamental principles of my economic doctrine" 
(Walras, 1965, p. 37). The main points of Auguste Walras' economic 
thought were the attempt to place "reretd" (marginal utility) Instead 
of labour or cost of production as the source of value, and the 
measurement of raret6. Moreover, he advocated a mathematical economic 
science which would be similar to mechanics, physics, accoustics and 
optics (laffe', 1972, p. 389). 7bus, it can be seen that Walras took from 
his father the general guidelines of his subsequent economic thought. 
All of the above elements of Auguste Walras' work can be found in the 
writings of Leon Walras. 
At the beginning of his work Walres constructs demand and supply 
curves for given commodities. He follows a diagrammmUcal approach 
which Is supported by algebraic expressions of the relationships. 
Walras Is the first economist to use the nowadays familiar diagrams of 




Where OP1a, OP"a etc represent various possible prices; a, a', all 
etc represent quantities demanded (see Walras, 1965, p. 94). It is worth 
mentioning here that Walras does not initially provide a utility based 
explanation of his demand curves but considers them as given. However, 
as we shall see, he was to explain the derivation of demand curves in 
terms of raretd or utility in subsequent chapter. 
His next step is to examine the problem of equilibrium between 
two commodities (A) and (B). He finds out that in order for the market 
to be in equilibrium "it is necessary and sufficient that the 
effective demand be equal to the effective offer of each commodity" 
(Walras, 1965, p. 106). ' The discussion of the problem of exchange of two 
commodities comes next and is expressed in algebraic terms as follows: 
D. F. (p. ) (1) 
Djý Fb (ptý) (2) 
D. v. = Dbvb (3) 
where (1) and (2) are the demand functions of (A) and (B) and v., is 
the value in exchange of one unit of (A) and v, is the value in 
exchange of one unit of (B). Equation (3) determines the equilibrium 
price. Although his analysis here is still at an early stage, one can 
discern the use of algebra and geometry as the main analytical tools. 
After having discussed the above, Walras attempts to derive 
demand curves from utility. In order to do that he needs to give 
specific definitions to economic concepts on which he would base his 
analysis. Thus, in his next chapter entitled "Utility Curves or Want 
Curves. The Theory of Maximum Utility of Commodities", he defines the 
meaning of those basic terms. The following is a summary of his 
discussion. 
Walras recognizes the need to refer to utility as the subjective 
concept necessary for the construction of demand curves. (He was the 
f irst economis to do this; Jevons, for example did not make this 
attempt. ) His approach to utility, however, is somewhat different from 
the contemporary standard textbook analysis. He distinguishes two 
kinds of utility: extensive utility, and intensive utility'. These two 
notions are similar to the contemporary notions of the extensive and 
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intensive margin (see Varlan, 1987, pp. 271-272). Walras associates these 
two conceptions of utility with the slope of the demand curve and this 
can be seen as the first formulation of the concept of elasticity 
(Weilras, 1965, pp. 115,116). According to Walras, both kinds of utility 
are measurable. (Although he has reservations about the measurability 
of the second one, he solves the problem by assuming a "standard 
measure... which is applicable not only to similar units of the same 
kind of wealth but also to different units of various kinds of wealth; 
see Walras, 1965, p. 117. ) 
Walras' next step Is to introduce the term raretd which Is one of 
the most important aspects of his economic thought. This essentially 
corresponds to the final degree of utility that we saw In levons, and 
to the modern term of marginal utility. Walras defines raretd as "the 
Intensity of the last want satisfied by any give quantity consumed of 





Where q on the vertical axis is quantity and r In the horizontal axis 
is raretd. The curve a, acq represents the raretA- curve of a given 
individual. If he consumes quantity Od. of good (A) the "effective" or 
total utility is represented by the area Od. ar.. The whole method of 
reasoning shows that Walras treated raretd as a quantifiable concept. 
As is the case with the rest of marginalist economists, raret6 would 
be used as the basis of a new subjective theory of value. 
The concept of raretd and his previous analysis enables him to 
find the relationship between prices and raretds in a two-commodity 
exchange market. After some pages of mathematical formulations he 
concludes that: 
"Given two commodities In a market, each holder attains 
maximum satisfaction of wants, or maximum effective utility, 
when the ratio of intensities of last wants satisfied (by 
each of these goods), or the ratio of raret6s, is equal to 
the price. Until this equality has been reached, a party to 
the exchange will find it to his advantage to sell the 
commodity the raretd of which is smaller than its price 
multiplied by the raretd of the other commodity and to buy 
the other commodity the raretd of which is greater than its 
price multiplied by the raretd of the first 
commodity. "(Walras, 1965, p. 125) 
Apart from establishing the nowadays well-known equilibrium condition 
of exchange, a number of important points can be observed from the 
above passage. First the concept of maximum satisfaction occupies a 
central position in Walras' thought. It is regarded as the desired, 
the optimum position of an individual. As we shall find out, this 
hedonistic idea is present in every key formulation of Walras' 
theories. Second, in accordance with the hedonistic tradition, Walras 
finds it necessary to establish a method of measurement of marginal 
utility or raretd. We observed the same attempt in his extensive and 
intensive utility. In the above passage he clearly implies the 
existence of a measurement of raret6 by comparing the magnitude of the 
raretds of two commodities. Moreover, as a final but important point 
we should mention that Walras reached the above conclusion through the 
assumption that the individual's objective is the satisfaction of the 
greater possible sum of wants. The assumption serves as an Important 
maximization condition in Walras' mathematical formulations which 
prove the relationship between prices and raretds (Walras, 1965, p. 121). 
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Here, one can discern the hedonistic foundation of the assumption. 
As we noted, the concept of maximum satisfaction can be found in 
all important aspects of Walras' work. Walras, after having analysed 
the general solution of the simple two commodity problem -and 
subsequently the general solution of the multi-commodity problem along 
the same lines- turns his attention to the theory of production. Again 
the general framework of the discussion is similar to the method of 
two commodity equilibrium which is the simplest exhibition of Walras' 
approach. He starts by stating n productive services of land M, 
labour (P) and capital (Q). These are required to produce m 
commodities A, B, C. Thus we have nm technical coefficients (n columns 
of m rows) of the form: 
(a, a., a, ) 
(b.,, b,, b,. .. ) 
(C+., Cp, Cq... ) 
............. 
As in the two commodity equilibrium, he writes the utility functions 
for each individual for n productive services and m consumer goods. 
The form of the utility function is the following: 
r= (q) 
Individuals initially possess a given amount of productive services 
at prices (pp,, p,,... ). The prices of the consumer 
goods are (p,. jpt,, p, =,... ). Then are the quantities of 
the factor services offered, and (d., dt,, d, are the quantities 
demanded of consumer goods. The equation relating quantities and 
prices (budget equation) is: 
o., p,. + o, p, + oý-, pq +. .. =d. p. + dtp6 + d, -pý +... 
The next step is to state the condition of maximum satisfaction which 
as we saw equates marginal utilities (raretds) with prices. This gives 
us n equations for productive services for each individual of the 
form: (equalization of marginal utilities with prices) 
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0, (q, - ot) ptO. (d. ) 
Op(q, - o, ) p, O. (d. ) 
....................... 
The equation for commodity (A) the numeraire, drops out and we have 
m-1 equations for goods of the form: 
0, (d, ý) = p, (D. (d. ) 
(Dý_ (d, -) = p, (%<dý) 
All the above are the basis for constructing individual demand 
functions for consumer goods and individual supply functions for 
productive services. From these we can obtain the market functions (by 
summation). Finally Walras adds two more conditionst market clearing 
for factor markets and equality of unit costs and prices of final 
goods (for a detailed discussion see Walras, 1965, pp. 237-242 and 
Blaug, 1978, pp. 574-579). The above system of simultaneous equations 
will give the solution of the general equilibrium position. This is 
the essence of Walras' basic project which was to establish the 
conditions necessary for market clearing equilibrium. 
Apart from maximum satisfaction, Walras' economic thinking 
exhibits another important assumption; he assumes that there is a 
perfectly competitive market. This assumption has the crucial function 
of facilitating the conception of the economy as a mathematical model. 
These two assumptions are interrelated In a vital way: the existence 
of perfect competition guarantees the maximization of utility or 
satisfaction (see also Stigler, 1950, p. 322). As he. writes: 
"Freedom procures, within certain limits, the maximum 
utility; and since the factors which interfere with freedom 
are obstacles to the attainment of this maximum, they should, 
without exception, be eliminated as completely as possible. " 
(Walras, 1965, p. 256) 
The hedonistic-based objective of maximum satisfaction clearly 
underlies the previous passage. 
As was stated above the assumption of perfect competition Is also 
ideal for the application of mathematical analysis to economics. W. 
Jaffe', the translator of Walras' work and also an established 
authority on Walras' economic thought, gives a summary of the 
Walrasian idea of perfect competitiont 
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"It comes out more clearly in the resume than in the Elements 
that Walras meant by an ideally perfect competitive market 
one in which there is no friction or viscosity in the flow of 
bids and offers to a central point where positive or negative 
excess demand is eliminated prior to the closing of any 
contracts. Contracts are then executed at a unique current 
equilibrium price. The process of elimination of excess 
demand is normally entrusted in the best-organised markets to 
brokers, whose procedures are so mechanical that a 
Icalculateur' (a computer) might have done Just as well, 
though -Walras surmised in 1873- not as quickly. " 
(Saffe', 1972, p. 383) 
The Walrasian concepts of general equilibrium and perfect 
competition, as well as the rest (demand-supply curves, theory of 
value) presuppose the existence of a specific kind of economic agent. 
As is evident the main psychological characteristics of this agent are 
maximization of satisfaction or utility, rationality and self- 
interested behaviour. This sort of psychology -which many would regard 
as a partial if not simplistic view of human nature- fits perfectly 
the requirements of the mathematical approach that Walras followed. 
Let us see some examples where Walras uses the above economic agent 
(he emphasizes the element of maximum satisfaction). In the preface to 
the fourth edition of his "Elements" when he refers to the problem of 
capital formation, he writes: 
All I had to do was first to represent the circulating 
capital as rendering a service of availability, either in 
kind or in money; and then to look upon the offer of all such 
services as coming exclusively from capitalists, and the 
demand as coming, In part, so far as these services are 
consumers' services, from land-owners, workers, and 
capitalists in their pursuit of maximum satisfaction, and in 
part, so far as these services are productive services, from 
entrepreneurs to the extent of their need for certain 
coefficients of production in the form of services of 
availability. " (Walras, 1965, pp. 42,43) 
Here, It can be observed that the conception of all land-owners, 
workers, and capi. talists as pleasure maximizers Is central to the 
theory. The same approach is taken In the process of the discussion of 
utility and prices. In particular, Walras states that if we assume 
that In trading the individual gratifies the greatest possible sum of 
total wants, then raretd should equal prices upon completion of 
exchange (Walras, 1965, p. 121). Again, a pleasure maximizing individual 
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is a vital step to the mathematical proof of a link between prices and 
raretds. Moreover, the other aspects of Walras' economic agent can be 
explicitly revealed by further examples. Specifically, Walras 
corresponded with the well-known French mathematician H. Foincare, an 
the issue of the appropriateness of the application of mathematics to 
economics and especially on the legitimacy of*the cardinal measurement 
of utility or satisfaction. Walras was anxious to know Poincare's 
response to his method of measurement of satisfaction. Poincare 
replied as follows (after having stated that he approves of the use of 
mathematics within certain limits): 
"When I spoke of 'proper limits' that is not all I wanted to 
say. What I had in mind was that every mathematical 
speculation begins with hypotheses, and that if such 
speculation is to be fruitful, it is necessary (as in 
applications to physics) that one be aware of these 
hypotheses. If one forgets this condition, one oversteps the 
proper limits. For example, in mechanics one often neglects 
friction and assumes bodies to be infinitelly smooth. You, on 
your side, regard men as infinitely self-seeking (egoistes) 
and infinitely clairvoyant. The first hypothesis can be 
determined as a first approximation, but the second 
hypothesis calls perhaps, for some reservations. " 
(Jaffe', 1977a, p. 305) 
Thus, the picture of Walras' economic man can be said to consist 
of a pleasure - satisfaction maximizing, rational, selfish, and 
perfectly informed being. The last characteristic is also necessary if 
Walras' general equilibrium theory Is to work (the individual is 
supposed to know any changes in prices). One can observe here that the 
requirement of perfect forsight Is still present in many contemporary 
general equilibrium models (see for instance Stoleru, 1975, p. 11). 
Moreover, the importance of clairvoyance for the concept of general 
equilibrium can be seen in the lantiequllibrium' stance of theorists 
who emphasize uncertainty (i. e Menger). However, before going on we 
have to mention that Walras thought of the economic man concept as 
being applicable only to pure economics. This can be seen in his view 
that "the will of man is free to influence the production as well as 
the distribution of social wealth. The only difference Is that in 
distribution, man's will Is guided by considerations of Justice, 
whereas in production his will is guided by considerations of material 
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well-being" (Walras, 1965, p. 75). This Is relevant to the discussion 
that he undertakes In his subsequent writings where he distinguishes 
'homo oeconomicus' who maximizes his satisfactions by the division of 
labour and exchange from 1homo ethicus' who has sympathy and aesthetic 
sense, understanding, reason and free will, both being blended to 
become 1homo oenonicus' (Bansusan-Butt, 1978, p. 129). However, pure 
economics is only concerned with homo oeconomicus. According to his 
view a higher social science is needed for the study of both homo 
oenonicus and homo oeconomicus. All these points tend to indicate that 
Walras thought of his economic man as a fictional being. However, he 
takes little notice of this in the course of the exposition of his 
economic theory, The whole analysis is conducted in a way that tends 
to show that Walras thought of his assumptions as realistic. In other 
words his notion of a fictional economic man did not have any effect 
on his view of the validity of his economic theory. Before we conclude 
this topic it is worth mentioning the similarity of Walras' Ideas to 
those of Jevons. As was observed, Jevons was not very comfortable with 
his approach to the behaviour of economic agents. Thus it seems, that 
both theorists wanted In a way to compensate for their extreme 
conception of economic behaviour, and that is why they referred to the 
possibility of a higher morality. 
The Walraslan theory of value is similar to that of Jevons; 
depending upon raretd or marginal utility. Like levons, Walras 
discards the labour or cost of production theory of value. In a 
section dealing with a critique of Adam Smith's and T. B. Say' s 
theories of value, he forcefully rejects the ideas of these two 
classical economists: 
"So the theory which traces the origin of value to labour is 
a theory that Is devoid of meaning rather than too narrow, an 
assertion that is. gratuitous rather than inacceptable. " 
(Walras, 1965, p. 202) 
As a typical marginalist, he proceeds to the marginal utility based 
formulation of value: 
"Current prices or equilibrium prices are equal to the ratios 
of the raretds. In other words: Values in exchange are 
proportional to the raret6s. " (Walras, 1965, p. 145) 
Thus, Walras (like Jevons) advocates the marginal utility theory of 
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value which, as can be seen from the preceeding pages Is ultimately a 
pleasure-based theory of value. Again we have a shift from an 
objective (labour, costs) to a subjective (utility) value theory, a 
shift of major importance for the development of economic theory. 
As we have already stated, the use of mathematics Is the 
underlying characteristic of Walrasian economics. Apart from being an 
analytical tool, mathematics is also a vital link in the construction 
of his economic theories starting from hedonistic assumptions. In a 
very indicative and Important passage, Walras outlines his views: 
"It is only with the aid of mathematics that we can 
understand what is meant by the condition of maximum utility, 
for attributing to each trading party an equation or curve 
relative to each consumer's good or service, In order to 
express the raretd, i. e the intensity of the last want 
satisfied, as a decreasing function of the quantity consumed, 
mathematics enable us to see that a given party will obtain 
the greatest possible total satisfaction of his wants if the 
demands and offers in such quantities when certain prices are 
cried that the raret6s of these commodities are proportional 
to their prices upon completion of exchange. " 
(Walras, 1965, p. 43) 
The above demonstrates the close association of hedonistic principles 
and mathematic methodology in Walras' economics, a general 
characteristic of marginalist economics. 
Walras was completely aware of the continued use of mathematics 
in his theory and was prepared to justify it methodologically. He 
believed that mathematics would make pure economics a science of 
absolute exactness like physics or mechanics. He was convinced that 
his treatment would result in a transformation of economics Into what 
he called a 'physico-mathematical science' Uaf f e', 1972, p. 382). For 
him this transformation of pure economics was a perfectly Justifiable 
methodological proposition. 
"In any case the establishment sooner or later of economics 
as an exact science is no longer in our hands and need not 
concern us. It is already perfectly clear that economics, 
like astronomy or mechanics, is both an empirical and a 
rational science. " (Walras, 1965, p. 47) 
We observed the existence of this constant methodological trait in 
almost every hedonist ic-orLenteted economist: the desire to turn 
economics into an exact science like physics. According to our view, 
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one has to place in this context the increasing use of mathematics 
and the methodological demand for a positive economic science. We 
believe that the following methodological ideal of Walras would be 
enthustiastically advocated by a large number of orthodox economists: 
"It took from a hundred to a hundred and fifty or two hundred 
years for the astronomy of Kepler to become the astronomy of 
Newton and Laplace, and for the mechanics of Galileo to 
become the mechanics of d'Alembert and Lagrange. On the other 
hand, less than a century has elapsed between the publication 
of Adam Smith's work and the contributions of Cournot, 
Gossen, Sevons, and myself... Then [in the twentienth century] 
mathematical economics will rank with the mathematical 
sciences of astronomy and mechanics; and on that day Justice 
will be done to our work. " (Walras, 1965, pp. 47,48) 
As it was pointed out at the beginning of this section, Walras 
enjoys a greater familiarity with his work among contemporary 
orthodox economists than levons or Menger. This is a clear indication 
of the influence of his theories (mainly his general equilibrium 
theory) and methods upon subsequent economists. For instance, 
Schumpeter thinks that as far as pure theory is concerned, Walras is 
the greatest of all economists (Schumpeter, 1963, p. 827). More 
analytically, a number of central points of Walrasian economics can be 
found almost intact in the contemporary body of orthodox economic 
theory. As R. Harrod states: "Walras' general theory of commodity and 
factor prices will already be familiar to readers; for it is nothing 
less than what may be called the theory of commodity and factor prices 
as purveyed in any respectable textbook today" (Harrod, 1956, p. 313). 1. 
Hicks and H. C. Recktenwald are another two theorists who place Walras 
as one of the great contributors to the modern 'permanent body of 
established truth" (Hicks and Recktenwald, 1973, p. 262). In addition, a 
number of contemporary equilibrium analysts, expl icitly acknowledge 
Walras' contribution. For instance, K. Arrow and F. Hahn refer to him 
in their "General Competitive Analysis" and M. Allingham in his 
"General Equilibrium" points out that the basic framework of 
equilibrium analysis can be found In Walras' "Elements" (Arrow and 
Hahn, 1971, pp. 3-5, and Allingham, 1975, p. 41). As far as the textbooks 
are concerned, one can find in them many sections very similar to 
Walras' original formulations (see for Instance Chiang, 1984, pp. 46-51). 
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Moreover, the contemporary orthodox theory of value is heavily based 
on Walras' ideas about value. All these demonstrate the great 
importance of his theories in the development of mainstream economics. 
In this section we have discussed the central points of Walras' 
economic thought. It was observed that his work represents an 
important factor in the development process of hedonistically 
oriented economic science with a positive, mathematical methodology. 
(At this point one has to mention that despite the hedonistic basis of 
his ideas, Walras does not refer to Bentham; the explanation may be 
found in the antagonistic attitude of French and British writers 
towards each other at that period. ) Like Jevons, Walras based his 
system on the concept of raret6 or marginal utility which in turn is 
founded on satisfaction or pleasure. Like all hedonistic economists, 
Walras attempted to find a method of measurement of raretd, and 
subsequently treated raret6 as a quantifiable concept. The hedonistic 
orientation of his thought is also shown in his central assumption of 
maximization of utility or satisfaction. This assumption Is of major 
importance, since it serves as the maximization condition for the 
mathematical formulation of his equilibrium theory. The second major 
assumption that Walras makes, perfect competition, is related to the 
first in the sense that perfect competition leads to the maximization 
of satisfaction. The economic agents who compose the traders in his 
general equilibrium are pleasure maximizing, rational, perfectly 
informed and selfish beings. Thus, the psychological characteristics 
of economic man can be found in Walras' economic agents. However, he 
maintains that his hedonistic economic man is appropriate only for 
pure economics, thus advocating in theory (but not in practice), a 
fictional economic man. Moreover, his mathematical, physical science- 
like economic methodology is the bond holding together his economic 
theory. Thus, the essence of Walras' economic approach is: selfish 
individuals seeking to maximize their utility (pleasure) and to 
minimize their disutility (pain) In a perfectly competitive market 
which can be described in mathematical formulations. And the fact that 
he is so widely acknowledged by contemporary orthodox economists 
indicates the influence of the hedonistic framework on mainstream 
economic theory. 
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4.2.4 C. Menger 
The Austrian economist C. Menger (1840-1921) is considered by 
most historians of economic thought to be one of the three originators 
of the marginalist school. However, his influence upon subsequent 
orthodox economists is not so profound as is that of Jevons and 
Walras. Leading mainstream economists regard Menger as the least 
significant figure in the famous marginalist triad. For instance, 
Samuelson declares that "a recent rereading of the excellent English 
translation of Menger's 1871 book convinces me, that it Is the least 
important of the three works [Jevons, 1871, and Walras, 1965, being the 
other two]" (Samuelson, 1966, p. 1756). Menger's unique style of writing 
-long paragraphs, use of ambiguous terms- and his total rejection of 
the use of mathematics, are two obvious obstacles to the enthusiastic 
acceptance of his work by 
ýubsequent 
orthodox economists. Another 
important reason for the limited influence of Menger's thought is the 
fact that he was the 'least marginalist' of the three founders of 
marginalism. His rejection of the notion of equilibrium and his unique 
mathematical methodology distance him from the more or less uniform 
approach of Jevons and Walras. However, the use of the concept of the 
margin in his economic analysis, his subjective theory of value and 
his emphasis upon the analysis of competitive markets are the main 
elements that can Justify his position in the history of the 
development of marginalist thought. 
Even if Menger is today the least influential of the marginalist 
triad, this does not mean that he played a minor role in the history 
of economics. The fact that it was he who systematically introduced 
the new marginalist approach to the German-speaking world, and also 
that he is considered to be the founder of the Austrian school (which 
followed a line of development as a separate school) Indicates the 
importance of his work. The Austrian school has influenced orthodox 
economics to a considerable extent; for instance the rational 
expectations approach to macroeconomics has its roots in Austrian 
thought. 
From our viewpoint, although his thought exhibits some important 
departures from the marginalist framework, Menger's work is of 
interest because he promoted the development of the hedonistic 
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approach In economics. Although his economic thought is less 
hedonistically-oriented than other marginalists one can find the basic 
characteristics of the hedonistic framework. Let us see these basic 
characteristics in detail. 
The two most important works of Menger are first the "Grundsatz 
der Volkwirtschaftslehrell (translated as "Principles of Economics"), 
and second, the "Untersuchungen uber die Methode der 
Socialwissenschaften und der Politischen Oeconomie Insbesondere" 
(translated as "Problems of Economics and Sociology"). In the first 
work, Menger expounds his economic theory (theory of value, theory of 
price, theory of commodity, theory of money). This work appeared in 
1871 almost at the same time of publication as Sevons' "Theory" and 
Walras "Elements". His second work, which dealt with methodological 
problems, appeared in 1883, and it is here that one can find Menger's 
definition of pure economics: 
"The exact theory of political economy is a theory of this 
kind, a theory which teaches us to follow and understand in 
an exact way the manifestations of human self interest in the 
efforts of economic humans aimed at the provision of their 
material wealth. " (Menger, 1963, p. 87) 
In the above quotation one can find two basic elements of Menger's 
approach: 1) the methodological view of economics as an exact science 
and 2) the selfish, (and as we shall discover later, ) satisfaction 
seeking, economic man. 2 In another definition of economics, the 
hedonistic related characteristic of the satisfaction of needs 
Cwants' in modern terminology) Is present: 
"if we sum up what has previously been said together with 
this characterization of the nature of economy, it is clear 
that 'economy' ultimately means that activity by which we 
satisfy our direct material needs with the directly available 
goods. " (Menger, 1963, p. 217) 
Although this. definition is not as explicitly hedonistic as 
Sevons', the key point of all hedonistic theorists, which is the 
satisfaction of wants, is used as the fundamental feature of economic 
activity. Another important observation is that in both definitions, 
Menger refers only to material needs (or wants). It seems that he gave 
more emphasis to material needs which are satisfied by material 
objects, than to non-material needs. According to him the basis of 
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economic activity is the satisfaction of material needs and these 
needs are satisfied by material objects. At this point he is close to 
1. S. Mill who did not accept services as part of wealth. This is also 
related to his notion of first order goods which, although somewhat 
ambiguously defined, tends to include only material goods and not 
services. This issue will be discussed more analytically in the 
section dealing with Menger's theory of value. 
In addition to a hedonistically-oriented definition of economics 
and economic activity, Menger uses a hedonist ical ly-based economic 
agent in his economic theory. First of all, like most economists 
influenced by the hedonistic framework, Menger's economic agent 
exhibits self-interested behaviour. Menger sees self-interest as a 
fundamental characteristic of human behaviour, and above all the 
dominant characteristic in economic activity. Implicit here is also 
the idea that economic motivation determines all other forms of human 
activity. As he points out: 
" Among human efforts those which are aimed at the 
anticipation and provision of material (economic) needs are 
by far the most common and most important. In the same way, 
among human impulses that which impels each individual to 
strive for his well being is by far the most common and most 
powerful. " (Menger, 1963, p. 87) 
It is clear that a selfish individual who is striving for his material 
well-being is the kind of economic agent that Menger has in mind. 
Indeed, in his work "Froblems of Economics and Sociology", Menger, 
views self-interest as a basic idea for theoretical economics, and 
goes on to condemn the representatives of the historical school who 
doubt its validity (see also Hutchison, 1973, pp. 22-37). Menger holds 
that self-interest is basic to economic activities although he does 
not see it as the exclusive factor In other aspects of life. This 
point Is related to his notion of economic man as a fictional rather 
than a real being, following Mill and the other two marginalists. He 
emphasizes this point especially in his second, methodological work: 
"It Ea theory] cannot provide understanding of human 
phenomena in their totality or of a concrete portion thereof, 
but it can provide understanding of one of the most important 
sides of human life. " (Menger, 1963, p. 87) 
Thus, Menger views economic theory as representing only one side of 
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the reality and also the concept of economic man as representing only 
one side of human nature. As was mentioned, this side, the economic 
one, is the most important one. 
In order to support his argument for the role of self interest 
Menger uses the name of Helvetius (Menger, 1963, p. 88). This 
demonstrates the influence of the hedonistically oriented French 
philosopher on Menger. The influence of Helvetius might be the 
possible explanation for Menger's emphasis upon the satisfaction of 
material needs. As we have seen in previous sections, Aristippus and 
Helvetius gave greater emphasis to material pleasures. Another 
description of the behaviour of economic man is given in his 
"Principles": 
-0 
"Wherever men live, and whatever level of civilization they 
occupy, we can observe how economizing individuals weigh the 
relative importance of satisfaction of their various needs in 
general, how they weigh especially the relative Importance of 
the separate acts leading to the more or less complete 
satisfaction of each need, and how they are finally guided by 
the results of this comparison into activities directed to 
the fullest possible satisfaction of their needs 
(economizing). " (Menger, 1950, p. 128). 
Thus, Menger, apart from viewing economic agents as selfish, 
satisfaction maximizers, also attaches rational behaviour to them. Two 
further characteristics are added to complete the picture of economic 
man: infallibility and omniscience (Menger, 1963, p. 84). Here the 
picture of economic man is very close to that of Jevons and Walras. 
Perfectly informed, selfish, and pleasure maximizing are the key 
characteristics of the marginalist conception of economic man. 
Moreover, as in the case of Jevons and Walras, Menger notes that all 
the above characteristics do not describe every aspect of actual 
behaviour. Once more he states that in real life other motives also 
exist (public spirit, love of one's fellow men, custom, feeling for 
Justice), but in order to have an exact science of economics the 
economist assumes as motivations only those mentioned above 
(Menger, 1963, p. 84). This is why he calls them the "dogma of ever- 
constant self-interest, and the dogma of infallibility and 
omnoscience"; terms which signif y that they are arbitrary assumptions, 
Without these assumptions there can be no exact economics with exact 
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laws. In order' to 'Justify this method he provides examples of other 
sciences which make 'similar assumptions (mechanics, mathematics and 
chemistry) (Menger, 1963, pp. 85,86). These points support the view that 
Menger's economic man was a fictional being. 
Before we go on we have to mention M enger's emphasis on 
uncertainty and error. In spite of his previous statements about 
infallibility, Menger paid far more attention to the concepts of error 
and uncertainty than the other two marginalists. In particular, in his 
theoretical work, he' gives considerable stress to the importance of 
uncertainty for economic phenomena. As he points out: "This 
uncertainty is one of the most important factors in the economic 
uncertainty of men, and as we shall see in what follows, is of the 
greatest practical significance in human economy. " (Menger, 1950, p. 71). 
And also: 
"Even individuals whose economic activity is conducted 
rationally, and who therefore certainly endeavor to gain an 
accurate fo , undation 
for their economic activity, are subject 
to error. Error is inseparable from all human knowledge. " 
(Menger, 1950, p. 148) 
Thus It seems that while in his methodological work he was willing to 
exclude error from his economizing individuals, he attached a much 
greater importance to it in his theoretical work. The fact that 
selfishness and pleasure maximization are characteristics that can be 
found In both of his works, while infallibility and omniscience are 
mentioned In the second only, also supports this view. Menger's 
emphasis on uncertainty and error has also to do with his rejection of 
the notion of equilibrium. It is not difficult to see that in a world 
where uncertainty and error are present the notion of equilibrium 
cannot be easily accepted. 
As was noted in the beginning of this section Menger's value 
theory is one of the features of his thought which place him closer to 
the marginalist school. Moreover, the theory of value constitutes a 
crucial part of Menger's most influential work: "The Principles of 
Economics". Menger develops a whole theory of goods and of economy in 
order to arrive at the formulation of his theory of value. His views 
about value also demonstrate the influence of the hedonistic 
framework, 
III 
The cornerstone of Menger's theory of value is his definition of 
a good. According to him a thing can become a good when the four 
following conditions are present: 111) A human need, 2) Such properties 
as render the thing capable of being brought Into a causal connection 
with the satisfaction "of this need, 3) Human knowledge of this causal 
connection, 4) Command of the thing sufficient to direct it to the 
satisfaction of the need" (Menger, 1950, p. 52). Conversely if these 
conditions cease to exist the good loses its character as a good. One 
can observe that the basis of a good is that it is capable of 
satisfying a need. One can discern that the hedonistically related 
idea of maximium satisfaction of wants as the prime objective of man 
is present in the above definition. 
Menger proceeds to separate goods into four orders. The goods of 
the first-order are those that directly satisfy human needs. Menger 
gives some examples of such kind of goods; he mentions, bread, 
beverages, clothes. These consumption goods are the most Important 
because on them depend the second-order goods. The second-order goods 
are those used for the production of the first-order goods and it is 
only through this relationship that they acquire their goods character 
(Menger, 1950, p. 57). Examples of these second-order goods are the 
"labor service of a Journeyman baker, ordinary flour" etc. By the same 
principle, the third-order goods are those that are used for the 
production of the second-order goods. The example that Menger gives in 
this case, are the grain mills, wheat, rye, and labour services 
applied to the production of flour (Menger, 1950, p. 57). Finally, the 
fourth-order goods are used for the production of the third-order 
goods. According to Menger, examples of fourth order goods are fields 
for the cultivation of wheat and rye, instruments and appliances 
necessary for their cultivation, and specific labour services of 
farmers (Menger, 1950, p. 57). One can note here that only first order- 
goods which directly satisfy needs have direct value. Values of higher 
order goods are imputed. Clearly this is the reverse of the cost of 
production theories of value. 
Menger's analysis of the concept of good shows that for - him 
consumption goods (first order) are those that are directly 
responsible for the satisfaction of human needs. And as we observed 
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from Menger's examples the first-order goods are mainly material 
goods. Services are only first mentioned In the description of the 
second order goods. This leads again to the point that Menger 
emphasized material needs and their satisfaction by material goods. 
Services can be second, third or fourth order goods, and as we saw the 
criterion for the characterization of such order of goods Is their 
remoteness from the direct satisfaction of human needs. This line of 
thought is another Indication of the influence on Menger of the 
hedonistic framework. 
Having stated Menger's theory of goods we can now proceed to the 
rest of the basic elements of his value theory. Menger starts the 
chapter on value by emphasizing the purely subjective nature of value; 
"Value is therefore nothing inherent In goods, no property of 
them, but merely the Importance that we first attribute to 
the satisfaction of our needs, that is, to our lives and 
well-being, and in consequence carry over to economic goods 
as the exclusive causes of the satisfaction of our needs. " 
(Menger, 1950, p. 116) 
A purely subjective, satisfaction-based definition of value Is thus 
the starting point of Menger's value theory. In addition, as is 
implied by the definition, only economic goods have value. The 
economic goods also possess another characteristic that enables them 
to have value: utility. Menger identifies utility as the capacity of a 
thing to serve for the satisfaction of human needs 
(Menger, 1950, p. 119). Thus, he follows the tradition of all 
hedonistically- oriented economists, from Senior to Gossen and Jevons, 
who defined utility in terms of satisfaction or pleasure. 
The next step for Menger is the attempt to find some kind of 
measure of value. And as, according to him, value depends on 
satisfaction, he starts from a discussion of the magnitude of 
satisfactions, Here one can again discern the familiar need for all 
hedonistic inspired theorists to find some kind of measure of pleasure 
or satisfaction. As we have seen this need is always present In the 
development of the hedonistic Ideas, from Aristippus to the 
marginalist economists. In a very indicative passage, Menger maintains 
that: 
113 
11 ... it is above all a fact of the most common experience that 
the satisfactions of greatest importance to men are usually 
those on which the maintenance of life depends, and that 
other satisfactions are graduated in magnitude of importance 
according to the degree (duration and Intensity) of pleasure 
dependent upon them. " (Menger, 1950, p. 122) 
And after few lines, he goes on to explain: 
"With the same intensity, they will prefer pleasures of 
longer duration to pleasures of shorter duration, and with 
the same duration, pleasures of greater intensity to 
pleasures of less intensity. " (Menger, 1950, p. 123) 
Apart from the apparent idea that pleasures can be measured, the 
quotation is a further indication that Manger viewed individuals as 
pleasure maximizers. Moreover, he seems to suggest that men actually 
behave this way which means that he advocated psychological hedon Ism. 
We must also point out that in his description of fictional economic 
man, Manger did not doubt the Issue of maximum satisfaction which is 
another indication of his preference for psychological hedonism. (As 
was seen he was doubtful about the prevalance of other motives in 
other sides of life, the non-economic ones. ) Again, in the above 
quotation, one can not avoid noticing the similarity of Manger's 
terminology to that of Bentham. 
In his attempt to measure satisfaction, Manger proceeds to give 
numerical examples of magnitudes of the satisfaction that different 
goods yield. In the table that he constructs, he compares the 
magnitudes of satisfaction of different goods by using a scale for 
satisfactions (Menger, 1950, p. 127). Thus, he completes his attempt of 
evaluating through measuring satisfaction. 
As we have already seen, this analysis of value is purely 
subjective, based only on each individual's level of satisfaction. 
Manger wanted to add an objective factor too In his theory of value. 
This objective factor is the availability or supply of the goods. 
However, this factor plays a secondary role in the determination of 
value. As he writes: 
"Accordingly, in every concrete case, of all the 
satisfactions secured by means of the whole quantity of a 
good at the disposal of an economizing individual, only those 
that have the least importance to him are dependent on the 
availability of a given portion of the whole quantity. Hence 
the value to this person of any portion of the whole 
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available quantity of the good Is equal to the importance to 
him of the satisfactions of least importance among those 
assured by the whole quantity and achieved with an equal 
portion. " (Menger, 1950, p. 132) 
One can also observe the use of the term 'least importance' which has 
the same meaning as the established term 'marginal'. Menger did not 
use the nowadays universally accepted term marginal In either of his 
books. 
Like the rest of the marginalists, Menger emphasized the 
erroneous character of every non-sat isf act ion-based theory of value. 
More specifically, he dismissed the labour and cost of production 
theories of value. He devotes a whole section in which he stresses the 
absolute validity of the subjective theory of value. He points out: 
"The determining factor in the value of a good, then, is 
neither the quantity of labor necessary for its production 
nor the quantity necessary for its reproduction, but rather 
the magnitude of importance of those satisfactions with 
respect to which we are conscious of being dependent on 
command of the good. " (Menger, 1950, p. 147) 
As we noted in the beginning of this section, Menger's value theory is 
one of the points held in common with the rest of the marginalists. 
Indeed, Menger's theory is an important link in the chain of 
development of a hedonistic, subjective theory of value. 
The manner of exposition of the above theories Is different than 
that of Jevons and Walras. The most distinctive characterisitic of 
Menger's. methodology is the absence of mathematics. He rejected the 
use of mathematics on methodological grounds. In order to understand 
this particural methodological stance, we have to mention some of his 
ideas concerning economic investigation. Menger's conception of 
economic theory can be characterized as essentialist, meaning that he 
was interested about the general nature and the general inter- 
connections of economic phenomena (Menger, 1963, p. 37). He accused other 
economists of dealing with the linguistic image of economic concepts 
and not with their essence. In short, Menger thought that the object 
of economic research was to discover those laws governing market 
phenomena which can be traced back to their ultimate genetic 
determinants in man's physiological, psychological and social nature 
(Jaffe, 1976, p. 522). The method by which we can trace the ultimate 
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nature of economic phenomena is called by Menger the "analytic- 
compositive method". Mathematics can not serve the above purpose and 
so their use in economics is not appropriate (they can only describe 
functional relationships). The only concession that he made in this 
respect was that mathematics might be a method of presentation (see 
Menger, 1973, p. 52). 
As well as the above, other points of Menger's economic 
methodology, and also his general views about the methodology of 
social sciences, can be found In his second book "Problems of 
Economics and Sociology". The main arguments of this work are directed 
against the German historical school of economics. The emphasis on 
induction, the rejection of the absolute character of economic laws, 
the resistance to accept stereotyped models of human behaviour (ie 
economic man) and generally the 'holistic' approach, were the basic 
features of the methodology of the German school. The deductive, 
physical-science oriented methodology of Menger was clearly at odds 
with that of the historical school. Menger's hostility towards the 
historical method is characteristic of this particular work. (The 
methodological discussion between Menger and the historical school 
became known as "Methodenstreit". ) 
Like most of the hedonistically- oriented economists, Menger held 
that economics can be as exact a science as the physical sciences 
(mechanics, chemistry etc. ) are. As he writes: 
"The high value of these 1 aws for the theoretical 
understanding of the economic aspect of social phenomena has 
already been stressed by us repeatedly, as well as their 
formal nature is no different from that of the laws of all 
other exact sciences and of the exact natural sciences 
particularly. " (Menger, 1963, p. 218) 
Again like most of the previous economists that we discussed, Menger 
viewed physics as the Ideal science and the prototype for economics. 
Unlike Jevons and Walras who, as we saw, believed that it was only a 
matter of time for economics to be an exact science like physics, 
Menger believed that economics had already the status of an exact 
science (provided that theories are based on the 'dogmas' or the 
assumptions that we discussed). An Indication of the above is his 
continuous reference to physical sciences as an example in his 
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analysis of economics as an exact science (Menger, 1963, pp. 85-88). 
However, we must emphasize his caution that exact economics can only 
provide us with the theoretical understanding of a special side of 
social phenomena. Moreover, it should be mentioned that Menger thought 
of economics as an exact science only when the initial assumptions 
hold. It seems that this idea was similar to the problem faced by 
physical sciences: the outcomes hold only when the Initial conditions 
(laboratory) hold. 
Before we conclude, we have to point out again that Menger's 
thought, aside from these similarities, had some points of difference 
from the marginalist conceptual framework. The first, as we have 
noted, is his emphasis on uncertainty and error at least in his first 
work. The second which is related to the first, is the introduction of 
time in his economic theories. As M. Alter observes: 
"The introduction of time as essential, as an ontological 
element in his 'exact' theories, has two consequences: On the 
theoretical level it introduces uncertainty at the very basis 
of economic theory and therefore emphasizes the Importance of 
gathering Information. " (Alter, 1982, p. 154) 
The third important point of difference from the rest of the 
marginalists Is his rejection of the concept of equilibrium which was 
basic in Jevons and especially in Walras' thought. The reason for this 
rejection was his notions of uncertainty and error which clearly do 
not facilitate the Idea of equilibrium. Also the emphasis on 
historical rather than on mechanical time, can be seen as another 
reason for his rejection of equilibrium. Some economists have desribed 
Menger's economics as process economics with unintended consequences 
leading to further actions (Loasby, 1976), and others as disequilibrium 
economics (Streissler, 1973, p. 178). The crucial point here, however, is 
that the concept of equilibrium was alien to his thought. 
As a conclusion we can point out that although Menger is the 
'least marginalist' of the hedonistic oriented marginalist school, his 
thought represents another link in the development of the hedonistic 
influence on mainstream economics. His definition of economics in 
terms of satisfaction of wants is the first indication of the above. 
Menger's economic man is described in his methodological work as 
selfish, pleasure maximizing, perfectly informed and rational. In his 
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theoretical work the last two characteristics are de-emphasized, and 
error and uncertainty are brought into account. In both works, Menger 
pointed out that economic man was a fictional being corresponding only 
to a part of human behaviour. In spite of this however, the fact that 
he supported the universal character of pleasure maximization as a 
human characteristic, Indicates his preference for psychological 
hedonism. (Fleasure maximization is never thought of as an abstraction 
like the other characteristics of economic man, but it is treated as a 
permanent, realistic feature of behaviour. ) Menger's theory of value 
depends again on the satisfaction of wants. Like other marginalists, 
Menger rejected any labour or cost of production based theory of 
value. In accordance with the hedonistic tradition, he attempted to 
find a measure of satisfaction. The fact that his attempt was made In 
terms of Intensity and duration of pleasure and also his construction 
of a scale for measuring the different magnitudes of satisfaction, 
shows the influence of the Benthamite calculus. Another common point 
with the marginalists and generally with hedonistically oriented 
economists was his methodological view of physical-science-type 
economic methodology. It has to be pointed out however, that his 
economic thought differed in some respects from the marginalist 
framework. His emphasis upon historical time, uncertainty and his 
rejection of mathematics, and of the concept of equilibrium, are the 
main points of difference from the marginalist orthodoxy. One might 
state the above as the main reason for Menger's lesser influence on 
subsequent mainstream theory. An additional reason for his lesser 
impact on subsequent orthodox economists Is his less explicit 
hedonistic basis of his theories. This can be seen as an additional 
sign of the continuous influence of this framework on orthodox 
theorists. (As we shall see this was the case with Marshall's 
theories. ) 
In general, although his hedonism was less explicit, Menger 
assisted the development of hedonistic ideas especially among German- 
speaking economists. (His polemic against the more open, non- 
hedonistic approach of the historical school of economics is an 
indication of the above. ) The hedonistic basis of economic man and the 
satisfaction based theory of value are the most Important 
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contributions of Menger to the promotion of the hedonistic framework 
to economics. 
With the discussion of Jevons, Walras and Menger, we complete our 
examination of the first marginalist generation. The Impact of the 
marginallst ideas became Increasingly, though gradually pronounced. 
This was assisted by the publication of works which promoted the 
Benthemite ideas. One good example of such author was Sidgwick who 
provided philosophical grounding for the new term utility (see 
Sidgwick, 1874). The next generation of theorists was to become known 
as the second marginalist generation to which we now turn our 
attention. 
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4.3 SECOND MARGINALIST GENERATION 
4.3.1 A. Marshall 
Some years after the publication of the works of Jevons, Walras 
and Menger, the marg1nalist doctrine commenced its gradual dominance 
in orthodox economics. A. Marshall (1842-1924) was one of most 
influential figures of the period (late nineteenth, early twentieth 
century) who followed the marginalist analysis. Marshall's main work 
"Principles of Economics" was widely read and used as a textbook 
during the above period. However, Marshall can in no way be considered 
as a typical representative of marginalist thought. As we shall see, 
although one can find important elements of marginalism, such as 
developing demand analysis by using the concept of marginal utility, 
one can also find some points in his work which clearly lie outside 
the marginalist paradigm. (For Marshall, marginalism was largely the 
principle of continuity. ) With this in mind we can understand the 
characterization of Marshall as the "odd man out" of the marginalist 
school. 
Marshall's thought played a peculiar role In the development of 
the hedonistic approach to economics. In his work, passages that are 
of hedonistic origin can be found alongside passages that explicitly 
reject the hedonistic framework. However, as one can Judge from the 
subsequent development of mainstream economics, the influence of 
Marshall's non-hedonistic side was minimal in comparison to the 
influence of the other aspects of his thought. 
Even from the opening pages of his "Principles" one notes the 
particuliarity of Marshall's approach. The first paragraph supplies 
the definition of economics: 
"Political Economy or Economics is a study of mankind in the 
ordinary business of life; it examines that part of 
individual and social action which is most closely connected 
with the attainment and with the use of material requisites 
of wellbeing. " (Marshall, 1961, p. 1) 
In this definition, Marshall does not mention the usual terms, - such 
as satisfaction of wants or maximization of pleasure, that can be 
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found in most hedonistically- oriented economists. His definition 
involves the element of social action, too. In the above definition, 
Marshall speahs about the business part of life and about the material 
requisites of well being. These points can be found in most orthodox 
definition of economics. However, he is anxious to Include another 
element In the definition of economics. Immediately after the first 
paragraph he writes: 
Thus it [economics] is on the one side a study of wealth; and 
on the other, and more important side, a part of the study of 
man. " (Marshall, 1961, p. 1) 
The study of man is thought by him to be more important than the study 
of wealth. This is a clear departure from the established view of most 
hedonistically-based definitions of economics. 
Marshall's treatment of the concept of economic man follows the 
same path as his definition of economics: one can find some points 
which are of marginalist character and also some explicit refutations 
of marginalist, views. More specifically, in the chapter dealing with 
consumers' demand, he conceives human nature in the same way as the 
rest of the marginalists: 
"There is an endless variety of wants, but there Is a limit 
to each separate want. This familiar and fundamental tendency 
of human nature may be stated in the law of satiable wants or 
of diminishing utility thus: The total utility of a thing to 
anyone (that is, the total pleasure or other benefit It 
yields him) increases with every increase in his stock of it, 
but not as fast as his stock increases. " (Marshall, 
1961, p. 93) 
This passage has no serious differences from the respective treatment 
of diminishing total utility of the main representatives of the 
marginalist school. The same holds for the identification of utility 
with pleasure. However, in another section one can discern a clear 
rejection of the narrow, hedonist Ical ly-based concept of fictional 
economic man. In a passage which is worth quoting at length, he points 
out: 
"In all this we deal with man as he is: not with an abstract 
or $economic' man; but a man of flesh and blood. They 
[economists] deal with a man who is largely influenced by 
egoistic motives in his business life to a great extent with 
reference to them; but who is also neither above vanity and 
recklessness, nor below delight in doing his work well for 
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its own sake, or in sacrificing himself for the good of his 
family, his neighbours, or his country; a man who is not 
below the love of a virtuous life for its own sake. They deal 
with man as he is: but being concerned chiefly with those 
aspects of life in which the action of motive is so regular 
that it can be predicted, and the estimate of the motor- 
forces can be verified by results they have established their 
work on a scientific basis. " (Marshall, 1961, p. 27) 
Although Marshall is ready to accept the existence of egoism as the 
most powerful motive in the business part of life, he rejects the 
artificial being (fictional economic man) of J. S. Mill and of the 
marginalists. Moreover, the fact that he Insists on treating man as he 
is, and that he takes into account other motives like altruism and the 
love of virtuous life indicates the extent of his reservations about 
the use of fictional hedonistic economic man. This disagreement is 
connected with his mistrust of economic abstractions as potentially 
misleading. (As we shall see later this point Is related to his ideas 
on mathematics. ) 
Clearly, Marshall's view of human nature is much broader than 
that of the previous orthodox economists whom we discussed. This 
broader view of Marshall Is not restricted to the methodological level 
but is a vital part of his economic theory. As Whitaker states: 
"Normal action is always to be viewed as the consequence of all 
motives, not the economic one alone -a consideration which is 
particularly important in the theory of factor supply" 
(Whitaker, 1977, p. 196). However, this does not mean that Marshall did 
not apply in any of his theories the concept of the maximizing 
consumer. As we saw, in his analysis of demand, he uses a much less 
broad view of human nature. As P. O'Brien points out: "Marshall's 
utility analysis, which involved the theory of the maximizing 
consumer, clearly comes after the demand curve and owes a good deal to 
Jevons" (O'Brien, 1981, p. 41). 
In his "Principles" Marshall expressed some views concerning the 
philosophy of hedonism and especially the hedonism of Bentham. His 
critique is conducted in terms of the necessity of an independent 
principle if hedonism is to become a complete ethical philosophy. As 
he writes: 
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"It may be noted that some followers of Bentham (though 
perhaps not Bentham himself) made this large use of 'pain and 
pleasure' serve as a bridge by which to pass from 
individualist hedonism to a complete ethical creed, without 
recognizing the necessity for the introduction of an 
Independent major premiss; and for such premiss the necessity 
would appear to be absolute, although opinions will perhaps 
differ as to Its form. " (Marshall, 1961, p. 17n) 
One cannot help observe the difference of Marshall's attitude towards 
Bentham and utilitarianism from that of the English founder of 
marginalism, Jevons. As was noted in the section dealing with Jevons, 
he embraced every aspect of utilitarianism without any reservations. 
In addition to this critique, Marshall advocated a refined version of 
utilitarianism. A great number of pages in his "Principles" refer to 
the higher faculties of man; to his higher motives other than those of 
preserving his physical wellbeing; to the necessity of education, in 
general, to human progress. As Birch emphasizes: "In the final 
analysis, Marshall's vision of progress consisted of people deyeloping 
new and better wants and activities than satisfying the existing ones" 
(Birch, 1985, p. 195, but see also Jensen, 1985). 
However as we pointed out in the beginning, one can also find in 
Marshall's work elements of the hedonistic approach. For instance In 
the mathematical appendix to the book, Marshall bases his analysis 
upon the assumption of the maximization of pleasure. As in Sevons and 
Walras, the central point of his mathematical exposition is marginal 
utility. In the Mathematical Appendix, a number of issues which are 
today part of every orthodox microeconomic textbook can be found: the 
analysis of the elasticity-of demand, consumer surplus, utility and 
disutility of labour etc. These nowadays familiar concepts are 
products of Marshall's work, especially the elasticity of demand and 
the consumer surplus. His manner of presentation of these issues is 
very similar to Jevons and Walras. For example in Note Il of his 
appendix he states: 
"If m is the amount of money or general purchasing power at a 
person's disposal at any time, and ýL represents the total 
utility to him, then d)i/dm represents the marginal degree of 
utility of money to him. 
If p is the price which he is just willing to pay for an 
amount x of the commodity which gives him a total pleasure u, 
then 
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du Ap = Au, and du e= du &d-- - 
dm dm dx dx 
If p' is the price which he is Just willing to pay for an 
amount W of another commodity, which affords him a total 
pleasure u', then 
dýL el = du' 
dm dx' dx' 
and therefore 
e: gipl = du : du' 
dx dxl dx dxl 
(Marshall, 1961, p. 838) 
As can be observed, the method and assumptions (measurability of 
pleasure) of the above analysis are typical of the marginalist - 
hedonistic analysis. 
However, in contrast to Sevons and Walras, Marshall makes this 
analysis only in an appendix. This is related to his position on 
mathematical methodology which we shall see later, and also with his 
doubts concerning hedonistic assumptions. More specifically, he is 
cautious to emphasize from time to time that most results like the 
above "belong to Hedonics and not properly to Economics" 
(Marshall, 1961, p. 841). This is a very Important point because it 
demonstrates that Marshall had serious reservations about the approach 
of the marginalists. It is evident that an economic theory based on 
hedonistic assumptions and expressed in abstract terms was not 
considered by Marshall as proper economics but as hedonics. 
As one would expect, Marshall's theory of value differs from the 
common approach of Jevons, Walras and Menger. As was observed, the 
three founders of marginalism. based their value theory on marginal 
utility. They also rejected categorically every labour, cost of 
production based theory of value. Marshall takes into account both 
marginal utility and cost of production in the determination of value. 
Moreover, time plays a decisive role in the theory, because it 
determines the share of each of tfie two factors in the final 
determination of value. 
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"Thus we may conclude that, as a general rule, the shorter 
the period which we are considering, the greater must be the 
share of our attention which is given to the Influence of 
demand on value; and the longer the period, the more 
important will be the influence of cost of production on 
value. " (Marshall, 1961, p. 349) 
More analytically, utility has a greater significance in the 
determination of value in the short run. The short run value are the 
market values. The normal values which are the long run values are 
influenced more by the cost of production. (Marshall believed that in 
the long run the cost of production is steadily declining because of 
the growth of knowledge and organization thus helping to improve the 
condition of the people. ) Marshall's idea of including the cost of 
production in the determinants of value indicates once again his 
unique position in the development of orthodox economic theory. At 
this point he Is closer to the classicals -Smith, and Ricardo- than 
to the contemporary marginalist approach. Moreover, Marshall (again in 
accordance with the classicals) uses the term costs of production for 
real costs, not for money costs or opportunity costs: "The 
businessman is concerned with money costs; but the evaluation of 
normal value with real costs". (Marshall, 1961, p. 350). His emphasis on 
the real costs 
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of production distance him from the subjective, 
pleasure-based theory of value which -was one of the main 
character issytics of the marginallst school. However, Marshall's theory 
of value was not to have any substantial influence on the course of 
the mainstream theory. The simple hedonistic oriented theory of value 
would prevail. As B. Loasby points out: 
"Marshall's own theory [value] was found much too difficult 
by his successors, who replaced its elaborate structure with 
a plain and simple doctrine. 'f (Loasby, 1978, p. 2) 
Apart from the theory of value, another major theoretical 
departure from the marginalist framework was Marshall's partial 
equilibrium analysis. In contrast to Jevons and especially to Walras, 
Marshall rejected the conception of the economy as being in a general 
equilibrium. His emphasis upon historical time and his willingness to 
accept complex interrelationships between various markets may be the 
explanation for his partial equilibrium approach. (The emphasis on 
historical time and the rejection of equilibrium were also observed in 
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Menger's thought. ) Marshall always believed that adjustments in the 
market take time -time was also one important determinant of normal 
value- and this meant that he rejected a general equilibrium model, 
like that of Walras, which did not allow much scope for historical 
time. Again at this point Marshall is closer to the classical views 
than to marginalist ones. As S. Dow writes: 
11 ... [Marshall's Principles] attempted to express marginalist 
theory as a progression from Ricardian theory, i. e. to 
restore a theoretical consensus; and indeed Marshall's 
partial equilibrium framework (contrasting with Walras's 
general equilibrium framework) was designed to preserve the 
capacity to relate theory to developments in historical 
time. " (Dow, 1985, p. 53) 
Marshall' methodology is also different from that of most 
marginalists (with the exception of Menger). In contrast to the 
methodology of most hedonistically-oriented economists, Marshall did 
not consider economics as an exact or as a physical-science-like 
discipline. He saw the changing character of human nature as the main 
reason that economics cannot be an exact science. As he writes: "But 
of course economics cannot be compared with the exact physical 
sciences: for it deals with ever changing and subtle forces of human 
nature" (Marshall, 1961, p. 14). Marshall sees analogies of economics 
more with biology, than the established analogy with mechanics. His 
belief in the dynamical or evolutionary nature of economic phenomena 
is another methodological reason for the rejection of the general 
equilibrium model. As he points out in the preface of his 8th edition 
of the "Frinciples", the term equilibrium suggests something of a 
statical analogy" (Marshall, 1961, p. xiv). 
A related point of his methodology was his serious reservations 
about the use of mathematics in economics. As can be observed from the 
previous pages, the mathematical approach started to dominate 
mainstream economics with the emergence of marginalism. (Menger was 
again the exception. ) The marginalists' simple hedonistic model of 
economic man assisted the mathematical approach to economics and vice- 
versa. Marshall, though a mathematician himself, was very reluctant to 
use mathematics In his work. Only in footnotes and appendices did he 
present the mathematical exposition of his theories. Moreover, he had 
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expressed his methodological reservations in the following way, as 
described by his student A. C. Pigou: 
"Though a skilled mathematician, he used mathematics 
sparingly. He saw that excessive reliance on this instrument 
might lead us astray in pursuit of Intellectual toys, 
imaginary problems not conforming to the conditions of real 
life; and further, might distort our sense of proportion by 
causing us to neglect factors that could not easily be worked 
in the mathematical machine. " (Pigou, 1925, p. 84) 
This reluctance to use mathematics can be connected with his concern 
about the damage wreaked by abstraction. Indeed, it seems that 
Marshall regarded utility maximization as a useful abstraction in 
economics, but was also worried about its damaging effects. Thus he 
attempted to limit the damage by relegating mathematics to appendices 
and by emphasizing the potential risks of a formalist methodology. It 
is evident that the use of mathematics and economic man are of a 
diminished significance within the body of his work. However, as we 
shall see, Marshall's partial marginalist approach would become 
widespread in the work of subsequent economists. 
Marshall is a unique figure In the development of orthodox 
economic thought. One can find the main elements constituting 
mainstream economics in his work. For instance, the basis of his 
demand theory is a consumer who maximizes his satisfaction. Also 
present are: the use of the concept of pleasure; the assumption of Its 
measurability in the analysis of various economic Issues (especially 
in the mathematical appendix); and the use of mathematical methodology 
in the footnotes and in the mathematical appendix. All these aspects 
place Marshall in the position of an important mainstream theorist, 
and that is the image that most orthodox. economists have of him. But 
as was noted, this Is only a partial picture of his thought. An 
essential part of his work can be recognized as not falling into the 
mainstream hedonistically- oriented framework. His explicit rejections 
of the conception of man as a selfish and pleasure maximizing; the 
critique of the hedonistic philosophy; the combination of marginal 
utility. with the cost of production in his theory of value; the 
emphasis on partial and not on general equilibrium-, the desire to 
create betterwants and not just to satisfy the existing ones; and the 
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more open methodology; are all aspects which do not promote Marshall's 
image as a marginalist economist. However, the contemporary use of his 
economic ideas <mainly demand theory) without any reference to 
Marhall's qualifications and reservations, shows that mainstream 
economists have totally neglected most of his non-hedonistic, non- 
marginalist points. This very important point provides strong evidence 
about the influence of the hedonistic frameork on orthodox economics. 
The fact that those aspects of Marshall's work which did not fit the 
hedonistic programme were ignored, rejected or distorted Is a clear 
indication of overall hedonistic Influence. 
From our point of view, Marshall's work as an entirety does not 
fit in the hedonistic framework. However, the fact that subsequent 
economists adopted only those parts that fitted this framework, and 
thus assisted the further development of the hedonistic approach, 
demonstrate clearly its dominance in orthodox economics. 
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4.3.2 F. Y. Ed7eworth 
A. Marshall's critical and sceptical approach towards the 
h edonistic-oriented marginalist school did not have any considerable 
Inhibiting influence upon the subsequent development of the hedonistic 
framework in economics. In contrast, the writings of F. Y. Edgeworth 
(1845-1926) (a contemporary of Marshall) gave new momentum to the 
adoption of hedonistic ideas by orthodox economists. Moreover, the 
profound mathematical character of his methodological approach (in 
great contrast with that of Marshall as shown above) reinforced the 
idea that a mathematical methodology and the hedonistic framework are 
the optimum combination for orthodox economics. 
Edgeworth's thought were explicitly rooted in Bentham's 
philosophy of utilitarianism. Moreover, the ideas of Tevons played a 
key role in the development of his views. By developing this 
hedonistic background, Edgeworth was able to formulate his theories of 
taxation, foreign trade and production, and above all his contract and 
indifference curves. Indeed, Edgeworth's utility functions and 
contract curves constitute the basis of modern mainstream approaches. 
The most important work of Edgeworth is the "Mathematical 
Psychics" with an indicative subtitle: "An Essay on the Application of 
Mathematics to Moral Sciences". In the first pages of this book, 
Edgeworth gives the definition of economics: 
"For Economics investigates the arrangements between agents 
each tending to his, own maximum utility; " 
(Edgeworth, 1881, p. 6) 
First of all, one can observe the reduction of economics to the study 
of selfish, hedonistic behaviour (catallactics). His emphasis upon 
maximum utility as the central characteristic of economics is in 
accordance with the definitions given by marginalist economists 
(Jevons, Walras, Menger, etc). Moreover, this emphasis can be found in 
modern orthodox definitions. Edgeworth saw all social sciences as 
having a basic common feature: all their Inquiries can be viewed as 
maximization problems (Edgeworth, 1881, p. 6). The intention of Edgeworth 
Is to draw attention to the analogy between the maximization 
principles of physics and the principle of maximization of pleasure or 
129 
utility in the social sciences, and particurarly In economics. As he 
emphatically points out: 
"An analogy is suggested between the Principles of Greatest 
Happiness, Utilitarian or Egoistic, which constitute the 
first Principles of Ethics and Economics, and those 
Principles of Maximum Energy which are among the highest 
generalizations of Physics... " (Edgeworth, 1881, p. v) 
Apart from the methodological implications of the above passage -which 
we will discuss later in this section- one can also discern its 
utilitarian philosophical basis. Indeed, throughout his book, 
Edgeworth mentions several times Bentham and his philosophical system. 
He calls Bentham "great" and he uses the key notions of utility or 
pleasure as the foundation stone of his theoretical framework. He 
distinguishes between the two principles of utilitarianism in the same 
way as Bentham had: a) the principle of utility which refers to the 
individual level and b) the Greatest Happiness Principle which refers 
to the social level. As is stated In the above quotation, the 
(utilitarian) first principle is that which in Bentham's terms 
corresponds to the Greatest Happiness Principle (the second 
formulation of the Utility Principle; see section on Bentham). The 
second principle is the Egoistic one which corresponds to Bentham's 
(individual) first formulation. The starting point of "Utilitarian 
Ethics" Is the Greatest Happiness Principle. The "calculus of 
pleasure" can be subdivided into Economics and Utilitarin ethics, each 
one based on different hedonistic principles. In Edgeworth's words: 
"Such are some of the preliminary considerations by which 
emboldened we approach the two fields into which the Calculus 
of Pleasure may be subdivided, namely Economics and 
Utilitarian Ethics. The Economical Calculus investigates the 
equilibrium of a system of hedonic forces each tending to 
maximum individual utility; the Utilitarian Calculus, the 
equilibrium of a system in which each and all tend to maximum 
universal utility. " (Edgeworth, 1881, p. 15) 
Thus, according to Edgeworth, economics can be reduced to a system of 
economic calculus which Is based on the egoistic maximization of 
pleasure. This conception is essentially identical to Jevons' 
statement that economics is a calculus of pleasure and pain. As we 
observed, the hedonistic oriented definition of economics occupies a 
central position in both theorists. 
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As with most 
present in Edgeworl 
but it is implicit 
all hedonIstically 
man as a self ish, 
states: 
marginalist economists, economic man is again 
. h's work. He does not mention the term explicitly 
throught his book. Naturally, as Is the case with 
oriented economists, Edgeworth conceives economic 
pleasure maximizing being. As he categorically 
"The first principle of Economics is that every agent is 
actuated only by self-interest. " (Edgeworth, 1881, p. 16) 
However, it must be noted that the selfish motive is supposed to 
dominate the economical calculus only. In the utilitarian calculus, 
the agent is thought to be more benevolent in order to maximize 
universal utility. In both cases, man Is conceived as a "pleasure 
machine" (Edgeworth, 1881, p. 15). 
The distinction between the agent of economic calculus and the 
agent of utilitarian calculus, indicates that Edgeworth viewed 
economic man as a fictional being. In fact, he believed that the real 
agent is something between the two. As he writes: 
"For between the two extremes Pure Egoistic and Pure 
Universalistic there may be an indefinite number of impute 
methods; wherein the happiness of others as compared by the 
agent (in a calm moment) with his own, neither counts for 
nothing, not yet 'counts for one', but counts for a 
fraction. " (Edgeworth, 1881, p. 16) 
In contrast to the selfish motive, Edgeworth thinks of the 
maximization of pleasure (either one's own or all) as the fundamental 
characteristic of human nature. Moreover, he is ready to use the 
abstraction of a selfish, pleasure maximizing economic agent in his 
theories. This is again a point of contrast with Marshall's explicit 
rejection of the use of fictional economic man in economics. 
Edgeworth's conception of utility is similar to Bentham and 
Jevons. Following Jevons closely, he states that utility has two 
dimensions: time and intensity. Then, the issue of the existence of a 
utilltyýpleasure unit comes into the scene. 
"The implied equitability of time intensity units, 
Irrespective of distance in time and kind of pleasure, is 
still imperfectly evolved. Such is the unit of economical 
calculus. " (Edgeworth, 1881, p. 7) 
Edgeworth realizes the need of having a pleasure/utility unit (, even 
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if he accepts its imprecise nature, ) for the subsequent development of 
his mathematical approach. For the economic calculus a two 
dimenslonial unit is adequate, but as he states: "For moral calculus 
a further dimension is required; to compare the happiness of one 
person with the happiness of another, and generally the happiness of 
groups of different average happiness" (Edgeworth, 1881, p. 7). At this 
point, he introduces interpersonal comparisons of utility. As has been 
noted, comparability of utilities is a characteristic of 
utilitarianism. As we saw, even Jevons was very reluctant to accept 
interpersonal comparisons of utility. This fact indicates Edgeworth's 
adoption of an extreme form of utilitarianism-hedonism. 
In other parts of his work, Edgeworth becomes more explicit in 
the Issue of the unit of pleasure. As he points out: 
"We must then carefully consider this possibility, or, what 
is much the same thing, the existence and nature of a unit of 
pleasure. There is no doubt, much difficulty here, and the 
risen science is still obscured by clouds; and hedonism may 
still be in the state of heat or electricity before they 
became exact sciences, as described by Professor Tevons. 11 
(Edgeworth, 1881, p. 98) 
As was observed, Sevons thought that the discovery of a unit of 
pleasure and pain was only a matter of time. By the same reasoning, 
Edgeworth hopes that hedonics would someday become an exact science. 
The difficulties concerning the exactness of a unit of pleasure 
do not prevent Edgeworth from stating in a categorical way the 
measurability of pleasure: 
" Ax i om: Pleasure is measurable and all pleasures are 
commensurable; so much of one sort of pleasure lef t by one 
sentient being equatable to so much of other sorts of 
pleasure left by other sentients. " (Edgeworth, 1881, p. 59) 
Again as all hedonists, Edgeworth discusses the issue of measurability 
of pleasure. As can be seen, the mathematical minded Edgeworth solves 
the problem by accepting it as an axiom. 
The unit of pleasure or utility, the interpersonal comparisons of 
utility and the axiom of measurability of pleasure are all integrated 
in Edgeworth's utilitarian calculus or moral arithmetic. To these 
points, he adds another assumption, viz: that some people are more 
capable of pleasure than others: "An individual has greater capacity 
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for happiness then another, when for the same amount whatsoever of 
means he obtains a greater amount of pleasure" (Edgeworth, 1881, p. 57). 
These four points constitute the bases for the solution of the 
following problem : "To find a) the distribution of means and b) of 
labour, the c) quality and d) number of population, so that there may 
be the greatest possible happiness" (Edgeworth, 1881, p. 56). After 
stating a number of postulates such as "the capacity of pleasure and 
the capacity for work generally speaking go together" and by using 
pleasure-based terms such as "megisthedone" (representing a plane of 
capacities and means to pleasure), Edgeworth arrives at results like: 
The happiness of the present generation may be symbolized: 
J-3co' n[F(xy) - cyldx + cD 
where n Is the number of people, F(xy) is a unit of pleasure of 
consumption, x is the capacity for pleasure, y is the means, x, Is the 
highest existing degree of capacity, x,, is the abscissa of emigration, 
and D is the given distribuend. 
The happiness of the next generation was represented as: 
f--: [n (F (xy) - cy) 1 dx + cD 
(Edgeworth, 1881, pp. 72,74) 
One can here observe the combination of hedonism and mathematics in 
its extreme form. Although a great number of contemporary orthodox 
theorists would discard this highly abstract and unrealistic approach, 
it shows the extent of the influence of the hedonistic framework among 
leading marginalist economists of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. 
As was noted earlier, Edgeworth did not need the assumption of 
interpersonal comparisons of utility and of the different capacities 
for pleasure in his economical calculus (although, as we shall see, he 
allowed interpersonal comparisons in his taxation theory). A purely 
selfish, pleasure maximizing agent was adequate for him. Moreover, the 
measurability of utility was another necessary assumption. With the 
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above given, Edgeworth proceeds to supply the equation of his famous 
contract curve between two Individuals, two goods trading under 
perfect competion: 
dp dn - dp dn =0 dx dy dy dx 
(where p and n the utilities of individuals A and B and x, y the 
portions of commodities exchanged) 
The locus of points that have the above property is the contract 
curve. In modern terminology these points are called Pareto optimal 
points. Edgeworth adds that his contract curve holds under the 
following conditions: 
IlD that the pleasure-energy of X and Y considered each as a 
function of (certain values of) the variables x and y should 
be functions of the same values... ii) that the joint team 
should never be urged in a direction contrary to the 
preference of either individual; " (Edgeworth, 1881, p. 24) 












Where Ia and lb are indifference curves of A and B Individual, and cc' 
is the contract curve. This is also known as Edgeworth box diagram; 
although nowhere In "Mathematical Psychics" can one find the above 
diagram. (Professor Jaff6 believes that the origin of the Edgeworth 
box diagram can be found in Pareto's writings, see 
Jaff6,1974, pp. 343,344. ) Later on, the contract curve is expanded to 
several persons and several goods. Its general form Is (we have m 
contractors and n equations of this form for n variables): 
II dP, + LzdRn + 1,,, dP- =0 
dx, dxl dx, 
where 11,12... are indeterminate multipliers, P are the utilities of 
individuals, and x are the subjects of contract (goods). Edgeworth's 
formulae of exchange have the same basis as those of contract curve: 
utility m5ximization and selfish agents. As he himself writes, his own 
formula 
F, x (x, y) =y 
F' y (X, y) x 
is a more general form of Jevons'. It shows that maximum satisfaction 
is attained when the ratio of exchange Is inversely proportional to 
the ratio of marginal utilities, (see Edgeworth, 1881, p. 104). This 
again indicates the continuity of the marginalist approach along the 
same theoretical guidelines. 
His theory of taxation is also developed along the marginalist- 
hedonistic framework. For instance he states that "the condition that 
the total net utility produced by taxation should be a maximum then 
reduces to the condition that the total disutility should be a 
minimum" (Edgeworth, 1925, p. 103). Moreover, in his taxation theory 
Edgeworth allows interpersonal comparisons of utility. As was 
observed, this assumption was necessary for his utilitarian calculus 
but not for his economical calculus. However, in the taxation theory 
(stated in his "Papers") this assumption is reintroduced in economics. 
"Practically, I think, - in order to apply A2 -to show for 
instance, that the richer class should contribute a larger 
sum of money G do not say a larger proportion of income) -we 
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must pressupose the sumpathetic comparison of wants and 
feelings experienced by different persons. " 
(Edgeworth, 1925, p. 235) 
(In the introduction of his first work, he had equated the meaning of 
the word 'feeling" with those of pleasure and pain, p. D. 
As was stated in the beginning, Edgeworth's methodology is 
extremely mathematic. As was the case with Sevons and Walras, 
Edgeworth thought that the application of mathematics to economics 
would make economics an exact science. The ideal example of exact 
science was physics. (Again this view is commom among most 
hedonistically oriented economists. ) Edgeworth Is more specific In 
stating the parallel points between economic and physics. The most 
important point was that 'energy', which Is the basic concept in 
physics, corresponds to pleasure, the basic concept in economics 
according to Edgeworth. 
"The application of mathematics to the world of soul Is 
countenanced by the hypothesis (agreeable to the general 
hypothesis that every physical phenomenon is the concomitant, 
and in some sense the other side of a physical phenomenon), 
the particular hypothesis adopted in these pages, that 
pleasure is the concomitant of energy. Energy may be regarded 
as the central idea of Mathematical Psychics; " 
(Edgeworth, 1881, p. 9) 
Edgeworth was the first economist to draw such a close parallel 
between physics and economics. Jevons and Walras had spoken about the 
"mechanics of utility and self-interest", but none had identified 
maximum energy with maximum pleasure. In another more general 
statement, Edgeworth reveals his methodological ideal for economics; 
an ideal which seems to have occupied the thoughts of all hedonistic 
theorists: 
"Mecanique Sociale may one day take her place along with 
Mecanique Celeste, throned each upon the double sided height 
of one maximum principle, the supreme principle of moral as 
of physical science. As the movements of each particle, 
constrained or loose, in a material cosmos are continually 
subordinated to one maximum sum-total of accumulated energy, 
so the movements of each soul, whether selfishly isolated or 
linked sympathetically, may continually be realising the 
maximum energy of pleasure. " (Edgeworth, 1881, p. 12) 
Thus, the tradition of a physical-science-I Ike economic methodology 
based on hedonistic principles is at its height in Edgeworth's work. 
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The relationship between a mechanistic, mathematical methodology and 
hedonistic principles -especially that of hedonistic economic man- Is 
best shown in Edgeworth's words: 
11 ... at least the conception of Man as a pleasure machine may 
Justify and facilitate the employment of mechanical terms and 
mathematical reasoning in social science. " 
(Edgeworth, 1881, p. 15) . 
Again, to our knowledge, Edgeworth was the first hedonistic economist 
explicitly to declare this crucial point. The relationship of the 
hedonistic approach with the mechanistic economic methodology is 
essential for the understanding of the development of the influence of 
the hedonistic framework on economics. 
Edgeworth's views concerning the work of the classical economists 
also indicate the main points of his thought. For instance he realizes 
the "greatness of Benthad', but he points out that the "principle of 
the greatest happiness... lost its meaning, by the addition of the 
'greatest number"' (although he realized the value of the Greatest 
Happiness principle as such) (Edgeworth, 1881, p. 118). As was seen, his 
view that some people have greater capacity for pleasure than others 
led him to his reservations about the 'greatest number'. Moreover, his 
enthusiastic comments about Sevons' theory of value, show his belief 
in the subjective, marginal utility based value theory 
(Edgeworth, 1881, p. 118). Although he accepts the substantial 
contributions of Catrnes, he points out that he might have achieved 
more if he had used mathematical forms (Edgeworth, 1881, p. 119) 
Edgeworth's economic analysis had considerable influence on the 
subsequent development of orthodox economic theory. As was observed, 
his indifference and contract curves are the foundations of the 
theory of exchange, and this is still acknowledged by contemporary 
orthodox theorists (see for instance Varian, 1987, p. 481). Moreover, his 
more general formulation of Tevons' utility functions facilitated the 
development of the theory of consumer behaviour. His discussion of 
taxation theory in terms of equal sacrifices (marginal utilities) set 
the basis for the modern orthodox theory of taxation. In addition, his 
contributio n to the theory of production was the emphasis upon the 
distinction between average and the marginal product which later led 
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to the identification of the optimum position. 
Edgeworth's work represents another link In the development of 
the Influence of the hedonistic framework on mainstream economics. 
The definition of economics in terms of pure selfish maximization of 
pleasure, was the first indication of his extreme hedonistic views. 
The distinction between the calculus of pleasure to Economical 
Calculus, and to Utilitarian Calculus -the first examining the 
egoistic maximization of pleasure- demonstrates again the hedonistic 
nature of his thought. As with most hedonistic economists, Edgeworth 
used a selfish, pleasure maximizing economic man. As Tevons, Walras 
and Menger, Edgeworth's economic man Is a fictional being. His extreme 
emphasis on the universal character of pleasure maximization shows 
that he advocated psychological hedonism. His insistence on the 
existence of a unit of pleasure or utility and of measurability of 
pleasure (hedonometry, according to him) is again the commom point of 
almost all hedonistic theorists since ArIstippus. The theoretical 
formulations of Edgeworth exhibit the hedonistic nature of his 
approach. More specifically, his utility functions, contract and 
Indifference curves, and exchange theory are based on the concept of 
selfish maximization of utility by the economic agents. In addition 
interpersonal comparisons of utility -an assumption of his Utilitarian 
Calculus- are Introduced into the theory of taxation. 
Edgeworth's economic methodology is an ideal manifestation of the 
combination of the mechanistic, mathematical approach with hedonistic 
principles. More extreme than Jevons and Walras, he identifies the 
concept of maximum energy of physics with that of the maximum pleasure 
of economics. By admitting that the conception of man as a pleasure 
machine facilitates the application of mechanistic and mathematical 
terms in economics, he proceeds to express mathematically the 
"happiness of the present and future generations". As Edgeworth 
himself declares his ideal is the identification of 'Mecanique 
Celeste' with 'Mecanique Sociale'. This shows the attempt of 
marginalist economists to transform economics Into an exact science 
like physics, through greater quantification and stricter adoption of 
hedonistic principles. These ideas found their best expression in the 
work of Edgeworth. 
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4.4 CONCLUSION 
Having entered the classical school with the work of Bentham, the 
hedonistic tradition continued in the marginalist school of economics. 
As was observed in this chapter, the hedonistic approach was 
increasingly strengthened and also found its ideal combination with 
the formalist methodology. Thus, the marginalist school represents the 
height of the hedonistic approach in orthodox economics. In 
Edgeworth's work, with which we closed our discussion of the 
marginalist period, the continuous line of development of the 
hedonistic ideas can be discerned: from ancient Greeks and Helvetius 
to-Bentham and classical economics and then to the marginalist school 
through Gossen and especially through Jevons. 
More specifically, in this chapter we examined the works of 
Gossen, Jevons, Walras, and Menger (first marginalist generation) and 
Marshall, and Edgeworth (second generation). These economists are 
considered to be the main representatives of marginalist economics. We 
found that all of the above theorists (with the exception of Marshall 
who is a unique case) have some important theoretical and 
methodological points in common. These common points again demonstrate 
the continuity and the profound Influence of the hedonistic framework. 
From Gossen, the most important forerunner of marginalism, up to 
Edgeworth, one can identify the following common points. The use of 
the concepts of pleasure, satisfaction or enjoyment (all conceived as 
equivalent), as basic to the study of economics; the definition of 
utility in terms of pleasure or satisfaction; the belief In the 
measurability of pleasure or utility and the attempt to find some 
method of measurement; the emphasis on psychological hedonism, 
(although Gossen's and levons' thought had an element of moral or 
ethical hedonism too, ); the use of a hedonistically oriented economic 
agent. More specifically, economic man is conceived as a) pleasure 
maximizing, b) selfish and c) rational. Moreover, in most cases the 
assumption of perfectly or well informed man is also present 
explicitly (Walras) or implicitly (Sevons, Edgeworth). The next common 
point is the fact that they all conceived economic man as a fictional 
being which means that they followed Mill's concept of economic man as 
a hypothetical construction. However it can be maintained, that their 
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conviction in and persistent emphasis on the pleasure maximizing 
character of economic man, indicates that they saw maximization of 
pleasure as a general characteristic of human nature. A subjective, 
pleasure based theory of value is another universal aspect Of 
marginalist economists. The new theory of value is one of the most 
important theoretical consequences of the adoption of hedonistic 
ideas. The categorical rejection of the cost of production or labour 
based theories of value demonstrates the subjective, psychological 
nature of the marginalist theory of value. 
Another crucial common point of the marginalist economists was 
the adoption and development of a formalist economic methodology, 
(Menger can be seen as an exception at this point. ) The underlying 
idea was that the combination of hedonistic views and of mathematical 
methodology would help the advancement of economics towards an exact 
science. The ideal exact science for marginalist economists (Menger 
Included) was physics. The combination of a mathematical methodology 
with the hedonistic approach reached its peak in Edgeworth's work. 
Moreover, his assertion that the conception of man as a pleasure 
machine facilitates the application of mathematical methods to 
economics describes In a representative way the intentions of 
marginalists. 
Marshall was the. exception -to the general trend of the 
development ' of a hedonistic oriented economic science. His 
reservations about the use of a pleasure maximizing, selfish economic 
agent and his theory of value based on marginal utility but also costs 
of production, are two crucial indications of his unique approach. 
However, the fact that contemporary and subsequent orthodox economists 
adopted and developed only those elements of his work that fitted in 
the hedonistic framework demonstrates the limited influence of his 
non-hedonistic ideas on orthodox economists. Conversely, this 
phenomenon, (that important aspects of Marshall's work which did not 
fit the hedonistic programme were ignored or rejected, ) is a very 
strong indication of the hedonistic influence on orthodox theory. 
In sum, the general characteristics of the marginalist school of 
economics are: the dominance of the concept. of pleasure in economic 
definitions; the central position in the theory of the pleasure-based 
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concepts of utility or marginal utility; the treatment of utility or 
pleasure as something measurable; a pleasure maximizing, selfish and 
rational economic agent; a subjective, utility based theory of value; 
and a physical science-like economic methodology. To these points one 
can add the emphasis on the study of microeconomics, the general 
equilibrium approach (except for Menger) and the use of marginal 
utility as the basic analytical concept of economic theory. 
From the above points one can discern the continuity of the 
hedonistic framework in the thought of marginalist economists. The 
marginalist school with its elaborate approach and the formalization 
of hedonistic behaviour, represents the highest stage of the Influence 
of the hedonistic ideas on orthodox economics. And as was noted, the 
work of Edgeworth would be the peak of this stage. His thought 
represents the ideal exposition of the hedonistic philosophy through a 
mathematical methodology, which meant the identification of maximum 
pleasure with the Idea of maximum energy of physics. 
After Edgeworth, there was a change In tone. The two main reasons 
for that change were the intense criticism by heterodox schools of 
economic thought (eS the historical school, ) and the growing influence 
of positivist phil osophies of science, which gave momentum to the idea 
of the construction of a psychology-free, positive economic science. 
Thus, after Edgeworth, orthodox economists would start attempting to 
diminish the apparent- hedonistic orientation of their science. The 
object of the next chapter will be the discussion of these 
developments. 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 4 
1) Walras defines extensive utility as: 
"[the first kind of utility] we shall call extensive utility, 
because it Is found in the capacity of the particular kind of 
wealth under consideration to fill wants that are more or 
less extensive or numerous, depending upon the number of 
people that feel them and the strenght with which they feel 
them -in a word, because more or less of the commodity would 
be consumed even If no sacrifice at all had to be made to 
produce It. " (Walras, 1965, p. 115) 
Furthermore, Walras views extensive utility as something that can be 
measured. As he writes: 
"Furthermore, extensive utility is a measurable quantity, 
inasmuch as it consists in the quantity that will be taken at 
the price zero, and this quantity can be measured. " 
(Walras, 1965, p. 115) 
Walras maintains that the first kind of utility is simple and absolute 
in the sense that it affects only the demand curves of each commodity 
(A) or (B). More analytically, the extensive utility of commodity (A) 
affects only the demand curve of (A) and the extensive utility of 
commodity (B) affects only the demand curve of (B). 
The second kind of utility is defined by Walras as another type 
of utility of the commodity which will be called Intensive utility 
because: 
"it is found in the capacity of this type of wealth to fill 
wants that are more or less intense or urgent in proportion 
to the number of people who continue to feel these wants and 
the persistence with which each person feels them 
notwithstanding the expensiveness of the commodity -in a 
word, because the magnitude of the sacrifice- which must be 
made to procure it affects the quantity consumed of the 
commodity. " (Walras, 1965, p. 116) 
2) Menger's notion of economics as an exact science is different from 
the one commonly understood. The basic difference Is that this exact 
science does not yield many specific predictions because actions 
depend on subjective assessments. This is associated with the general 
emphasis on subjectivity which characterizes Manger and the Austrian 
school in general. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE ATTEMPT TO DOWNPLAY HEDONISM 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter, we discussed the main aspects of Ahe 
economic thought of the most important representatives of the 
marginalist school. It was noted that with the emergence of this 
school, the hedonistic framework was further strengthened and became 
one of the dominant influences on orthodox economics. Moreover, it was 
seen that marginalist economic thought represented the ideal 
combination of the hedonistic approach with a mathematical, physical- 
science-like methodology. A hedonistic oriented conception of the 
nature of economics (calculus of pleasure and pain), a hedonistic 
oriented economic man (pleasure maximizer), a pleasure-based theory of 
value and a highly abstract, formalistic methodology were the basic 
characteristics of orthodox economics during the marginalist period. 
Thus, seventy years after Bentham's "An Introduction to the Principles 
of Morals and Legislation", hedonism had established itself as a 
fundamental conceptual framework of mainstream economics. 
As was observed in the previous chapters, hedonistic Ideas had 
entered classical economics with the work of Bentham; however, their 
influence became very profound in the marginalist theories. During the 
late period of the marginalist, school the hedonistic orientation of 
economics was so apparent that, after Edgeworth's extreme hedonistic 
economic theory, a need started to arise for a lower profile of the 
hedonistic approach. According to our view, the main reason for this 
was the increasing influence of the positivist methodologies which 
called for a social science without philosophical or psychological 
elements. This fact was reinforced by heterodox economists' critique 
of the philosophical and psychological content of hedonism. But let us 
see the above in more detail. 
In the letter half of the nineteenth century, positivism 
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gradually emerged as the dominant scientific philosophy. More 
analytically, positivism originated in the beginning of the 
nineteenth century with the work of A. Comte, and continued with R. 
Congreve and G. Lewes in Britain, and E. Littre and P. Laffitte in 
France (Brehier, 1968, pp. 287-303, and Lewes, 1878, pp. 10-26). The 
starting point of positivism was the enormous success of physics as a 
science. Positivism took the methodology of physics as the Ideal. The 
logical conclusion of a classical physics methodology was the 
rejection of metaphysical elements as non-scientific. This would 
become the basic methodological characteristic of positivism and 
especially of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century 
positivism. In particular, this branch of positivism placed more and 
more emphasis on the scientific basis of assumptions of theories. (As 
was observed, the positivist influence of the late classicals and 
marginalists did not discourage them in accepting the hedonistic 
premises. ) 
Marginalist economics had a physical-science-type methodology but 
with hedonistic Ideas as a basis. The latest branch of positivism 
called for a formalist methodology but without the philosophical or 
psychological connotations (given the fact that psychological 
knowledge was thought to be incomplete and therefore not appropriate 
for assumptions; again this was related to the belief in superiority 
of physics In comparison to other disciplines). The increasing 
influence of positivism led to attempts towards the minimization of 
the hedonistic profile of orthodox economics. Moreover, this tendency 
was reinforced by the heterodox economists' attacks an the hedonistic 
nature of mainstream theory. 
Thus, towards the end of the nineteenth century, there were the 
first signs of economic works which tried to minimize the profound 
hedonistic orientation of economic theory. The works of P. Wicksteed, 
V. Pareto and I. Fisher can be seen as the f irst attempts in this 
direction. For instance, Wicksteed's explicit reservations about 
hedonism, Pareto's use of "given" (and thus allegedly neutral) 
indifference curves, and Fisher's critique of the concept of utility, 
are indications of the above tendency. However, it must be noted, that 
during this period there was not any major essential change in the 
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content of mainstream economic theory, and this gives us af irst 
indication that hedonism remained an underlying influence on orthodox 
economics. (This might also Indicate the Impossibility of eradicating 
philosophical or Ideological influences from economics. ) 
For a detailed discussion of the above mentioned points, this 
chapter will start with the work of Wicksteed. Wicksteed was the main 
influence on the thought of Robbins who, as we shall see, set the 
methodological framework for a psychology-free economic theory. 
Pareto's ideas (the main representative of the new positivist spirit) 
will be examined In the following section. (Also we will discuss 
briefly the thought of M. Pantaleoni who is considered to be the main 
influence on Pareto. ) A discussion of Fisher's views will close this 
chapter. 
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5.2 P. WICKSTEED 
P. Wicksteed (1844-1927) Is not considered to be one of the major 
figures in the history of economic analysis by most historians of 
economic thought. However, from our point of view, he played an 
important role in the development of the Influence of hedonism on 
economics, for two reasons. The first was that Wicksteed's Ideas 
represent the starting point of the attempt to downplay hedonism. The 
second was that his views influenced his disciple L. Robbins, who was 
one of the first theorists to set the methodological basis for an 
allegedly value-free economic science, a crucial turning point In the 
development of the influence of hedonism on economics and also in the 
development of orthodox economics as a whole. 
Wicksteed's economic thought Is very similar to that of the 
marginalists and especially to Jevons. His analysis is conducted In 
terms of marginal utility; however, he does not use mathematics to the 
same extent as Jevons. As E. Paul writes: "He expressed Jevons' 
complex formulas in ordinary language, thus rendering them more 
accessible to those less schooled in advanced mathematics" 
(Paul, 1979, p. 222). As we shall see, his economic arguments, which he 
develops In his most important works, are essentially marginalist. In 
spite of this, he attempts to fight the idea that hedonism is a 
crucial influence on marginalist economists. Thus, after some sections 
where he describes the basic elements of the marginalist approach, he 
declares: 
"Nothing that has been said in this chapter must be taken as 
committing the author to a hedonistic theory of ethics. " 
(Wicksteed, 1933, p. 434) 
It is clear that Wicksteed was anxious to counter the idea that his 
economic theories are based on hedonism. He devotes a number of pages 
to trying to eliminate the role of hedonism in his work, by 
referring to higher pleasures (Wicks teed, 1933, pp. 431-435). At this 
point it Is interesting to note Wicksteed's conception of "higher 
pleasures". It seems that he considers material enjoyments as lower 
pleasures and artistic or spiritual enjoyments as higher pleasures. 
According to him, lower pleasures are hedonistic and higher pleasures 
are non-hedonistic. Moreover, he does not consider as hedonistic the 
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sacrificies and suffering that someone might endure for the purpose of 
some religious or social end. After making this distinction, he 
emphasizes that his "general principles do not presuppose a hedonistic 
theory, but are equally applicable to any other" 
(Wicksteed, 1933, pp. 433-435). However, as we shall see, his analytical 
framework is hedonistic (maximization of pleasure, use of the 
concepts of pleasure and pain, satisfaction diagrams etc. ). This is 
one of the first explicit denials of hedonism by an orthodox 
economist. Before we go on to examine Wicksteed's claims to a non- 
hedonistic economic theory, it would be useful to mention his ideas 
about the important issue of economic man. 
Wicksteed's views about economic man are not in line with 
mainstream marginalism. The new element was his rejection of the 
concept of fictional economic man. This rejection had to do with the 
meaning of positive economic theory. Wicksteed thought that an 
economic science which does not include all psychological 
considerations and has no universal laws Is not a positive science. He 
thinks that all psychological considerations that actually bear upon 
the production, distribution, etc, of wealth must be included in 
economics if It Is to become a positive science 
(Wicksteed, 1933, p. 770>. Again one can observe the new element of this 
period, which is the increasing influence of positivist thought. In 
the same spirit, he Insisted that economic laws were not an exclusive 
set of rules which apply only to the economic behaviour of human 
beings, but that their validity was of a general nature. As he 
explicitly states: 
"This brings the economic conduct of man under the same laws 
as his conduct in general, and promises to give us the wider 
basis of which we are in search. " (Wicksteed, 1933, p. 771) 
Clearly, this is a divergence from the established line of marginalist 
thought which, as we have discussed, viewed economic laws as dealing 
with a specific sphere of human activity. As would be expected, the 
above points led him to dismiss the concept of fictional economic man: 
"the psychological law that dominates economics dominates life" 
(Wicksteed, 1933, p. 780). This position puts him in complete opposition 
to Mill's hypothetical economic man and to the fictional economic man 
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of the marginalists. In this respect, he is closer to Senior and 
Marshall. (Marshall insisted on including all motives which act with 
force and regularity. ) 
The rejection of the concept of fictional economic man might mean 
that Wicksteed applied hedonism more extensively than marginalists; 
but let us try to see if there are elements of the hedonistic approach 
in Wicksteed's economic thought. 
Wicksteed's starting point In his economic analysis is the Idea 
of differential satisfaction which corresponds to marginal utility. He 
analyses total and marginal satisfaction by using diagrams, as the 
marginalists did. He attaches a positive sign to pleasure and a 
negative sign to pain. His whole approach implies that the 
maximization of pleasure or satisfaction is a standard and observable 
thing (Wicks teed, 1933, pp. 415-417). Apart from this point, which is 
closer to psychological hedonism, Wicksteed also advocates moral 
hedonism. After some pages, in the same book ("The Common Sense of 
Folitical Economy", ) he writes: 
"We must therefore cultivate the power to endure such 
undesired experiences as are unattainable, with the minimum 
of suffering, and to derive the maximum of satisfaction from 
the realization of things desired. " (Wicksteed, 1933, p. 421) 
Although the phrase "things desired" might include -for Wicksteed- 
non-hedonistic considerations (altruism, moral ends), the important 
point here is that the whole manner of analysis is based on the 
hedonistic programme. Furthermore, his failure to distinguish between 
psychological or moral hedonistic principles can also be seen from the 
fact that he wishes to include all psychological data whether facts or 
principles (Wicksteed, 1933, p. 770). 
The above point brings us onto another characteristic of 
Wicksteed's conception of human nature, namely rationality. He 
maintains that human decisions are mainly rational, and rational 
estimations are carried out unconsciously. He gives some examples of 
ordinary behaviour which display an unconscious rationality when 
undertaking decisions. As he concludes: "but to say all this is merely 
to say that our scale of preferences often asserts itself 
automat ical ly" (Wicksteed, 1933, p. 35). Wicksteed uses here a term - 
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scale of preferences- which was to become central In the subsequent 
theory of consumer behaviour. In another passage he emphasizes the 
underlying rationality of decisions: 
"That Is to say, if we are moderately wise we pretty 
generally act without reflection In the manner which 
reflection would have dictated. " (Wicksteed, 1933, p. 36) 
Although he expresses some reservations about the correctness of these 
decisions, Wicksteed holds that generally human behaviour is 
rational'. As will be observed, this rationality assumption would 
become central in subsequent economic theories. 
On the issue of egoism, Wicksteed adopts a different position 
from the marginalists. He thinks that selfish and altruistic behaviour 
are both equally acceptable in economics. He condemns the exclusion of 
altruistic motives from the study of economics by previous economists 
(Wicksteed, 1933, p. 179). However, he maintains that in business 
transactions another situation arises. More specifically, in a 
bargaining situation the agents might think of their interests (ego) 
or of the interests of others (family, friends: alteri) but they do 
not think of the interests of their trading partner (tu). Thus, 
according to him, "the specific characteristic of an economic relation 
is not its 'egoism' but its 'non-tuism' (Wicksteed, 1933, p. 180). This 
elaboration of the selfish orientation of economics does not prevent 
him from stating that "after all, 'altruism' has no place in business, 
and 'non-tuism' is equivalent to 'egolsm"'. (Wicksteed, 1933, p. 180). The 
reservations of Wicksteed to accept openly the selfish nature of 
economic agents can be traced to his Christian background. (Wicksteed 
was a clergyman. ) According to our view, this background was. the main 
reason for his objection to an abstract, pleasure maximizing, selfish 
economic man. However, as we shall see in the following pages the 
above theoretical reservations about selfish Individuals in economics 
does not prevent him from constructing his theory along marginalist 
lines (, especially those of Sevons). 
Like most of the previous orthodox economists, Wicksteed 
discusses the issue of measurement of satisfaction. As was noted in 
the beginning, his economic theory is essentially based on 
marginalism, and thus, the measurability of satisfaction is necessary 
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for the development of his economic analysis. In his first book 
entitled "Alphabet of Economic Science" one can read-. 
"... a curve must theoretically exist which assigns to every 
conceivable quantity of a given commodity the corresponding 
total satisfaction to be derived by a given man from its use 
or possesion. " (Wicksteed, 1888, p. 14) 
In his second book, he construct diagrams which are like those of 
Jevons, k1alras and Edgeworth. The diagram which follows Is an example: 
x 
Figure 5.1 
On the Y-axis rates of satisfaction are measured, and on the X-axis 
the supply of any commodity per unit of time Is measured. The area 
OPP, X, represents the rate of total enjoyment per unit of time 
(Wicksteed, 1933, p. 415). 
It is clear that the manner of exposition resembles closely the 
marginalist one. In this section, Wicksteed even uses the "strong" 
terms of pleasure and pain instead of the "softer" ones satisfaction 
and suffering. 7bus, at this point he is closer to the hedonistic 
terminology which was used by most hedonistic-oriented economists, 
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Again, as was common to most previous hedonistic theorists, 
Wicksteed attempts to find a unit of satisfaction, with which one 
could measure different kinds of satisfactions. As he declares: 
"The representation of a given satisfaction by an area of any 
kind, whether rectilinear or curvilinear, involves by 
implication the conception of a unit to which different 
satisfactions can be reduced, and in which they can be 
expressed for diagrammatic comparison with each other. " 
(Wicksteed, 1933, p. 440) 
Like Jevons, he was convinced of the existence of such a unit, since 
the mind can compare pleasures. Along the same lines, he accepts the 
difficulty of finding such a unit, but he implies that satisfaction is 
the same case as the case of heat. As he points out (in considerable 
resemblance to Jevons): 
"Meanwhile, It may be observed that. since satisfaction is 
certainly capable of being 'more' or 'less', and since the 
mind is capable of estimating one satisfaction as 'greater 
than' or 'equal to' another, it cannot be theoretically 
impossible to conceive of such a thing as an accurate 
measurement of satisfaction, even though its practical 
measurement should always remain as vague as that of heat was 
when the thermometer was not yet invented. " 
(Wicksteed, 1888, p. 15) 
The implication here is that some time in the future the science of 
economics will be able to invent a method of accurate measurement of 
satisfaction as physicists invented the thermometer for the 
measurement of heat. In the section which dealt with Jevons we 
observed the same idea in his discussion of the measurement of 
pleasure. 
Up to this point it can be seen that Wicksteed's economic 
analysis exhibits the main points which characterized the hedonistic 
basis of marginalist economics. Specifically, his marginal utility 
based economic approach, with the use of diagrams representing total 
or marginal satisfaction; his convinction in the measurability of 
satisfaction or pleasure and his attempt to reduce all different 
satisfactions to a universal standard demonstrate his hedonistic 
influence, despite his explicit denials of hedonism that we saw in the 
beginning. Apart from the above, other important aspects of 
Wicksteed's economic thought are again influenced by the hedonistic 
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framework. For instance, Wicksteed's theory of value Is -in accordance 
with the marginalists- based on marginal utility. His subjective, 
hedonistic-oriented view of value can be shown from his statement: 
"... the laws of value are now seen to be so intimately 
dependent upon the psychological law of diminishing returns 
of satisfaction... "(Wicksteed, 1933, p. 768) 
Like Jevons, Walras and Edgeworth, Wicksteed is an equilibrium 
theorist, and this is another indication that he essentially follows 
the orthodox, marginalist approach in spite of his reservations about 
economic man and the selfishness of the economic agents. As Hutchison 
states: Wicksteed's economic theory has "an extensive reliance, 
implicit or explicit, that in some rather indefinite 'long run' the 
economic system in general and in particular was self-adjusting, with 
supply and demand marrying happily ever after in equilibrium! ' 
(Hutchison, 1953, p. 101). Or as Wicksteed himself points out: 
"The function of exchange is to bring about a state of 
equilibrium in which no such divergencies exist in the 
relative intensity with which diverse possessors of 
commodities severally desire or esteem (small) units of them 
at the margin. " (Wicksteed, 1888, p. 140) 
Wicksteed's economic methodology is again in the same climate as 
marginalist methodology. For Instance, the physical science ideal is 
present in his economic works. In his "Alphabet of Economic Science", 
he compares the analysis of total and marginal utility to the 
projection of a body upwards at a given velocity. The curve which 
demonstrates the connection between height and time corresponds to the 
curve which demonstrates the connection between total satisfaction 
derived from a given good and the quantity of the good 
(Wicksteed, 1888, pp. 2-15). The comparison between the projected body 
and utility extends to include the analysis of marginal utility. Thus, 
one can discern the idea that for Wicksteed, physics provided the 
analytical method for the science of economics. 
In general we can state that Wicksteed's thought represents a 
change in the course of development of the influence of hedonism on 
orthodox economics. After the profound dominance of the hedonistic 
approach in the work of Edgeworth, a need for a lesser hedonistic 
profile arose among orthodox economists. Wicksteed's refusal to accept 
152 
an abstract, fictional economic man characterized by pleasure 
maximization, selfishness and rationality, can be seen in this 
perspective. However, his rejection of the concept of fictional 
economic man made Wicksteed very careful in ascribing generalizations 
about the economic behaviour of human beings. Thus, he avoids 
mentioning the concept of maximization of satisfaction explicitly and 
also he allows for altruism -although he admits that altruism has no 
place In business. In spite of these reservations, his economic 
analysis has no difference from that of the marginalists. The use of 
standard diagrams representing total and marginal satisfaction is also 
present In his work. The same happens with the attempt to measure 
satisfaction and to find a unit for its measurement. His theory of 
value again follows the line of the marginalists and it Is based on 
the concept of satisfaction. His belief in equilibrium and his 
physical science-type economic methodology conform to the marginalist 
paradigm. Thus, according to our view, Wicksteed's economic thought is 
still influenced by hedonism, since despite his explicit rejection of 
hedonism, the hedonistic framework is still present. 
Finally, Wicksteed exercised a significant Influence upon the 
thought of L. Robbins who is considered to be among the first 
economists to attempt to built an economic theory without the concepts 
of utility and self-interest. It remains to be seen however, if the 
Implicit hedonistic ideas of Wicksteed passed, among other aspects, to 
his famous student. 
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5.3. M. PANTALEONI AND V. PARETO 
5.3.1 Introduction 
After Wicksteed, the movement towards a less profound hedonistic 
orientation of orthodox economics found its representative in the 
thought of V. Pareto. The majority of contemporary economists view 
Fareto's work as a first important step towards the (positive science) 
"purification" of orthodox economic theory from its philosophical and 
psychological bias -Ie hedonism- (Rol 1,196 1, p. 409 and 
Blaug, 1980, pp. 140,141). Indeed, as we shall see, Pareto is very 
careful -especially in his second major economic work- to avoid 
concepts and terms which are connected with psychology. More 
specifically, the adoption of the more neutral term "ophelimlty" and 
his attempt to construct a theory of consumer behaviour without using 
subjective concepts reflect the above tendency. However, as will be 
observed, Implicit and explicit hedonistic elements are again present 
in central parts of his work. 
The first Indication which supports the view that Pareto's 
thought belongs to a great extent to the hedonistic framework despite 
his attempts towards a neutral economic science, is the fact that one 
of his main Influences was M. Pantaleoni. Pantaleoni was one of the 
typical advocates of a hedonistic oriented economic science, and it 
was he -who drew Pareto into the study of economics 
(Hutchison, 1953, p. 216). Moreover, Pareto pays regular tribute to his 
teacher in both of his major works. For Instance in his first work 
"Cours d' Economie Politique", Pantaleoni is mentioned as the theorist 
who has made the most important summary of the various utilites 
theories (Pareto, 1896, p. 10). From the above, it can be seen that a 
better understanding of Pareto's economic thought Involves reference 
to this economist who influenced him considerably: M. Pantaleoni. 
(Walras was the other economist who influenced Pareto. ) Thus, we will 
start this section by discussing briefly the basic Ideas of 
Pantaleoni, and then we will move to the discussion of Pareto's work. 
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5.3.2 M. Pantaleoni 
Apart from his influence on Pareto, another important reason for 
discussion the work of M. Pantaleoni (1857-1924) is his strong 
Influence upon other Italians and, in general, European economists. As 
P. Sraffa emphasizes: 
"'Pure Economics' [Pantaleoni's major work] has been the most 
efficacious disseminator of the theory of utility in Italy as 
well as in other Latin countries. " (Straffa, 1924, p. 651) 
Moreover, a reference to his work gives us an Idea of the prevailing 
economic theories in continental Europe. 
Pantaleoni's most important work was "Manuale di Econamia Pura" 
which first appeared in 1889 and was translated into English as "Pure 
Economics" in 1898. In his definition of economics one can discern the 
hedonistic orientation of his economic thought. 
"Economic science consists of the laws of wealth 
systematically deduced from the hypothesis that men are 
actuated exclusively by the desire to the fullest possible 
satisfaction of their wants, with the least possible 
individual sacrifice. " (Pantaleoni, 1898, p. 3) 
The above definition is similar to the definition given by most 
hedonistically oriented economists. It is thus clear that the central 
hypothesis of his economics is the hedonistic hypothesis. Pantaleoni 
is not reluctant to point out the role of hedonism in economics. 
"... on the other hand no room for confusion is left, if we 
note that economic scie 
, 
nce_ considers, in all the processes 
connected with wealth, only the workings of the law of the 
minimum of . action; 
that is: it either recognizes in these 
processes the realization of the hedonic hypothesis, or 
supposes that they take place under the operation of the 
hedonic postulate. " (Pantaleoni, 1898, p. 7) 
It can be observed that Pantaleoni views the workings of the "law of 
minimum of action" as fundamental for economics. This point is 
analogous to Edgeworth's basic idea that the maximum pleasure-minimum 
pain approach of economics corresponds to the maximum-minimum energy 
of physics (see section on Edgeworth). Indeed, Pantaleoni makes a 
lengthy reference to Edgeworth's views in his work 
(Pantaleonl, 1898, p. 7). 
Pantaleoni was also an enthustiastic advocate of the concept of 
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'Homo Economicus'. In the following passage, he explains the function 
of economic man in the study of economics: 
"It is easy to understand how the fullest satisfaction of his 
wants, at the least possible cost, has come to be regarded as 
the specific characteristic of homo oeconomicus; Inasmuch as 
an economic problem, in a broad sense, presents itself 
whenever it is desired to obtain a given result with the 
smallest comparative means; or conversely, to obtain any 
maximum result with any given means. Economic problems, in a 
broad sense, are e. g those which constitute the mathematical 
doctrine known by the genetic name: de maximis et minimis. " 
(Pantaleoni, 1898, p. 5) 
The specific characteristic of homo oeconomicus is that he satisfies 
his wants with the least possible cost acquiring the maximum possible 
pleasure or utility. As J. Bonar states, "Pantaleoni's 'homo 
economicus' and 'hedonist' are convertible terms" (Bonar, 1967, p. 219). 
Thus, homo economicus has the same role as material bodies have in 
physics (maximum energy, minimum action). Also, It seems that 
Pantaleoni suggests that economics should be restricted to those 
phenomena that fit the models of physical phenomena. The important 
consequence of this, is that economic problems can be expressed in 
mathematical terms as minima or maxima problems. As we shal 1 see In 
the following section, this conception of homo oeconomicus can be 
found In Pareto's work, another indication of Pantaleoni's influence. 
Like almost all hedonistic theorists, Pantaleoni identifies self- 
interest as another basic characteristic of homo oeconomicus. 
"Above all, it is evident that commercial or industrial 
activity, or the activity (whatever its nature may be) 
displayed by man In the pursuit of what is commonly termed 
wealth, has no other motive than ego Ism. 
(Pantaleoni, 1898, p. 11) 
In his discussion of egoism, Pantaleoni refers to the views of 
Helvetius. This demonstrates the continuity of the hedonist ic 
framework from Helvetius and Gassendi to the post-marginalist period 
of orthodox economics. 
In another passage dealing with the subject matter of economics, 
Pantaleoni combines homo oeconomicus, the egoist motive and the 
hedonistic principle (minimum action or cost): 
"It is in turn the cause of a series of acts intended to 
satisfy it, and it is these acts alon 
,e 
that form the subject 
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matter of economic science; Inasmuch as by egoistic 
individuals (or by the homo oeconomicus) they are performed 
in accordance with the hedonistic principle, that is, at the 
minimum possible cost that circumstances admit of. of 
(Pantaleoni, 1898, p. 41) 
In his discussion of hedonism and egoism, Pantaleoni makes the 
distinction between 'Individual' and 'Tribal' egoism. His view is that 
economic problems can be worked out easily and correctly by accepting 
the hypothesis of homo oeconomicus actuated by Individual egoism 
(Pantaleoni, 1898, p. 22). (This point is related to Pareto's rejection 
of the term utility and adoption of the term ophelimity. ). 
The next step of Pantaleoni is the identification of the concept 
of utility with that of satisfaction: "In fact, what we have before 
called intensity of satisfaction, is nothing but what we now call 
degree of utility. " (Pantaleoni, 1898, p. 71). This is in line with the 
marginalist tradition of definining utility in terms of satisfaction 
or pleasure. 
Like almost all hedonistic theorists the attempt at measuring 
pleasure is again present. Pantaleoni seems to accept the 
measurability of pleasure -at least in principle: 
"Since pleasures are differentiated from pains, ceterls 
paribus, by their duration, and, their duration being equal, 
by their Intensity, it follows that the more lasting pleasure 
appears to be the greater when the degree of intensity is the 
same, and that the intenser pleasure appears to be greater 
when the duration Is equal. " (Pantaleoni, 1898, p. 26) 
The above passage resembles Bentham's terminology and method in 
measuring pleasures and pains. Again this indicates the continuity of 
the hedonistic conceptual framework. 
Pantaleoni's theory of value is based on the concept of 
commodity, which In turn is based on pleasure or satisfaction. Unlike 
most of the marginalists, Pantaleoni was not an extreme advocate of 
the subjective theory of value. The definition of value is the 
following: 
"Now, we call VALUE the ratio of cost to renumeration, 
whether in the case of the direct trucking of one commodity 
against another by two persons, or in that of a single person 
who undergoes some labour, or who submits to some pain in 
order to obtain a pleasure. " (Pantaleoni, 1898, p. 24) 
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In the discussion of other economic issues, Pantaleoni follows 
the general lines of marginalist thought and especially those of 
Gossen and Jevons. For instance his analysis of the degree of utility 
and of the total utility of commodities is quite similar to Jevons. 
(He uses almost the same diagrams and concepts). 
In general, we can state that Pantaleoni's economic thought 
exhibits the basic characteristics of the hedonistic framework. The 
definition of economics Is based on the hedonistic hypothesis. Use is 
made of an abstract fictional economic man. The concept of utility is 
based on pleasure. The attempt towards the measurement of pleasure and 
pain, and the belief in the similarity of physical to economic 
phenomena (maximum, minimum problems) are also present. 
Pantaleoni is not considered as a major figure In the development 
of orthodox economics. However, his thought represents the state of 
economics at the turn of the century in continental Europe -especially 
in the Latin countries. In addition, he was an influential figure in 
the thought of the Important mainstream economist V. Pareto, who made 
one of the first serious attempts at the purification of orthodox 
economics. However, the apparent hedonistic orientation of one of his 
main sources of influence may be the first indication that hedonism 
was still the underlying framework of Pareto's ecomomic 
thought. 
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5.3.3 V. Pareto 
V. Pareto is considered to be one of the major f igures in the 
development of mainstream economics. By many orthodox economists, he 
is thought to be the main originator of the ordinal approach to 
utility. (As we shall see later, the main characteristic of this 
approach is the attempt to exclude psychological connotations from 
economics for the purpose of making it a positive science. ) Pareto had 
discerned that very important elements of orthodox economic theory 
were based on subjective -or according to his terminology on 
metaphysical- notions (utility, marginal utility, measurability of 
pleasure etc). Thus, a part of his work deals with the attempt to 
construct an economic theory free of subjective elements. This is the 
reason why he is viewed as a pioneer of the modern so-called objective 
ordinal approach to utility. However, as we shall see in the following 
pages, this attempt represents only a minor part of his whole work and 
even so the underlying framework is again hedonistic. 
Methodological concerns formed the major motive for Pareto's 
attempt to diminish the role of subjective concepts in orthodox 
economic theory. (As was seen, these subjective concepts were mainly 
hedonistically based. ) Pareto's thought is a good example of the 
increasing influence of positivism. As was noted in the introduction, 
this period was characterized by the progressive dominance of 
positivist philosophies which demanded value-free social sciences. 
Pareto's economic methodology fits the general positivist methodology 
with which he approached the social sciences. (Pareto was also a noted 
sociologist and political scientist. ) The key process of his 
methodology is the "logico-experimental" method with which he attempts 
to discard all "metaphysical abstractions" from the social sciences 
(Aron, 1967, p. 145). In the case of economics, the metaphysical 
abstractions were utility, value in use etc. Having this In mind, one 
can understand better his uneasiness about the great importance for 
mainstream economics of concepts less scientifically defined, in the 
positivist sense. But let us first discuss the main points of his 
economic methodology In a more detailed way and then examine the most 
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important parts of his economic theory. 
As was pointed out, Pareto's ideas about economic methodology are 
basic for a better understanding of his economic theories. Pareto 
wanted to exclude all metaphysical elements from social theories. As 
E. Roll writes: 
"Pareto's methodological position is one in favour of an 
absolutely formal and positive theory and of purging of 
economics of all ethical elements. " (Roll, 1961, p. 409) 
Pareto's positivist orientation was responsible for his methodological 
objective: a unification of all scientific disciplines. According to 
the positivist philosophy the unification of sciences can only be 
achieved with the elimination of all subjective, ethical or 
metaphysical elements. The ideal scientific method was that of the 
natural sciences. Thus, Pareto thinks of economics as part of the 
natural sciences. He specifically states that economics is the same 
sort of science like physiology and chemistry (Pareto, 1896, p. 2,91). In 
addition his table of analogies between mechanical and social 
phenomena In which homo oeconomicus is compared with material bodies 
and utility (or ophelimity) with the attraction of atoms Is another 
indication of his extreme positivist views. The use of mathematics is 
considered to be a key step towards the construction of a positive, 
formalist economic science. Pareto's methodological ideas are best 
portrayed in the following passage: 
"Thanks to the use of mathematics, this entire theory, as we 
develop it In the Appendix, rests on no more than a fact of 
experience, that is, on the determination of the quantities 
of goods which constitute combinations between which the 
individual Is indifferent. The theory of economic science 
thus acquires the rigor of rational mechanics; it deduces Its 
results from experience without bringing in any metaphysical 
entity. " (Pareto, 1971, p. 113) 
In essence Pareto has the same ideal as the marginalists: a formalist, 
positive, physical science-like economic methodology. The difference 
is that while the marginalists construct their economic theory through 
a formalization of hedonistic ideas, Pareto attempts to arrive at the 
same results by minimizing the role of the hedonistic Ideas. His 
motivation was not the view that hedonism was a mistaken approach but 
rather the subjectivity of the hedonistic-based concepts. But let us 
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move on to his theoretical work. 
Pareto's two major economic works were first "Cours d'Economie 
Politique" and second "Manuale d'Economia Politica" translated into 
English as "Manual of Political Economy". The definition of economics 
can be found in his first work: 
"The object of our study are the phenomena which result from 
the actions of men for the acquisition of objects which 
satisfy their needs or their desires. " (Pareto, 1896, p. 3) 
The definition is in the same climate as the ones given by major 
representatives of marginalism. Although Pareto does not mention 
anything like maximization of pleasure or utility (Jevons, Edgeworth), 
his definition contains the key point that can be found In all 
hedonistic theorists, which is the conception of the satisfaction of 
wants as the fundamental feature of economic activity. 
As was pointed out in the introduction and in the beginning of 
this section, Pareto's work represents the attempt towards the making 
of a more 'objective', 'positive' economic science. As was observed, 
the marginalists had the same objective, but their approach to greater 
positivism was through formilization based on hedonistic principles. 
Pareto and many subsequent economists attempt to diminish the 
importance of these principles (on the ground that they are subjective 
or that they are related to psychology, not on the ground that they 
are hedonistic) but they leave the methodology and the basic 
theoretical framework unchanged. In this light one can understand 
Pareto's dislike for the term "utility". "Ophelimity" is a central 
concept in both of Pareto's major works. This term is derived from the 
Greek "o#Xi+oq1' which approximately means useful. According to Pareto 
the term utility has been used by many theorists and it has a general 
character while ophelimity is more specialized to the purposes of 
economics, and thus more scientific. However, the still hedonistic 
framework of Pareto's economic thought forces him to attach a 
hedonistic orientation even in this new term. (One could maintain that 
the new term is closer associated with individual hedonism; see 
Pareto, 1896, p. 3 and Cooter and Rappoport, 1984, p. 515. ). As he states in 
his "Manual": 
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"For an individual, the ophelimity of a certain quantity of a 
thing, added to another quantity (it can be equal to zero) 
which he already possesses, is the pleasure which the 
quantity affords him. " (Fareto, 1971, p. 112) 
The word pleasure is used for the definition of ophelimity, and this 
demonstrates the hedonistic basis of ophelimity. Thus, it seems that 
in essence the two terms are not substantially different (see for 
instance Cirillo, 1979, p. 21). Pleasure is again mentioned in the 
definitions of elementary and weighted elementary ophelimity. 
of 
"If this quantity is very small (Infinitely small) and if the 
pleasure which it gives is divided by the quantity itself, we 
have ELEMENTARY OPHELIMITY.... Finally, if we divide the 
elementary ophelimity by the price, we have WEIGHTED 
ELEMENTARY OPHELIMITY. 11 (Pareto, 1971, p. 112, emphasis in 
original) 
The further development of Pareto's theory which follows the 
marginalist pattern forces him to accept one by one the basic 
hedonistic characteristics of this school. Thus, after defining 
ophelimity In terms of pleasure, Pareto, like all hedonistic theorists 
attempts to measure ophelimity. In his discussion of the indices of 
ophelimity -a concept which is viewed by mainstream economists as an 
Important step towards the abandonment of the cardinal approach to 
utility- one can read: 
"Moreover, a man can tell fairly well whether In passing from 
combination [of goods] I to combination II, he experiences a 
greater pleasure than in passing from combination Il to 
another combination III. If this Judgement could be of 
sufficient precision, we would be able, at the limit, to know 
whether in passing from I to II this man experiences a 
pleasure equal to that which he experiences in passing from 
II to III. And consequently, in passing from I to III he 
would experience a pleasure double that which he gets in 
passing from I to II. That would be enough to permit us to 
consider the pleasure or ophelimity as a quantity. " 
(Pareto, 1971, p. 191) 
Another observation that one can make from the above quotation is that 
Pareto's combination of goods resembles the modern standard notion of 
bundles of goods which are compared to other bundles of goods. 
Similarly to the modern approach , the main feature of Pareto's 
combination of goods is that they are capable of giving an amount of 
pleasure to the individual. As we shall observe, however, modern 
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orthodox theory attempts to avoid terms like pleasure or satisfaction, 
although they are implicitly assumed. 
In another passage one can discern Pareto's need to f ind a 
concrete method of measurement of ophelimity. 
"The theory of ophelimity has been improved. There is a weak 
point, pointed out principally by Frofessor I. Fisher, In all 
the reasoning to establish it. We have taken this thing 
called pleasure, value In use, economic utility, ophelimity 
to be a quantity; but a demonstration of this has not been 
given. Assuming this demonstration accomplished, how would 
this quantity be measured?... We can do so only in one 
particular case, the unit of measure of ophelimity alone 
remaining arbitrary; this is when it is a. case of goods of a 
kind such that the ophelimity of each of them depends only on 
the quantity of that good and remains independent of the 
quantities of other goods consumed. " (Pareto, 1971, p. 112) 
Fareto's solution to the problem of measurability Is not very far from 
the marginalist line when he speaks of a unit of ophellmity. This 
proximity is because like Edgeworth, he assumes the existence of such 
a unit when the ophelimity or utility function of a good depends only 
on the quantity of that good. 
Economic man is an important element of Pareto's economic 
thought, and indeed economic man or homo oeconomicus is mentioned 
explicitly in his first work. Although Pareto attempts to diminish its 
role In his second work, economic man is still implicitly assumed in 
his "Manual of Political Economy". In an analogy between mechanical 
phenomena and social phenomena, (which also reveals his methodological 
ideas, ) Pareto compares the material bodies studied by the science of 
mechanics with homo oeconomicus studied by the science of political 
economy. Moreover, Pareto maintains that as rational mechanics studies 
only Ideal situations, so pure economics studies a fictional type of 
man motivated only by economic considerations (Pareto, 1896, p. 12 §592). 
He accepts that man's character present other characteristics too, 
which are studied by other sciences (Pareto, 1896,5592). A rational 
economic man can be found as a prerequisite in his discussion of 
economic equilibrium. He holds that man, after trial and error, will 
end up making the perfectly rational choice of action for the 
satisfaction of his desires. As he points out: 
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"Similarly, if at first he makes a mistake in his reasoning 
about what he desires, he will rectify it in repeating the 
reasoning and will end up by making it completely logical. " 
(Pareto, 197 1, p. 103) 
In addition to that, Pareto assumes that economics will deal with 
rational actions only that is when man, after repetition, is able to 
make the perfect rational choice (Pareto, 1971, p. 103). Although he does 
not state it explicitly, his whole approach to rationality seems to 
suggest that unbounded rationality was a fictional characteristic of 
economic man. 
Selfish behaviour is the next feature of economic man. As in the 
case of measurability of ophelimity or pleasure, Pareto again diverts 
from the extreme hedonistic approach of the marginalists. More 
analytically, although he accepts selfish behaviour as basic in 
political economy, he is prepared to allow altruistic behaviour too. 
At this point he is closer to Wicksteed's view about altruistic 
behaviour in economics. Pareto writes: 
"Political economy deals with this class of theories 
primarily; and since it Is customary to assume that man will 
be guided in his choice exclusively by consideration of his 
own advantage, of his self-interest, we say that this class 
is made up of theories of egotism. But it could be made up of 
theories of altruism (if the meaning of that term could be 
defined rigorously or, in general, of theories which rest on 
any rule which man follows in comparing his sensations. " 
(Pareto, 1971, p. 105) 
Although Pareto asserts that the analytical structure will not be 
affected by adopting an altrustic economic agent, the whole of his 
approach is constructed on the assumption of selfish behaviour. As we 
saw, the same is true for Wicksteed's economic theory which again is 
based on egoism. This tendency to mention altruistic behaviour too - 
even- If it does not have any impact on their economic theories- is 
another reflection of the attempt of these two theorists to minimize 
the high hedonistic Image of orthodox economics. (As will be observed 
subsequently, the adoption of altruistic agents does have important 
implications for the analytical structure. ) 
Up to this point we have seen that Pareto's new term ophelimity 
was as utility, a pleasure based term; that although sceptical, he 
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does not reject the possibility of a unit of measure of ophelimity; 
and finally that his notion of economic man Is a rational, selfish, 
ophelimity maximizing being. Thus It can be maintained that although 
Pareto attempts to construct a more objective, positive economic 
science, his orientation Is still Influenced by hedonism. His main 
theoretical contributions, namely Indifference curves and the theory 
of equilibrium, will now be discussed. 
Pareto starts his theory of indifferent curves by giving a 
numerical example of two goods (breed, wine) and combinations of 
quantities between which the Individual Is Indifferent in choosing. 
Then, he constructs a diagram which represents the different numerical 





Pareto calls nms an Indifference line or Indifference curve. As was 
seen, Edgeworth used indifference curves for the derivation of his 
contract curve. Pareto points out an Important difference between his 
curve and that of Edgeworth. As he writes In a footnote: "This 
expression is due to Professor F. Y. Edgeworth. He assumed the 
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existence of utility (ophellmity) and deduced the indifference curves 
from it. On the other hand, I consider the indifference curves as 
given, and deduce from them all that Is necessary for the theory of 
equilibrium, without resorting to ophelimity" (Pareto, 1971, p. 119). 
Pareto does not specify what he means by the word given; that is if 
his indifference curves are based on observation, personal experience 
or taken as a priori. His approach is closer to the modern orthodox 
position because he attempts not to depend upon subjective notions. 
However, although the implication of the above quotation Is that in 
Pareto's view it Is better for economics if it does not depend on 
ophelimity, his subsequent analysis of the indifference curve is 
conducted in terms of this concept. For instance, the higher 
indifference curve nm'n" is explained in terms of providing a higher 
level of pleasure. More especially, he assigns an index in each 
combination (indifference curve) which has the following conditions: 
1) Two combinations between which the choice is indifferent must have 
the same Index value, 2) of two combinations, the one which Is 
preferred to the other must have a larger index value 
(Pareto, 1971, p. 119). He calls these Indices the Indices of ophelimity. 
The definition is the following: 
"Thus we have the INDICES OF OPHELIMITY, or of the pleasure 
which an individual feels when he enjoys a combination which 
corresponds to a given Index. " (Pareto, 1971., p. 119, emphasis 
in original) 
Thus, the underlying concept behind the Indifference curve Is again 
pleasure. The hedonistic influence becomes more apparent when he 
extends his discussion in the indifference map. By referring to the 
above diagram, he declares: 
"The curves in figure 15.21 are contour lines if we consider 
the indices of ophelimity to represent the height of the 
points of a hill above the plane OAB which is assumed 
horizontal. It can be called the hill of indices of 
pleasure... If pleasure can be measured, if ophelimity exists, 
one of these Index systems will be precicely that of values 
of ophelimity, and the corresponding hill will be the hill of 
pleasure or of ophelimity. " (Pareto, 1971, p. 120) 
He proceeds to state that if an individual possess a certain 
combination of bread and wine he will be at a certain point above the 
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plane OAB. It follows that "the individual will experience a greater 
pleasure Insofar as he is at greater height; of two combinations he 
will always prefer the one which is represented by a higher point on 
the hill" Pareto, 1971, p. 120). (The second part of the passage is 
clearly a statement of psychological hedonism. ) In spite of his doubts 
about the measurability of pleasure in the preceeding quotation, he 
proceeds by taking measurability as given. Pareto's above analysis is 
very similar to the modern orthodox approach. The pleasure based 
definition of the indifference curve and the conception of different 
Indifferent curves as different levels of satisfaction can be found in 
standard orthodox textbooks (see for instance Henderson and 
Quandt, 1980, pp. 10,11). 
Pareto's introduction of the concept of indices and his more 
"objective" conception of indifferent curves -i. e taking the 
Indifference curve as given without presupposing the existence of 
subjective concepts like utility- have led many contemporary 
economists to view him as the originator of the modern positivist 
approach (Roll, 1961, p. 409, Blaug, 1980, pp. 140,141). Moreover, his 
emphasis upon tastes and choice (which led him to state that "the 
individual can disappear, provided he leaves us this photograph of his 
tastes") is another reason that makes them see Pareto as the starting 
point of modern microanalysis. As V. Tarescio writes: 
"The more common view of Pareto's contribution to utility 
theory is that, through the use of monotonic transformations 
(index functions), he was able to avoid the necessity for 
cardinal measures of utility. Hence the cardinal utility 
theory of the 'marginal utility school' was replaced by an 
ordinal theory of utility. " (Tarascio, 1972, p. 411) 
As we shall see later, an important difference of the modern marginal 
utility theory from that of the marginalists is the introduction of 
ordinal utility theory which emphasizes choices of individuals without 
allegedly taking into account psychological assumptions. (The peak of 
this trend was reached with Samuelson's revealed preference which 
attempted to expel all psychological assumptions by emphasizing 
observed behaviour. ) The exclusion of psychological assumptions 
(mainly, as we have seen, hedonistically oriented) was vital for the 
construction of a positive economic science. 
167 
In the Appendix to his "Manual" Pareto derives an equation which 
Is very close to the above "non-psychological" modern approach. More 
specifically, Pareto states that by observation we look for the 
positive quantity A, x by which x must be Increased in order to offset 
the decrease represented by the negative quantity Ay, where x and y 
are quantities of economic goods X and Y possessed by an individual 
(Pareto, 1971, p. 393). He does the same thing for Amx which corresponds 
to Az (x, y, z are goods); Aax etc refer to negative changes in further 
other goods, and qx, qy are quantities. His next step is to set 
Ax = A, x + A, x +.... 
from which he gets: 
qxl 6x + qyl Ly +. .., =0 (1) 
the limit of (1) will give: 
qxdx + qydy + qzdz +..., =0 (2) 
He comments on equation (2): 
"Strictly speaking, equation 121 Is the only one which we 
need in order to establish the theory of economic 
equilibrium; but that equation contains nothing which 
c orresponds to ophelimity, or to the indices of ophelimity. 
Hence the entire theory of economic equilibrium is 
independent. of the notions of (economic) utility, or value in 
use or ophelimity. " (Pareto, 1971, p. 393) 
One can maintain that the above approach is the origin of all 
subsequent developments in the theory of consumer behaviour. 
Essentially equation (2) describes an Indifference curve which is 
allegedly based on observation and thus does not require any 
subjective concept. However, even this allegedly neutral equation is 
not entirely independent from psychological assumptions (for instance, 
the extra amount of x which would compensate for the loss of y is a 
subjective Bssessment). However, we will discuss this issue more 
analytically in the chapter dealing with modern consumer behaviour 
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theory. 
Despite the above approach, Pareto arrives at the same result by 
using ophelimity indices. This can imply he was not prepared to 
abandon the marginal utility framework entirely. As J. Schumpeter 
points out: 
"The second point is that Pareto's own argument brings out 
the difficulty he experienced in disentangling himself 
entirely from the old utility theory. He always kept an eye 
on the cases in which it might be possible to speak of 
utility and even of cardinal utility, the existence of which 
-hence the question of integrability- continued to Interest 
him very much. And his index functions bear after all a 
pretty close similarity to the old concept. " 
(Schumpeter, 1949, p. 162) 
Moreover, the concepts of pleasure and ophelimity and also the 
explicit assumption of their measurability are present at key points 
of Pareto's economic theory. And this shows that in spite of his 
attempts to minimize the importance of these concepts, they are still 
fundamental elements of his economic thought. For instance, the 
notions of complementary and rival goods are heavily based on the 
hedonistically oriented concepts of pleasure and ophelimity. 
"Dependence can result from the fact that we appreciate the 
use and consumption of a thing more or less according to the 
circumstances in which we find ourselves. This dependence can 
arise from the fact that certain things must be used Jointly 
in order to yield us pleasure; these are called COMPLEMENTARY 
GOODS. " (Pareto, 1971, p. 183, emphasis in original) 
In more general terms: 
"We conclude, then, that in general, for the first type of 
dependence [complementarityl, the elementary ophelimity of A 
increases when the quantities of certain other goods B, C.... 
increase. It is completely different for the second type of 
dependence. If A can replace a good B, the elementary 
ophelimity of A will be smaller insofar as one has a larger 
amount of its substitute B. " (Pareto, 1971, p. 194) 
Pareto constructs a table in which he gives a numerical example of 
complementarity and rival goods. In this table the pleasure provided 
by the quantity of goods A and B is given a numerical value 
(Pareto, 1971, p. 195). Clearly, at this point, he accepts the 
measurability of pleasure explicitly. 
169 
Pareto's notion of equilibrium is based on the concepts of 
"tastes" rand "obstacles". The analysis of tastes Is represented by the 
theory of indifference curves and the analysis Of obstacles Is 
essentially a theory of production. Pbreto begins by giving a simple 
example of the, equilibrium position In the case of an Individual who 
transforms wine Into vinegar at a certain ratio. As In orthodox 
textbooks, the equilibrium point Is at the point of tangency of an 
Indifference curve with the constraint line (Pareto, 2971, p. 251). In 
the more complicated case of the equilibrium of exchange between two 
Individuals, the tastes of one Individual appear as obstacles for the 
realization of the desires of the other individual. The graphic 
representation is similar to what is currently termed the Edgeworth 




f Igure 5.3 
The axes ox, oy are for the first individual, and the axes oa, coD for 
the second. The indifference curves are t, t' for the first and S, S' 
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for the second. The respective hill of pleasures rise from 0 towards 
a), and from o) to 0. According to Pareto point c is the equilibrium 
point. A movement along to the route cc' means that we ascend A's hill 
of pleasure and we descend that of B. The opposite happens if we 
follow route cc''. Thus, as Pareto states: "it is not possible to move 
away from c helping or harming both Individuals at one and the same 
time; but necessarily If it is agreeable to the one, it is 
disagreeable to the other" (Pareto, 1971, p. 262). This is the basis of 
Pareto optimality. The general formulation of the equilibrium in 
exchange is the following: 
"... when equilibrium takes place at a point where the 
indifference curves of the contracting parties are tangent, 
the members of the collectivity under consideration enjoy 
maximum ophelimity. " (Pareto, 1971, p. 261) 
It Is clear that his analysis is conducted in terms of maximum 
ophelimity, hills of pleasure, satisfaction of both individuals etc, 
and also it is implied that the purpose of each individual is to 
attain maximum ophelimity. This shows the influence of the hedonistic 
framework on his economic thought. Moreover, in his discussion of the 
equilibrium in a collectivist society he uses "an abstraction 
analogous to homo oeconomicus" which considers that the purpose of a 
collectivist society "is to procure maximum ophelimity for its 
members" (Pareto, 1971, p. 267). 
Pareto's positivist approach did not allow him to accept the 
utilitarian idea of interpersonal comparisons of utility. Thus, he 
explicitly rejects any possibility of comparability of utilities of 
different Individuals. As he declares: "A sum of ophelimity enjoyed by 
different individuals does not exist; it is an expression which has no 
meaning" (Pareto, 1971, p. 192). However, in his discussion of' the 
equilibrium in the collectiv ist society, he admits that there are 
special considerations like comparisons of ophelimity of different 
individuals, with which he cannot deal but assumes as solved 
(Pareto, 1971, p. 267). One can also point out that the very concept of 
maximum ophelimity of members of a collective requires comparability. 
In addition, the same inconsistency appears in his "Cours". As G. 
Myrdal writes: 
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"Although Pareto says that interpersonal comparisons are 
Istricly speaking' impossible, he concludes, after drawing 
some dubious analogies with the theory of colours, that 
common sense sanctions approximate comparisons. " 
(Myrdal, 1953, p. 102) 
There also seems to be a discrepancy between his ideas about 
value as expressed in his first work and those expressed in the 
second. In his first work, value in use is defined as following: 
"The Value in use of the economists, appears to have the same 
meaning with that of ophelimity. 11 (Pareto, 1971, p. 7,518) 
In his "Manual" he does not use the above definition, but he points 
out that it Is senseless to speak of value in use unless we speak of 
the quantities consumed (Pareto, 1971, p. 110). Thus, while In. his 
"Cours" value is defined in purely subjective terms, he is more 
careful not to mention the above definition in his "Manual". Value in 
exchange is defined In "Cours" as follows: 
"The concept of ophelimity can be found in the concept of 
value in exchange. However, it is not the ophelimity which 
results from the direct acquisition of a good; it is the 
ophelimity of another good which can produce from the 
exchange with the first. " (Pareto, 1896, p. 7, §18) 
The above definition Is similar to the marginalist idea of value in 
exchange. However, in his "Manual" value in exchange is thought to be 
similar to the notion of price which is the quantity of X which must 
be given to obtain one unit of Y; and this is the price of Y in terms 
of X. He conceives value in exchange as a ratio of the exchange of two 
goods. This idea is similar to Pantaleoni's views. Moreover, Pareto 
with this definition attempts to construct a more 'objective' theory 
of value. His idea of value as an interdependency concept makes him 
adopt a neutral position with respect to the two rival theories of 
value, costs of production versus utility (Tarascio, 1972, p. 409). 
Before we state our conclusion, it must be noted again that 
Pareto followed a formalist methodology based on the ideal of rational 
mechanics. As was observed in the beginning, his aim was to construct 
a value-free economic science, and this was his main motive for the 
exclusion of psychological concepts from economics. 
Modern orthodox economists who support the view that mainstream 
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economics is a science which does not depend on any philosophical or 
psychological framework see Pareto as the originator of this view. As 
Wicksteed, Pareto wanted to minimize the high hedonistic profile of 
mainstream economics at the beginning of this century. (One can also 
note that similar attempts started to be made in other social sciences 
like psychology at approximately the same period. ) Indeed, Pareto's 
economic thought exhibits some points which clearly divert from the 
extreme hedonistic orientation of the marginalists. More analytically, 
his reluctance to accept the measurability of pleasure or ophelimity, 
his willingness to accept the possibility of altruistic behaviour in 
economics, his attempt to find a theoretical method which will be 
independent of the notions of pleasure or utility and his reservations 
at embracing the extreme hedonistically based marginalist theory of 
value -at least in his second work- , demonstrate the above. 
However, in spite of the above, the general character of Pareto's 
economic thought is still influenced by hedonism. First, the 
hedonistic foundations of his economic theory force him to assign a 
pleasure based definition to his new term "ophelimity". Moreover, in 
spite of his first attempt towards the ordinal approach, the 
assumption of measurability of pleasure or ophelimity is basic for the 
analysis of key theoretical points (see also Stigler, 1950, p. 381). 
Pareto's fictional economic man is similar to that of most of the 
marginalists: selfish, rational and pleasure maximizing. One of his 
most important theoretical constructions, the analysis of indifference 
curves, is based on pleasure and on the cardinal approach. The same 
thing happens in his discussion of complementary and rival goods where 
he assigns a numerical magnitude to pleasure derived. The analysis of 
exchange equilibrium Is conducted in terms of maximum ophelimity, 
hills of pleasure, satisfaction of both individuals etc, which show a 
hedonistic influence. Although the possibility of interpersonal 
comparisons of utility is ruled out in general, it is assumed in some 
cases; and value is defined -at least in his first work- in terms of 
pleasure. Fareto's positive economic methodology Is the motivation for 
the construction of a neutral economic theory. The exclusion of all 
ethical elements and the intensive use of mathematics are viewed as 
necessary steps for constructing a physical science-like economic 
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science, but proved impossible in practice. The ideal for Pareto is 
the unification of all sciences into a universal scientific discipline 
which will be based on the methodology of classical physics (logico- 
experimental method). In addition to the above, the apparent 
hedonistic orientation of his two main sources of Influence, L. Walras 
and M. Pantaleoni, is another indication of Pareto's hedonistic 
conceptual framework. 
In general it can be maintained that in spite of his attempts to 
diminish the hedonistic image of orthodox economics, Pareto's economic 
thought is still clearly influenced by hedonism. 
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5.4.1. FISHER 
After Wicksteed and Pareto, I. Fisher (1867-1947) was the next 
economist of the post-marginalist period whose economic thought is 
marked by attempts towards the minimization of the hedonistic 
character of orthodox economics. In fact, as with Pareto, Fisher is 
viewed as one of the important forerunners of the contemporary 
prevailing economic theory and especially of microeconomic theory. 
Fisher's most influential work is a reprint of his doctoral 
dissertation entitled: "Mathematical Investigations In the Theory of 
Value and Prices". From the very first pages of this book, Fisher 
reveals his intentions. His first important point is directed against 
the inclusion of psychological concepts in economics: 
"To fix the idea of utility the economist should go no 
farther than is serviceable in explaining economic facts. It 
is not his province to build a theory of psychology. It is 
not necessary for him to make sides with those who wrangle to 
prove or disprove that pleasure and pain alone determine 
conduct. " (Fisher, 1965, p. 11) 
The above Is the essence and the most important motive behind Fisher's 
economic thought. Indeed, his whole book is characterized by the 
attempt to demonstrate that economics can be an absolutely positive 
science which will not be based on any kind of psychological or 
philosophical theory. As Pareto, he does not believe that hedonism is 
an inadequate basis for economics but he thinks that It should be 
abandoned if economics is to be a positive science. This drive towards 
positive economics makes him very careful in all aspects of his work. 
More specifically, he is very cautious in mentioning any hedonistic 
based terms like satisfaction, pleasure, pain etc. Moreover, he 
defines utility and marginal utility by accepting some assumptions as 
true and then proceeding by mathematical elaboration. 
The starting point of Fisher's theory is to replace all previous 
"psychological" assumptions of economics with a "simple psycho- 
economic postulate: each individual acts as he desires" 
(Fisher, 1965, p. 11). Althought it can be maintained that there Is much 
implicit psychology in this psycho-econom1c postulate, Fisher believes 
that the adoption of this postulate enables him to construct a theory 
of utility without using any of the hedonistic axioms. His view is 
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that the above postulate is a neutral one, free of any subjective 
notions like pleasure and pain (see also Coats, 1976, p. 5). One can 
argue that this postulate does not belong to the hedonistic framework 
that characterizes the basic points of the marginalist theory of 
utility. However, as Georgescu-Roegen writes, "this postulate is a 
bare tautology which tells us nothing about the individual desires" 
(Georgescu-Roegen, 1976, p. 316). 
Having as a basis the above postulate, Fisher proceeds to discuss 
the definition of utility. He holds that utility is conceivable as a 
quantity if we accept that: 
"D For a given individual at a given time, the utility of A units of 
one commodity or service (a) is equal to the utility of B units of 
another (b), if the individual has no desire for the one to the 
exclusion of the other. 
2) For a given individual, at a given time, the utility of A units of 
(a) exceeds the utility of B units of (b) if the individual prefers 
(has a desire for) A to the exclusion of B rather than for B to the 
exclusion of A. In the same case the utility of B Is said to be less 
than that of All (Fisher, 1965, p. 12) 
One can discern the similarities of Fisher's views to those of the 
modern theory of choice. His next step is to define mathematically 
utility, marginal utility, the unit of utility, total utility etc. In 
sum, his formulations are: 
(Util of A) > (util of B) if the individual at a given time prefers A 
to B or neither. 
dU = Marginal utility 
dA 
dUdA = Total Utility 
dA 
(Fisher, 1965, pp. 22,23) 
(His first formulation is very similar to the nowadays standard method 
of connecting a preference function with a utility function. ) 
The first observation that one can make from the above is that 
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Fisher continues to use the term utility, and that his formulations 
are similar to marginalist theory. The difference here is that Fisher 
does not want to accept the established view that utility Is based on 
pleasure. He attempts to disassociate utility from pleasure and to 
define it objectively In terms of preferences of the Individual. 
However, in spite of this attempt, he accepts the possibility of 
measuring utility. 
At this point, Fisher is close to the position of hedonistically 
oriented theorists who accept measurability of utility. Clearly, 
Fisher is an advocate of the cardinal approach to utility, despite his 
rejection of a pleasure-based concept of utility. The first. indication 
of support for the cardinal approach is his idea of a unit of 
measurement called "util". As he states: 
"The marginal utility of any arbitrary chosen commodity on 
the margin of some arbitrary chosen commodity quantity of 
that commodity may serve as the unit of utility for a given 
individual at a given time. This unit may be called util. " 
(Flsher, 1965, p. 18) 
Thus, although Fisher was more careful than Fareto in using 
hedonistically oriented axioms and terms, he is more strongly in 
favour of the measurability of utility. As we have seen, Fareto was 
reluctant to fully accept the possibility of utility measurement. 
Another indication that Fisher was convinced of the measurability of 
utility or marginal utility is his acceptance of diminishing marginal 
utility and of increasing marginal disutility: 
"... to express the fact for consumption that marginal utility 
decreases as quantity of commodity increases and for 
production that marginal disutility increases as the quantity 
of commodity increases. " (Fisher, 1965, p. 94) 
The important implication of these two principles is that utility or 
disutility can be measured in exact terms. Thus, even the mere 
acceptance of these two principles means automatically the acceptance 
of the measurability of utility. Therefore, in Fisher's economic 
analysis utility is treated always in cardinal terms. Moreover, one 
can maintain that the acceptance of decreasing marginal utility, which 
is a psychological characteristic, does not fit in with Fisher's 
strive for objectivity. 
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As was seen in previous pages, Fisher is always very careful to 
use the word "utility" In a neutral sense, independent from the 
concept of pleasure or satisfaction. However. in his discussion of the 
possibility of Interpersonal comparisons of utility, Fisher reveals 
the implicit hedonistic influence on his thought. But let us see this 
important point more analytically. 
In contrast to Pareto and to a number of other orthodox 
economists, Fisher realizes the need for interpersonal comparisons of 
utility for the solution of some economic problems. He is ready to 
accept the possibility of interpersonal comparisons if an "objective" 
method can be found. In the following passage he expresses his 
thoughts about the possible difficulties of such comparisons, which is 
worth quoting at length: 
"It would doubtless be of service in ethical investigations 
and possibly In certain economic problems to determine how to 
compare the utilities of two Individuals... when it Is done 
the comparison will doubtless be by objective standards. If 
persons alike in most respects show to each other their 
satisfaction by similar gestures, language, faciai 
expression, and general conduct we speak of their 
satisfaction as very much the same. What however this may 
mean In the Inoumenall world is a mystery. Very little could 
be meant by comparing the desire of a Fuegian for a shell- 
fish with that of a college conchologist for the same object 
and surely nothing is meant by comparing the desires of the 
shell-fish itself with that of either of its tormentors. " 
(Fisher, 1965, pp. 86,87) 
First of all, it can be observed that contrary to his initial 
statements, Fisher uses the terms "Utility" "satisfaction" and 
"desire" as synonymous. It seems that despite his attempts to avoid 
the use of subjective concepts, Fisher can not help using the word 
satisfaction as equivalent to utility or desire. At this point the 
Implicit hedonistic influences on his work come to the surface. 
Moreover one can wonder why a comparison of individual actions should 
enable us to compare individual utilities when Individual choices 
depend on intra-personal comparisons, as Fisher maintains in the 
beginning of this section, 
Another point which can be observed from the previous passage is 
that Fisher Is prepared to accept a method of comparison of the 
utilities of individuals despite the difficulties involved. Indeed, in 
178 
his subsequent work, he proceeded to assume that utilities or wants of 
different people can in practice be compared. More specifically, in 
1927, some thirty years after the first publication of his 
"Investigations", he wrote an article entitled: "A Statistical Method 
for Measuring 'Marginal Utility'. (The inclusion of marginal utility 
in inverted commas is because he thought that this term was no longer 
appropriate for an objective economic science; instead he uses "want 
for more". ) Apart from demonsrating again his conviction in the 
measurability of utility by attempting to determine statistically the 
exact values of marginal utilities, Fisher Justifies his belief in the 
interpersonal comparisons of utilities. To be more analytic, he holds 
that by making some assumptions and by using the statistics of retail 
prices and family budgets, he will be able to succeed "in gauging 
average or typical human emotions even better than any individual who 
feels them" (Fisher, 1927, p. 159). One of these assumptions is the 
comparability of wants of different people, and again one can maintain 
that this a psychological assumption, and does not fit well Into 
Fisher's approach. He admits that there are serious philosophic and 
academic doubts about comparability, but he sees it as a practical 
problem which can be solved. As he states: 
"... I venture to set up a working hypothesis, that similar 
families have similar wants, that In particular, two average 
American workingmen's families which are of the same size and 
age and sex constitution, and which have the same food 
budgets will also have the same want-for-one-more unit of 
food. " (Fisher, 1927, p. 180) 
As we have seen, even the extreme advocates of the hedonistic 
approach, Jevons and Edgeworth, were very reluctant to openly admit 
the utilitarian idea of the possibility of interpersonal comparisons 
of utilities. Fisher was even prepared to admit them from his very 
first work onwards. Moreover, in his arguments for comparability, he 
speaks about "the average intensities of the wants" which indicates 
the influence of the hedonistic mode of thought on him. 
As was pointed out in the beginning, a constant characteristic of 
Fisher's work is his attempt to minimize the hedonistic orientation of 
orthodox economic theory. Under this light one can explain his 
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endeavour to eliminate the concepts of pleasure and pain from 
economics: 
"Doubtless pleasure and pain are connected with desire and 
doubtless they have an important biological and sociological 
function as registering 'healthful' or 'pathological' 
conditions. But the economist need not envelop his own 
science in the hazes of ethics, psychology, biology and 
metaphysics. " (Fisher, 1965, p. 23) 
Under the same light one can also explain his dissatisfaction and 
uneasiness with the term "utility" and his desire to find a new and 
more "objective", scientific term for economics. 
"Perhaps utility is an unfortunate word to express the 
magnitude intended. Desirability would be less misleading, 
and its opposite, undesirability is certainly preferable to 
disutility. 'Utility, is the heritage of Bentham and his 
theory of pleasure and pains. " (Fisher, 1965, p. 23) 
Apart from desirability, Fisher suggested some other "neutral" terms 
like Iwantability' and 'marginal wantabilityl. Moreover, he changed 
his mind about the unit of utility (util) and he advocated a new term 
called "wantab" (Fisher, 1918, p. 336). Generally, Fisher was one of the 
first orthodox economists of this period to express explicitly his 
views about the utilitarian bias of economics and to call openly for 
its abandonment. Wicksteed's and Pareto's reservations about hedonism 
were most of the time implicit. 
However, In spite of all his reservations and renunciations of 
utilitarianism, pleasure and pain, satisfactions etc, Fisher's work is 
still influenced by the hedonistic framework. For instance In one of 
his subsequent works, economics is defined as follows: 
"The purpose of economics is to treat the nature of wealth; 
the human wants served by wealth; the satisfaction of those 
wants and efforts require to satisfy them; " (Fisher, 1912, p. 1) 
Essentially, this definition has no differences from the marginalist, 
hedonistic oriented definitions of economics. The reference to wealth 
and to the satisfaction of wants is common to most marginalist 
economists (Jevons, Walras, Menger). As Mill and Menger, Fisher 
conceives wealth only in terms of material objects: 
"Wealth, then includes, all those parts of the material 
universe that have been appropriated to the uses of mankind. 
It includes the food we eat, the clothing we wear, the 
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dwellings we inhabit, the merchandise we buy and sell, the 
tools, machinery, factories, ships, and railways, by which 
other wealth Is manufactured and transported, the land in 
which we live and work, and the gold by which we buy and sell 
other wealth" (Fisher, 1912, p. 4). 
Moreover, his analysis of supply and demand is another Indication of 
the influence of the hedonistic framework on him. 
"This special relationship enables us to see clearly the fact 
that, at bottom, supply rests on efforts and demand on 
satisfactions. The business man, reckoning in money, comes to 
think of money expenses and money receipts as though they 
were real costs and benefits in the productive process, 
whereas they are only the representatives of real costs 
(efforts) and real benefits (satisfactions) ... We see, then, 
that everything intermediate which happens in the economic 
machinery represents merely steps in the connection between 
effort and satisfaction. " (Fisher, 1912, pp. 351-353) 
Fisher's assertion that in the final analysis economics is an 
interplay of efforts and satisfactions is very important. It 
demonstrates that his own allegedly neutral economic approach is not 
very far from the hedonistic calculus of pleasures and pains. Thus in 
spite of his clear rejection of subjective, psychological terms like 
pleasure, pain, satisfaction, Fisher now bases the whole mechanism of 
economic activity on these concepts. In addition, although he has 
abandoned utility and uses desirability in the above mentioned book, 
his implicit hedonistic orientation forces him to refer to the 
importance of efforts and satisfactions when he analyses the basic 
determinants of economic activity. 
Furthermore, another indication of his implicit (and sometimes 
explicit) hedonistic influences can be found in the very book, 
"Investigations" where he openly rejects the use of psychological or 
subjective concepts in economics. In his discussion of the 
relationship between price, quantity and marginal utility, he uses the 
example of a cistern where the amount of liquid represents commodity 
and the distance of its surface from the top 0, Its marginal utility 





In the above figure the curve HN is drawn with axes OE and Oa. This 
curve is such that the shaded area represent any amount of the given 
commodity consumed by the given individual in the given period of time 
(Fisher, 1965, p. 25). Then he states: 
"If the price rises, OR will Increase and less be consumed 
but if it falls, more. If the price falls to zero as in the 
case for water and air the quantity consumed fill the whole 
cistern up to the horizontal axis. This volume is therefore 
the quantity of max1mum satisfaction [emphasis by Fisher]", 
(Fisher, 1965, p. 26) 
Clearly at this point Fisher's analysis is identical to the hedonistic 
based economic theorists. It also implies that satisfaction is 
measurable. 
Although Fisher did not mention explicitly the idea of economic 
man, it will become evident that the notion of an economizing 
individual Is present in his analysis. More analytically, in his 
discussion of equilibrium and indifference curves, Fisher makes some 
assumptions about individual behaviour which are very similar to those 
of the marginalist economists (especially Walras). In his analysis of 
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one consumer one commodity when the utility is a function of one 
commodity only, he assumes that: 
"Each individual in the market knows all prices, acts freely 
and independently and preserves some characteristics during 
the period, so that the forms of his utility curves do not 
change. " (Fisher, 1965, p. 25) 
Apart from assigning psychological characteristics which according to 
him must be absent from economics, the above quotation demonstrates 
that the Individual or economic man is considered to be perfectly 
Informed and consistent, Furthermore In the appendix of his discussion 
of general equilibrium, the individual is portrayed as maximizing his 
total utility and minimizing his total disutility. As the individual 
maximizes his total utility so he minimizes his total disutility, or 
in Fisher's words: 
"In the like manner the individual distributes his production 
so that the marginal disutilities in all modes of producing a 
dollar's worth of commodity are equal so that his total 
disutility is a minimum. Hence the difference between his 
total utility and total disutility or his economic gain is a 
maximum. " (Fisher, 1965, p. 98) 
Apparently the individual is portrayed above as a utility maximizer. 
This is at odds with Fisher's earlier claims that his economic 
analysis does not involve psychological (hedonistic) assumptions. 
Thus, this is an addtional indication that hedonism is still an 
important underlying framework in Fisher's thought despite the fact 
that he claims otherwise. 
The main theoretical points of Fisher's work are the analysis of 
equilibrium and the indifference curve. He separates his work in two 
parts: the first deals with equilibrium when the utility of a 
commodity is assumed to be a function of that commodity. He discusses 
the equilibrium when there is only one consumer or producer and many 
commodities. Then he extends his analysis to m. commodities and n 
consumers. The analysis is conducted in terms of incomes of 
individuals and of their utility functions. Like Walras, Fisher 
provides a general solution which is derived from a system of 
simultaneous equations. The starting point of the second part is that 
the utility of one commodity is considered to be a function of the 
quantities of all commodities. At this part, he derives the 
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Indifference curves and supplies a general equilibrium solution. His 
approach is very similar to the m5rSIn5lIsis and also very similar to 
modern techniques. Fisher derives Indifference curves as the locus of 
points representing all consumption combinations of A (axis) and B 




The numbers attached to each indifference curve represent magnitudes 
of utility. Fisher avoids the use of strong terms like pleasure or 
satisfaction In this analysis, and confines himself to the use of the 
term utility (as was seen, Pareto In his discussion used freely strong 
hedonistic concepts). However, Fisher cannot avoid mentioning that 
point M (where Indiffernce curves vanish, bliss point) is the point of 
maximum satisfaction for the individual (Fisher, 1965, p. 70). Moreover, 
he thought that the supreme principle which characterizes economic 
equilibrium "is that arrangement will be assumed which will maximize 
utility" (Fisher, 1965, p. 72). At this point, he makes a reference to 
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Edgeworth who, as was seen, bmphasized the 'principle of maximization 
of pleasure in equilibrium. In addition, Fisher makes frequent 
references to other hedonistically oriented economists like 
Pantaleoni, Jevons, and Gossen and enthustlastically credits them as 
pioneers of scientific economics (Fisher, 1965, pp. 109-115). 
As we noted in the relevant section, Edgeworth is the perfect 
example of a theorist combining hedonistic ideas with a formalist 
methodology (especially a physical science-type methodology). Fisher's 
economic methodology is again similar to those of the marginalists. 
First of all, the whole manner of exposition of his economic theory is 
mathematical. As with the marginalists, mathematics is viewed as the 
means for establishing a physical-science-type, "objective", 
"positive" science of economics. As Fisher himself declares: "The 
Introduction of mathematical method marks a stage of growth -perhaps 
it is not too extravagant to say, the entrance of political economy 
on a scientific era" (Fisher, 1965, p. 109). 
In the course of our discussion we observed that most of the 
hedonistically oriented economists thought that physics was the ideal 
model for the scientific development of economics. Although Fisher 
attempted to minimize the hedonistic Image of economics, he frequently 
emphasizes the analogies between economics and physics and especially 
between energy and utility, an idea which we saw in Edgeworth's 
extreme hedonistically based work. More specifically, a great number 
of pages of his "Investigations" are devoted to showing the analogies 
between physical and economical phenomena. (Fisher was Influenced also 
by the famous physicist W. Gibbs, see Tobin, 1985, p. 32. ) His attempts 
were directed towards drawing a mechanical (especially hydrodynamic) 
analogy for every economic phenomenon. As was observed before, most 
economic problems are associated with the analogy of cisterns and 
liquids. As Edgeworth and Pareto, he went on to construct a table of 










Work or Energy = Forcefspace 
Force is a vector 
(dir. in space) 
Forces are added by vector 
add it Ion. 
Work and Energy are scalars 
Equilibrium will be where 
net energy is maximum; or 
equilibrium will be where 
the impel. and resist. 
forces along each axis 




Marg. Ut. or Disutility 
Disutility 
Utility 
Disutility or utility 
= marg-ut-*commodity 
Marg. ut. is a vector 
(dir. in commodity) 
Marg. ut. are added by 
vector addition 
Disut. and ut. are 
scalars 
Equilibrium will be 
where gain Is maximum; 
or equilibrium will be 
where the marg. ut. and 
marg. disut. along each 
axis will be equal 
(Fisher, 1965, pp. 85,86) 
Another implication of the above table is that the individual is 
portrayed as having a machine-like behaviour guided, as a particle, 
only by the maximization of his utility or the minimization of his 
disutility. As we saw in the previous pages, this image of man 
facilitates the application of mathematics and opens the way for a 
positive physical science oriented discipline of economics. 
Nowadays, Fisher is considered as an important figure in the 
formation of orthodox economic theory (especially microeconomic 
theory). His equilibrium equations and Indifference curves are the 
basis for the contemporary theory of consumer behaviour. Moreover, 
Fisher is well-known for his theories of capital and interest and for 
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the formulation of the quantity theory of money. 
The general characteristic of Fisher's work is his attempt 
towards a neutral economic science. He is considered to be one of the 
first originators of the modern theory of choice which allegedly is 
characterized by its independence from psychology and subjective 
notions. As Wicksteed and Pareto, Fisher wanted to minimize the 
profound hedonistic orientation of marginalist economics, which was 
instead to be based on objective concepts. His first step towards this 
purpose was to reject the so-called hedonistic hypothesis and to 
disassociate utility from pleasure. He attempted to base utility on 
desire and to avoid using the subjective terms pleasure, pain, 
satisfaction etc., Unlike Wicksteed and Pareto, he explicitly pointed 
out the utilitarian orientation of marginalist economics. Along the 
same line can be seen his later attempt to replace the "biased" 
concept of utility with desirability, wantability, want for one-more 
etc. In general, he is very careful in using any hedon1stically 
related terms, especially in his "Investigations". Thus, he builds a 
similar economic theory to that of marginalists without mentioning 
hedonistic-based concepts. 
However, in spite of his attempt to purify economics from its 
hedonistic or psychological bias, Fisher's economic thought is still 
influenced by the hedonistic framework, sometimes implicitly and 
sometimes explicitly. First although, he rejects subjective terms, he 
speaks about maximum satisfaction in the discussion of the 
relationship between price and quantity. A point relating to maximum 
satisfaction is also mentioned in the analysis of indifference curves. 
Like most hedonistically oriented theorists, he discusses the issue of 
measurability of utility. Fisher is an advocate of the cardinal 
approach to utility. He devises a unit of its measurement called 
"util" and even a statistical method for the measurement of marginal 
utility. His definition of economics in terms of satisfaction of wants 
and his conception of wealth in terms of material objects are ideas 
which are influenced by the hedonistic approach. Furthermore, his 
analysis of supply and demand on the basis of efforts and 
satisfactions, is very similar to the marginalists' idea of pleasures 
and pains. His conception of economic individuals (econontic man) is 
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again similar to that of the marginalists: a utility maximizing, 
disutility minimizing being. The methodological ideal of Fisher is the 
same as that of most hedonistically influenced economists: a physical- 
sclence-type economic methodology. The mathematization of economics 
would open the way for a positive, objective economic science. Fisher 
was an enthusiastic advocate of the above methodology and this is the 
reason why his "Investigations" are filled with analogies between 
economic and mechanical phenomena. The correspondence of an Individual 
with a particle who is motivated only by considerations of maximum 
utility or minimum disutility (like a particle, 'motivated' by work 
and energy) Is again another Indication of his influence from 
hedonism. 
It seems that despite his attempts to construct a neutral 
economic science, Fisher's economic ideas are still influenced by the 
hedonistic mode of thought. 
188 
5.5. CONCLUSlON 
The common characteristic of the theorists that we examined was 
the attempt towards the minimization of the profoundly hedonistic 
orientation of orthodox economics. As was shown, orthodox economists 
started to realize the obvious dependence of their discipline on a 
particular psychological or philosophical theory: hedonism. Thus, 
Wicksteed's, Pareto's and Fisher's thought expressed the trend towards 
the downplay of hedonism. The general feature of this trend was to 
achieve the same theoretical results with the same mathematical, 
physical-science-type methodology but without depending on the 
"subjective" concepts of pleasure, pain, satisfaction, pleasure 
maximizing agents or, in short, to expel the (hedonistic) 
psychological assumptions. This tendency towards the purification of 
disciplines from subjective concepts was also the case in other social 
sciences at that time. For Instance, the rise of behaviourism in 
psychology which tried to explain behaviour in terms of stimulus- 
response only, without referring to any other subjective concept 
demonstrates the above (see for example Watson, 1930). The origins of 
this general tendency towards purification can be found in the gradual 
dominance of the positivist philosophies of science which called for 
the abandonment of all subjective, metaphysical concepts from 
sciences. (At this point one might question the possibility of 
eliminating normative elements from science; but this issue will be 
discussed in the final chapter. ) 
Thus, Wicksteed explicitly rejected hedonism and was very 
reluctant to accept the concept of economic man as a selfish, pleasure 
maximizing being, and also he avoided mentioning the maximization of 
satisfaction explicitly. Moreover, his willingness to consider 
altruistic behaviour in economics can also be seen from the above 
perspective. Pareto's attempt to find a theoretical method independent 
of the concepts of pleasure or utility, his reservations about the 
measurability of pleasure and about the extreme hedonistic based 
theory of value are all in this same climate. Furthermore his 
consideration of altruistic behaviour is another indication of the 
tendency to downplay the extreme egoistic hedonism of the 
marginalists. Fisher's attempt to disassociate psychology from 
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economics by stating a "simple psycho-economic postulate", his 
avoidance of subjective notions like pleasure and satisfaction and the 
replacement -in later works- of utility with wantability or 
desirability, are all indications of this same tendency. 
However, In spite of the above, the hedonistic Influence is still 
explicitly or Implicitly present In the works of these economists. 
Moreover, the fact that their economic theories are similar to those 
of the marginalists is another indication of the presence of the 
hedonistic approach. Thus, one can see, that despite his reservations, 
Wicksteed uses the standard marginalist diagrams of total and marginal 
satisfactions, that he accepts the measurability of satisfaction and 
that his value theory is based on the concept of satisfaction. 
Moreover, as with the marginallsts his methodology Is inspired by 
physics and his theory of equilibrium is based on the idea of the 
maximization of utility or satisfaction. 
Similarly, Pareto's reservations about measurability do not stop 
him from adopting measurability as the basis of the development of key 
theoretical points. Furthermore, Pareto's economic man is a selfish, 
rational, pleasure maximizing being and his indifference curves are 
explicitly based on pleasure. In addition, his discussion of 
equilibrium in terms of maximization of utility or satisfaction, his 
indirect acceptance of interpersonal comparisons of utility and the 
fact that his theory of value is still based on pleasure, are 
additional indications of his hedonistic influence. As with Wicksteed, 
physics is the methodological ideal for Pareto. Finally, his influence 
from the clearly hedonistically oriented economic thought of 
Pantaleoni Is another sign of his hedonistic origins. 
The definition of economics in terms of satisfaction of wants, 
the discussion of supply and demand on the basis of efforts and 
satisfactions, and the reference to maximum satisfaction in his 
indifference curves theory are some of the hedonistic traits of 
Fisher's economic thought. The absolute commitment to the 
measurability of utility, the perfectly informed, utility maximizing 
economic man and the idea that economic phenomena correspond exactly 
to mechanical phenomena (cf Edgeworth) are additional indications of 
Fisher's influence from the marginalist, hedonistic conceptual 
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framework. 
Apart from Wicksteed, Pareto and Fisher there were also other 
economists who took part in this drive towards the purification of 
economics. Auspitz and Lieben (1889), Barone (1908). Johnson (1913) 
and Slutsky (1915) were the most important of these. 
The next phase of orthodox economics concerns the modern 
developments (starting from the first decades of this century) where 
prevailing theories became established. Thus, the next-chapter will 
examine the influence of hedonistic ideas on modern orthodox 
economists. 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 5 
1) Wicksteed's idea of rationality is related to A. Whitehead. 
According to Whitehead Civilization advances by increasing the number 
of operations which we can perform without thinking about them (see 





Our discussion of the previous chapter which dealt with the works 
of Wicksteed, Pareto and Fisher, enabled us to observe an underlying 
tendency common to those economists towards the minimization of the 
hedonistic Image of economics. As indications of this tendency, we 
mentioned -among other things- Wicksteed's explicit rejection of 
hedonism, Pareto's attempt to find a method independent of the 
concepts of utility and pleasure and Fisher's critique of the concept 
of utility. We also pointed out that the main reason for this 
downplaying of hedonism was the increasing Influence of the late 
nineteenth century positivist philosophies of science. The main 
characteristic of these philosophies was the demand for the exclusion 
of all subjective or metaphysical concepts from science and especially 
from the social sciences with the ultimate purpose of constructing 
positive sciences. 
However, in spite of this tendency, it was seen that the 
influence of hedonism on orthodox economic thought at the end of 
nineteenth and the beginning of the twentlenth centuries, was still 
considerable. 
This century's economic thought is characterized by a 
continuation of the trend to downplay hedonism. More specifically 
after an interval of almost two. decades (1910's-1930's) dominated by 
Pigou's celebrated book "The Economics of Welfare", which was 
explicitly influenced by Bentham's system, the above tendency was to 
be highlighted again in Robbins' work. Robbins' ideas were in the 
spirit of Pareto's and Fisher's but (unlike Pareto and Fisher) he was 
responsible for the systematic introduction of a positivist philosophy 
in economics. The introduction of this scientific philosophy marked an 
important point in the history of the hedonistic influence on 
mainstream economics. From then on, economists, much more consciously 
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than before, have attempted to 'purify' economics from subjective and 
psychological assumptions and concepts like pleasure and pain, or a 
pleasure maximizing consumer. Moreover, the new ordinal approach 
assisted the construction of allegedly value-free scientific 
economics. In their effort to Implement the above, economists have 
replaced concepts like pleasure or satisfaction with preference or 
choice and the assumption of satisfaction maximization with the 
maximization hypothesis. For instance, a new, apparently neutral, 
theory of choice was the outcome of the attempt to purify economics 
from hedonistic influences. 
However, we believe that In spite of these efforts to expel any 
philosophical or psychological content, the hedonistic influence is 
still discernable in orthodox economics. The existence of the concept 
of utility maximization (in spite of attempts to neutralize the term 
utility), the dominance of the egoistic motive, the explicit use of a 
satisfaction maximizer economic man etc, are indications of the 
continuation of the spirit of egoistic hedonism. One can even find 
indications of an underlying psychological framework in the allegedly 
neutral theory of the rational consumer. Moreover, the explicit 
hedonistic orientation of well-known modern textbooks (especially in 
the discussion of consumer behaviour theory), Is an additional 
Indication of the Influence of the hedonistic framework. 
In order to show the above points, we will start with a 
discussion of Pigou's work which held an Influential position between 
the 1910's and 1930's, signifying in turn the explicit reappearance of 
utilitarianism in that period. 
After a brief discussion of logical positivism which had a major 
impact on Robbins' thought, we will examine Robbins's attempt in the 
1930's to construct a positive economic science without any dependence 
on ethical or philosophical notions. In this sense, 'Robbins can be 
seen as expressing a continuation of Wicksteed's, Pareto's and 
Fisher's line of thought. 
After Robbins, we will move on to a discussion of the more recent 
theoretical developments (especially theory of choice) and their claim 
to be Independent of any psychological (hedonistic) content. Our 
discussion will be concentrated on the work of Hicks and Samuelson 
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which constitutes the basis of modern choice theories. 
The final section of this chapter will deal with a discussion of 
the current state of affairs including a survey of established 
mainstream textbooks with the purpose of uncovering Implicit or 
expicit traits of the hedonistic Influence, especially in consumer 
theory. 
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6.2 A. C. PIGOU 
In the previous chapter, we observed the attempt of Pareto and 
Fisher to minimize the hedonistic image of economics. As we pointed 
out in the introduction, this attempt was to continue in the 1930's in 
Robbins' work. In the meantime, however, (between 1910 and 1930) we 
find the strong Influence of an economist whose work is explicitly 
characterized by the Benthamite line of thought. A. C. Pigou's work, 
and especially his "Economics of Welfare", had a considerable 
influence on mainstream economics in the above period. The "Economics 
of Welfare" was used in teaching at Cambridge during the 1920's and 
even until the 1950's (see also Cotter and Rappoport, 1984, p. 513). Its 
influence is an indication that in spite of Pareto's and Fisher's 
endeavour to downplay hedonism, the Benthamite tradition was still 
very strong. Naturally, Pigou's work was not so explicit utilitarian 
as previous marginalist works (eg those of Edgeworth). The general 
tendency towards a value-free science of economics also had Its impact 
on his thought. However, the basis of his economics was hedonistic 
oriented and we find many more direct influences from Bentham than in 
Pareto or subsequent economists. Moreover, one can add that Pigou's 
work can be seen as an example which indicated that a discussion of 
economic problems from an aggregate point of view inevitably involved 
the more explicit use of utilitarian ideas. Thus, In the 1920's and 
1930's, with Pigou's work, the hedonistic tradition (especially the 
universal maximization of utility approach) was once more very much 
discernable. But let us discuss more systematically the main aspects 
of his thought. 
As was noted Pigou's most important work was "The Economics of 
Welfare" published in 1920, which grew out of his earlier work "Wealth 
and Welfare" published In 1912. Pigou was not unaffected by the 
general trend among economists during this period, which called for 
the construction of a positive economic science freed from ethical 
concepts. Thus, as we shall find later In this section, he considered 
economics to be a positive science. Moreover, one can discern the 
influence of the period in the opening pages of the "Economics of 
Welfare" where he discusses the term utility. In a statement where one 
can trace the influence of Pareto and Fisher, he writes: 
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"The term 'desiredness' seems, however, to be preferable (to 
utility], because, since it cannot be taken to have any 
ethical implication, it is less ambiguous. " (Pigou, 1932, p. 23) 
The above statement is In the same spirit as Pareto's substitution of 
utility with the term ophelimity and with Fisher's preference for 
'desirability' instead of utility. Fisher especially was dissatisfied 
with utility because of its ethical implications. Thus, Pigou was not 
at all isolated from the general idea of an objective or neutral 
economics. However, in spite of this awareness of the general 
attitude, Pigou's work is based more explicitly on hedonism than 
Pareto's and Fisher's. 
As the title of his most Important work suggests, the central 
idea in his work is welfare. According to Pigou the goal of economics 
'is to make more easy practical measures to promote welfare' 
(Pigou, 1932, p. 10). Pigou separates social welfare and economic 
welfare, the first being a much broader concept than the latter. His 
next point is to make clear that his inquiry is restricted to that 
part of social welfare which may be called economic welfare 
(Pigou, 1932, p. 11). Allthough according to him these two concepts of 
welfare move towards the same direction, economic welfare Is defined 
as that part of social welfare that can be brought directly or 
indirectly Into relation with the measuring-rod of money' 
(Pigou, 1932, p. 11). Those aspects related with money are explained as 
follows: 
"The only aspects of conscious life which can, as a rule, be 
brought into relation with the money measure, and which, 
therefore, fall within economic welfare, are a certain 
limited group of satisfactions and dissatisfactions. " 
(Pigou, 1932, p. 14) 
This is a first Indication that economic welfare Is associated with 
satisfactions. Another statement where a stronger conne'ction between 
economic welfare and satisfaction is established, can be found in a 
subsequent article which Pigou wrote in 1951. (This article "Some 
Aspects of Welfare Economics" was added and became part of the 
subsequent editions of the "Economics of Welfare". ) Pigou writes in a 
categorical way: 
"For the present purpose, I propose to make welfare refer to 
satisfactions... A Man's welfare consists of his 
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satisfactions. " (Pigou, 1951, p. 288) 
After having defined economic welfare, Pigou sets as the Ideal 
the maximization of economic welfare. More specifically, the aim or 
criterion for economic policies is the maximization of economic 
welfare. Economic welfare can be maximized when there is a larger 
national dividend, more equal distribution and less fluctuation over 
time. It is evident that this line of thought is very close to the 
Benthamite idea of the 'Greatest Happiness Principle'. 
Apart from the aggregate maximization of satisfactions, Pigou has 
also other ideas which are very similar to Bentham, and to 
utilitarianism generally. In particular, he holds that interpersonal 
comparisons of the utilities of different persons are valid. As we 
observed in the section on Bentham, interpersonal comparisons were 
thought to be possible. Pigou writes: 
"Nevertheless, it is evident that any transference of income 
from a relatively rich man to a relatively poor man of 
similar temperament, since it enables more ifitense wants to 
be satisfied at the expense of less intense wants, must 
increase the aggregate sum of satisfaction. " 
(Pigou, 1932, p. 89) 
The important implication of this statement is that interpersonal 
comparisons can be made. Moreover, it is Implied that the total 
welfare of the society is the sum of the welfare of the Individuals, 
and this again is a utilitarian idea. In addition, the above is 
another indication of the identification of economic welfare with 
satisfaction which is a sign of hedonistic influence. 
In line with other hedonistically influenced orthodox economists, 
Pigou defines utility in terms of satisfaction. In spite of his 
initial comments about the ethical implications of the term, he makes 
use of it, especially in the subsequent article of 1951. In this 
article, he emphasizes the identification of utility and satisfaction: 
"... I shall employ it [utility] here to mean satisfaction, so 
that we may say that a man's economic welfare is made up of 
his utilities. " (Pigou, 1951, p. 288) 
After stating that the purpose of economics Is the maximization 
of welfare or satisfaction, Pigou attempts to find a method for 
measuring satisfaction. We observed this characteristic in almost all 
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hedonistically oriented thinkers. In his main work, Plgou tries to 
measure satisfactions In terms of money. As he points out: 
"Not much harm Is likely to be done by the current practice 
of regarding money demand price as indifferently as the 
measure of a desire and as a measure of the satisfaction left 
when the desired thing is obtained. " (Pigou, 1932, p. 24) 
However, in his 1951 article, Pigou seems to have rejected 
completely any possibility of a cardinally measurable satisfaction. 
the gradual dominance of the ordinal approach (which we shall discuss 
later) seems to be the main factor for change in Pigou's mind. In this 
articlehe clearly denies cardinality: 
"They [pleasures, satisfactions, utilities) are not the sort 
of thing that we can correlate with a series of cardinal 
numbers. " (Pigou, 1951, p. 289) 
But this rejection of cardinality does not prevent him from accepting 
Interpersonal comparisons of utilities. As he declares: "satisfactions 
or utilities, though not measurable, are comparable in principle and 
can In fact be compared both intra-personally and inter-personally" 
(Pigou, 1951, p. 293). Another point which can be noticed once again from 
his discussion of measurability is the use of the concepts of 
pleasure, satisfaction and utility synonymously. 
As one would expect, the hedonistic influence of Pigou's work 
leads him to point out the important role of self-interest in 
economics. As we have seen, the role of self-interest is emphasized by 
the vast majority of the hedonistic minded economists, a1lowing for 
characterization of orthodox economics as being based on egoistic 
hedonism. The importance of self-interest in Pigou's work is 
manifested in his discussion about the size of national dividend. He 
writes: 
"The essential point for our present purpose is that, when 
marginal private net products and marginal social net 
products coincide, any obstacles that obstruct the free play 
of self-interest will, In general, damage the national 
dividend. " (Pigou, 1932, p. 143) 
In general, throughout Pigou's work, 'the free play of self-interest' 
seems to be accepted as a beneficial and dominant force in the 
economy. 
Pigou's economic methodology Is not positivist to the same extent 
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as Pareto's and Fisher's. The nature of Pigou's subject matter does 
not allow much space for a strict positivist methodology. The idea of 
collective maximization of happiness could be seen only with 
difficulty as having a positive basis. Thus, in the beginning of his 
"Economics and Welfare", he asserts that because of the economist's 
motive -which is the improvement of social conditions- "it follows 
that the type of science that the economist will endeavour to develop 
must be one adapted to form the basis of an art" (Pigou, 1932, p. 5). 
However, he proceeds to emphasize that only the basis of economics 
should be normative, the science itself should be a positive science. 
"It [economics] will not, indeed, itself be an art, or 
directly enunciate precepts of government. It Is a positive 
science of what is and tends to be, not a normative science 
of what ought to be. " (Pigou, 1932, p. 5) 
This demonstrates the idea that we mentioned in the beginning of this 
section: Pigou's thought is not isolated from the general positivist 
framework which dominates economics during that period. 
In general, we observed that Pigou's economics exhibit the main 
characteristics of the hedonistic influence which we also observed in 
the work of previous orthodox economists. Although there are 
indications that he advocated the growing idea of a value-free 
economics independent from any psychological or ethical notions, 
Pigou's work is more explicitly influenced by hedonism than Pareto's 
and Fisher's. More specifically, Pigou bases his most crucial concept 
-economic welfare- on satisfactions and dissatisfactions (, in the same 
manner as Bentham's pleasure and pain). He also submits to the 
utilitarian Idea that the total welfare is a sum of individual 
welfares and to the possibility of interpersonal comparisons of 
utility. Moreover, like many previous orthodox economists, he 
identifies utility with satisfaction and conceives (, at least in his 
most important work, ) utility or satisfaction as something measurable. 
In addition, he realizes the importance of self-interest (egoistic 
hedonism) and although he states that the basis of economics should be 
normative, he thinks of economics as a positive science. From all the 
above one can also observe the explicit reappearance of hedonistic 
ideas in a work which viewed economic phenomena from a collective 
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perpective. Overall, the important implication is that in the 1920's 
and 1930's, the influence of hedonistic ideas In economics is still 
clearly distinguishable. 
Before we finish this section we have to mention that Pigou was 
not the only Influential utilitarian oriented economist of the period. 
R. Harrod was another well-known theorist whose ideas were influenced 
very much by the utilitarian-hedonistic framework. For instance, 
Harrod, in his discussion of the supply of savings, makes his analysis 
in terms of 'future and present satisfactions' and -conceives 
satisfaction or utility as something cardinal (Harrod, 1963, pp. 36-40). 
Moreover, like Pigou, he advocates interpersonal comparisons of 
utility, and generally follows Pigou's approach in welfare questions. 
The example of Harrod is an additional indication that Pigou's 
utilitarianism is not an isolated example in the above mentioned 
period. 
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6.3 LOGICAL POSITIVISM AND L. ROBBINS 
6.3.1 LoRical Positivism 
As was pointed out in the introduction, after an interval of two 
decades dominated by Pigou's thought, the tendency to downplay 
hedonism came again onto the scene with the work of Robbins. Robbins 
attempted to construct a methodology which would be the basis for a 
value-free, positive science of economics. One of the fundamental 
features of Robbins' work was his endeavour to eliminate all value 
Judgements or psychological elements from economics. As one would 
expect, the hedonistic orientation of mainstream economics was the 
most obvious target of Robbins' endeavour. The reasons for this 
renewed tendency to downplay hedonism were first the prevailing 
influence of the philosophy of positivism and especially of logical 
positivism, and second the critique by heterodox economists of the 
hedonistic bias. of orthodox economics. As we have seen In the previous 
chapter, Wicksteed, Pareto and Fisher were motivated by the same 
reasons, the only difference being that for them the prevailing 
scientific philosophy was the positivism of the nineteenth century. 
Robbins' ideas were a very important point In the history of the 
hedonistic influence on orthodox economics. But before we start 
discussing his views we shall devote some space to one of the major 
sources of influence for the economists of this period: logical 
positivism. 
Logical positivism was a continuation of the spirit of positivism 
which emerged from the writings of A. Comte in the nineteenth century. 
The origin of logical positivism is to be found in the famous Vienna 
Circle, the most important members of which, were: R. Carnap, 0. 
Neurath, M. Schlick and F. Waismann. Moreover, the theories of logic 
of B. Russell and A. Whitehead, which are to be. found in "Principia 
Mathematica", were the principal source of the methodology of logical 
positivism. L. Wittgenstein's early ideas were also regarded by the 
members of the Circle as very much related to their philosophy. 
Similarly, the Englishman A. J. Ayer, although not a member of the 
Circle, popularized the ideas of the movement. 
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The starting point of the philosophy of logical positivism is 
expressed in the following way by Ayer: 
"We say that a sentence is factually significant to any given 
person, if and only if, he knows how to verify the 
proposition which it purports to express. " (Ayer, 1946, p. 48) 
The above principle came to be known formally as the 'verification 
principle'. (It has to be mentioned here that the above statement can 
not be verified. ) According to this principle, a sentence has meaning 
or significance if it can be verified either analytically or 
empirically. The empirical statements are verified by observation and 
the analytical statements by merely reflecting on the meanings of the 
relevant words (Hanfling, 1981, p. 9). The basic function of the 
verification principle is to categorise all kinds of statements Into 
a) meaningful, b) meaningless, and c) tautological. Usually, the 
statements made by the physical sciences are regarded by logical 
positivists as being meaningful statements. Value judgements and 
ethical statements are branded meaningless. As one of the most 
important logical positivists emphasizes: 
"Value Judgements have no theoretical sense. Therefore, we 
assign them to the realm of metaphysics. " 
(Carnap. 1981a, p. 150) 
As we shall see, Robbins' argument for a 'neutral' science of 
economics Is very similar to the logical positivist rejection of value 
Judgements. 
The next Important point of logical positivism is the Idea of 
unified science. It was anticipated that the adoption of the logical 
positivist methodology by all scientific disciplines would eventually 
result In the unification of all sciences. The reduction of all 
sciences to one is crucial for the unity of sciences. The first step 
for the reduction would be the establishment of a common scientific 
language to be based on the language of a very advanced science, the 
language of physics. Logical positivists admitted that the task of 
their philosophy was the construction of one homogeneous system of 
laws for the whole of science (Carnap, 1981b, p. 128). 
The main theoretical points of logical positivism are the 
rejection from sciences of all statements that cannot be verified 
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through the verification principle, and the unification of all 
sciences which can be achieved with the adoption of a common 
scientific language. From the above, It is clear that for logical 
positivism, the ideal model of science is physics and that all 
sciences should be constructed like it. In order to do this, sciences 
should abolish all elements that are "meaningless" in the logical 
positivist sense. In the case of social sciences, the implication is 
that they should become "neutral", "positive" sciences. 
The scientific philosophy of logical positivism was developed in 
the first decades of this century. Its impact on the methodology of 
sciences, and especially of the social sciences, was great. In 
particular, economics, as 'the queen of social sciences' was one of 
the first disciplines to be influenced by this new positivist 
philosophy. One of the main advocates of this new epistemology was L. 
Robbins whose Ideas we will now discuss. 
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6.3.2 L Robbins 
Without doubt, L. Robbins was one of the most influential 
economists of this century, especially as far as the methodology of 
economics is concerned. His celebrated "An Essay on the Nature and 
Significance of Economic Science" had considerable impact on the 
development of orthodox economics in the sense that it provided a 
methodological framework. One could say that even today, the above 
work is a standard reference for a large number of economic theorists. 
The prevailing spirit of the book is the spirit of a positivist 
scientific philosophy. Because of this, an important characteristic of 
Robbins' essay, is to construct a positive science of economics with a 
methodology similar to that of physics. This meant that psychological 
or philosophical (hedonist) elements of economic theory should be 
separated from the theory as illegitimate. (Obviously this idea 
presupposes the possibility of separation. ) But let us discuss in a 
more detailed manner the main reasons behind Robbins' endeavour to 
disassociate economics from hedonism. 
As was mentioned, logical positivism was a major source of 
influence on Robbins' thought. His statements about the neutral 
science of economics and the rejection of philosophical or ethical 
elements rely on the ppistemology of logical positivism that we 
discussed in previous pages. Robbins' influence from logical 
positivism can be seen in a well-known article which he wrote in 1938. 
In this, article entitled "Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility" 
Robbins rejected the idea of comparability as a value judgement. The 
justification of this rejection was the following: 
"I still cannot believe that it is helpful to speak as if 
interpersonal comparisons of utility rest upon scientific 
foundations. " (Robbins, 1938, p. 640) 
The whole argument against the possibility of interpersonal 
comparisons is based on the logical positivist conception of science. 
Even the term "value judgement" that Is used is of logical positivist 
origin. It seems that the ultimate purpose of Robbins' work was the 
construction, through the application of the methodology of logical 
positivism, of a positive economic science. This positive science 
would resemble the "ideal" science of physics. The parallel between 
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economics and physics is clear when he writes : "In pure Mechanics we 
examine the Implication of the existence of certain given properties 
of bodies. In Pure Economics we examine the implication of the 
existence of scarce means with alternative uses" (Robbins, 1932, p. 83). 
We have noticed this methodological characteristic In almost all 
previous hedonistic oriented economists that we discussed. The 
difference with Robbins (and up to a certain extent with Pareto) is 
that while previously the positivist methodology was assisted by the 
hedonistic approach, now Robbins tries to retain the same methodology 
but without hedonism. 
Before we proceed, It has to be mentioned that Robbins was also 
influenced by the contemporary developments In psychology. Some 
psychologists, especially 1. B Watson, were responsible for a new 
movement which developed in the first decades of the century. The 
basic Idea of this movement, called behaviourism, was that the 
province of psychology was behaviour, measured in terms -of stimulus 
and response (see Watson, 1930 and Brennan, 1982, p. 264). By 
concentrating on observable behaviour in terms of stimulus and 
response, behaviourists asserted that the study of central mental 
states (consciousness) was outside the scope of psychology. The fact 
that some psychologists excluded mental states and motivations from 
their discipline, had a considerable effect on Robbins' attempt to 
exclude such elements from economics. 
Apart from the above, another reason for this renewed tendency 
to downplay hedonism was the reaction against orthodox economics by 
heterodox economists. Indeed as we shall see in the next chapter, a 
number of economists (especially Institutional Ists) had launched a 
forceful attack on the hedonistic orientation of mainstream economics. 
This took place at the turn of the century. Clearly, Robbins was aware 
of such critics, as one can see when he writes: 
11 ... in recent years, endless time has been devoted to the 
acquisition of cheap notoriety by attacks on the alleged 
psychological assumptions of Economic Science. " 
(Robbins, 1932, p. 84) 
By the term 'psychological assumptions' , Robbins means hedonistic 
assumptions. In the subsequent defence against these critics, Robbins 
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admits that in the past, there were some economists who were 
influenced by psychological hedonism. However, he emphasizes that 
hedonism was incidental to the main structure of the theory 
(Robbins, 1932, pp. 85,86). One can observe the attempts of Robbins to 
minimize the role of the hedonistic approach in orthodox economics, 
even when it was very obvious (eg. In the wake of Jevons and of 
Edgeworth) that hedonism was the dominant framework of mainstream 
economics. 
The above attack on the critics leads us to one of the most 
important points of his thought: the subject-matter of economics. 
Robbins' starting point Is to discuss the established definition of 
economics. He points out the widely accepted definition that economics 
"is that which relates it to the study of the causes of material 
welfare" (Robbins, 1932, p. 4). According to him, this definition 
describes for practical purposes the object of interest for 
economists. However, he goes on to emphasize that a new definition is 
needed which would be free of any ethical elements. It seems that the 
term "material welfare" was viewed by Robbins as implying that 
economics is concerned only with the material aspects of life. For 
this reason he brands the above definition a "materialist definition" 
(Robbins, 1932, p. 9). Again at this point. one can discern Robbins' 
effort to disassociate economics from any philosophical or ethical 
framework. After a lengthy discussion of the disadvantages of the 
materialist definition, he proceeds to state his own new definition. 
"Economics is the science which studies human behaviour as a 
relationship between ends and scarce means which have 
alternative uses. " (Robbins, 1932, p. 15) 
The above definition is allegedly free from any psychological or 
philosophical connotations. It can be seen that the spirit of 
positivism is present here. The definition does not specify anything 
about the nature of ends. The ends can be anything and this very fact, 
according to Robbins, makes economics a neutral science. However, we 
believe that despite this "neutralization" of economics the "ends" 
remain the same, as before, namely: the maximization of satisfaction. 
One indication of the above is Robbins' assertion that the practice of 
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those economists who follow the materialist definition fits perfectly 
in his new definition (Robbins, 1932, p. 21). In short, -according to 
Robbins, although the materialist definition misrepresents economics, 
economic practice (which presumably is the basic object and study of 
economics) fits perfectly in the new definition. It is clear that the 
essential features of economics (one of which is the hedonistic 
influence) are not challenged by Robbins. 
After the 'neutralization' of the definition of economics, 
Robbins' next step is to make sure that the concept of 'utility' is 
totally free from any psychological connotations. Here he defines 
utility in terms of desire. As was seen in the previous chapter, 
Wicksteed, Pareto and Fisher attempted the same thing at the turn of 
the century. Robbins acknowledges this, and states: 
"Thus, from a very early stage we find explanations that 
utility is not utility in the sense of psychological 
hedonism, but rather a neutral quality of being the object of 
desire, whether hedonistic or otherwise. " (Robbins, 1970, p. 27) 
The importance of the quotation is in fact that it was written thirty 
eight years later than the "Essay". Specifically, it can be found in 
"The Evolution of Modern Economic Theory" which was published in 1970. 
In the "Essay" Robbins categorically rejected any association of 
economics with hedonism. However, as one can see, in this later work 
hedonism is tolerated and he is even willing to consider the 
connection between utility and hedonism. Moreover, as we shall find 
out, Robbins' later works are generally less strict in the use of 
hedonistic related concepts than the "Essay". Thus, one might argue 
that there Is a tendency in Robbins' subsequent works toward 
acceptance that the unspecified ends of his famous definition could 
be hedonistic. Furthermore, this Is an additional indication that 
Robbins did not challenge the essential assumptions of marginalist 
economics. 
Another step in his attempt to construct a positive science of 
economics was his assertion that the concept of economic man Is not 
basic to economics. Robbins realized that his view of a psychology- 
free. economic science was incompatible with the existence of the 
concept of economic man which was based on psychological 
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characteristics (As we have stated, the established model of economic 
man was influenced by egoistic hedonism. ) Thus, he attempted to 
minimize the importance of this concept in economic theory. 
"If this were commonly known, If it were generally realized 
that Economic Man Is only a expository device -a first 
approximation used very cautiously at one stage in the 
development, of arguments which, in their full development, 
neither employ any such assumption nor demand it In any way 
for a justification of their procedure- it is impossible that 
it would be such a universal bogey. " (Robbins, 1932, p. 90) 
Apart from his attempt to minimize the importance of economic man, 
Robbins also tried to change the characteristics of economic man. He 
conceived that rationality and maximizing behaviour were the most 
important features of his economic man (although it is ambiguous what 
economic man Is maximizing). This new picture was to become basic in 
the subsequent theories of choice. As will be observed, modern 
theorists tend to assume rationality, whilst implying that rationality 
actually means maximizing behaviour. However, the fact that even 
after the change of features, Robbins insisted on the peripheral role 
of the concept, indicates that he was not completely certain about its 
non-hedonistic nature. 
So far we have seen the main points of Robbins' attempt to 
disassociate economics from hedonism: a "neutral" definition of 
economics, an attack on those who hold that economics is influenced by 
hedonism, the minimization of the role of economic man etc. In spite 
of these, however, signs of hedonistic influence are still discernable 
in Robbins' later works. In particular, when he discusses economic 
problems, he finds it easier to construct his analysis in the same 
manner as most hedonistic oriented theorists. Thus, In his 1963 work: 
"Politics and Economics" one can read the following passage: 
"We can, ' if we are so minded, conceive of a market apparatus 
which is all sufficient in determining the supply of 
commodities which yield the end-products of satisfaction to 
particular consumers- the family for example. But it Is In 
the nature of things that this will not be available in 
regard to the extensive (and very important) groups of 
services which afford satisfaction to all and sundry- to use 
the well-known technical jargon, the case of indiscriminate 
as distinct from discriminate benefit: roads, bridges, 
lighthouses and so on. " (Robbins, 1963, p. 17) 
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Another indication that Robbins' thought is not at all alien to 
the hedonistic spirit can be found in a more recent work, his 
"Evolution of Modern Economic Theory". In this work, Robbins openly 
admits the great importance for the field of economics of the work of 
Bentham. He proceeds to declare: 
"Now conceived in this way, we can regard the Benthamite 
outlook as something which definitely transcends Its 
historical origin and achievement. To ask of any contemplated 
law or administrative order, will it, on balance, achieve 
more happiness or less pain that the other possibilities, is 
a habit which, in my Judgement at least, is just as incumbent 
today as it was at the time of the publication of the 
Principles of Morals and Legislation; and it is difficult to 
conceive of a state of affairs in which it would not be so. " 
(Robbins, 1970, p. 8 1) 
Thus, in spite of Robbins' early attempts to cut any connection of 
economics with philosophy or ethics, it seems that utilitarianism is 
still an influential system in his economic thought. 
In the same work, Robb. ins expresses his high esteem for the 
economic ideas of P. Wicksteed. Robbins was influenced by the ideas of 
Wicksteed, which were seen to be influenced by the hedonistic 
framework. Naturally, Robbins points out that Wicksteed attempted to 
exclude any philosophical bias from economics, but as we discovered, 
the essential aspects of Wicksteed's economic thought are not 
different from those of Jevons and Edgeworth in this respect. 
Apart from the above, signs of hedonistic Ifluence can even be 
found in his "Essay" where for instance some issues are discussed in 
terms of increasing satisfaction (see Robbins, 1932, p. 126). 
Before we conclude this section, it has to be mentioned that 
Robbins' ideas appealed to a considerable number of economists also 
because of the new theoretical developments which appeared to exclude 
any psychological or philosophical assumptions. We mainly refer to the 
ordinal theory of utility which entered economics in the 1930's, 
especially with the work of J. Hicks. It can be maintained that 
Robbins provided the methodological framework for these allegedly 
value-free theories. 
In general, it can be said that with the appearance of Robbins' 
"Essay" in 1932, we have the revival of the tendency to downplay 
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hedonism in economics. As the main reasons behind this tendency we 
identified (a) the increasing dominance of the epistemology of logical 
positivism which demanded the abolition of all non-verifiable elements 
from social sciences; (b) the critique of the hedonistic or 
utilitarian bias of orthodox theory, as put forward by heterodox 
economists; and (c) the influence of behaviourist psychology which 
emphasized observable behaviour only and thus neglected motivations 
and mental states. The most important step of Robbins towards the 
minimization of the hedonistic image of economics, was the 
introduction of a new definition of economics allegedly free from any 
non-scientific elements. Moreover, in the same spirit, Robbins 
attempted to clear utility of any psychological or philosophical 
associations. However, it seems that his attempt affected only the 
surface and that in essence orthodox economics preserved its 
hedonistic influence. As indications of the above, one can mention 
instances from his later works where he conducts his analysis in a 
manner very similar to explicitly hedonistically oriented economists 
(i. e use of hedonistic related concepts). Furthermore, in subsequent 
works he pays tribute to Bentham's utilitarian ideas and also he 
admits that utility can be the object of hedonistic desire (, something 
that he avoids discussing in his "Essay"). In addition one can find 
hedonist ic-based concepts in his "Essay". Although Robbins attempted 
to construct a new type of economic man apparently fre e from 
hedonistic characteristics, the rationality (or maximization) feature 
is still present; the only difference being that we are not told what 
economic man is maximizing. And as would become evident later, 
pleasure or satisfaction maximization seems to be the implicit motive 
of Robbins' economic man. 
Thus, in a way Robbins' work Is a continuation of Pareto's and 
Fisher's attempts to downplay hedonism. However, in Robbins' case the 
endeavour was to be supported by theoretical developments which could 
be claimed to be totally 'neutral'. In general, Robbins set the 
methodological framework for the construction of a new theory. 
Before we finish this section we have to mention that Robbins was 
not the only economist of this period who advocated a psychology-free 
economic science. F. Knight's work was along the same lines. In 
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particular, Knight, in the same way as Robbins, held that scientific 
economics must deal with observed facts but that feelings are not 
observed facts. Thus economics should leave their study to other 
disciplines (see for instance Knight, 1925, pp. 375-385 and for an attack 
on this position, Copeland, 1925). In addition, Knight was sympathetic 
to the idea that economics should attempt to follow the methods of 
physics. Thus his work (some of It was published earlier than 
Robbins') also promoted the Idea of rejecting psychology from 
economics. 
The next section deals with the work of Hicks who was among the 




6.4 J. HICKS 
In the previous section it was observed that the two most 
important characteristics of Robbins' attempt to construct a value- 
free economic science (which essentially was an endeavour to downplay 
hedonism) were (a) a 'neutral' definition of economics and (b) a 
value-free concept of utility. It can be said that Robbins' work 
represented a methodological attempt towards the neutralization of 
economics. Two years after the appearance of Robbins' "Essay" there 
was the first Indication that the above attempt could be matched by 
theoretical developments. More specifically, in 1934, J. Hicks and 
R. G. D. Allen published an article entitled "A Reconsideration of the 
Theory of Value" which allegedly set the basis for a totally objective 
economic theory, free from any psychological assumptions (Hicks and 
Allen, 1934). The same approach had been taken earlier by Johnson and 
Slutsky but It had minimal influence. However, a more systematic 
exposure of these new theoretical developments can be found in Hicks' 
well-known work: "Value and Capital" which was published in 1939. This 
work is still considered to be one of the foundations of modern 
economic theory, especially of microeconomic theory. The underlying 
characteristic of this work was the attempt to purify the basic 
marginalist concepts of their psychological (hedonistic) connotations 
for the purpose of the introduction of a new objective economic 
approach. Modern mainstream economists regard Hicks' work as extremely 
important for the evolution of scientific economics and this is the 
reason why some refer to it as the 'Hicksian Revolution'. 
Hicks thought that the subjective, utilitarian assumptions of 
marginalist economists did not constitute a legitimate scientific 
approach. Thus his basic effort was the replacement of the marginalist 
utility theory with an objective, positive theory of choice. One could 
point out that Hicks, like Robbins, was influenced by the rising 
positivist philosophies of the period. After the 'Hicksian 
Revolution', and, as we shall see, Samuelson's Revealed Preference 
theory, many orthodox economists felt comfortable to claim that modern 
economics had no philosophical or psychological connections. It is 
true that the introduction of choice theories minimized the explicit 
hedonistic image of orthodox microeconomics. However, in spite of 
213 
this, we believe that the hedonistic connection has not disappeared. 
In order to show this, we will discuss Hicks' main ideas In a more 
detailed way. 
Hicks starts with a brief review of the historical development of 
utility theory. He mentions Marshall's argument of the equalization 
of marginal utilities and prices in equilibrium, next pointing out the 
ambiguity of the concept of utility (Hicks, 1946, p. 12). Then he praises 
Pareto as the first economist to conceive of an ordinal conception of 
utility and to expand on the idea of the indifference curve. However, 
as he states, Pareto did not develop these revolutionary notions 
further and "continued to use concepts derived from the earlier set of 
ideas" (Hicks, 1946, p. 19). Hicks claims that the translation of the 
marginal utility theory in terms of indifference curves paves the way 
for a new concept; the ordinally defined scale of preferences. He 
emphasizes the distinctivness of this new concept when he writes: 
"In Marshall's theory (like that of Jevons and Walras, and 
the Austrians) 'given wants' Is interpreted as meaning a 
given utility function, a given intensity of desire for any 
particular collection of goods... 'Given wants' can be quite 
adequately defined as a given scale of preferences: we need 
only suppose that the consumer has a preference for one 
collection of goods rather than another, not that there Is 
ever any sense in saying that he desires the one collection 5 
percent more than the other, or anything like that. " 
(Hicks, 1946. pp. 17,18) 
It is evident that one of Hicks' main concerns was to avoid the term 
utility. The concept of the scale of preferences and Its ordinal 
measurement are fundamental in the new theory. As was seen, Pareto was 
the first economist to attempt a non-cardinal approach. Hicks exploits 
this concept and starts from the idea that preferences need not be 
measurable in the cardinal sense. (As we shall see later, he does not 
give an explanation for preferences, which thus can be seen to be as 
ambiguous as the concept of utility. ) He believes that by this new 
method he can arrive at the same theoretical results as the 
marginalists without using psychological concepts (utility, 
satisfaction, pleasure). Cardinality is the first to go: 
"The quantitative concept of utility is not necessary In 
order to explain market phenomena. Therefore, on the 
principle of Occam's razor, it is better to do without it. " 
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(Hicks, 1946, p. 18) 
The main theoretical points of the marginalist theory are thought to 
be valid. The only thing that changes is the method of arriving at 
these points. Apart from the idea of minimum assumptions, the other 
main motive behind his new theoretical approach is similar to that of 
Robbins: the construction of an economic science free from value 
judgements. This aim is stated explicitly when he emphatically 
asserts: 
"If one is utilitarian in philosophy, one has the perfect 
right to be utilitarian in one's economics. But if one Is not 
(and few people are utilitarians nowadays) one also has the 
right to an economics free of utilitarian assumptions. " 
(Hicks, 1946, p. 18) 
One can observe that contrary to early Robbins, Hicks is explicitly 
ready to tolerate the old utilitarian approach. However, he claims 
that he is on the side of non-utilitarians and thus sets the task for 
himself of building this non-utilitarian economics. His first step 
towards this direction is to abandon the traditional economic concepts 
used by marginalists. Hicks is very specific on this matter: 
"We have now to undertake a purge, rejecting all concepts 
which are tainted by quantitive utility, and replacing them, 
so far as they need to be replaced, by concepts which have no 
such implication. " (Hicks, 1946, p-19) 
The above was to be an important part of "Value and Ca pital" and 
demands that we devote some space to discussing it. 
The basic tool which Hicks uses for the construction 
_of 
his 
theory is the notion of the indifference curve. As we have seen, 
indifference curves were invented by Edgeworth, who defined them 
clearly in terms of pleasure or utility. Pareto also used indifference 
curves but he took them as 'given' thus attempting to avoid the 
employment of subjective terms (like 'pleasure'). Hicks, based on 
Pareto, conceives indifference curves as showing the combination of 
goods for which the individual is indifferent. (Edgeworth would say 
the combination which gives equal pleasure. ) Structurally, Hicksian 
indifference curves are identical with the utility-based indifference 
curves. The only alleged difference Is that now we have a commodity 
space instead of a utility or pleasure hill. Hicks puts particular 
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emphasis on the concept of Indifference curves, and as he declares, 
nothing more can be allowed then the indifference map 
(Hicks, 1946, p. 18). However, he does not provide a new concept to 
describe what happens when the consumer moves to a higher Indifference 
curve. Clearly, a subjective concept Is Implicitly present 
(satisfaction, utility). This can be seen as the first indication that 
Hickslan indifference curves are not substantially different from 
Edgeworthian Indifference curves. 
By using Indifference curves and the line of the budget 
constraint, Hicks proceeds to construct the law of consumer's demand 
(based on incoffte and substitution effects). The theoretical device 
which is widely used nowadays (constrained optimization) . 
has the 




Where LM Is the budget line, Y and X are goods, I is the highest 
attainable indifference curve and P (the tangency point) is the point 
of equilibrium. The shape of Indifference curves shown in figure 6.1 
presupposes a number of psychological assumptions; but this will be 
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discussed later in this chapter, also this issue will be examined 
again in our discussion of he theory of rational consumer. Hicks 
defines the equilibrium point as the point where the marginal rate of 
substitution equals the price ratio. With this he attempts to avoid 
the idea that point P is the point of maximum satisfaction for the 
consumer; but it is very doubtful if he succeeds. This def inition 
brings us to the next point which is the new terms that he uses in 
place of marginal utility and diminishing marginal utility. 
Thus, apart from 'preference' based indifferent curves, Hicks 
introduces new concepts like 'Marginal Rate of Substitution' and 
'Diminishing Marginal Rate of Substitution' which allegedly are free 
from utilitarian psychology. He defines the first one as follows: 
"In order to avoid the danger of misleading associations, let 
us give this quantity a new name, and call it the Marginal 
Rate of Substitution between the two commodities. We may 
define the marginal rate of substitution of X for Y as the 
quantity of Y which would Just compensate the consumer for 
the loss of a marginal unit of X. " (Hicks, 1946, p. 20) 
The "Marginal Rate of Substitution" and the "Diminishing Rate of 
Marginal Substitution", are a vital part of his attempt to eliminate 
the utilitarian influence in economics. One can observe that the 
definition does not refer to any psychological concept and that it 
does not involve cardinal measurement. Hicks saw the Introduction of 
new value free concepts as crucial and not just as a change In 
terminology: "the replacement is therefore not a mere translation; it 
is a positive change in the foundation of the theory" 
(Hicks, 1946, p. 21). In spite of this however, he realizes that the new 
concepts are not very far from Marshall's marginal utility and 
diminishing marginal utility. But he is quick to point out that the 
old concepts can be discarded and that the whole theory can be built 
on these new notions if a set of assumptions Is accepted. This takes 
us back to the discussion of the shape of indifference curve. 
As was noticed, Hicksian indifference curves require a number of 
assumptions, a fact that is acknowledged by modern microeconomic 
textbooks (reflexivity, continuity, convexity etc; again these 
assumptions will be examines in a subsequent section). Hicks is very 
careful when he attempts to Justify assumptions because his initial 
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motive was to eliminate as many assumptions as possible. In discussing 
the Issue of the non-existence of kinks in the preference map, he 
wrl t es-. 
"When market conditions change, the consumer moves from one 
point of equilibrium to another point of equilibrium; at each 
of these positions the condition of diminishing marginal rate 
of substitution must hold or he could not take up such 
position at all ... We have to assume that the condition holds 
at all intermediate points, so that there are no kinks in the 
curves between the two positions of equilibrium. " 
(Hicks, 1946, p. 23) 
As Hicks himself admits, the non-existence of kinked curves assumes a 
sufficient degree of regularity In the system of wants. Furthermore, 
the assumption 'of diminishing marginal rate of substitution is 
supposed to hold in the case of many commodities too. Apart from the 
simple situation of two goods, Hicks extends the above psychological 
assumption to the case of many goods. As he writes: 
"On the same grounds as before we shall assume that the 
marginal rate of substitution diminishes in every direction 
at every position with which we shall be concerned in our 
analysis. " (Hicks, 1946, p. 25) 
One would expect that Hicks attempts to provide a plausible 
justification for the use of such assumptions In a theory which aims 
at scientific neutrality. As we have observed up to this point, Hicks' 
main motive was to build a value-free, positive economic theory. We 
saw the attempt to substitute marginalist utility theory with an 
allegedly objective theory of choice, in the light of the above 
motive. The introduction of the preference based indifference curve, 
the ordinal approach, and the replacement of value-laden concepts were 
the most important steps in this direction. As was noted, Hicks was 
motivated by the same reasons as Robbins: the construction of a 
positive economic science free from psychological assumptions with a 
physical-sciences methodology. This Idea of methodological monism can 
also be found in Hicks when he states that "the method of modern 
economic investigation Is the same method of. all science" 
(Hicks, 1946, p. 3). It is clear that he was also influenced by the 
prevailing scientific philosophy of logical positivism. His positivist 
orientation can also be seen in his rejection of the idea of 
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interpersonal comparisons of utility on the grounds that it would 
involve a value judgement (see Hicks, 1939, p. 697). In general, the 
underlying aim of Robbins' and Hicks' thought was the construction of 
a positive economic science and the way towards this target was the 
rejection of all value judgements or psychological elements from 
economic theory. 
In fact, given the above, Hicks tries to provide some 
Justification for the legitimacy of using psychological assumptions. 
He states (mainly referring to the non-existience of kinks) that "this 
is the simplest assumption possible, it is a good assumption to start 
with; and in fact its accordance with experience seems definitely 
good" (Hicks, 1946, p. 24). 
His careful explanation of the above assumption, although not 
very consistent with his previous points, does prevent him from making 
a number of subsequent psychological assumptions. For instance, in his 
discussion of producer's theory, he makes again an implicit 
psychological assumption. 
"The prices of both A (factor] and X [product] are given in 
the market; it will therefore be to its advantage to embark 
upon production, so long as the total value of the product 
secured is greater than the total value of the factor 
employed. Further, it will be to its advantage to produce 
that quantity of product which will make the excess as large 
as possible. " (Hicks, 1946, p. 79) 
The point here is the assumption that businessmen (or firms) will 
always aim to maximize profits. One can also maintain that there is 
the Implicit assumption that higher profits mean a higher level of 
satisfaction for businessmen, which is not very far from the 
hedonistic or utilitarian ideal. 
In a subsequent article, Hicks is more explicit in stating 
psychological assumptions. He even goes so far as to speak of an 
'ideal consumer' or 'ideal man' (Hicks, 1956, p. 18). As one would expect 
he avoids the use of the old concept of economic man, because of its 
hedonistic connotations. One of the main characteristics of this ideal 
consumer is the concept of maximization. 
"Let us now introduce the additional hypothesis, that the 
consumer will always prefer a larger amount of M to a smaller 
amount of M, provided that the amount of X at his disposal is 
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unchanged. " (Hicks, 1956, p. 42) 
Clearly the concept of maximization is implicitly present in the above 
passage. As was observed an important manifestation of the influence 
of the hedonistic approach in orthodox economics is the idea of 
maximum satisfaction. Although Hicks does not specify what the 
consumer maximizes, it seems that this idea is connected with the 
hedonistic aim: maximum satisfaction. As we shall see later, the 
concept of maximization is an important part of modern consumer and 
producer theories. Also it is vitally connected with the notion of 
rationality which will be discussed subsequently. A rational consumer 
or producer will always aim at maximization. As one can observe modern 
theory has succeeded In deleting the explicit hedonistic terms. 
However, this does not mean that they succeeded in eliminating the 
implicit hedonistic influence, as the concept of maximization 
Indicates. 
After some pages in the same article, Hicks goes even further to 
mention that consumers maximize utility. More specifically, Hicks 
makes an assessment of previous orthodox economics which he calls 
'Plain Economics' in contrast with the new approach which he calls 
'Econometrics'. After mentioning that Plain Economics conceive 
producers as maximizing money gain and consumers as maximizing utility 
(Hicks, 1956, p. 5), Hicks asserts that the conception of human behaviour 
is identical in both kinds of economics, and he goes on to state: 
"The human individual only comes to Plain economics as an 
entity which reacts to certain stimuli; all that the Plain 
economists needs to be interested in are the laws of his 
reactions. Now it is precisely these laws which the 
econometrist is endeavouring to study, by methods which are 
empirical as well as theoretical. " (Hicks, 1956, p. 5) 
For the above it seems that he was ready to tolerate the idea of a 
utility maximizing human individual. Moreover, one can observe the 
similarity of his conception of consumer behaviour with that of 
behaviourist psychology. As we noted, behaviourist psychologists 
emphasized the stimulus-response approach to human behaviour. In 
addition there is a similarity with Pareto's statement that the 
individual can vanish provided the photography of his preferences is 
preserved. 
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The above is not the only indication that in essence Hicks' 
thought was not so independent from hedonistic associations. In 
another subsequent work, "The Social Framework" his terminology is 
clearly influenced by the hedonistic approach. More specifically, in a 
very similar manner to that of the hedonistically-oriented economists, 
he conceives economic life as an organization of producers to satisfy 
the wants of consumers (Hicks, 1960, p. 15). The analysis in terms of 
satisfaction of wants is again present in his definition of the 
concepts of producer and consumer. 
"Henceforward we shall mean by production any activity 
directed to the satisfaction of other people's wants through 
exchange; we shall use the word producer to mean a person 
engaging in production in this sense. A person whose wants 
are satisfied by such production we shall call a consumer. " 
(Hicks, 1960, p. 22) 
A want-sat Isf action consumer is also a key concept in his "Value and 
Capital". At one point, Hicks admits something which was implicitly 
present in the whole of his analysis. As he writes: 
"As the discussion proceeded, we have mostly kept in mind the 
most obvious application of our analysis: to the ordinary 
consumer spending his income on the satisfaction of his 
immediate personal wants. " (Hicks, 1946, p. 55) 
One can discern the implicit presence of a satisfaction maximizer, 
selfish economic man. Hicks does not specifically mention that the 
consumer is motivated by self-interested behaviour only, but the 
implication of the above is that this is so. However, Hicks 'is again 
anxious to eliminate hedonistic implications and attempts to include 
altruism too. Thus, he states that: "there is also included, as 
Wicksteed well pointed out, the purchase and sale of goods, not to 
satisfy the wants of other people, or what one supposes those wants to 
be" (Hicks, 1946, p. 56). However, the above passage seems to be a minor 
part in his theory. Hicks does not mention again the possibility of 
altruistic behaviour and certainly he does not devote any space to its 
possible theoretical implications. (The adoption of altruistic agents 
has substantial effects especially In exchange theory, but Hicks does 
not examine this possibility; see for instance Collard, 1978 and 
Danielson, 1975. ) 
The idea of maximization is important in Hicks' economic thought 
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(as it was in marginalist economics). In his effort to purify 
economics from psychology or ethics, Hicks in his "Value and Capital" 
avoids specifying what the consumer maximizes, and as we shall observe 
later, this Is the case with the modern consumer theory. However, it 
is clearly inmplied that the object of maximization is utility. This 
can also be seen from his subsequent works which indicates that the 
essence of his approach Is not very far from the marginalist paradigm. 
It has to be said though, that on the surface, utility is not a 
necessary concept in the Hicksian theory of choice, but' its 
rela tionship with the theory of utility is not so diffi cult to 
identify. As B. Loasby points out: 
"Preference functions do not logically require the old- 
fashioned concept of utility; but it is much easier to 
believe in them if one is allowed to believe in utility as 
well. " (Loasby, 1976, p. 23) 
As we will observe later the modern developments of the Hicksian 
theory of choice, which can be found in standard microeconomic 
textbooks, attempt to present a theory of choice which is independent 
of any normative elements. The presentation of this theory starts with 
a set of assumptions and proceeds to formulate the problem in terms of 
constrained optimization (see for instance Gravelle and 
Rees, 1981, pp. 55-95). In spite of all the formalization and attempts to 
expel all non-scientific terms, the concept of utility maximization is 
always present. The modern theory of rational choice which comes from 
Hicks, will be discussed in a subsequent section. There we will also 
observe its implicit psychology. Moreover, a number of contemporary 
authors when they refer to Hicksian consumer theory, state that the 
consumer is supposed to maximize his satisfaction as an important 
assumpt. ion of the theory. This is additional evidence of the implicit 
presence of hedonistic based assumptions (see for instance 
Mishan, 1961, p. 2). Thus one can maintain that despite Hicks' and 
subsequent economists' efforts, hedonism has still an underlying 
Influence. 
In this section we discussed the main points of the new approach 
of J. Hicks. We noted that Hicks' thought represented a theoretical 
attempt towards a positive economic science, without psychological 
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assumptions. Like Robbins, Hicks was influenced by logical positivism 
which was the dominant scientific philosophy by the time that he wrote 
his most important work "Value and Capital". The first step towards 
the construction of an objective economic science was the replacement 
of the utilitarian oriented theory of utility with a new allegedly 
objective theory of choice. Thus, Hicks replaced the marginalist 
utility function with a preference function in which preferences can 
be ordered but cannot be measured cardinally. The implications of 
this, were a new conception of the indifference curve. The. Hicksian 
indifference curves had the same structure as the ones used by 
Edgeworth but instead of utility space, Hicks introduced commodity 
space. After this, Hicks went on to reject all the utilitarian 
concepts and to Introduce new ones like marginal rate of substitution 
instead of marginal utility. However, in the process of his analysis, 
Hicks introduces some psychological assumptions (axioms in the theory 
of choice) which of course are not in the methodological spirit of the 
new objective economics. One of these assumptions is the principle 
that the consumer attempts to maximize something, which is not 
specified, although utility in the sense of satisfaction is clearly 
implied. This can also be reinforced by Samuelson's accusations which 
will be seen in the next section. And as we have observed this idea 
comes from the hedonistic tradition. Moreover, the same thing can be 
seen from his Indifference curves analysis where a higher indifference 
curve Is explained In terms of Increased utility. In addition, 
hedonistic influences are further indicated in his subsequent works 
where the idea of the satisfaction of wants is crucial. One can also 
discern signs of explicit acceptance of the consumer as a utility- 
maximizing being. Furthermore, it seems that he conceives consumers as 
basically selfish which is in accordance with the majority of the 
hedonistic oriented theorists, despite his brief and minor statement 
otherwise. The modern versions of Hicksian theory which can be found 
in orthodox microeconomic textbooks cannot help analysing consumer 
behaviour in terms of maximum utility and indifference curves in terms 
of utility levels. 
In general, it has to be mentioned that the introduction of the 
Hicksian theory of choice minimized to a considerable extent the 
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hedonistic image of orthodox economics. However, the above leads us to 
believe that although hedonism has been pushed from the foreground of 
orthodox economics, Hicksian theory did not succeed in eliminating it, 
and it remained as an important underlying Influence. 
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6.5 P. SAMUELSON 
The attempt towards the reconstruction of an economic science 
free from psychological or philosophical connotations continued in the 
work of P. Samuelson. Like Hicks', Samuelson's work is clearly 
oriented towards the reconstruction of microeconomic theory, 
especially of consumer's behaviour theory. Samuelson's work goes back 
to the late 1930's when he started to formulate his views about 
consumers' behaviour. More specifically, in 1938 he published an 
article entitled "A Note on the Pure Theory of Consumer's Behaviour" 
which constituted the basis of his subsequent theories. However the 
work which most influenced orthodox economists was his "Foundations of 
Economic Analysis" which first appeared in 1947. (Apparently it was 
based on Samuelson's doctoral dissertation. ) It can be said that the 
above work along with Hicks' "Value and Capital" are the pillars of 
modern microeconomic theory. A basic part of the "Foundations" Is the 
theory of revealed preference which according to Samuelson and to many 
contemporary economists, is a pure scientific theory free from 
subjective concepts. In his quest for objectivity and for a positive 
economic science, Samuelson tried to go a step further than Hicks by 
starting from fewer assumptions and expelling more 'subjective' 
concepts. Thus, for Instance, he does not assume that Indifference 
curves are given as Hicks did. This extreme emphasis on observed 
behaviour was the starting point of his theory of choice. The idea was 
that by emphasis on observed behaviour only, economic theory could be 
Independent from any philosophical or psychological connection and 
thus achieve the much desired status of an exact science. Moreover, 
this attention to observed behaviour foreshadowed Friedman's 
methodological views. But let us discuss Samuelson's main points and 
especially his claim of the neutrality of the revealed preference 
theory. 
As was the case with Robbins and Hicks, Samuelson believed that 
economics could acquire the scientific prestige of the physical 
sciences if it could free itself from 'subjective' elements. Thus, one 
important motive for the construction of his theory was the making of 
positive economics. Another equally important motive, again like 
Robbins and Hicks, was the critique of hedonistic or utilitarian bias 
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of orthodox economics by followers of alternative economic approaches. 
The above points can be clearly seen in many of Samuelson's works and 
especially in his "Foundations". More specifically Samuelson wishes to 
point out the non-hedonistic nature of modern economic theory when he 
writes: 
"Concomitantly, there has been a shift In emphasis away from 
the physiological and psychological hedonistic, introspective 
aspects of utility... At the same time there has been a 
similar movement away from the concept of utility as a 
sensation, as an introspective magnitude. It is not mqrely 
that the modern economist replaces experienced sensation or 
satisfaction with. anticipated sensation, desire, according to 
the now familiar distinction between ex post and ex ante 
analysis. But much more than this, many writers have ceased 
to believe in the existence of any introspective magnitude or 
quantity of a cardinal, numerical kind. " 
(Samuelson, 1963a, p. 91) 
Samuelson uses two arguments for the defence of his idea of the non- 
hedonistic nature of modern economic theory: anticipated sensations 
and ordinal measurement. In respect of the first, it can be observed 
that he avoids stating that 'experienced satisfaction is replaced by 
anticipated satisfaction' but only uses the word sensation or desire. 
(It is clear that he means satisfaction. ) Here It can be noted that 
most hedonistic theorists (since the ancient Greeks) also considered 
future or anticipated satisfactions or pleasures, and this means that 
the essence of the idea of maximization of pleasure (hedonism) is the 
same. One can also point out that introspection does not have to be 
cardinal or numerical. 
The second motive (the critique of hedonistic bias) of this 
attempt towards the establishement of a 'neutral' theory can be seen 
in the following statement: 
"Moreover, it is part of economic doctrine [the subjective 
theory of value associated with the names of Jevons, Menger 
and Walras] , which has proved to be the center of so much 
controversy. Indeed, many critics of the orthodox tradition 
have identified the whole body of economic theory with the 
belief in that abstraction, homo economicus. 11 
(Samuelson, 1963a, p. 90) 
Thus, the influence of logical positivism and the critique by non- 
orthodox economists are two elements which must be taken into account 
for the understanding of Samuelson's theory. 
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Samuelson is not satisfied by Hicks' attempt to construct a 
value-free theory of consumer behaviour. In an early article (1938) he 
expresses his doubts about Hicks' and Allen's reconstruction of 
utility theory in terms of marginal rate of substitution. As he 
writes: 
"It is clear that much of even the most modern analysis shows 
vestigial traces of the utility concept-The Introduction 
and meaning of the marginal rate of substitution as an entity 
independent of any psychological, introspective implications 
would be, to say the least, ambiguous; and would seem an 
artificial convention in the explanation of price behaviour. " 
(Samuelson, 1938, pp. 61,62) 
In the same art. icle, he goes on to formulate the basic elements 
of a new theory which later was to be known as the theory of revealed 
preference. As its name indicates, the basis of this theory is 
observed behaviour. Influenced by the behaviourist psychology which 
emphasized observed behaviour and neglected the underlying 
motivations, Samuelson tries to get away from 'subjective' concepts by 
accepting observed behaviour only. His starting point Is that "the 
individual behaves as he behaves". We have seen a similar point in 
Fisher's "Investigations" where, like Samuelson, he attempted to 
Ineutralizel the theory of utility. However, for the construction of 
revealed preference the above point is not enough. Some psychological 
assumptions or axioms according to Samuelson are needed. (Of course, 
Samuelson never calls his axioms psychological assumptions. ) These 
axioms or postulates, as mentioned in the article. are the following% 
Postulate I: Confronted with a given set of prices and with given 
income the individual will always choose the same set of goods. 
Postulate II: It is assumed that the consumer's behaviour is 
independent of the units in which prices are expressed. 
Postulate III: It is assumed that the individual will be 
consistent in the following sense: If the first batch of goods is 
preferred to second batch, the second will never be preferred to the 
first. In symbols, it will never be the case that both: 
('#I) < OV) 
and (, #) < Oyl 
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where 1<1 means is 'preferred less than' and V and V' are bundles of 
goods (Samuelson, 1938, pp. 61-65). 
The essence of the theory is that if the behaviour of the individual 
conforms to the above postulates then the existence and the nature of 
his indifference curves can be known by his actions. Thus, in this 
way, Samuelson hopes to build a positive scientific theory of 
consumer's behaviour. 
However, one can express a number of reservations about the 
validity of the above approach. First of all, Samuelson's extreme 
emphasis on observed behaviour can only be seen as a Baconian 
methodological view. However, the theory's dependence on axioms, which 
are deemed to be beyond observation, makes it irrefutable; and this 
goes against the mainstream of scientific methodology which places 
much emphasis on refutability of scientific theories. In addition, one 
could point out that the above postulates entail certain psychological 
characteristics. As we also noted in Hicks' theory, the concept of 
diminishing rate of marginal substitution and the assumption of non- 
existence of kinks -continuous preferences-, pressupose psychic 
characteristics. Samuelson cannot avoid the above observation and 
states that the postulates "relate to an idealized individual -not 
necessarily however, the rational hamo-econamicus" 
(Samuelson, 1938, p. 61). Nothing is mentioned about the precision with 
which the behaviour of the idealized individual is to be observed. 
Thus, although he is keen to state otherwise, the old concept of 
economic man is again on the scene. It is clear that an additional 
characteristic -maximization of satisfaction- is present at least 
implicitly in the theory (as we shall see later). Moreover, one can 
also state that despite Samuelson's emphasis on observed behaviour, he 
does not give evidence of any actual observation of behaviour, but 
only refers to it In theoretical terms. 
Before we proceed, it is useful to mention that Postulate III is 
also known as the 'weak axiom' of revealed preference. After some 
years, Samuelson would find necessary to extend this axiom into the 
so-called 'strong axiom' of revealed preference. The reasons for this 
extension will be examined in the subsequent pages. 
Ten years after the appearance of the above article, Samuelson 
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would publish a more sophisticated version of his preference theory. 
This can be found In the "Theory of Consumer's Behaviour", a chapter 
of his "Foundations". In this chapter, Samuelson, apart from restating 
the preference theory, examines the Implications of changes In prices 
and Income. First of all he states the fundamental assumptions of his 
theory: 
"The utility analysis rests upon the fundamental assumption 
that the individual confronted with given prices and confined 
to a given total expenditure selects that combinati 
, 
on of 
goods which Is the highest on his preference scale. This does 
not require a) that the individual behave rationally In any 
other sense; b) that he be deliberate and self-conscious In 
his purchasing; c) that there exist any Intensive magnitude 
which he feels or constructs. " (Samuelson, 1963a, p. 97) 
One can note some Interesting points from the above quotation. First 
of all, Samuelson seems to offer a utility analysis. This is quite 
incompatible with his stated purposes. Also one can only wonder about 
the role of the concept of preference scale In a theory which Is 
concerned with observed behaviour. Furthermore one can argue that 
assumption c) Implies that there Is no reason for behaviour. 




In the case of two goods, let us assume that when prices were given by 
the line p. the consumer purchased the good combination qO, and when 
prices were given by p, the consumer purchased q' (the lines represent 
budget lines). According to the figure he could have purchased q' at 
the pO prices since q' lies below the line pO. Given this choice, the 
weak axiom states that qO must be unattainable when the consumer buys 
q1, that is, qO must lie above line pl. By repeating the same method, 
Samuelson is able to derive indifference curves which are identical to 
Hicksian indifference curves. Having done this, the problem,. according 
to Samuelson, is reduced to finding a maximum for the ordinal 
preference field subject to a budget constraint. More analytically, 
Samuelson considers the simple case of any two combinations of goods 
respectivelly <X1",..., X, '11) and (X1',... 'X, 1) or in short (XO) and 
(XI). Then he asserts that the consumer has the following mutually 
exclusive choices: 
a) (XO) preferred to (XI) 
b) (XI) preferred to (XO) 
c) (XO) and (XI) equally preferred or indifferent 
Each combination Is assumed to be a continuous differentiable function 
which can be written 
(P = (#(X) = (P (X, ,..., Y, ) 
A given utility index can be found if a number is attached to every 
combination. Then he introduces another function 
F((#) vhere P ((p) >0 
which is defined by any monotonic transformation of the function 
Then the ordinal preference field can be defined as: 
F[ 9 (X, X) 3, F' «p) >0 (1) 
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And if the budget line is: 
n 
where p= price and I= income, then the problem is to find a maximum 
for (1) subject to (2) (Samuelson, 1963a, p. 98) 
The whole analysis resembles the familiar issue of finding the 
highest indifference curve subject to a budget constraint. The 
difference here is that indifference curves are not given but can be 
constructed if the consumer chooses according to the axioms. From this 
stage onwards both theories provide the same results: the construction 
of demand functions. 
One can observe an important point In the above analysis: it is 
assumed that the functions are continuous. The implication of this, is 
that indifference curves can only be constructed if we assume the 
above. In modern texts this assumption is sometimes stated as the 
continuity assumption. 
Another significant observation is that Samuelson emphasizes that 
his theory does not require the existence of any intensive magnitude 
which the consumer feels or consults. However, a few pages later, in 
the process of his discussion of his theory, he states: 
"If this cost [the cost of the second batch of goods] Is 
equal to or less than the amount of money that the f Irst 
batch actually cost, we have conclusive evidence that the 
second batch is not higher on the individual's preference 
scale than the first batch; for If it were, the individual 
could not have been in equilibrium in the first place, since 
he would not be minimizing total expenditure for the attained 
level of satisfaction. In other words, if he could have 
bought the second batch, and he bought the first, we rule out 
the possibility that he prefers the second to the first. " 
(Samuelson, 1963a, p. 109) 
As it can be seen, Samuelson uses here the concept of satisfaction as 
the explanation of consumer's choice. This Is in sharp contrast with 
his previous statement of the 'non-existence of magnitudes that the 
consumer feels or consults'. Moreover, the above passage Implies that 
the consumer attempts to maximize his satisfaction subject to a 
constraint. This indicates the necessity of bringing in a kind of 
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psychological dimension to the theory and this dimension is not very 
far from hedonism (see also Kroeber-Riel, 1971, pp. 340-344). Clearly the 
implication here is that the hedonistic connection is not at all 
finished as Samuelson claims. 
Even with the unquestionable acceptance of the three axioms as 
completely legitimate, the theory of revealed preference is 
susceptible to serious criticism in its own framework. More 
specifically, the 'weak axiom' which we saw in the previous pages was 
shown to be insufficient for the construction of indifference curves. 
The first sign of this criticism appeared even before Samuelson's 
first official publication of his theory. In particular, Georgescu- 
Roegen pointed out that one has to assume consistency in the 
preference field before attempting to arrive at indifferent curves 
through revealed preference theory (Georges c u-Roegen, 193 6, pp. 549-593, 
and Lutz and Lux, 1979, p. 325). Thus a need for a stronger axiom arose 
which would solve the above problem. Three years later, after the 
publication of his "Foundations", Samuelson -assisted by an earlier 
article written by H. Houthakker- extended the 'weak axiom' Into the 
$strong axiom' (Samuelson, 1950, pp. 355-385, and Houthakker, 1950, pp. 159- 
174). In simple terms this new axiom (stronger transitivity) states: 
if XO > X1 
and X1 > X2 
then XO > X2 
Where x., xj, x2 are combinations of goods, and > implies "preferred 
to 
The new axiom was thought to be sufficient for the establishment 
of the indifference curves. However, In 1954 Georgescu-Roegen 
demonstrated again that even the 'strong axiom' cannot establish 
indifference curves. According to Georgescu-Roegen the strong axiom 
does not guarantee that the derived indifference curves would give 
comparable combinations of goods at all points. We have seen that 
Samuelson's theory claims that from observation, one can construct 
Integral varieties (from the continuous functions that we have 
mentioned) and these integral varieties give us indifference 
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varieties. (For a detailed discussion of this, see Georgescu- 
Roegen, 1966, pp. 217-227. ) Georgescu-Roegen's criticism is in the 
following lines: 
... although they [integral varieties] have many properties in 
common with indifference varieties, they cannot possibly be 
related to the latter In any truly significant way-In the 
first place, not all combinations can be compared with 
another. " (Georgescu-Roegen, 1966, p. 225) 
Apart from the above one could describe decision situations where 
the transitivity relation breaks down. A specific example of a 
decision maker who wants to purchase a type of car can be described as 
follows: Price Is the dominant criterion and reliability Is the 
secondary one. His decision rule is: preference will be based on price 
unless the difference is less than E1000, in which case the second 
criterion operates. 
Type of car Price Reliability 
A 4000 Low 
B 4800 Medium 
C 5500 High 
If types of cars'A, B, C correspond to x, xj, xýý respectively, then: 
XI > X0 
X2 > XI 
XO > X2 
It is clear here that the transitivity relation is not valid. (Choices 
here are lexicographic, but they need not to be, see 
Fishburn, 1974, p. 1446. ) 
Up to now we have discussed the logical difficulties of the 
axioms. Apart from the logical difficulties there is an observational 
difficulty concerning the strong and even against the weak axiom and 
this comes from the field of psychology. More specifically, both 
axioms are also knowm as the 'transitivity condition'. At first sight, 
transitivity seems quite logical especially when it refers to 
mathematical relations. However, it seems that it is questionable when 
it refers to preferences, as In Samuelson's theory. A. Tversky, in a 
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1969 article demonstrated that individuals are not perfectly 
consistent in their choices. By drawing Information from experiments, 
Tversky asserts that: 
"When faced between repeated choices between x and y, people 
often choose X in some instances and Y in others. 
Furthermore, such inconsistencies are observed even in the 
absence of systematic changes in the decision maker's taste 
which might be due to learning of sequential effects. " 
(Tversky, 1969, p. 31) 
These psychological findings undermine the Idea of transitivity of 
preferences and thus Samuelson's revealed preference theory. 
As was observed in the previous pages, the novel idea of 
Samuelson's theory is that it attempts to derive indifference curves 
without assuming their existence as was the case with Hicks. In the 
section dealing with Hicks we noted that essentially Indifference 
curves are conceived along the lines of Edgeworth and Pareto (utility 
or pleasure based). On the other hand, Samuelson declares in the first 
publication of his theory that his purpose is to develop the theory of 
consumer's behaviour freed from any vestigial traces of the utility 
concept (Samuelson, 1938, p. 71). Thus, one is tempted to ask why 
Samuelson goes back to indifference curves. As S. Wong puts it: 
"The use of indifference curves is obviously illegitimate 
within a framework which aims to dispense with vestigial 
remnants of the utility concept... '(Wong, 1978, p. 59) 
Moreover, the fact that Samuelson's theory uses the same tools and 
arrives at the same results of consumer's behaviour theory as Hick's 
ordinal utility theory, is another Indication that his thought belongs 
to the same conceptual framework as Edgeworth, Pareto and Hicks. 
The most important implications of the above points (logical and 
observational difficulties) suggest the view that in revealed 
preference theory, the existence of indifference curves is implicitly 
assumed, otherwise the theory is problematic. Moreover, this 
reinforces the view that the theory belongs to the same conceptual 
framework as those discussed previously. Georgescu-Roegen points out: 
"Perhaps the most important Is that the integral varieties, 
whether for two or more commodities, do not necessarily 
represent indifference varieties, unless the existence of a 
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regular indifference map is already assumed by the approach 
as, according to my contention, Pareto did. " (Georgescu- 
Roegen, 1976, p. 337) 
All this points to the idea that a satisfaction maximizing 
consumer is an implicit but ever-present concept in the theory of 
revealed preference. Thus, the hedonistic Influence is still present 
and so Samueslon's intention to construct a value-free economic theory 
seems to be unsuccesful. As S. Wong emphasizes: 
"The development of the theory ESamuelson's] does not 
represent a break with the tradition in economic theory in 
which consumer behaviour is explained in terms of preferences 
(and material circumstances). Consequently, the attendant 
philosophical and psychological controversies of utility 
theory, which Samuelson hoped to erode with his observational 
theory, are not exorcised from the corpus of economic 
theory... " (Wong, 1978, p. 73) 
Apart from the above mentioned theorists, other economists have 
questioned the independence of revealed preference theory from utility 
theory (see for instance Robinson, 1962, pp. 50-51, and 
Stigler, 1966, p. 68). 
An additonal indication of the underlying hedonistic influence in 
Samuelson's theory is his discussion of consumer's theory in his very 
influential textbook "Economics". Given his aims of purifying economic 
theory of subjective elements one would expect that his treatment of 
consumer theory would be oriented towards this aim even in an 
elementary textbook. In spite of this he easily identifies utility 
with satisfaction and explains: 
"As a customer you will buy a good because you feel it gives 
you satisfaction or utility. A first unit of a good gives you 
a certain amount of psychological utility. " 
(Samuelson, 1980, p. 408) 
Furthermore the relationship between indifference curves and 
satisfaction is established and the maximization of consumer 
satisfaction is stated as the point of tangency of the budget line to 
an indifference contour (Samuelson, 1980, pp. 418-420). But we will 
discuss modern orthodox textbooks more analytically in the following 
section. 
In this section we discussed the main points of Samuelson's 
revealed preference theory. It was noticed that his main motivation 
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for the construction of a new theory of consumer's behaviour was the 
ideal of a positive economic science free from psychological or 
philosophical connections. According to Samuelson, the latest attempt 
towards this direction (Hicks' ordinal utility theory) had ambiguous 
results because it assumed the existence of indifference curves (which 
ultimately are based on the concept of satisfaction). Thus, Samuelson 
considered only observed behaviour in the market and tried to 
reformulate consumer's theory on this basis only. By defining a number 
of behavioural axioms and by subsequent observations (which were 
purely theoretical), he was able to construct an ordered preference 
field or an indifference map. Then he implicitly assumed maximizing 
behaviour and arrived at the final formulation which sets to maximize 
the ordered preference field equation subject to a budget constraint. 
Thus, all the fundamental concepts of orthodox microeconomic theory 
(demand function, substitution effect, etc) are constructed on the 
above basis, which is allegedly free from any subjective elements. 
However, his analysis can be criticized on the following grounds: 
In the process of the construction of his theory, Samuelson cannot 
avoid using the concept of satisfaction In order to explain consumer 
choice. Also, along with the concept of satisfaction, the concept of 
utility appears in his attempt to clarify his theoretical views. In 
addition, while the idea of homo economicus is discarded, he admits 
that the axioms refer to an 'idealized individual'. Moreover, he 
realizes (after some years from the initial appearance) that a further 
axiom is nedded in order to construct indifference curves from 
observation (stronger transitivity axiom). However, as Professor 
Georges c u-Roegen (whom Samuelson acknowledges In later works) showed, 
even the strong axiom is not sufficient to derive indifference curves 
unless these curves are implicitly assumed to exist. Apart from this, 
the validity of transitivity In preferences has been questioned by 
modern psychologists. Moreover, Samuelson's need to construct, by 
allegedly objective methods, the indifference curve (an old, value- 
laden psychological concept) indicates that Samuelson's theory is not 
at all alien to the hedonistic approach of marginalist theorists. 
Furthermore, the treatment of consumer theory in his extremely 
influential "Economics", is an additonal indication of his connections 
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with the old approach. 
All of the above together with the fact that his discussion is 
highly formalized (as with most hedonistically influenced theorists), 
pose serious questions to the claim that revealed preference is a 
neutral theory and independent from hedonistic connotations. 
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6.6 THE DEBATE ABOUT THE ASSUMPTIONS 
Before we go on to a discussion of the current state of affairs, 
we should mention M. Friedman's methodological position which can be 
seen as a more recent attempt to Justify orthodox economics as a 
neutral, positive theory. More specifically, Friedman's attempt was 
entirely different from that of Hicks' and Samuelson's. As we 
discussed, Robbins, Hicks, Samuelson and other orthodox theorists 
attempted to construct an economic theory free from any utilitarian or 
hedonistic connection. The basis of their endeavour was the 
Introduction of new concepts and theories allegedly free from 
psychological connotations (ordinal measurement, preference based 
indifference curves, revealed preference theory etc). As was observed 
the attempt was not succesful in establishing a value-free theory. 
In 1953, M. Friedman tried to do the same thing (expel 
hedonism) by a completely different method. In his "Essay on the 
Methodology of Positive Economics", Friedman argued that the realism 
of the assumptions does not matter for the validity of a theory. It is 
clear that Friedman's purpose was to insulate orthodox theory from a 
wide range of criticisms; among them the hedonistic critisism, as we 
shall see. From our point of view, the implication of Friedman's 
thesis is that the philosophical or psychological connections of the 
assumptions of orthodox economic theory are irrelevant and that they 
do not have any effect on the value of the theory. It Is evident that 
this thesis effectively brands as useless all the previous attempts to 
construct a value-free economic science. Thus for instance Robbins', 
Hicks' and Samuelson's attempts to build an economic theory without 
the notion of a pleasure maximizing individual or more generally to 
eliminate the importance of economic man, are seen as unnessessary in 
Friedman's context. As one would expect, Samuelson and other 
economists reacted strongly against Friedman's thesis. But let us see 
the debate more systematically. 
Friedman made his intentions clear from the beginning of the 
essay: 
"Viewed as a body of substantive hypotheses, theory is to be 
Judged by its predictive power for the class of phenomena 
which it is intended to 'explain'. Only factual evidence can 
show whether it is 'right' or 'wrong' or 'better, tentatively 
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'accepted' as valid or 'rejected'. As I shall argue at 
greater length below, the only relevant test of the validity 
of a hypothesis is comparison of its predictions with 
experience. " (Friedman, 1953, pp. 8-9). 
Friedman moves on to state explicitly that the assumptions of a theory 
are Irrelevant for its validity. As he writes: 
"Up to this point our conclusions about the significance of 
the 'assumptions' of a theory have been almost entirely 
negative: we have seen that a theory cannot be tested by the 
'realism' of Its assumptions and that the very concept of the 
'assumptions' of a theory is surrounded by ambiguity. " 
(Friedman, 1953, p. 23) 
At one point of his essay, Friedman goes so far as to state that In 
order to be important, a hypothesis must be descriptively false in its 
assumptions (Friedman, 1953, p. 14). 
His next step is to point out the Implications of his me thodology 
for certain economic issues. His first example, which also proves that 
one important purpose of his thesis was to combact the criticism of 
hedonistic influence, is Veblen's attack on orthodox economics. 
Specifically, he refers to Veblen's idea which sees economics as a 
'dismal' science because it assumes man to be a selfish and money- 
grubbing, a lighting calculator of pleasures and pains, who 
oscillates like a homogenous globule of desire of happiness under the 
impulse of stimuli that shift him about the area, but leave him 
intact' (Friedman, 1953, p. 30). Friedman's response to this attack is 
not like Robbins' or Samuelson's. He simply points out that: 
"... criticism of this type is largely beside the point unless 
supplemented by evidence that a hypothesis differing in one 
or another of these respects from the theory being criticized 
yields better predictions for as wide a range of phenomena. 
Yet most such criticism is not so supplemented; it is based 
almost entirely on supposedly directly perceived 
discrepancies between the 'assumptions' and the 'real 
world'. " (Friedman, 1953, p. 31) 
Thus Friedman's response to the idea of hedonistic influence on 
economics is carried out in terms of the "irrelevance of assumptions 
thesis". The neutrality of mainstream economics is not affected by the 
fact that its assumptions are based on a particular conceptual 
framework. 
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Samuelson's answer to Friedman's position, which he branded the 
'F-Twist', was very fierce. In a 1963 article, Samuelson wrote: 
"To use the F-Twist to minimize the imperfections or 
irrelevancies is, as I have argued, simply wrong... IF-Twist] 
is fundamentally wrong in thinking that unrealism In the 
sense of factual inaccuracy even to a tolerable degree of 
approximation is anything but a demerit for a theory or 
hypothesis (or set of hypotheses). " 
(Samuelson, 1963b, pp. 233,236) 
An important implication of Samuelson's response Is that 
assumptions do matter and of course that they must be a good 
approximation of reality, if a hypothesis or a theory is to be valid. 
This response gives also a new dimension to Samuelson's earlier work 
and especially to the axioms of his revealed preference theory, that 
we saw in the previous section. Thus, for instance his notion of an 
'idealized Individual' which is used in the construction of his 
theories. is a more or less realistic assumption (as we noted, the 
psychology of this idealized individual is not very different from the 
hedonistic psychology of economic man). 
Samuelson was not the only orthodox economist to react to 
Friedman's thesis. Other theorists like Koopmans and Rotwein launched 
a strong methodological critique against the thesis of the 
'irrelevance of he assumptions' (Koopmans, 1957, and Rotwein, 1959). 
However, a large number of orthodox economists accepted or were ready 
to tolerate Friedman's argument. Moreover, Rational Expectations 
theorists followed Friedman's methodology In practice by explicitly 
stating that their theory is instrumentalist (see Luces, 1980). 
However, one can argue that Rational Expectations theorists are 
inconsistent in that their argument that economic agents are rational 
-in their sense- appeals to realism (see also Dow, 1985, pp. 149-154). 
In general it seems that the F-Twist provides an alternative 
method (apparently an easy one) for diminishing the significance of 
the hedonistic based assumptions of mainstream economics. Also the 
fact that Friedman's thesis was used to Justify allegetions of 
hedonistic bias of theories, Indicates that the earlier neutralization 
attempts were not seen to be very successful. 
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6.7 CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS 
6.7.1 General State of Microeconomlc Theory 
It can be maintained that Samuelson's revealed preference theory 
was the last major theoretical development of modern microeconomics 
and especially of consumer's behaviour theory. After Samuelson, 
subsequent orthdox economists worked towards a general theory of 
choice free from psychological assumptions (Arrow and Debreu are the 
first examples that come to mind; see for instance Arrow and 
Debreu, 1954, and Debreu, 1959). However, these subsequent developments 
do not constitute a significant change from the basic logic of the 
theories of choice that we discussed. Thus, the foundations of modern 
microeconomics are both the Hicksian ordinal utility theory and 
Samuelson's revealed preference. 
Hicks' and Samuelson's choice theories did not only apply to the 
consumer but to the producer too. Thus both Hicks and Samuelson, and 
also subsequent theorists, aimed at establishing general theories of 
choice which would be capable of dealing with a wide range of economic 
problems. Nowadays neoclassical economic theory Is heavily based on 
these theories of choice, and as one would expect there is concern 
over their axioms or assumptions. Economists attempt to combat the 
criticism of these assumptions by simply stating that essentially the 
only crucial necessary assumption Is that of rationality. By doing 
this they attempt to reduce all the assumptions of the theories of 
choice that we saw to just this one fundamental assumption. 
Rationality in orthodox economics is equivalent to constrained 
optimization (maximization or minimization). However, this important 
point will be discussed in detail In the subsequent section which will 
be concerned with the theory of the rational consumer. 
As was noticed in the previous chapters, the origin of the 
concepts of maximization and minimization can be found in the 
influence of the hedonistic approach. One can observe the implicit 
influence of hedonism in this context when one presses even the more 
formalist orthodox economists to answer the question as to what 
consumers (producers) maximize (minimize). The fact that most of them 
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will answer utility (profits) and that they are willing to identify 
utility with satisfaction indicates the above. This issue will be 
discussed more analytically in the following chapter. 
Despite the attempt of a number of economists to reduce all their 
assumptions to that of rationality, one can discern eight lawlike 
statements that constitute the basis of equilibrium economics and 
generally of neoclassical economics. These statements have been 
identified by Hausman as being the following (see Hausman, 1984, p. 345): 
1) For any individual A and two options x and y, one and only one 
of the following is true: A prefers x to y, A prefers y to x, or A is 
Indifferent between x and y. 
2) A's preferences among options are transitive. 
3) A seeks to maximize his or her own utility where the utility 
of an option x is greater than the utility of an option y for A if and 
only if A prefers x to y. The utilities of options are Just equal in 
the case where the agent is indifferent between them. 
4) If option x is acquiring bundle x' and option y Is acquiring 
bundle y' and y' contains at least as much of each commodity and more 
of at least one commodity, then all agents prefer y to x. 
5) The marginal utility of a commodity c to an agent A is a 
decreasing function of the quantity of c that A has. 
6) When we increase any input into production, other things being 
equal, output increases, but, after a certain point, at a decreasing 
rate. 
7) Increasing all inputs Into production in the same proportion 
increases output by that proportion. The production set is weakly 
convex and additive. 
8) Entrepreneurs or firms attempt to maximize their profits. 
The above are sufficient to construct, through a formalist 
methodology, theories of production and consumption. A first 
observation that one can make is that the term 'utility', which was 
the object of so much controversy has not been displaced, but rather 
is still widely acceptable. Although it is not explicitly stated, 
utility is conceived by the majority of mainstream economists to mean 
satisfaction or pleasure (see for instance Becker, 1976, p. 137 and 
Etzioni, 1986, pp. 160-161). 
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Furthermore consumers are supposed to maximize their utility and 
producers their profits. Everyone would prefer more to less because 
the Implicit idea is that more goods or more profits mean more 
satisfaction. One can safely say that it Is not very difficult to 
discern the hedonistic influence here. Moreover, some economists have 
identified this very strong position of maximizing behaviour not only 
in contemporary orthodox economics, but also in the history of the 
discipline (see for instance Gordon, 1965, p. 124). 
Maximizing behaviour is the basic trait of economic man, a 
concept which despite the great efforts of many orthodox theorists, is 
still present (see for instance Becker, 1976, pp. 5,6,153). Whether it is 
called economic man or an Idealized individual, the idea of 
maximization is present. A number of orthodox economists would deny 
the importance of this concept for orthodox economics. However, the 
effort to dismiss it that we saw in the previous pages, and the 
attempt of many economists to find an alternative, indicates its still 
Important role in theory (see for instance, Lelbenstein, 1976, 
Hargreaves-Heap, 1985, and for a critical approach Hollis and 
Nell, 1975, p. 54). 
As an additional Indication of the presence of hedonistic 
concepts In modern microeconomics, one can mention examples from the 
recent developments in the theory of choice under uncertainty. In 
particular, in their effort to account for some inconsistencies in the 
standard theory of choice under uncertainty, some theorists have 
developed the theory of regret. The basic point of the theory is that 
people tend to compare their actual situations with the ones they 
would have been In, had they made different choices in the past 
(Loomes and Sugden, 1983, p. 428). The subsequent analysis is conducted 
in terms of pleasurable or painful sensations. 
"If they realize that a different choice would have led to a 
better oucome, people may experince the painful sensation of 
regret; if the alternative would have led to a worse outcome, 
they may experince a pleasurable sensation we call 
rejoicing. " (Loomes and Sugden, 1983, p. 428) 
It is clear that this approach is not very far from hedonism, 
especially when in a previous article related to the theory, the 
authors explicitly admit the similarity of their conception of utility 
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with that of Benthamite pleasure (Loomes and Sugden, 1982, p. 807). The 
specific reference to the psychological experince of pleasure as well 
as the idea that agents are assumed to maximize expected modified 
utility is another clear indication of the hedonistic connection. 
(Furthermore the conception of utility as a sensation can also be 
observed from the discussion. ) 
A utility maximizing economic agent Is also a basic concept in 
modern welfare economics. In addition to this, the Benthamite idea of 
the collective maximization of satisfaction Is also one of the 
foundations of welfare economics. In spite of the attempts to minimize 
the normative basis of welfare economics, It is clear that hedonism is 
a very Influential framework in this subfield of orthodox economics 
(see for instance Ng, 1979). 
From the above brief description of the current state of 
affairs, one can state that modern orthodox economics has not 
succeeded in freeing itself from philosophical or psychological 
connections, which was its goal. And when one speaks about the 
philosophical or psychological connections of orthodox economics, one 
cannot help but speak about hedonism, especially egoistic hedonism. 
In order to see the implicit presence of psychology in contemporary 
economics our next section is concerned with the modern axiomatic 
theory of the rational consumer which Is considered as a good example 
of a psychology-free theory by many orthodox theorists. 
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6.7.2 The Theory of Rational Consumer 
The majority of economists perceive the standard contemporary 
theory of the rational consumer as a neutral, positive theory, free 
from any psychological framework (: the basis of this theory is the 
Hicksian theory of choice). The starting point of this theory is that 
agents are assumed to be rational. The assumption of rationality is 
usually conceived as an obvious and simple assumption which does not 
itself Involve any specific psychological characteristics. This is 
because the concept of rationality as is used in Neoclassical 
economics is seen as a general principle, the universal principle of 
all purposive action. In essence this conception has shielded the 
theory of rational consumer from any criticism and especially 
criticisms which are directed against its empirical validity. However, 
since the assumption of rationality is not adequate by itself to 
specify a theory, theorists supply a number of axioms which constitute 
the theory of the rational consumer. These axioms are as follows: (In 
our notation R means "at least as good as", P means "strongly 
preferred, X is the consumption set, and x, x, x" are bundles of 
goods. ) 
Completeness 
For all x in X either xR x' or x' Rx or both. 
Transitivity 
For all x, xI , x" in X, if xR x' and x' R x" then xR x". 
Reflexivity 
For all x in X, xRx 
Non-satiation 
For all x, x' In X, if x> x' then xP x' 
Continuity 




For all x In X, the set RW, consisting of all x' in X such that 
x'R x, is strictly convex. 
The implication of the above axioms Is that the preference ordering 
can be represented by a continuous, convex to the origin indifference 
curve. As a result of the non-satiation assumption, higher 
indifference curves are preferred to lower indifference curves. The 
introduction of the budget constraint completes the picture of the 
axiomatic rational choice theory. 
Most writers feel that the axiomatic theory would be understood 
better If they supplement it with the old concept of the utility 
function. (We have explained this need in terms of the implicit 
presence of hedonistic ideas in previous sections). The following 
method is adopted: 
U(X) = u(x') Iff x=x 
U(X) > u(xl) iff x>x 
After introducing the additional assumption of the differentiability 
of the utility function, the problem of the rational consumer choice 
becomes a problem of utility maximization of the following form: 
maxU(x1, x... x, ) 
subject to 
I: Pixt. = M 
Where p is price and M is the total income of the consumer. 
The above conception of the theory of the rational consumer 
appears to be neutral. However, a more careful examination reveals a 
number of Implicit assumptions concerning the behaviour of the agent. ' 
To start with, the theory of the rational consumer presupposes 
that the preferences of the consumer are Archimedian. In formal terms 
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Archimedian preferences imply the following: Suppose that there are 
two bundles of goods x and y, and that 
(X yP (Ký-, y-, 
this can be reversed by increasing x2. This means that there is a 
x> x2 such that: 
(X, Y: Z) 
In particular, a loss of some units of one bundle can always be 
compensated by gain of some other unit of another commodity (see 
Borch, 1968, p. 22). This means that all preferences are considered to be 
reducible, that the preferences have no hierarchical structure. 
Different wants or needs with varying importance are reduced to a 
common denominator: utility. This implicit asssumption can be traced 
back to the first conceptions of indifference curves that we observed 
in the previous sections. 
The psychological nature of this implicit assumption can be seen 
more clearly if one assumes non-Archimedian preferences. Such 
preferences imply that agents are characterized by the principle of 
the hierarchy of wants or needs or in other words that preferences are 
irreducible. One can construct a complete model of consumer choice 
based on non-Archimedian preferences. A specific example of such a 
model is the lexicographic model where choice is based on different 
criteria: primary, and secondary. This model can be connected with 
non-hedonistic psychological thories Q. e Maslow). We will discuss the 
theory of lexicographic choice in chapter 7 In the section dealing 
with the alternative theories of choice. 
As well as Archimedian preferences, egoistic preferences are. 
almost always assumed by most theorists. According to many writers, 
the utility function of a given individual depends on what he or she 
consumes and nothing else (see for instance Winter, 1969, p. 9, and 
Nicolaides, 1988). The standard approach is the following. The utility 
of individual I is written as 
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Ui (x x2., ... 
The utility of the individual Is not affected by the consumption of 
goods by other Individuals. Thus the standard implicit assumption in 
the presentation of the theory of rational consumer is: 
bui =0 
bxj 
(where i and J refer to individuals) 
The importance of this implicit assumption can be demonstrated if one 
takes into account non-selfish utility functions. In the simple case 
of two individuals and one good, the utility function is: 
Ui (XIL, XJ ) 
with the possibilities: 
1) bui- >0 (altruism) 
bx, j 
2) bul <0 (malevolence) 
bxj 
The adoption of altruistic preferences will sigmificantly alter a 
number of established theoretical points. For instance, altruistic 
preferences imply that indifference curves are closed when 
bul < bul 
bxj bxj 
When the above holds then the individual's indifference curve has a 
positive slope which means that the preference set becomes closed. 
Closed indifference curves have important implications for the theory 
of exchange. In the case of two goods, two individuals analysed in the 
standard Edgeworth box, closed indifference curves will give a shorter 
contract curve with sections which represent charity (see 
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Danielson, 1975 and Collard, 1978). 
The implicit assumptions of Archimedian preferences and egoistic 
preferences combined with the idea of utility maximization as the sole 
aim of the consumer (which as we have seen Is a standard feature of 
orthodox theory) can indicate an underlying psychological theory of 
the consumer. In particular, the basic characteristic of Archimedian 
preferences is that all wants are reducible because of the existence 
of a common denominator, utility, which as was observed, is conceived 
to mean satisfaction or pleasure. This implies that the underlying 
psychological framework can be identified as quantitative egoistic 
hedonism. The quantitative element corresponds to the presence of 
Archimedian preferences (pleasures are reducible and comparable). The 
egoistic element corresponds to the preoccupation with egoistic 
agents. Finally, the orientation towards the idea of utility 
maximization corresponds to hedonism. Thus one can observe that even 
in the contemporary theory of the rational consumer, which allegedly 
is seen as one of the positive bodies of orthodox theory, indications 
of the hedonistic psychological framework are present. This reinforces 
the idea of a continuous hedonistic influence on conventional 
economIcs. 
249 
6.7.3 Hedonism and Textbooks 
The above idea that modern orthodox microeconomics has not 
succeeded in freeing itself from hedonistic influence can also be 
reinforced by a small survey of contemporary orthodox textbooks. One 
would expect that the 50 year old attempt to 'neutralize' economics 
would have its influence on the way that economic theory is taught. 
However, if one looks at contemporary influential economic textbooks. 
one will find out that the marginalist approach constitutes the core 
of consumer theory or production theory, four or five decades after 
Hicks' and Samuelson's purification attempts. As we noted, in spite of 
these neutralization attempts, the new allegedly positive theories 
still exhibit implicit and sometimes explicit hedonistic connotations. 
However, at the textbook level the hedonistic influence becomes much 
more apparent. The majority of orthodox texts use the terms utility 
and satisfaction (pleasure) as synonymous. This happens in elementary 
textbooks such as McConnell, 1975, p. 488; Begg et al., 1984, p. 90; and 
Graven, 1984, pp. 168-169). Also the same thing can be observed in more 
advanced texts. For instance, one can read in Henderson and Quandt: 
"If we have a utility function of the form 
UO = f(q, qý) 
then since the utility function is continuous (1) is 
satisfied by an infinite number of combinations of q, and q.. 
Imagine that the consumer derives a given level of 
satisfaction UO from 5 units of q, and 3 units of q2. 
(Henderson and Quandt, 1980, p. 9) 
Another intermediate textbook also follows the same approach. Ferguson 
and Gould write: 
"A consuming unit -either an individual or a household- 
derives satisfaction or utility from the services provided by 
the commodities consumed during a given time period. " 
(Ferguson and Gould, 1975, p. 12) 
In addition to the foregoing other widely used intermediate texts (and 
sometimes advanced ones) follow the same approach (see for instance, 
Koutsoyiannis, 1979, p. 18). It is clear that the above is much closer to 
the marginalist line of thought than to developments of the last 
decades. 
Apart from identifying utility with satisfaction as the 
marginalists did, many contemporary textbooks explicity refer to the 
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concept of economic man. In spite of Robbins' efforts to minimize its 
importance, the concept can be found In a number of textbooks, and is 
almost identical to that of the pre-Robbinsonian era. L. Friedman 
states: 
"The model of economic man can be described in terms of four 
assumptions... These assumptions form a model of decision 
making sometimes referred to as economic man, where each 
individual is portrayed as utility maximizer. " 
(Friedman, 1984, pp. 22,23) 
Although it is not usually stated explicitly, economic man is viewed 
as selfish. The model of economic man is present in D. Laidler's text 
when he writes: 
"The consumer wishes to do as well as he can for himself, to 
select that consumption pattern out of those available to him 
that will yield the highest possible level of satisfaction - 
he wishes to maximize his utility. " (Laidler, 1981, p. 15) 
The attempt by orthodox theorists to reduce all characteristics of 
economic man into one -rationality- is not very popular among textbook 
writers who still conceive him as a satisfaction maximizer. The 
consumer is not the only participant in the market who is shown as a 
utility or satisfaction maximizer. The same applies to the manager, as 
a succesful textbook of managerial economics points out (see 
Heldenshohn and Robinson, 1974, pp. 82,93). 
As one would expect from the above, the notion of the 
indifference curve is not explained in Hicksian terms but in 
marginalist terms- 
"The locus of all commodity combinations from which the 
consumer derives the same level of satisfaction forms an 
indifference curve. An indifference map is a collection of 
indifference curves corresponding to different levels of 
satisfactions. " (Henderson and Quandt, 1980, p. 9) 
Exactly the same definition is given by Koutsoyiannis (1979, p. 18). The 
Hicksian notion of a "neutral" indifference curve or map seems to have 
little impact on contemporary textbooks. (As was observed, Hicks 
avoided mentioning any subjective concept like "satisfaction" In his 
discussion of the indifference map). 
In addition the analysis of consumer equilibrium that can be 
found in the majority of texts is conducted in terms of satisfaction 
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or utility levels. The consumer is viewed as having a given budget 
constraint which is represented with a straight line or a linear 
equation. The maximum of consumer satisfaction or utility is attained 
at the point of tangency of the budget line with the highest 
indifference curve (maximization of a utility function). m5ny 
textbooks follow this approach without worrying much about using 
concepts Implemented by the marginalists years ago (see, for instance, 
Laidler, 1981, p. 14 amd Miller, 1978, p. 31). 
There are Instances, however, where the modern developments are 
taken into account (this is the case among more advanced texts). The 
Hicksian-based term of marginal rate of substitution (which as we saw 
was meant to replace the hedonistic "marginal utility") is mentioned 
by many texts. However, the term is connected with the notions of 
satisfaction or utility which it was originally meant to replace. In 
an Intermediate text one can read: 
"[The marginal rate of substitution of x for y is] the number 
of units of y that must be given up per unit of x gained if 
the consumer is to either feel equally well-off or to 
continue to obtain the same level of satisfaction. " 
(Miller, 1978, p. 21) 
Exactly the same line of explanation is followed by Ferguson and Gould 
and Koutsoyiannis, where the concept of constant level of satisfaction 
is used to explain compensation (Ferguson and Gould, 1975, p. 24; and 
Koutsoyiannis, 1979, p. 18). 
Few texts refer to Samuelson's revealed preference theory as a 
theory which meant to replace the value laden marginalist utility 
theory. In many cases RPT is mentioned only as a brief footnote (see 
for instance Miller, 1978, p. 31) or as a way of explaining index 
numbers. Generally, modern choice theories are connected with the 
marginalist analysis without giving a hint that the purpose of those 
theories was to free economics from the psychological assumptions of 
the marginalists. An example of such textbook is Lancaster's where one 
can read: 
"Since 'most preferred' and 'giving greatest utility' are 
synonymous, we can make an addition to the list of 
equivalents to the statement that the consumer chooses point 
C on his budget line: At point C, the consumer maximizes his 
utility for points on the budget line... The decision to use 
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utility analysis or direct preference analysis is simply a 
matter of convenience. " (Lancaster, 1974, pp. 231-232) 
Apart from the above, some textbook definitions of economics are 
in the old marginalist climate (calculus of pleasure and pain). It 
seems that Robbins' apparently value-free definition had little 
Influence on them. It must be noted, however, that such definitions 
are limited among textbooks. It shows though, that the explicit 
influence of hedonistic oriented marginalist economists is still 
present even in such basic thing as the definition of economics (see 
for instance, Solmon, 1976, p. 14). 
Clearly, one can suggest a number of other possible explanations 
for the above explicit hedonistic orientation of economic textbooks. 
The first could be that textbook writers attempt to simplify theory in 
order to make it easier for students. Thus, it is better to use 
simpler concepts. One can note here that hedonistic concepts are not 
only used in introductory texts, but also In intermediate ones (and 
sometimes advanced ones). This is a first indication that hedonistic 
ideas are not used for simplification purposes. Another argument which 
supports this, is the existence of a few elementary textbooks where 
consumer theory is presented solely in terms of a general choice 
theory. An example of such textbook is V. Walsh's "Introduction to 
Contemporary Microeconomics". Walsh's textbook starts with a brief 
reference to the history of the utility concept and its subsequent 
replacement by a theory of choice. The whole subsequent analysis is 
based on Hickslan analysis. In contrast to many texts, Walsh discusses 
indifference curves in terms of preferences not in terms of utility 
(see Walsh, 1970). (One can mention though that Walsh, in the process 
of explaining the theory of choice, uses extremely hedonistic 
examples). The fact that the text has been a popular student textbook 
for many years indicates that choice theory can be presented simply 
enough tobe understood by first year students. 
Another argument against 'simplification' is that the great 
majority of textbook writers support explicitly a positivist economic 
methodology. This means that value-laden terms are not permitted (even 
if they can simplify theories) for methodological reasons (see, for 
instance, Lipsey, 1979). 
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A second explanation can be suggested in terms of the irrelevance 
of assumptions thesis that we saw in previous section. One could 
Justify the use of hedonistic oriented assumptions by textbook authors 
in terms of this methodological position. However, none of the 
textbooks that we mentioned explicitly adopts Friedman's 
methodological ideas. (Only Miller and Ferguson and Gould are 
sympathetic to the Idea that assumptions are not very important for 
theories. ) On the contrary there are examples of texts which refer to 
the necessity of realistic assumptions. Onp of these texts is 
Stonier's and Hagues' that state that the ideal would be to devise 
assumptions which come closest to reality (Stonier and 
Hague, 1980, p. 678). Other authors explicitly call for realistic 
assumptions or reject Friedman's idea that unrealistic assumptions are 
positive advantage for a theory (see Graven, 1984, p. 10 and 
Koutsoyiannis, 1979, p. 4). 
Given the above, one is tempted to conclude that the fact that 
many textbook authors feel that students will better comprehend better 
consumer theory if they mention things like "each individual tries to 
maximize his satisfaction", "utility means satisfaction" or "higher 
Indifference curve means higher satisfaction level", might be seen as 
another Indication of the Implicit presence of hedonism in choice 
theories. 
The above picture (a utility maximizing consumer) that most 
orthodox textbooks present, is also the microeconomic basis of 
mainstream macroeconomic textbooks (see for instance Stevenson et 
al, 1987, p. 17). It seems that the modern attempts towards the 
'neutralization of economics' had no great impact on the 
microfoundations of orthodox macrotheory. As S. Dow points out: 
"Individuals maximize utility subject to a constraint given 
by the structure of consumers preferences and the conditions 
of production (the production function). " (Dow, 1985, p. 90) 
Moreover, the hedonistically oriented marginalist theory of value 
still constitutes the explicit basis of modern orthodox macroeconomic 
theory (Dow, 1985, p. 90). 
In general, the above arguments demonstrate that the influence of 
the hedonistic framework on many orthodox textbooks is considerable. 
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Important sections of microeconom1c theory are presented in a way that 
is explicitly based on hedonistic ideas. Moreover, the 
microfoundat ions of modern orthodox macroeconomics are influenced by 
the hedonistic framework. Thus, despite the efforts of a number of 
economists, the textbook presentation of important parts of economic 
theory Is close to the explicitly hedonistic oriented economics of 
Jevons or Edgeworth. All this indicates that hedonism was not simply 
one characteristic of some marginalist economists, as many 
contemporary theorists believe, but that It still exercises a 
considerable influence on orthodox theory. 
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6.8 CONCLUSION 
our discussion in this chapter dealt with the main developments 
in orthodox economic theory of this century (especially microeconomic 
theory). In particular we started with a discussion of Pigou's Ideas 
which were very influential In the first decades of the century. 
Although there were Indications of a growing move towards a value- 
free, positive economic science In the spirit of Pareto, Pigou's 
thought was explicitly influenced by the hedonistic framework. His 
portrayal of the individual as a pleasure maximizer, his cardinal 
conception of utility and the idea of collective maximization of 
welfare place him closer to utilitarianism. However, after Pigou, the 
idea of a 'neutral' economic science (based on logical positivism) 
became very strong, and we have the first works which place emphasis 
on the minimization of the hedonistic image of orthodox economics. 
Robbins was the main figure in this respect. Additional reasons for 
the above tendency were the criticism against the hedonistic approach 
by heterodox economists and the influence of behaviourist psychology 
which emphasized observed behaviour, as opposed to motivations. 
These reasons and especially the influence of logical positivism, led 
Robbins to introduce a new allegedly neutral definition of economics. 
However, as was observed, hedonistically oriented concepts can still 
be found in Robbins' work and utilitarian Influences are also 
discernable especially in his later works. 
While Robbins set the methodological framework for constructing a 
positive economic science, Hicks and other mainstream theorists 
attempted to supply the theories. Hicks attempted to replace utility 
theory with a theory of choice, thus avoiding the value-laden concepts 
of utility and marginal utility. However, his analysis still involves 
the notion of an indifference map which can only be defined in terms 
of satisfaction levels, and also the concept of a selfish, 
satisfaction maximizing economic man. 
It is likely that the unsuccesful attempt by Hicks to free 
economics from philosophical or psychological concepts, was one reason 
for Samuelson's revealed preference theory. By accepting observed 
behaviour only and by setting some postulates, Samuelson constructed 
his revealed preference theory and rediscovered all the basic elements 
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of consumer theory I objectively' . However, Samuelson can not help 
using the concept of satisfaction in the process of his theory 
construction. Moreover, some theorists have suggested that revealed 
preference Is valid only when indifference curves are assumed to exist 
in the first place. In addition, experimental psychological findings 
cast doubt on Samuelson axioms of behaviour. The Implication of all 
this, is that Samuelson's theory Is not far removed from utility 
theory. 
The idea that the above attempts to set economics free were not 
very successful is reinforced by the appearance of a different 
approach to the issue. Friedman's thesis that the assumptions do not 
matter for the validity of a theory can be seen as a way of 
overcoming the problem of hedonistic Influence. However, although this 
methodological position had considerable impact on economists, the 
fact that Samuelson and other orthodox theorists rejected Friedman's 
argument shows the importance that the assumptions have for such 
theorists. 
It must be mentioned that the efforts of Robbins, Hicks and 
Samuelson are responsible for the much reduced hedonistic image of 
orthodox microeconom1c theory (although as we have shown, the 
hedonistic influence is still present). However, our discussion of the 
current state of affairs (especially the contemporary theory of the 
rational consumer) and our survey of orthodox textbooks Indicated that 
conventional economics has not succeeded In freeing itself from 
psychology. Moreover, the microfoundations of modern orthodox 
(neoclassical) macroeconomtcs are based an the idea of utility 
maximizing and selfish consumer, producer, and worker. This 
hedonistically based conception of behaviour assists the application 
of formalization in orthodox economics. 
Our discussion enables us to support the view that the attempts 
to free mainstream economics from philosophical or psychological 
connections, attempts which were intensified in this century, have 
essentially not succeeded. And as was noted before, when one speaks 
about the philosophical or psychological connections of orthodox 
economics, one cannot help Identifying hedonism as a dominant 
Influence. 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 6 
1) Apart from the implicit assumptions which concern the agent's 
behaviour, there is a number of other assumptions which concern the 
agent's environment. One can mention three main implicit assumptions 
of this sort: 
1. Euclidean consumption: this implies that consumption goods are 
infinitely divisible. 
2. Stability of commodities: the characteristics of the commodities 
are given. 
3. Income and unit prices are assumed to be fixed. 
One can also maintain that agents are assumed to be parametrically 
rational. Parametric agents treat their environment and the behaviour 
of other agents as constant. For a discussion of parametric 
rationality see Elster, 1979, pp. 117-118; and Lesourne, 1977, pp. 10-13. 
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CHAPTER 7 
NON-HEDONISTIC ECONOMIC APPROACHES 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the previous four chapters, we discussed the development of 
the influence of the hedonistic approach on the formation of orthodox 
economic theory. We saw the systematic Introduction of hedonistic 
ideas in economics with the work of Bentham. Next, we observed the 
peak of the influence of hedonism on economics in the marginalist 
school where economics was reduced to a 'calculus of pleasure and 
pain' (especially in the works of Jevons and Edgeworth). The 
subsequent stage was the beginning of the attempt towards the 
minimization of the hedonistic image of marginalist economics. This 
attempt started with Wicksteed, Pareto and Fisher, who, as was noted, 
were not very succesful, since hedonism was still an important 
influence on their theories. The above trend continued with modern 
economists like Robbins, Hicks and Samuelson and was assisted by the 
increasing influence of a positivist scientific philosophy. However, 
as we pointed out in the previous chapter, despite the attempts 
towards the 'neutralization' of economics, hedonistic Ideas are still 
an underlying characteristic of modern orthodox economic theory. 
Our discussion of the influence of hedonism on orthodox 
economics, can not be complete if we do not mention examples of 
economists whose economic thought is not based on the hedonistic 
approach. (In this thesis, the first indication of an economic theory 
without a hedonistic basis was seen in the section on Marshall -4.3.1- 
where it was stressed that although Marshall's thought as a whole 
cannot be characterized as hedonistic, subsequent economists dropped 
the elements that did not suit their hedonistically oriented theories 
and gave more emphasis to those that fitted. ) We believe that a 
discussion of non-hedonistic oriented economists is necessary for two 
reasons. The first reason is to show that there indeed are conceivable 
non-hedonistic alternatives , and that some of them have been tried. 
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The second reason is to show examples of non-hedonistic economists 
which will assist in the understanding of the influence of hedonism on 
orthodox economics, by demonstrating the contrast. 
At this point it has to be mentioned that such theorists were 
mainly inspired by non-hedonistic conceptual frameworks. There are a 
number of non-hedonistic conceptual frameworks; one can mention 
Stoicism as an example of a non-hedonistic philosophical framework and 
A. Maslow's theory of the hierarchy of needs as an example of a non- 
hedonistic psychological theory. Stoic philosophers believed that the 
basic motive of human life Is not maximum pleasure (minimum pain) but 
self preservation. Thus they started from a different psychological 
basis. They also rejected pleasure as the purpose of life (normative 
ideal), and suggested that 'living according to nature' is the basis 
of their morality (see Helios, 1981, pp. 88-89, and Xenakis, 1983, p. 108). 
Moreover some of them (i. e. Epictetus) rejected the hedonistic 
approach explicitly (see Xenakis, 1983, pp. 108-112). As far as modern 
non-hedonistic psychological theories are concerned, Maslow's theory 
is a representative example. A. Maslow's concept of the hierarchy of 
needs (motives) and self-actualization, is In contrast with the 
hedonistic conception of pleasure maximization as the sole motive (see 
Maslow, 1954). 
However, our purpose in this section is not a detailed 
examination of the non-hedonistic oriented economic approaches, but 
the exposition of a few indicative examples which will serve the above 
stated intentions. Thus in this chapter we will discuss the main ideas 
of non-hedonistically based economists and also demonstrate their 
attacks on the utilitarian approach of orthodox economics. Our 
presentation will again have a historical sequence and so the first to 
be discussed is Adam Smith. 
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7.2 ADAM SMITH 
Adam Smith (1723-1790) is considered to be the father of the 
discipline of economics by the vast majority of economists, and his 
ideas exercised great influence on the development of economic 
thought. In spite of this however, the subsequent hedonistic 
orientation of orthodox economics that we observed, is far from the 
spirit of Adam Smith's ideas. 
Before we go on to a discussion of Smith's views, we should point 
out that the founder of economics was also a philosopher, and this 
means that his economic thought was part of his general philosophical 
system. (Smith was Professor of Moral Philosophy in Glasgow and also a 
friend of David Hume. ) In this respect, Smith can be compared to 
Bentham, but as will become clear, Smith's thought can provide an 
alternative to Benthamite hedonism. 
Although, Smith was the author of other works too, the "Theory of 
Moral Sentiments" and the "Wealth of Nations" are the most 
influential. The "Theory of Moral Sentiments" is a more general work 
than the "Wealth of Nations", and here Smith expresses his views about 
human nature explicitly and systematically. From the first pages of 
this work, Smith starts exposing his Ideas about human motives. One of 
his first and most important ideas was the emphasis upon the non- 
selfish character of human beings. As he writes: 
"How self 1sh soever man may be supposed, there are evidently 
some principles, in his nature, which interest him in the 
fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to 
him, though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of 
seeing it. " (Smith, 1976, p. 9) 
The contrast of the above pasage with Bentham's statements in the 
first pages of his "Principles of Morals and Legislation" is evident. 
For Smith, sympathy is a crucial characteristic of human nature. In 
contrast with the majority of subsequent theorists, sympathy Is not 
viewed as a minor or even unimportant motive, but as a basic force 
influencing human action. 
Smith does not simply state that sympathy is a powerful motive 
but attempts to analyse it and to put it into a wider perspective. 
Thus, according to him, the reason why men on most occasions ("the 
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generous upon all occasions, the mean upon many") sacrifice their own 
Interests to the greatest interests of others, is the following: 
"It is a stronger love, a more powerful affection, which 
generally takes place upon such occasions; the love of what 
is honourable and noble, of the grandeur, and dignity, and 
superiority of our own characters. " (Smith, 1976, p. 137) 
The above provides a vital clue to the explanation of the different 
emphasis of motives that exist In Smith's two great works. (As we 
shall see later self-interest plays a central role In the "Wealth of 
Nations". ) 
The above emphasis on sympathy is in great contrast with the 
dominant views of the Enlightenment era, as it was manifested in other 
countries and discussed in Chapter Three. (It has to be mentioned 
though, that sympathy is also important in the work of Smith's friend, 
D. Hume, see Hume, 1938 and Broiles, 1964. ) As we pointed out, egoistic 
hedonism was an underlying characteristic of such thinkers as 
Gassendi, Helvetius and Hobbes. Adam Smith Is fully aware of the 
Intellectual climate elsewhere as can be seen in his "Theory of Moral 
Sentiments". More specifically, Smith criticizes Hobbes' views about 
the selfish and pleasure seeking nature of man. Moreover, Smith 
condemns the idea, which can be found in most hedonistic oriented 
theorists, that apparently non-selfish behaviour can be explained 
ultimately in terms of selfish and hedonistic considerations. Smith 
states: 
"Man, say they, conscious of his own weakness, and of the 
need which he has for assistance of others, rejoices whenever 
he observes that they adopt his own passions, because he is 
then assured of that assistance; and grieves whenever he 
observes the contrary, because he is then assured of their 
opposition. But both the pleasure and the pain are always 
felt so instantaneously, and often upon such frivolous 
occasions, that It seems evident that neither of them can be 
derived from any such self-interested considerations. " 
(Smith, 1976, pp. 13-14) 
Unlike the advocates of egoistic hedonism, Smith does not see the 
selfish maximization of pleasure as the sole motive of human 
behaviour. Apart from his emphasis on sympathy, he also acknowledges 
other causes of action, like a sense of duty. As he writes: "The 
regard to those general rules of conduct, is what is properly called a 
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sense of duty, a principle of the greatest consequence in human life, 
and the only principle by which the bulk of mankind are capable of 
directing their actions" (Smith, 1976, pp. 161,162). Clearly, the Image 
of man as conceived by Bentham (selfish maximization of pleasure) is 
very far from the image of man as conceived by Smith (sympathy and a 
sense of duty). 
From the above, one can see, that the most Important idea about 
motivation in the "Theory of Moral Sentiments" is the concept of 
sympathy. However, in his subsequent work the "Wealth of Nations" 
self-interest is mentioned as a basic motive, and sympathy is pushed 
aside. As Smith puts it in a well-known passage: 
"It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, 
or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their 
regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to 
their humanity, but to their self-love. " (Smith, 1970, p. 119) 
At first note there seems to be an Inconsistency between these two 
works. However, many authors have emphasized that in essence there is 
not any problem of inconsistency between the "Theory of Moral 
Sentiments" and the "Wealth of Nations" (see for instance Seligman, 
1971, pp. 8-11, Coase, 1976, pp. 545-546, West, 1976, p. 99, Heilbroner, 
1982, p. 434, and Evensky, 1987, p. 464). First of all one should dismiss 
the idea that Smith changed his mind when he wrote the subsequent work 
the "Wealth of Nations" because revisions of the "Theory of Moral 
Sentiments" made by Smith after the "Wealth of Nations" was published, 
show no change in the views which he had expressed in the earlier book 
(Whittaker, 1960, p. 102). Thus, it seems that instead of inconsistency 
there is a connection between sympathy and self-interest. More 
specifically, Smith holds that "the real foundation of the desire to 
trade is that principle to persuade which so much prevails in human 
nature. When any arguments are offered to persuade, it is always 
expected that they should have their proper effect ... we cultivate the 
power of persuasion, and indeed we do so without Intending it" (Smith 
quoted in Myers, 1983, p. 113). This implies that consideration for 
other human beings is the essential cause of the desire to trade. Thus 
a vital connection is established between sympathy and self-interest. 
The above indicate that Adam Smith's analysis of human nature is 
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a complex one and surely that he was not In line with the simple 
conception of man as a selfish pleasure-maximizing being that 
characterized hedonistically oriented thinkers. At this point one must 
take into account the influence on Smith by non-hedonistic 
philosophies. Specifically Smith was very much influenced by 
Naturalist philosophies and especially by Stoic Ideas 
(Ro 11,196 1, p. 143). 
It must also be added that Smith never refers to a fictional man 
in his economic writings. His discussion attempts to give a picture 
of actual behaviour and he always believes that he Is portraying 
actual behaviour (see also Hollander, 1977, p. 140). Thus, the concept of 
economic man which was invented later by Mill is totally alien to 
Smith's line of thought. As R. H. Coase declares: 
"It is wrong to believe, as is commonly done, that Adam Smith 
had as his view of man an abstraction, an 'economic man', 
rationally pursuing his self-interest in a single minded way. 
Adam Smith would not have thought it sensible to treat man as 
a rational utility-maximizer. " (Coase, 1976, pp. 545-546). 
In our discussion of the members of the late classical school, we 
pointed out that they followed an abstract, deductive economic 
methodology. More analytically, we observed that the introduction of 
hedonistic ideas in economics was associated with the emergence of a 
formalized methodology. For instance, it was observed that Mill, 
Senior and Cairnes who were influenced by the hedonistic approach, 
advocated a deductive, physical science-like economic methodology. The 
same tendency was seen in the members of the marginalist school. In 
contrast with the hedonistic oriented theorists, Adam Smith did not 
advocate a formalistic methodology for economics. In the "Wealth of 
Nations", Smith uses the historical, inductive and sometimes the 
deductive method. From his work, it seems that he was willing to 
accept any methodological approach and not restrict himself in 
following the deductive method. As J. N. Keynes emphasizes: 
"He rejected no method of enquiry that could in any way 
assist him in investigating the phenomena of wealth. " 
(Keynes, 1904, p. 10) 
Thus in the "Wealth of Nations", one can find examples where Smith 
advocates both inductive and deductive methods (see for instance, 
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Skinner, 1979, p. 115, and Hutchison, 1978, p. 9). In general Adam Smith's 
lopen' methodological approach is another point of difference from the 
subsequent hedonistic course of development of orthodox economics. 
In the previous pages we observed the differences that Adam 
Smith's thought exhibits if compared with the subsequent hedonistic 
theorists. A consequence of Smith's non-hedonistic thought Is that his 
economic analysis differs from that of subsequent orthodox theorists. 
His theory of value for instance, is quite different from the 
pleasure-oriented theory of value which was based on hedonistic 
principles. While, as we saw, most advocates of the hedonistic 
approach adopt a simple, pleasure based theory of value which comes 
from their view of human nature as pleasure maximizing. Smith conducts 
a careful discussion and tends to follow a cost-of -production value 
theory. Smith's analysis in terms of real prices, of the real measure 
of exchangeable value Gabour), of prices as reflecting factor rewards 
etc, Is In marked contrast with the subjectivist analysis. Smith does 
not conceive the value of a commodity as something subjective and 
ultimately based on pleasure as most hedonistic oriented economists 
do, but as something objective based on labour commanded by the 
commodity (see also Deane, 1978, pp. 19-28, and Hollander, 1975). 
In this section we examined the main points of difference of Adam 
Smith's Ideas from the hedonistic framework. In particular, it was 
observed that Smith's views of human nature were much more 
sophisticated If compared with the simple Idea of a selfish, pleasure 
maximizing being on which egoistic hedonism is based. Smith's emphasis 
on the role of sympathy in human behaviour and also the Identification 
of other important motives such as the sense of duty, put him in 
contrast with the hedonistic framework. Moreover, the establishment of 
a connection between self-interest and sympathy, the fact that he 
never saw man as a pleasure maximizing being and his open methodology, 
are further indications of his difference from the hedonistic 
orientation of mainstream economics. A manifestation of his non- 
hedonistic orientation is his complex theory of value which is in 
contrast with the marginalist pleasure-based theory. Hcýwever, as was 
the case with Marshall, subsequent economists were to neglect the 
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Important elements of Smith's analysis and concentrate on those which 
could easily be fitted easily in with hedonistic influenced theories. 
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7.3 ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES: 19TH CENTURY 
7.3.1 K. Marx 
After Adam Smith, the next thinkers whose economic ideas can be 
described as not belonging to the hedonistic framework are Marx and 
the members of the Historical school of economics. Chronologically, 
Marx and the Historical economists correspond to the late period of 
classical school and to the first marginalist generation. Both Marx 
and the Historical economists had different conceptions about human 
nature, economics and the method of economics from those of the 
theorists that we saw in the previous chapters. But let us examine 
these differences, beginning with K. Marx. 
During his lifetime, Marx wrote a very large number of works 
which refer to a wide variety of topics. Like Adam Smith, Marx was a 
philosopher, an historian and an economist, and thus his economic 
thought is only a part of his intellectual activity. Because of this 
and also because his writings cover a period of nearly fifty years 
during which Marx addressed different readerships, a short discussion 
of his views about man, the nature of economics and economic 
methodology, is bound to be selective. We will concentrate more on his 
early writings (up to 1848) where reference to the above topics is 
more explicit and abundant than in his later works. 
An early indication of Marx's views about human nature can be 
found in an essay written by Marx at around 1844. It contains comments 
by Marx on classical economists, and more specifically it is concerned 
with James Mill (who, as we have seen was a utilitarian economist). 
Marx makes a number of critical comments on James Mill's economic 
ideas. One can read: 
"Thus, the greater and more elaborate appears the power of 
society Inside the private property relationship, the more 
egoist, antisocial, and alienated from his own essence 
becomes man. " (Marx, 1977, p. 118) 
Clearly, the implication of the above quotation is that the real 
essence of man (non-alienated) is communal, non-egoist In his nature. 
Or as Marx himself puts it: "... human nature is the true communal 
nature of man, men create and produce their communal nature by their 
natural action" (Marx, 1977, p. 115). Thus, a basic feature of the 
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hedonistic oriented economic thought, egoism, is not considered as 
part of the real nature of man. Marx's starting point is therefore 
radically different from that of most orthodox hedonistic theorists. 
Moreover, Marx recognizes the spiritual aspect of human nature as 
basic. In his "Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts" he attacks the 
position of orthodox economists in this matter. As he writes: "But 
political economy knows the worker only as a working animal as a beast 
reduced to the strictest bodily needs" (Marx and Engels, 1975, p. 242). 
And further: 
"... [People) must, above all, have time at their disposal for 
spiritual creative activity and spiritual enjoyment. " (Marx 
and Engels, 1975, p. 242) 
The most important implication of the above is that Marx 
conceives human nature as an entity composed by bodily and spiritual 
needs; and also that sociality, not egoism constitutes the real nature 
of man (see also Meszaros, 1972, p. 170). These ideas are closely 
connected with the concept of alienation and of alienated labour which 
constitute one of the cornerstones of Marxian economics. More 
specifically, Marx's concept of alienation has to do with the 
alienation from his "species life". In Marx's words: "... alienated 
labour succeeds in alienating man from his species. Species life, 
productive life, life creating life, turns into a mere means of 
sustaining the worker's individual existence, and man is alienated 
from his fellow men" (Marx quoted in McLellan, 1980, p. 112). Thus, one 
can see that Marx's conception of human nature, as is shown above, is 
not an isolated idea, but is an important facet of his overall 
theoretical framework. 
Marx's views about the doctrine of economics are also different 
from the hedonistically oriented economists (especially marginalist 
economists) who conceived economics ih terms of satisfaction or 
utility. According to Marx: 
"Economics conceives of the communal nature of man, or his 
self-affirming human nature, the mutual completion that leads 
to the species-life, to the truly human life, under the form 
of exchange and commerce. " (Marx, 1977, p. 116) 
The difference between Marx's approach to economics and the 
utilitarian approach lies In the fact that Marx's starting point was 
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the socio-economic relations between men as producers, while the 
starting point of hedonistically oriented theorists was the 
psychological relation between men and goods (satisfaction) (see also 
Meek, 1977, pp. 165-175). According to our view this constitutes one of 
the most important differences of Marxian economic thought. As one 
would expect, Marx's conception of economics as the study of 
relationships between people can be seen as the explanation of the 
wide disagreement between Marxian and marginalist economic theorists. 
One can also note that Marx's conception of economies as relations 
between men, Is vitally connected with his labour theory of value 
(labour being the sole determinant of value). On the other hand, the 
subjective approach of marginalist economists leads to the utility- 
based theory of value. Naturally, this difference over the nature of 
value has tremendous Implications in the sense that it leads to two 
totally different economic theories. 
In addition, Marx explicitly condemned Bentham's and Y. S. Mill's 
utility theory; in his "German Ideology" Marx writes (after mentioning 
Bentham and Mill): 
"The economic content gradually turned the utility theory 
into a mere apologia for the existing state of affairs, an 
attempt to prove that under existing conditions the mutual 
relations of people today are the most advantageous and 
generally useful. " (Marx, 1977, p. 189) 
Apart from the above, Marx strongly criticizes Bentham's utilitarian 
theory in his "Capital" by pointing out: "In his ar id and simple way, 
he [Bentham] assumes the modern petty bourgeois, and above all the 
modern English petty bourgeois, to be the normal man" 
(Marx, 1957, p. 671). He goes even further and calls most of Bentham's 
ideas "rubbish" (Marx, 1957, p. 671). 
Marx's ideas about methodology are also related to his Ideas 
about human nature and economics. Marx does not consider human nature 
to be divided into many aspects as orthodox economists did in order 
to Justify the selfish, hedonistic character of economic agents 
(economic man). For Marx "to abstract from the historical process and 
presuppose an abstract-isolated-human individual is fundamentally" 
wrong (Marx, 1977, p. 157). One can state that Marx, like Smith, is 
concerned with a real and not a fictional Individual. An example of a 
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consequence of Marx's approach can be seen in his discussion about the 
attitude of orthodox political economy towards the worker. As Hunt 
asserts: 
"Marx is passionately opposed to the attitude of political 
economy which does not consider the worker 'when he is not 
working' as a human being; but leaves such considerations to 
criminal law, to doctors, to religion, to the statistical 
tables, to politics and to-, the workhouse beadle. " 
(Hunt, 1972, p. 166) 
Moreover, it has nothing in common with the mathematical, 
abstract method which we saw in the marginalist school. Like Smith, 
Marx uses every method in the study of economic process. In many parts 
of his work he follows a deduct ive-abstract methodology but it is 
combined with- historical examples and inductive reasoning. In the 
words of H. Katouzian: 
"Marx was not a pure speculator; if anything he put more 
emphasis on facts, i. e. empirical and historical knowledge 
than on pure theory. " (Katouzian, 1980, p. 26) 
The synthesis of these two methodological approaches (induction 
and deduction) is supposedly to be found in the Marxian dialectic 
method (the sources of this method can be found in Hegelian 
philosophy). Marx uses the dialectic method in order to make a 
synthesis of the theoretical abstractions and of historical examples. 
It is then used in order to construct theories and to study structures 
(see also Godelier, 1972, p. 187). 
Marx's holistic approach to human nature and his dialectical 
method encourage as a consequence a dynamic approach to economics. 
Marx's avoidance of abstract, deterministic models of human behaviour 
(i. e. hedonism) and his preference towards historical rather than 
mechanical time result in another type of economic approach, now 
identified as Marxian economics. Marxian economics has a substantial 
influence among many contemporary economists. Naturally, it has 
different explanations from orthodox theory for most economic 
phenomena (see Brody, 1975). For instance Marxian economics has a 
different value (price) theory, different wage theory and different 
explanation of business cycles. Thus, it can be seen as an example of 
a coherent body of economic theory which does not stem from hedonism. 
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7.3.2. Historical School 
It can be maintained that the Historical school appeared in 
1840's and its influence lasted up to the beginnings of this century, 
although elements of the Historical school can still be found in the 
work of contemporary economists. The Historical School developed 
mainly in Germany, but the same line of thought can be discerned in 
some English economists too. Historians of economic thought usually 
refer to the Old Historical school, represented by G. Roscher, B 
Hildebrand and K. Knies. The Younger Historical school is represented 
by G. Schmoller and W. Sombart. The English followers of the 
Historical school include C. Leslie, W. J. Ashley and J. K. Ingram. 
The school reached its peak in the latter half of the nineteenth 
century which means that it coincided with the development of the late 
classical school and with the marginalists. The school had a 
distinctive approach to economics and economic methodology and 
Historical economists attacked orthodox economics in many cases. Their 
first target. was the egoistic behaviour which, as we saw, constitutes 
an important part of the late classical and marginalist. schools. For 
instance K. Knies, a member of the Older Historical school writes: 
"To say that man is always and irremediably actuated by 
purely selfish motives, Is to deny the existence of any 
better motive or to regard men as having a number of centres 
of physical activity, each operating independentl 
,y 
of the 
other. " (Knies quoted in Gide and Rist, 1915, p. 393) 
The important point here is the implicit accusation of isolation of 
motives. As we saw, Marx accused orthodox economists of the same 
thing. This tendency of isolating motives (economic against non- 
economic, which is a basic characteristic of most hedonist ic-oriented 
economists) can be due to the dualistic nature of orthodox economic 
methodology (see Dow, 1987). As we observed in the previous chapters 
this tendency which started with J. S. Mill's fictional and real man 
can be found in the majority of mainstream economists. In the same 
spirit, B. Hildebrand points out that the egoistic approach of 
orthodox economics "would transform political economy into a mere 
natural history of egoism" (Hildebrand quoted in Gide and 
Rist, 1915, p. 395). 
By contrast to the dualistic approach of J. S. Mill and 
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subsequent classical and marginalist economists, historical economists 
emphasized that economics should consider all human motivations 
together. This line of thought Is related to the whole methodology of 
the school. In his "History of Economic Analysis" Schumpeter 
identifies this crucial difference of the Historical school: 
"The school professed to study all the facets of an economic 
phenomenon; hence all the facets of economic behaviour and 
not merely the economic logic of it; hence the whole of human 
motivations as historically displayed, the specifically 
economic ones not more than the rest for which the term 
ethical was made to serve, presumably because of it seems to 
stress hyperindividual components. " (Schumpeter, 1963, p. 812) 
Historical economists were also opposed to the Benthamite 
psychology which according to their view underlay orthodox economics. 
More specifically, G. Schmoller who was one of the most important 
figures of the school, always condemned Bentham's influence on 
orthodox theorists (Recktenwald, 1973, p. 337). Moreover, like other 
members of the school, Schmoller criticized the practice of isolating 
economic motives and economic phenomena in general. In the words of 
Schumpeter again: "Schmoller always protested against an 'isolating' 
analysis of economic phenomena -he and his followers spoke of a method 
of isolation- and held that we lose their essence as soon as we 
isolate them! ' (Schumpeter, 1963, p. 812). 
As one would expect, the ideas that Historical economists had 
about the nature of economics were different from the definitions that 
we hav e seen in the chapters dealing with orthodox theorists. For 
instance, G. Roscher views economics as follows: 
"Economic science need not attempt to find the unchangeable 
identical laws amid the multiplicity of economic phenomena. 
Its task is to show how humanity has progressed all the 
transformations of economic life, and how this economic life 
has contributed to the perfection of. mankind. Its task is to 
follow the economic evolution of nations as well as of 
humanity as a whole, and to discover the bases of the present 
economic civilization as well as the problems that now await 
solution. " (Roscher quoted in Gide abd Rist, 1915, pp. 383,384) 
The above passage reveals also the main methodological point of 
the school which is emphasis upon the historical dimension of economic 
phenomena (see also Keynes, 1904). Naturally. this methodological 
characteristic implies the strict opposition. of historical economists 
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to the abstract, physical science method of orthodox theorists 
(especially marginalists). As we discussed, the hedonistic influence 
on mainstream theory is associated with a physical science-like 
methodology. Thus, the isolation of motives, the construction of 
universal economic laws, are all unacceptable according to the members 
of the Historical school. 
The attack of Historical economists on marginalist methodology 
reached its peak in the 1880's in the famous debate between Schmoller 
and Menger which became known as 'Methodenstreit'. More specifically, 
Schmoller attacked the abstract-deductive methodology of Menger, and 
Menger replied in order to defend "pure political economy against the 
attacks of the German Historical school" Wide and Rist, 1915, p. 389). 
Schmoller stressed the organic nature of social phenomena and the 
methodological illegitimacy of having economic laws in the sense of 
physical laws (see Backhouse, 1985, pp. 119-120). 
Before we finish this section, we should mention that some 
subsequent theorists have attempted to minimize the importance of the 
methodological difference between the two schools In terms of a 
unified hypothetico-deductive method (see for instance Deane, 1983). 
However, we believe that the difference Is very substantial and can 
not be reconciled "easily. For instance, the historical and anti- 
isolationist character of the school can also be seen in the writings 
of the English historical economist J. K. Ingram: 
"In other words, a separate economic science is, strictly 
speaking, an impossibility, as representing only one portion 
of a complex organism, all whole parts and their actions are 
in constant relation of correspondence and reciprocal 
modification. Hence, too, it will follow that whatever useful 
indications may be derived from our general knowledge of 
individual human nature, the economic structure of society 
and its mode of development cannot be deductively foreseen, 
but must be ascertained by direct historical 
investigation... There must be a dynamic doctrine, a theory of 
succesive phases of the economic condition of society. " 
(Ingram, 1914, p. 199) 
As was the case with Marx, the different starting points, 
inclusion of all motives, definition of economics in non-hedonistic 
terms, holistic methodology with great emphasis on historical 
development, result in a different economic theory. In fact historical 
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economists advocated another type of economic theory than that of 
marginalist economists. A. Marshall whom we pointed out as a unique 
figure in the development of economic doctrine, recognizes the 
contribution of the Historical school. In his "Principles", he 
emphatically states that the Historical school has greatly extended 
the boundaries of economic theory (Marshall, 8th edition, p. 768). 
The economic approach of the Historical school Is characterized 
by an extensive historical analysis along with the theoretical 
discussion. For instance, F. List's book "National System of Political 
Economy" published in 1885 is a representative example of the 
economics of the Historical school. List divides the book into four 
main parts: the 'History' where the historical development -from an 
economic viewpoint- of the leading nations is analysed; the 'Theory' 
where one finds discussions about value, material capital, 
manufacture, customs etc; The 'Systems' where there is discussion of 
the industrial and agricultural systems; and the 'Politics' where 
there is a connection between the economic conditions and political 
developments (see List, 1885). 
Another example of the economic approach of the Historical 
school can be found in the analysis concerning labour by a historical 
economist- Bucher. Bucher starts by identifying the historical stages 
of labour production and organization (domestic work for family needs, 
then specialized handicrafts producing for a market and finally 
factory system of production). His next major step' is to investigate 
the factors affecting labour productivity (like for instance some 
musical forms which help to make labour more enjoyable thus increasing 
productivity) (Whittaker, 1960, pp. 207,208). The historical and holistic 
approach to specific economic issues that he follows is in contrast 
with the marginalist approach towards the same issues. As was 
discussed, marginalists saw labour in terms of utility and disutility 
mainly, while historical economists conceived the worker not as an 
agent engaged in the production process (orthodox approach), but as a 
whole man, in an activity In which all of the man participated 
(Whittaker, 1960, p. 208). 
In this section we discussed two alternative approaches which 
appeared in the same period as the late classical and marginalist 
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schools. We saw that Marx and the Historical economists had a more 
complex view about human nature from that of orthodox economists who 
conceived economic agents as selfish, pleasure maximizers -or 
maintained that they could be fictionalized as such. In addition, we 
pointed out the differences concerning the definition of economics and 
the methodology of economics. The common methodological standpoint of 
Marx and historical economists was that they both opposed the 
dualistic character of orthodox economics. In contrast to the 
tendencies towards the isolation of economic phenomena which 
characterized mainstream theories, Marx and the Historical economists 
had a holistic approach. As one would expect, the non-hedonistic 
character and the different methodology, led these two alternative 
approaches to a different economic analysis, which was marked by an 
emphasis an the historical perspective and which took into account the 
context of economic phenomena. 
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7.4 INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 
After K. Marx and and the Historical school, the next major wave 
of alternative economic thought was the Institutional school. The 
origin of the school is to be found mainly in the United States at the 
turn of the century. The founders of the school were the American 
economists T. Veblen, W. Mitchell and J. Commons. A distinct school 
of economic thought emerged with considerable influence in the 
english-speaking world. Its influence extends to modern economics 
where it Is viewed as one of the main heterodox economic approaches. 
Advocates of the modern Institutionalism include well-known theorists 
like J. K. Galbraith and G. Myrdal. Institutionalists are also 
connected with other modern heterodox economic approaches like the 
Post-Keynesians. A very important idea which is common to both schools 
is the rejection of the simplistic hedonistic conception of economic 
agents which characterizes orthodox economics. Moreover, both advocate 
a more open economic methodology and again oppose the physical- 
science-type mainstream methodology. Naturally, the above led to a 
different economic theory, an element of which we are going to see in 
the second part of this section. 
From our point of view, a crucial point of the Institutionalist 
school (and also of the Post-Keynesians) was the idea that preferences 
should be treated as endogenous, not as exogenous 
(Backhouse, 1985, p. 227). As we have seen in the previous chapters, most 
mainstream economists (the marginalists more explicitly) assumed that 
economic agents are selfish, pleasure-maximizing individuals. We also 
noted that some orthodox theorists viewed economic agents as 
fictional, representing only one aspect of human nature. The important 
point of difference was that Institutionalists did not submit to this 
dualism (fictional versus real individual, or economic versus non- 
economic) which marks orthodox economic thought. With this in mind one 
can understand better the nature of Veblen's attack on the abstract, 
isolated concept of economic man: 
"Of course, this perfect competitive system, with its 
untainted 'economic man', is a feat of scientific 
imagination, and is not intended as a competent expression of 
fact. It is an expedient of abstract reasoning; and its 
avowed competency extends only to the abstract principles, 
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the fundamental laws of science, which hold only In so far as 
the abstraction holds. But, as happens in such cases, having 
once been accepted and assimilated as real, though perhaps 
not as actual, it becomes an effective constituent in the 
inquirer's habits of thought and goes to shape his knowledge 
of facts. " (Veblen 1899, pp. 142-14w3) 
In essence, Veblen argues that the result of the dualist viewpoint is 
a distorted image of reality because, to use a nowadays familiar 
expression, the real world is fitted into the model. 
In addition to the above, Veblen attacks directly the hedonistic 
conception of man which is an underlying characteristic of * orthodox 
theory. The spirit of the following passage reflects Veblen's severe 
attack on the hedonistically-oriented theoristst 
"The hedonistic conception of man is that of a lightning 
calculator of pleasures and pains, who oscillates like a 
homogeneous globule of desire of happiness under the Impulse 
of stimuli that shift him about the area, but leave him 
intact. He has neither antecedent nor consequent. He is an 
isolated, definitive human datum, in stable equilibrium 
except for the buffets of the impinging forces that displace 
him in one direction or - another. " (Veblen, in 
Seckler, 1975, pp. 52,53) 
One can see that the target of Veblen's attack is the Idea that the 
only forces affecting individuals In their economic activities were 
selfish, hedonistic considerations. Veblen dismisses this view as very 
simplistic and unrealistic in the sense that It leaves out other 
important elements. Moreover, he argues that developments in 
psychology had undermined the hedonistic approach (see 
Coats, 1954, p. 530). Instead he proposes an entirely different 
psychology on which economics should be based. Veblen argues that 
people are not motivated by rational, selfish, hedonistic 
considerations but by a variety of instincts and habits.. (The same 
idea can be found in subsequent Insitutionalists like J. M. 
Clark, 1918. ) As examples of instincts Veblen mentions the instinct of 
workmanship, the drive towards providing for the family and society 
(parental bent) and the drive to produce interpretations of the world 
(idle curiosity) (see also Rutherford, 1984, pp. 331-336). Moreover, 
Veblen points out that habits of thought are the other determinant of 
behaviour. In turn habits of thought give birth to institutions. The 
interaction of instincts and habits of thought produce new 
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institutions. The whole process is an evolutionary one. As D. Walker 
states: I'Veblen formulated a general. system which rests upon an 
instinct and habit theory of human behaviour, and upon the dynamic 
principle of technological change that alters ways of making a living 
and consequently generates conflict and evolution In the scheme of 
economic institutions" (Walker, 1977, p. 235). Thus, like Marx, Veblen's 
theory is a dynamic one with great emphasis on the context of economic 
phenomena. 
Like Marx and the Historical economists, Veblen had a different 
view about the subject matter of economics from that of mainstream 
economists. Before he states his own definition of economics, Veblen 
makes another attack on the conventional view. More specifically, in 
an article in which he critisizes J. B. Clark's marginalist economics, 
Veblen accuses orthodox theory of not approaching questions of class 
which occupy the modern sciences (see Clark, 1899). (It can be 
maintained that they are the natural sciences like biology that Veblen 
has in mind. ) The questions that occupy modern sciences are questions 
of genesis, growth, variation and process, but orthodox economics 
confines itself to the definition and classification of a mechanically 
limited range of phenomena. Veblen goes on to characterize orthodox 
economics as a taxonomic science: 
"Like other taxonomic sciences, hedonistic economics does not 
and cannot, deal with the phenomena of growth except so far 
as growth is taken in the quantititative sense of variation 
in magnitude, bulk, mass, number, frequency. " 
(Veblen, 1972, p. 178) 
Veblen's own approach to economics involved the study of institutions, 
and cultural framework. (For a discussion of Veblen's methodology see 
Coats, 1954. ) As he writes: economics should be "an Inquiry into 
cultural or institutional development as affected by economic 
exigencies or by the economic interest of men" (Veblen, quoted in 
Walker, 1977, p. 215). Although he does not specify the meaning of the 
concept of economic interests, it is clear from his previous writings 
that his approach here is not hedonistic. 
Apart from Veblen, Commons and Mitchell also attacked orthodox 
economics along the same lines. For instance Commons emphasized that: 
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"Political economy implies thinking of economic activity as a 
power system as well as an economizing process. " (Commoms 
quoted in Elliot, 1978, p. 107) 
Mitchell concentrated on the assumption of rationality which 
underlies orthodox theory. To be more specific, Mitchell drew from 
work done by psychologists which revealed that in many situations 
human behaviour exhibits elements of irrationality (as defined by 
orthodox theorists). As we pointed out mainstream economists conceived 
economic agents as careful calculators of pleasure and pain 
(rationality, according to them). Mitchell points out -that the 
rediscovery of man's irrationality revealed the artificiality of the 
hedonistic analysis (Seckler, 1975, p. 106). Mitchell gave an example of 
irrational behaviour in economic situations. 
"The man who studies strikes and lock-outs, the shifting 
fortunes of business combinations, modern methods of 
overcoming 'consumer resistance' or business booms or 
depressions, does not confirm the impressions of human 
rationality conveyed by our theoretical treatises. " (Mitchell 
quoted in Seckler, 1975, p. 106) 
The methodology of the Institutionalist school has many common 
points with the economic methodology of the Historical school of 
economics. They emphasize the need to view economic phenomena not in 
isolation, but in context (especially in their institutional setting). 
Moreover, because they conceive all economic phenomena as essentially 
dynamic, Institutional ists strongly reject the mechanistic, formalist 
orthodox methodology. In particular, they oppose the Identification of 
economic methodology with that of classical physics which as we 
discussed, was the case for the vast majority of hedonistic oriented 
economists. Commons is explicit on this issue: 
"Yet the pure theory of economics cannot be identified with 
that of physical science, because physical materials have no 
purposes, wills, rights or interests. The economist is 
himself a part of the purposeful subject-matter of his 
science. " (Commons, 1980, p. 103) 
Most Institutional ists are willing to draw their economic methodology 
from biology because they think that the dynamic nature of this 
science with its functional rather than causal relations, is more 
appropriate to the study of economic phenomena. 
In general, Institutionalist economists attack orthodox theory in 
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the following terms: first, they argue that the dualist conception of 
man's nature is mistaken. Second, they assert that orthodox economics 
is based on a crude, simplistic hedonistic psychology which ultimately 
makes economics a 'taxonomic' science with a mechanistic methodology 
and therefore unable to grasp the evolutionary and dynamic nature of 
economic phenomena. Instead Institutional ists suggest focusing on a 
particular realistic aspect of human nature (instincts and habits of 
thought). This in turn implies that the study of institutions -which 
are formed by habits- is the primary concern of economics. Moreover, 
Institutionalists point out the inadequacy of the rationality 
assumption in the understanding of economic events. 
The placements of instincts, habits, and institutions instead of 
selfish, utility maximization as the basis of economic behaviour, 
constitutes the anti-hedonistic nature of the Institutionalist school. 
Moreover, its emphasis on evolution and dynamics Instead of static 
equilibrium is another important difference of the Institutional 
school, which can thus be seen to differ in many important respects 
from conventional economics. As we shall see later, one can set the 
basis of an alternative consumer behaviour theory on 
Institutionalists' ideas about human behaviour. 
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7.5 J. M. KEYNES 
Before we finish our discussion of economists and schools of 
economic thought which critisize hedonism, we should mention some 
basic points about the views on this matter of one of the most 
influential economists of this century, J. M. Keynes. Although our 
purpose here is not to engage in a detailed discussion about Keynes' 
views, we should point out that one can distinguish a clear anti- 
hedonistic attitude In his thought. One thing which is fairly clear In 
his writings, and especially his early works, is his dissatisfaction 
with the state of economic science. This can be seen when he very 
explicitly points out: 
"How disapponting are the fruits, now that we have them, of 
the bright idea of reducing Economics to a mathematical 
application of the hedonistic calculus of Bentham. " 
(Keynes, 1973, vol. X, pp. 184,260) 
Keynes thought that the hedonistic influence on orthodox economics was 
also responsible for the assumption of perfect knowledge which clearly 
characterized orthodox economics in the first decades of the century. 
Keynes rejects this as a "false rationalization that follows the lines 
of Benthamite calculus" (Keynes, 1973, vol. XIV, p. 122). Keynes's anti- 
hedonistic stance can also be seen in his autobiographical essay "My 
Early Beliefs" where he explicitly renounces the hedonistic approach 
(see Keynes, 1973, vol. X, pp. 445-450 and Bateman, 1988, pp. 1104-1106). 
Apart from rejecting hedonism, Keynes also was very clear In his 
position against the assumption of selfish behaviour (see 
Fitzgibbons, 1988, p. 65 and Hillard, 1988, p. 6). In addition one can find 
passages in his work where he strongly criticizes marginalist 
economics and especially the economic approaches of Jevons and 
Edgeworth -whose works were heavily influenced by hedonism- (see 
O'Donnell, 1989, p. 190). 
Although not all specialists on Keynes agree with this view. 
there are strong Indications that in place of selfish hedonism, Keynes 
put a liberal political and economic programme whose purpose was 
".... to devise institutions that would reconcile prosperity not with 
utility, but with the pursuit of the good. " (Fitzgibbons, 1988, p. 64) 
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The difference between Keynes's view from that of utilitarian oriented 
economist is evident. Moreover, one can observe that the replacement 
of the pursuit of utility with the pursuit of the good, places him 
philosophically in an anti-hedonistic framework. This can also be 
reinforced by the following quotation: 
"In truth it was the Benthamite calculus based on over- 
valuation of the economic criterion, which was destroying the 
quality of the popular ideal. " (Keynes, 1973, X: 446) 
It is clear that the "popular ideal" that Keynes had in mind was very 
different from Bentham's utility maximization. 
In addition to the above points, the anti-hedonistic additude of 
Keynes can also be seen by his actual economic theories. In 
particular, in his "General Theory", Keynes discusses the issue of 
consumption. Keynes begins by identifiying two main factors which 
affect consumption: a) objective and b) subjective. In the subsequent 
discussion of the subjective factors, eight motives are put forward: 
enjoyment, shortsightedness, generosity, miscalculation, ostentation 
and extravagence (Keynes, 1973, VII, p. 108). The strength of each of 
these motives depends on a number of factors. In Keynes's words; 
"Now the strength of all these motives will vary enormously 
according to the institutions and organisation of the 
economic society which we presume, according to habits formed 
by race, education, convention, religion and current morals, 
according to present hopes and past experience, according to 
the scale and technique of capital equipment, and according 
to the prevailing distribution of wealth and the established 
standards of life. " (Keynes, 1973, vol. VII, p. 109) 
One can observe the sophistication of Keynes's analysis and its 
similarity with the discussions of Institutional ists. The contrast 
with the simple standard utility maximization approach is evident. 
This can also be seen in his discussion of saving behaviour where 
Keynes's non-utilitarian background is also obvious (see 
Bateman, 1988, p. 1105). 
Although a thorough discussion of Keynes' views on hedonism would 
require a more detailed analysis of his work, our brief discussion 
here indicates that Keynes' thought is not only outside the hedonistic 
framework but also exhibits an alternative economic and political 
viewpoint. 
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7.6 ALTERNATIVE CHOICE THEORIES 
7.6.1 Introduction 
As was observed In the previous chapter, contemporary orthodox 
economists adopt a choice theory which assumes that economic agents 
are rational. The meaning of the term rational is that agents optimize 
and do the best for themselves. The specific variants of this general 
choice theories can be seen In the consumption and production 
theories. Optimization in consumption theory means that consumers 
always maximize utility (satisfaction) or minimize disutility 
(dissatisfaction); in production theory it means that producers 
always maximize profits or minimize costs. We have shown that although 
on the surface the above choice theory seems neutral, in essence it 
has been influenced by the hedonistic approach. As an additional 
indication of this, and in order to demonstrate the possibility of 
more sophisticated and non-hedonistically oriented theories, we will 
discuss alternative consumer and producer choice theories in this 
section. 
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7.6.2 Consumer Theory 
As was discussed in previous chapters, the roots of contemporary 
orthodox consumer behaviour theory are to be found in the works of 
Edgeworth, Pareto, Hicks and Samuelson. The basis of this theory is 
that the economic agent is always assumed to do what Is best for 
himself and to maximize utility or satisfaction subject to a budget 
constraint. Clearly, the only criterion of consumer's choice is the 
maximization of his/her satisfaction, and as we have mentioned, this 
is an important manifestation of hedonistic influence. 
Institutionalists and Post-Keynesians reject the above as a 
simplistic, conception of individual behaviour. The most well-known 
attack on conventional consumer theory was made, as was seen, by T. 
Veblen. Although, Veblen's critique was launched several decades ago, 
it is still relevant because in essence the most widely accepted 
consumer theory Is based on marginalist economics. Along with the 
attack, Veblen suggested a new basis for consumer behaviour theory. 
And as was noted, this new basis was Veblen's theory of instincts, 
habits and institutions. 
The fundamental points of a non-hedonistic consumer behaviour 
theory are to be found in Veblen's "Theory of the Leisure Class". The 
central Idea of the book was that the consumer is not an isolated, 
static individual who always maximizes his utility, but Instead the 
consumer is motivated by instincts, habits and by the social 
environment. For instance, Veblen emphasized the habitual nature of 
consumption by stressing that the "features of the conventional scheme 
of consumption do not change easily" (Veblen, 1949, p. 70). Moreover, 
other heterodox theorists expressed similar views, for example 
Commons, who also pointed out the role of habits and customs not only 
in consumption but in economic transactions in general (see 
Seckler, 1975, pp. 127-129). In addition, Veblen's main example of a 
consumption which is not based on rational (in the marginalist sense) 
calculations of utility or disutility was "conspicuous consumption". 
According to Veblen, the consumer acts or reacts to the consumption 
pattern of other Individuals. Veblen made a long analysis of the 
origins of conspicuous consumption in terms of habits, instincts and 
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institutions. He thought that every social stratum exhibits 
conspicuous consumption: 
"The result is that members of each stratum accept as their 
ideas of decency the scheme of life in vogue in the next 
higher stratum, and bend their energies to live up to that 
ideal. " (Veblen, 1949, p. 84) 
Veblen points out that conspicuous consumption is very strong even at 
times of dire necessity: 
"No class of society, not even the most abjectly poor, 
forgoes all customary conspicuous consumption. The last items 
of this category are not given up except under stress of 
direct necessity... There is no class and no country that has 
yielded so abjectly before the pressure of physical want as 
to deny themselves all gratification of this higher spiritual 
need. " (Veblen, 1949, p. 85) 
Of course Veblen did not believe that conspicuous consumption is the 
only canon of consumption. Instincts or habits also affect the pattern 
of consumption. 
From the above it is evident that Veblen -and other heterodox 
theorists who reject pleasure maximization as the basis of consumer 
behaviour- recognizes the hierarchy of needs starting from physical 
needs up to spiritual needs. Apart from heterodox economists, other 
social scientists have supported the concept of the hierarchy of needs 
(see for instance Maslow, 1954). This is in contrast with orthodox 
consumer behaviour theory which implicitly assumes -in the 
indifference curve analysis- that all needs or wants are reducible. 
Moreover, according to orthodox consumer behaviour theory, habits and 
instincts are not accepted as factors affecting consumption. The only 
criterion affecting individual consumption is utility maximization, 
However, if one takes into account the concept of the hierarchy 
of needs and also the effect of habits, Instincts and social factors, 
the orthodox indifference curve analysis seems to be Inadequate. In 
place of the indifference curve or map one can put the quasi- 
indifference curve or behavioural curve. This concept is closely 
connected with lexicographic choice models or the priorities-centered 
choice model. The formal description of a simple lexicographic model 
is the following: 
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Assuming that the consumption bundle consists only of two goods: good 
x, and good x, 
x= (x1, x2) 
Then given two bundles: 
X, = (X, X, 2) 
x 01 = (X 94 ,, X"2) 
the consumer's preferences are such that: 
a) x', > x", implies that x' is preferred to x" 
b) x', = x", and W, > x", Implies that x' is preferred to x". 
The consumer always prefers a bundle with more of the first good in 
it, regardless of the quantity of the second good; only if the bundles 
contain the same amount of the first good does the quantity of the 
second matter (see Gravele and Rees, 1981, pp. 92-95). Unlike the 
indifference curve, lexicographic ordering cannot be represented by a 
utility function. As we shall see, this type of ordering does not 
satisfy the standard assumptions of orthodox consumer theory (i. e. 
continuity, strict convexity, differentiability), and this means that 
it is fundamentally different from the orthodox approach (for a 
discussion of the above see Gravele and Rees, 1981, pp. 92-95; 
Elster, 1979, p. 124 and Fishburn, 1974; and Hodgson, 1985, pp. 830-831). 
Thus although lexicographic choice can not be characterized as 
stemming exclusively from an anti-hedonistic viewpoint, one can surely 
say that it is far less related to the hedonistic framework than the 
conventional choice theory. One can even relate it to Maslow's non- 
hedonistic psychological approach. So, lexicographic choice can be 
seen as an alternative to the orthodox, hedonistic-oriented consumer 
behaviour theory. But let us discuss this alternative model more 
analytically (Most of the discussion which follows Is based on Lutz 
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and Lux, 1979, Georgescu-Roegen, 1966, and Gorman, 1971. ) 
A simple example of a quasi-indifference curve is given below: 
beer 
Figure 7.1 
The Individual here is first and foremost Interested In beer which 
means that when there is a choice of beer or wine the Individual will 
always choose beer. The horizontal line represents the fact that under 
no circumstances will the undividual trade any beer for wine. Clearly 
there is a substantial difference from indifference curves. On the 
other hand, however, if the consumer's beer consumption Is given, he 
prefers more wine than less. This means that point a Is preferred to 
any point to the segment ab and also point a Is preferred to any point 
below the line bac (this Is a point of similarity with indifference 
curves). The Important point here is the lack of Indifference between 
b and a which distinguishes quasi-indifference curves. 
The above quasi-indifference curve has been constructed with 
respect to a primary criterion (beer addiction). However, the essence 
of lexicographic ordering is that the bundles of goods are ordered 
according to the principle of words In a dictionary or lexicon- food 
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wine 
comes first (physical needs), concerts come after material needs and 
so on. And as we pointed out, in this kind of ordering "each bundle 
has no points to which the consumer is Indifferent; indifference 
surfaces cannot be' drawn and no utility function exists" (Deaton and 
Muellbauer, 1930, p. 27). 
Thus, if we take into account secondary criteria (the need for 
beverage of any kind) then this explains why a is preferred to b 
(given a quantity of beer, the Individual will prefer more wine). One 
can illustrate that all points are ordered by two (or more. ) criteria 





The broken lines (such as XXI and pýO) represent the secondary 
criteria. Now if we introduce a third criterion the broken curves 
become quasi-indifference curves themselves. Now let us see a 
situation where we have four criteria. The first one Is the most 
urgent, thirst. Beer is assumed to fulfil perfectly the need to 
drink. The second one can be a social need. Wine is assumed to be 
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valued as a more refined end socially acceptable way of drinking. The 
third one Is taste; here it is assumed that the consumer enjoys the 
taste of beer. Fourth, is the consideration of after effects. Wine is 
considered to have less severe after effects than beer (hangovers). 
The above can be represented with the following model (with the 
assistance of figure 7.3) : 
d: primary criterion (the need to drink) 
D: Threshold or the saturation level of the primary 
criterion 
s: secondary criterion (social need) 
t: third criterion (taste) 
h: fourth criterion (after effects) 
Criterion d Is represented by line bac. When d>D then s arises 
and gives rise to I Ines such as XXI . When the third criterion t 
appears then it gives rise to lines such as oo' and nn. Finally. 
criterion h arises but It Is implicitly represented. 
beer et- 
%\-\ý 
Wil W1 W wine 
Figure 7.3 
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The solid lines in the above graph represent the first criterion: 
thirst W. The broken contours represent the social preference for 
wine (s). The dotted curves represent taste M. The fourth criterion 
(h) -after effects- is Implicitly represented by making the taste 
curves with an arrow favouring wine. Thus after the first need is met 
(higher than BW) the Individual is motivated by cultural or social 
habits and prefers wine. However, In the back of the mind the third 
criterion (taste) also operates now and so on. Thus, above BW points 
cabfW become a quasi- indif f erence curve but so does efW. One can 
observe that both curves touch at BW and each other. This Implies that 
any point which Is on a higher quasi-indifference curve Is not 
necessarily superior to another point on a lower curve. 
beer 
WT I@. - 
Figure 7.4 
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For instance point b is preferred to point a in the above graph. In 
addition, the existence of kinks (i. e. efW in Figure 3) will make 
choice more insensitive to price changes. This can be connected with 
the idea that the adoption of lexicographic choice will generate 
demand curves which will be characterized by kinks. Another 
characteristic of quasi-indifference curves is that they can portray 
Irrational behaviour (in the orthodox sense) in a budgetary situation. 
They can also show 'neurotic' behaviour (not choosing any single 
combination of goods) (see Gorman, 1971, pp. 93-97). 
Thus lexicographic orderings conform to alternative approaches to 
consumer behaviour. For instance, Veblen's idea that consumers are 
motivated by instincts, habits and social norms is best represented by 
lexicographic ordering. The basis of this approach is not a utility 
maximizer individual with reducible needs but an individual who has a 
number of different motives and a hierarchical structure of needs. 
Because lexicographic ordering cannot be easily accommodated to the 
hedonistic framework, most orthodox textbooks do not mention 
lexicographic ordering or quasi-indifference curves at all. Moreover, 
most of the few textbooks which mention this alternative approach 
reject them in a rather arbitrary way: "Although lexicographic 
orderings represent a perfectly reasonable system of choice, it is 
convenient to rule them out" (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980, p. 27). This 
is another indication of the influence and convenience of the 
hedonistic approach on mainstream economics. 
As a final point one can say that lexicographic choice Is part of 
contemporary heterodox economic theories. For instance, Neo- 
Institutionalists and Post-Keynesians use the theory as an alternative 
to the utility maximizer consumer or to the profit maximizer producer 
(see for example Eichner, 1987). 
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7.6.3 Producer theory 
In the previous pages we discussed an alternative approach to the 
orthodox hedonistic oriented consumer behaviour theory. Our purpose 
was to show the existence of an alternative to the utility maximizer 
consumer who is the basis of the theory. By the same reasoning, in 
this section we will attempt to show the existence of alternative 
production theories. As was pointed out, the implicit idea in the 
maximization of profits is that it leads eventually to the 
maximization of utility or pleasure. In essence, psychological 
hedonism is also present (although implicitly) in the other variant of 
orthodox choice theory, the production theory. At this point one might 
mention Scitovsky's demonstration that the orthodox general choice 
theory is inconsistent when it comes to production theory. 
Specifically, Scitovsky showed that utility maximization Implies 
profit maximization only for a specific preference function. In other 
words, if one assumes that producers are utility maximizers then the 
maximization of profits is only a special case, not the norm (see 
Scitovsky, 1943). 
One of the most well-known alternatives to the profit maximizing 
producer has been suggested by H. Simon. It should be pointed out, 
though, that Simon critisized not only orthodox production theory but 
orthodox choice theory in general. That is why he starts his critique 
with the general assumption of orthodox theory that decision makers 
maximize subject to their budget constraints. In an article entitled 
"Theories of Decision-Making in Economics and Behavioural Sciences", 
Simon casts doubt first on the Idea of a utility maximizer consumer. 
He refers to experimental evidence which shows that when the 
individual is confronted with real life situations, he becomes much 
less consistent than the archetypical utility maximizer. His 
explanation of the empirical evidence is the following: 
"We can interpret these results in either two ways. We can 
say that consumers 'want' to maximize utility, and that if we 
present them with clear and simple choices that they 
understand they will do so. Or we can say that the real world 
is so complicated that the theory of utility maximizer has 
little relevance to real choices. " (Simon, 1959, p. 259) 
If one is to judge from Simon's subsequent Ideas, then clearly he 
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adopts the second option. Simon's position against the idea that 
decision makers maximize utility (or profits) is based on two pol nts. 
The first has to do with the complexity of the decision-making 
environment. As B. Loasby states: "The complexity of the decision 
environment places optimality beyond reach, and often beyond 
definition" (Loasby, 1985, p. 5). The second point is related to the 
concept of rational agents. As we have seen, most orthodox theorists 
view economic agents as perfectly rational beings. This rationality 
enables them to achieve the highest utility or the highest profit 
given the constraints. Simon attacks the above conception by 
distinguishing two kinds of rationality: a) Substantive and b) 
Procedural. Substantive rationality is. the rationality of the 
traditional maximizing models. On the other hand, with procedural 
rationality the emphasis is placed on the process by which the 
decisions are made. Simon is explicit In stating the difference 
between the kind of rationality assumed by maximizing models and the 
procedural rationality of every day life. 
"First, I would like to expand to the theme that almost all 
human behaviour has a large rational component, but only In 
terms of the broader everyday sense of rationality, not the 
economists' more specialized sense of maximization. " 
(Simon, 1978, p. 2) 
Simon believes that the most commonly observed behaviour is 
'event matching' which of course is the result of procedural 
rationality. The individual examines a certain number of alternatives 
and chooses the best given his limited time and knowledge. In going 
back to experimental evidence, Simon again emphasizes that subjects 
fail to behave according to the theory of utility maximization: "The 
subject chooses the two alternatives (not necessarily at random) with 
relative frequencies roughly proportional to the relative frequencies 
with which they are rewarded" (Simon, 1959, p. 260). In a subsequent 
article, Simon gives a specific example of a decision which is not 
based on utility maximization. In particular, he states that flood 
insurance is bought by persons who have experienced or who know 
persons who have had such experiences. Cost/benefit considerations do 
not Influence the decision-maker. Simon emphasizes that utility 
maximization is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for 
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deducing who will buy Insurance; rather the process that puts the Item 
on the decision agenda is the Important thing (Simon, 1986, pp. 31-32). 
After having discussed the idea of utility maximization, Simon 
moves to his main theme which is the maximization of profits. He sees 
a vital connection between the two ideas, and thus his observations 
regarding utility maximization also hold for profit maximization. 
Procedural rationality and the closely connected idea of the 
complexity of the decision environment (because of complexity agents 
engage in event matching) imply that businessmen do not maximize 
profits. In Simon's words% 
"If we seek to explain business behaviour in terms of this 
theory, we must expect the firm's goals to be not maximizing 
profit, but attaining a certain level of rate of profit, 
holding a certain share of the market or a certain level of 
sales. Firms would try to Isatisficel rather than to 
maximize. " (Simon, 1959, p. 263) 
Thus, the maximization assumption is replaced with satisficing. 
The implications of satisficing are very important for the theory of 
the firm. Some economists like Cyert and March developed a behavioural 
theory of the firm which is based on Simon's concept of satisficing. 
The starting assumptions of this theory are the separation of 
management and ownership and that the firm is a coalition of groups 
(i. e. managers, workers) with conflicting interests. The above means 
that there are a number of conflicting demands in the firm which take 
the form of aspiration levels. These lead to the concept of firm's 
goals (production goal, sales goal, market share goal, profit goal) 
which again take the form of aspiration levels. The firm then seeks to 
achieve a 'satisfactory' performance as defined by Its aspiration 
levels. The important point here is that the firm does not simply 
attempt to maximize profits, sales or revenue. The concept of 
maximization is replaced by satisfactory performance (for a detailed 
discussion of the above see Cyert and March, 1963). In the process of 
attempting to attain its goals, the firm considers only a small number 
of options and chooses the best given its imperfect information and 
limited time. In other words the firm is not maximizing but 
satisficing. As is known, the assumption of profit maximization means 
that there is a unique equilibrium of price and output. However, if 
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satisficing is assumed, then we do not have a unique equilibrium. This 
can be shown with the following diagram: 
FiEure 7.5 
If 11 Is profits and Xa variable (price, ouput) then if we assume that 
profits are maximized Ulmax) the value of the variable is Vm. If 
satisficing is assumed then profits would be at Sv and the value of 
the variable would fall anywhere between Vland V2 (see also 
Bou I ding, 1955, p. 600). The value of S and S' are established by taking 
into account the firm's aspiration levels. (It should be mentioned, 
however, that this point is not very clear in the behavioural 
theories. ) Thus It can be seen that the existence of the above 
alternative approach, means that the concept of maximization (which In 
the final analysis Is connected with hedont sm) is not the only basis 
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of producer theory. 
Before we finish this section, we should point out that Simon's 
critique of the profit maximization hypothesis and his suggestion of 
adopting an assumption of a non-maximizing business behaviour is 
supported by other economists also. For instance, G. Katona in 1ýis 
work: "Psychological Analysis of Economic Behaviour" has questioned 
both the utility and profit maximization assumptions. Instead he 
emphasizes the existence of ,a number of interactive motives: 
"Multiplicity of motives, some reinforcing one another -and some 
conf 1 ic t ing wi th one another, is much more common" (Katona, 1963, p. 7 1). 
At this point one can observe the similarity of alternative choice 
theories (both consumer and producer theories): the fundamental 
assumption is that there are a number of different motives, goals, 
needs, not just a universal one of utility maximization. 
Apart from the above mentioned theorists, there are some other 
economists who have suggested other non-maximizing models of firm's 
behaviour. For Instance, S. Winter's approach is based on the concepts 
of satisficing and evolution (see Winter, 1964). Moreover, A. Elchner 
and P. Earl have attempted to apply the general theory of 
lexicographic choice to firm's behaviour (Eichner, 1987 and Earl, 1983). 
The ideas of J. K. Galbraith are also close to the non-maximizing 
theories of the firm. More specifically, Galbraith begins, like Simon, 
with an attack on the conventional hypothesis of profl t maximization. 
Galbraith asserts that the separation of management from control of 
the firm undermines the assumption of profit maximization. According 
to him, firms place much more emphasis on security of earnings and 
growth (Galbraith, 1975, pp. 106,116). The managers of the firm are 
people with specialized knowledge or in Galbraith's terminology the 
technostructure. The first concern of the technostructure is to secure 
the minimum acceptable earnings for the shareholders. After 
accomplishing this, the technostructure strives for growth, and the 
main way of achieving growth is by manipulating consumer demand 
(mainly through advertising) (see also Galbraith, 1967). It is evident 
that Galbraith's analysis 'differs' substantially from the orthodox 
theory of the firm. 
The general implications of alternative non-maximizing theories 
296 
of the firm are very important. As we pointed out a central 
consequence of adopting non-maximizing theories is the non-existence 
of a unique equilibrium of price and output. The consequences of non- 
maximizing theories of the firm are summarized by Lipsey as follows: 
"Non-maximizing models imply sensitivity of the price system 
to large but not to small changes in signals caused by 
changes in demand, costs, or public policy. " 
(Lipsey, 1983, p. 338) 
The origin of alternative, non-maximizing theories of the firm 
can be traced back to the 1950's. As we observed a significant number 
of economists have done considerable work In developing non-maximizing 
theories. In spite of this however, the vast majority of orthodox 
microeconomics textbooks pay very little attention to the existence of 
non-maximizing theories. Many textbooks ignore completely these 
theories and unquestioningly adopt profit maximization as the central 
assumption of the theory of the firm (see for instance, Ferguson and 
Gould, 1975). Others Just mention the existence of such approaches 
without going further (see for instance Braff, 1969). This is another 
indication of the bias towards maximization which characterizes 
mainstream theory. As was the case with lexicographic choice, non- 
maximizing theories are essentially ignored. According to our view, 
this is due to two reasons: the first has to do with the influence of 
the hedonistic framework (the maximization of profits is closely 
connected with the maximization of utility). The second is that the 
idea of a profit maximizing firm or a utility maximizing consumer, 
greatly facilitates the application of mathematical techniques. 
Lexicographic choice and non-maximizing theories involve important 
non-quantifiable elements, or make the application of mathematics more 
complicated (hierarchy of needs, procedural rationality, Influence of 
social factors, emphasis on firm's structure etc). Moreover, these 
alternative theories are not capable of predicting exact or unique 
levels of prices and output the way that orthodox theories do. 
However, these theories can give results which can be empirically 
tested. In the case of lexicographic choice for instance, this might 
involve simulation of demand functions (see Drakopoulos, 1989, 
pp. 18,19). 
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In general, however, one can say that non-maximizing theories of 
the firm, provide a reasonable alternative to the profit maximizing 
firm. They can again be seen as an alternative to the notion of a 
profit maximizing producer Just as lexicographic choice can be seen as 
an alternative to the utility maximizing consumer. Their small 
Influence on contemporary economics assists in the understanding of 
the role of the hedonism in the formation of orthodox theory. 
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7.7 CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this chapter was to demonstrate the possibility of 
alternative, non-hedonistically oriented economic approaches. In 
order to do this, we started discussing Adam Smith's and K. Marx's 
ideas and the views of two heterodox schools, the Historical and 
Institutional schools. In addition, we provided brief indications of 
J. M. Keynes' rejection of Benthemite hedonism. Subsequently, we gave 
examples of alternative choice theories which are not based on the 
Idea of utility maximization or profit maximization. We indicated that 
these alternative theories do not stem from the hedonistic framework 
(or at least are far less related with hedonism than orthodox theory), 
and thus they can be seen as examples of a non-hedonistically oriented 
economic theory. 
More specifically, we observed that Adam Smith's view of man was 
far more sophisticated than Bentham's selfish, pleasure maximizing 
beings. Smith emphasized the role of sympathy and other motives (such 
as a sense of duty) and established a connection between self-interest 
and sympathy. Moreover, Smith advocated an open, pluralist 
methodology, something which contrasted with J. S. Mill's, Senior's 
and Cairnes' physical-science oriented economic methodology. Because 
of the above, Smith's approach was seen as opposed to Bentham's 
utilitarian economics. Our next section which dealt with Marx showed 
that Marx's ideas also were not based on utilitarianism. In addition, 
Marx's emphasis on the social nature of man and his idea that selfish 
behaviour Is a sign of an alienated individual places Marx outside the 
hedonistic framework. Marxian economics, which is based on Marx's 
views, provide a distinct theoretical scheme with different 
explanations of economic phenomena than those of utilitarian economics 
(as a starting point, Marxian economists do not associate prices with 
marginal utility). 
The Historical school of economics was seen as the heterodox 
alternative to the late classicals and to the first marginalist 
generation. The attack on Bentham's utilitarian views, the emphasis on 
the idea that all motives of human behaviour affect economic 
activities, the different conception of the discipline of economics 
and holistic methodology, constituted the main differences from the 
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hedonistically oriented economists. 
In the same way, the Institutional school provided the 
alternative to the hedonistic economics of the second marginalist 
generation. The basic notion of the Institutionalist school which was 
that institutions are a major factor affecting economic phenomena gave 
a dynamic, evolutionary nature to the school, and this was in contrast 
with the static, isolated approach of orthodox theory. Moreover, the 
Institutionalist's analysis of consumption which was done in terms of 
habits, instincts and modes of thought (especially proposed by Veblen) 
was In marked contrast with the utility maximization based orthodox 
theory. The final part of this section was a brief discussion of 
Keynes' attack on the hedonistic orientation of orthodox economic 
theory which again provided additional evidence of the hedonistic 
character of this century's orthodox economic thought. 
If one takes into account heterodox economic ideas and non- 
hedonistic psychological theories (i. e. Maslow's), one can accept more 
easily alternative theories of choice which are not based on 
hedonistic assumptions. More specifically, it was observed that if 
one considers instincts, habits and social norms and also the 
irreducibility of needs (hierarchy of needs), Instead of only utility 
maximization, indifference curves become irrelevant and quasi- 
indifference curves based on lexicographic choice come into the 
picture. Lexicographic orderings provide a perfectly acceptable 
alternative system of choice to the maximizing model. In the same way, 
we observed that the Idea, related to utility maximization, of profit 
maximization which constitutes the basis of the orthodox theory of the 
firm, can be replaced by non-maximizing assumptions. Heterodox 
theories of the firm like those of H. Simon, and Cyert and March take 
into consideration social influences in the production decisions and 
also postulate that the perfect rationality which is assumed by 
orthodox models should be replaced by bounded rationality. 
Generally, although the economic thought of Smith, Marx, 
Historical and Institutionalist economists differ in many respects, 
they also exhibit some common points: they place emphasis on the 
social context of economic phenomena and of economic decisions. They 
reject the dualism of orthodox theory which isolates man's motives. 
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Instead, they pay attention to all human motives (and to their 
hierarchical structure) in the study of economics. They follow a 
dynamic approach with emphasis on historical-institutional factors. As 
a consequence, their economic methodology is not an abstract, 
physical-science-type methodology, but an open, pluralist one. This 
means that contrary to mainstream theories they do not sacrifice 
relevance for formalization. But above all, the idea which places the 
above outside the hedonistic-utilitarian tradition, is the rejection 
of man's image as a selfish (in the economic sphere at least) 
perfectly rational, utility (profit) maximizing being. 
Another observation of this chapter was that in every phase of 
the development of orthod. ox economics (since Bentham), there was a 
parallel alternative approach which provided a non-hedonistic 
viewpoint. Today, apart from the existence of heterodox schools like 
the Neo-Institutionalists, the Post7Keynesians or the Neo-Austrians, 
there are concrete, heterodox inspired alternative developments from 
orthodox theory like the lexicographic choice and the non-maximizing 
approach to producer theory. These latter theories appeared in 1950's, 
however, one can safely say that they have not had any significant 
effect on the structure of orthodox theory. This seems to demonstrate 
that non-hedonistic economics is possible, but the unwillingness of 
orthodox theorists to consider seriously this possibility, is an 
important indication of the influence of the hedonist ic/uti I itarian 
mode of thought on contemporary conventional economics. 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 7 
1) Having in mind the discussion of lexicographic choice and the 
analysis of non-selfish preferences that we discussed In the previous 
chapter (The theory of rational consumer), one can represent a 
lexicographic altruist. This simple model can portray the preferences 
of extreme altruists U. e mother and child). In the case of one good x 
and two individuals I and J, and assuming lexicographic utility, we 
can write: 
Ui (Xý, xj ) 
but > 0, but >0 and 
bxj.. bxj 
bui > bul 
bxj bx: L 
This implies that individual i has lexicographic preferences of the 
following form: 
(x,, xj. ) P (xi I, x,, ' ) when 
1) xj > xjl 
2) xj = x., ' and xi > x: (' 
Thus if x is food for instance, the mother Q) has a lexicographic 
preference to feed her child (j) first and then herself. 
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CHAPTER 8 
8.1 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The prime objective of this thesis was to show that, contrary to 
the common belief of historians of economic thought, the hedonistic 
approach has played a central role in the development of orthodox 
economic theory. In the process of demonstrating this, we discussed 
the work of influential economists over a long period of time. Our 
approach was mainly historical covering approximately two centuries of 
economic thought, starting from the classicals up to modern 
developments. Before this, however, a section was devoted to the 
origins of hedonistic Ideas. 
Thus, the opening chapter was concerned with the origin of 
hedonism In Ancient Greek thought, especially in the Ideas of 
Aristippus and Epicurus, who were responsible for the first systematic 
formulation of the hedonistic approach. During that time the first 
important elements of hedonism appeared: the idea that life is centred 
on two opposing concepts: pleasure and pain; that the purpose of life 
is- the maximization of pleasure; the attempt to find a method of 
measuring pleasure; and finally the combination of hedonism with 
egoism (selfish behaviour). 
The next chapter was concerned with the reappearance (after a 
long break of several centuries) of the basic hedonistic 
characteristics mainly in the thought of Gassendi, Helvetius and 
Hobbes and its subsequent introduction to the field of economics with 
the work of Bentham, Mill, Senior and Cairnes. It was during this 
period that the hedonistic paradigm started to become an Important 
influence on economics. 
The main elements of hedonism (although somewhat modified) were 
observed in the economic thought of the marginalist school, the 
subject matter of the fourth chapter. It was also observed that the 
hedonistic influence became stronger and more explicit, and that it 
was combined with an increasingly formalistic economic methodology. 
This was especially true in the theory of consumer's behaviour where 
economic agents (economic men) were portrayed as selfish, pleasure- 
maximizing beings. Moreover, during the same period, hedonistically- 
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based terms became central to marginalist economics. For instance, one 
of the basic terms, 'utility' , was identified with satisfaction or 
pleasure. In addition, the extent of the hedonistic influence can be 
illustrated by the fact that the non-hedonistic elements of Marshall's 
work were completely ignored or distorted by contemporary marginalist 
and subsequent orthodox economists. 
This very explicit hedonistic orientation aroused strong 
criticism by heterodox economists, and led to an attempt towards the 
minimization of the hedonistic image of orthodox economic theory. This 
attempt was also strengthened by the Increasing dominance of 
positivist scientific philosophies which called for 'value-free' 
social sciences. Wicksteed, Pareto and Fisher were mentioned as 
indicative examples of this tendency. Our discussion enabled us to 
argue that in essence hedonism did not disappear but was pushed into 
the background of mainstream economics. 
The trend towards the 'neutralization' of economics continued 
Into this century. Our main observations were the replacement of 
utility theory with an allegedly neutral theory of choice and in 
general the 'purification' of orthodox theory from philosophical or 
psychological connotations. This was In accordance with logical 
positivism, the new brand of positivism, the prevailing scientific 
philosophy until the first half of this century. Logical positivism 
called for value-free social sciences with formalistic methodology in 
the image of physics. However, in spite of the tendency towards 
neutralization, we were still able to trace signs of hedonistic 
influence which could be mainly found In the psychological assumptions 
of the theories (especially in the theory of choice). Moreover, apart 
from the Implicit presence of hedonism in those theories, we observed 
its explicit presence in the majority of orthodox textbooks, mainly in 
the form of a selfish, utility maximizing economic man or in the idea 
of collective maximization of pleasure or economic welfare. 
Finally, as a further Indication of hedonistic influence on 
orthodox theory, we mentioned examples of alternative economic 
approaches and schools which stem from non-hedonistic paradigms. 
Stoicism and Maslow's psychological theory were given as examples of 
non-hedonistic conceptual frameworks. Adam Smith, the 
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Institutionalists, Marxians and Keynes were mentioned as examples of 
non-hedonistically oriented economists. Lexicographic choice and non- 
maximizing theories of the firm were suggested as examples of theories 
which are at least far less related to hedonism than the orthodox 
approach. 
Thus our discussion points to the fact that hedonism has been and 
still is an important influence on conventional economics. However, a 
word of caution should be added at this point. In our work we have 
attempted to establish a commom pattern (or common points) over a long 
period of time. Inevitably, changes in the meaning of concepts and 
terms occur over such a long historical period. It is clear that the 
meaning and significance of hedonistic concepts have changed since 
their appearance in ancient Greek thought, and also that different 
theorists do not have the same conception about apparently identical 
ideas. Moreover, there has been a tendency to shift from philosophical 
to psychological hedonism. However, in spite of all this, we believe 
that there are some general common ideas which constitute the 
hedonistic framework. The maximization of pleasure or satisfaction as 
something central in human life, is one of these basic common ideas. 
This enables us to speak of a 'hedonistic paradigm' in the Kuhnian 
sense or of a 'hedonistic research programme' in the Lakatosian sense, 
which characterizes the development of orthodox economic theory. 
But what are the significance and implica tions of the hedonisitc 
influence? First of all, evidence of hedonistic influence challenges 
the claim of many modern orthodox economists to a 'positive', 
'neutral' or 'value-free' economic science in the sense that modern 
orthodox -theory is not based on any particular philosophical or 
psychological framework. It is quite clear that the underlying 
presence of a particular conceptual framework undermines the above 
claim. More specifically, many mainstream theorists would endorse the 
view that at least, large bodies of orthodox theory can be thought of 
as value-free, especially consumer's behaviour theory or value theory. 
The hedonistic presence, which Is a value-system -according to many 
philosophers, psychologists and orthodox economists who, for this 
reason, deny its presence- clearly undermines the above conception. 
One could argue that egoistic hedonism is. a positive basis if one 
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accepts as a fact that people always seek maximum pleasure. However, 
there Is very little support from psychology or anthropology to 
Justify this claim. On the contrary there is an evident tendency by 
the majority of psychologists and anthropologists to reject the 
hedonistic approach (see Laing, 1960, Masters, 1978, Peters, 1958, and 
Titmuss, 1971) 
Naturally, this Issue brings us to the question of a possibility 
of a positive economics (independent of any particular mode of 
thought). As was mentioned at some points In the text, the whole 
concept of a positive economic science comes from the influence of 
positivist philosophies of science which supported and justified the 
idea of positive economics independent of any psychological 
foundations as opposed to normative economics based on explicit value 
judgements. However, modern developments in the philosophy of science 
point to the impossibility of such clear-cut distinction (Kuhn, 1970, 
Toulmin, 1961, Lakatos, 1978, Feyerabend, 1975). 
If indeed the idea of a positive economics is impossible, this 
can be seen as an explanation why, in spite of the attempts of 
economists to expel hedonism, It remains an Important underlying 
paradigm of orthodox economics. 
The above arguments do not imply that orthodox economics be 
rejected because of its hedonistic orientation. They indicate, 
however, that despite the common belief, conventional economic theory 
is not a positive, value-free discipline, because (as other economic 
approaches) It is influenced by a particular research programme or 
paradigm, in this case the hedonistic one. 
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss whether hedonism 
is the appropriate framework for explaining and predicting economic 
phenomena. Most historians of thought have neglected the role of 
hedonism in the history of economics. Our main purpose was to show 
that contrary to this common belief, hedonism has been and still Is, 
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